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Integration of migrants in Europe: data sources and measurement in old and new receiving countries

edited by CORRADO BONIFAZI and SALVATORE STROZZA

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SOMMARIO

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edited by *Corrado Bonifazi* and *Salvatore Strozza*

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Integration of migrants in Europe: data sources and measurement in old and new receiving countries

Introduction

The level and type of insertion of foreign immigrants and their descendents in various sectors of the host society have always been a topic of considerable interest not only for researchers in the social sciences but also for legislative bodies, central and local governments, trade-union organisations and public opinion. The determination of the rights and duties of newcomers, the effects of the immigrant presence and the optimal size of further foreign immigration have indeed been controversial issues in the political debate in various countries, and in some cases, have been the key topic of lively election campaigns. In the past 30 years, concern for these issues has become even more important. This is motivated by the social and economic changes occurring in the host countries (in particular, the rise in unemployment levels, the restructuring of the production system and the weight of the informal economy) together with the changes in the causes and characteristics of international migration (in particular the prevalence of push factors over pull factors, the globalisation of migration and the greater relevance of unauthorized migration).

On the institutional level, and with specific regard to the European countries, abundant legislation was enacted from the early 1970s to control international migration flows. There was also significant commitment by various governments to foster the integration of immigrants, through the adoption of specific social and welfare policies. Within the European Union, the topics of immigration and asylum have become increasingly important in recent years, and with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam these issues were transferred from the third to the first pillar in the Community action, becoming topics directly depending on the European Union. As agreed at the 'Tampere' Summit in

1999, the so-called "communitarisation" of European policies on immigration and asylum not only regards the regulation of legal immigration and the fight against unauthorized immigration and trafficking, but also the expansion of the rights of legal immigrants and the introduction of measures to fight discrimination and racism. Despite significant difficulties and a number of hurdles, clearly highlighted in the European Council of Laeken in December 2001, the project for the European standardisation of laws and measures regarding flows and the integration of immigrants is still continuing. With specific reference to the issue of integration, various initiatives have been proposed or are being implemented. We can refer, in particular, to the extension of regulations on social security to the citizens of non-EU countries legally residing in the Community and the directive, which must be implemented in the various national legislations, aimed at guaranteeing the equal treatment of persons independently from race or ethnic origin. We should also recall other initiatives such as the draft directive on the status of long-term residents, on the circulation of the citizens of non-EU countries within the territory of the European Union, and the Community Action Programme 2001-2006 against discrimination, currently being implemented. There are also numerous Community, national and local research projects seeking to acquire basic knowledge in order to respond to specific questions and provide policy indications on the integration of immigrants in the host societies.

Measuring integration is an issue of considerable interest that can be faced on various levels and with different purposes, but which – in any case and first of all – requires a careful definition of the topics and the groups considered as well as a specific insertion in the space and time context enabling us to take into account the historical, institutional, social and economic characteristics of the various host countries, and the specific features of migration flows in the different contexts. The need to take all these aspects into consideration seems all the more relevant when attention is focused on measuring the integration or inclusion/exclusion through the individuation and/or use of specific statistical indicators.

We should first of all stress that the term 'integration' has been and is still used to indicate different levels of insertion and participation of newcomers in the various spheres of the host society, in a continuous process ranging from assimilation to coexistence, and in some cases, to segregation of immigrants. The issue of definitions is obviously very important in the measurement of integration and in the evaluation of corresponding policies, as values and changes assume a different degree of significance according to the various models of reference (for example, assimilation or multicultural co-existence). To evaluate the in-

tegration of immigrants, we should therefore focus more on the "concept" adopted, and on the resulting policies that form the necessary background. In other words, integration is considered as a pathway involving the newcomers and the host society, which can either favour or inhibit the immigrant inclusion, and which requires different processes and levels of adaptation to new situations. Although there is no doubt about the dynamic and multidimensional character of the integration process, it is essential to adjust measures and indicators according to the operational model of integration actually adopted by the single countries. Examples of such models are the French assimilationist model, the British multicultural model or the German model of the guest-worker. We should also recall that the different policies on migration and the integration of immigrants are deeply rooted in the very process of formation of Nation-States, in the political and institutional set-up, in the type of immigration and networks with the countries of origin (i.e., colonial links, as well as links related to the geographical proximity and to specific bilateral agreements, etc.).

In the formulation of integration policies, an essential aspect regards the identification of the categories of migrants to which the measures are targeted. According to the type of measure and the objectives pursued, we can ask whether the target group includes only legal foreign immigrants or also the unauthorized ones, whether or not naturalised immigrants are considered, and whether besides the first generation of immigrants the second, and the third generation (children and grandchildren of immigrants born in the host country) are taken into account. In general, one may completely agree with the idea that attention is required for all those categories that are underprivileged and at risk of exclusion or discrimination. In practice, in formulating the indicators, reference must be made to categories that can be accurately identified in statistical data collection. Under the criterion of current citizenship, we can identify foreign immigrants, and the descendents who have not yet acquired the citizenship of the host country. The weight of the immigrants and their descendents who have indeed obtained the citizenship of the receiving country also varies considerably from country to country, according to the prevalence of the *ius soli* or *ius sanguinis* principle. The combination of three criteria (citizenship, country of birth, citizenship or country of birth of parents) should enable us to identify the main segments of the population of foreign origin. These characteristics are, however, mainly recorded in the population census; the difficulty remains in creating specific indicators that allow for a continuous monitoring of the conditions of integration of immigrant communities. Administrative sources generally enable an accurate identification of the categories targeted by migration

policies, and attention is thus inevitably restricted to these categories. More accurate and detailed data could emerge from the major national sample surveys, but these are representative of the sub-sample of aliens only in some cases. Even when they are representative, they seldom enable the identification of all the specific categories of concern. A considerable contribution may derive from the special retrospective or follow-up sample surveys that allow us to both define the reference population on the basis of the specific objectives of the research study, and to introduce the characteristics that further enable us to identify the categories of interest. The special surveys, notwithstanding sampling errors and a local representation that can never go under a certain threshold, enable us to collect both dynamic information on situations and behaviour (we might mention biographies regarding migration, marriage, reproduction, professional, and housing data, etc.) and information on opinions and attitudes of the population surveyed. These enable us to set up standardised indicators according to certain specific characteristics (gender, age, educational level, etc.) to ensure that the measures regarding different communities are comparable (e.g., by nationality and immigration cohort), and to ensure comparability between the latter and the native population – when there is a control sample of nationals. The latter aspect seems to be quite relevant if we consider that the measures and indicators of integration should not only be interpreted over time (e.g., for the duration of stay or, even better, by immigration cohort) in order to grasp the dynamics of the process, but also in the comparative dimension which allows us to evaluate the gap between the immigrant population and the majority population of reference, considering the differences of demographic and socio-economic characteristics. These surveys also enable us to seek the key factors of underprivilege among immigrants, thus shifting the focus to root causes.

Although considerable efforts have been made by the EU Member States to standardise migration and integration policies, the differences in national legislations and operational measures adopted are still significant as they relate to the specific features of the various countries and to the characteristics of foreign immigration (stage of immigration, area of origin, link with the place of settlement). With regard to the stage of immigration, we should point out, for example, that attention towards the second generation of immigrants is a priority in the so-called traditional European host countries (France, Belgium and Germany), where the integration of the children of immigrants is probably the most important challenge being faced. In the new European receiving countries (for example, Italy and Spain), where the second generation is still relatively small, such interest is only recent.

With such a widely varying general situation, it seems hard to achieve comparable measures of integration between the various EU countries, not only because the models of integration and the measures planned are different, but also because there are problems arising from the lack of standardisation in the sources of data, the categories surveyed and the type of information actually available. Considering, in particular, census data and those of harmonised labour force surveys, it would perhaps be possible to create a minimum set of indicators available for most of the countries of the European Union. However, the outcome would be a blurred image of the current situation which, despite the use of statistical techniques designed to monitor the differences between the various immigration contexts (for example, multilevel analysis), is affected by the drawbacks of the statistical material available.

We felt it was more interesting in this special issue of 'Studi Emigrazione' to provide a picture as rich and complete as possible on the development of the theoretical references, the analytical approaches used and the most significant results obtained in the light of the different sources available in the analysis of the integration of immigrants in some of the main European receiving countries. This attempt has been conducted trying to highlight the specific elements of the single cases with regard to the characteristics of migration flows, the stock of the immigrant population, the evolution of legislation and the domestic debate on the integration of newcomers.

In dealing with the problems related to the statistical analysis of the integration processes, we have attempted to provide a sufficiently broad and significant view of the situation depicting the European scenario. In the first place, both differences and common elements deriving from the various migration histories have been highlighted, thus contrasting the old and new European receiving countries. In the second place, there has been a focus on some important and interesting national features within these two broad and widely differing categories of countries. Together with this introduction, the study conducted by Anna Maria Birindelli provides a general outline of this special issue. The French, German, Belgian and Dutch cases show widely differing situations, above all with regard to the approach characterising migration policies, i.e. the French Republican model, the German guest-worker model, and the specific and more recent multicultural models followed in Belgium and The Netherlands. With regard to the new receiving countries, attention has been focused on two Mediterranean countries (Italy and Spain), and one North European country (Finland). In these three countries, affected by immigration flows only in the past two or three decades, the dynamics of integration are obvi-

ously still in an initial stage, but the inevitability and speed of the integration process in the host country make their situation interesting from various points of view.

Our study underlines the substantial and continuing validity of the 'time' and 'place' axes, which Anna Maria Birindelli had identified as the two main reference points of the analysis of the integration processes. On the one hand, there is the 'time' aspect, both regarding the calendar year and the 'age' of the single flow, which influences the status and features of integration; on the other hand, it is only considering the 'place' where immigration occurs that we can achieve a complete definition. Perhaps, we should add to Birindelli's considerations a breakdown of the 'time' aspect into two phases, in order to separate the time dimension on the general context of reference from the one referring to the specific migration flow. The examination conducted on the European situation has shown the validity of all these elements in characterising the integration processes. In this sense, reference to situations characterised by different starting times of the immigration flows has proved particularly useful. We have begun from one extreme, with a country like France, where immigration already started in the 19th century, and moved to the other extreme with Finland, where immigration only started in the last decade. The current resemblances in the context factors, which have considerable weight in the process of convergence in migration policies, interact with national features (above all in terms of migration history and tradition) so as to define the various situations. The different approaches of the papers, partly due to the diverse background of the Authors, and the analytical approach that may well differ among the various disciplines, are also undoubtedly connected to the specific types of immigration contexts, immigrant populations and integration models adopted in the countries examined. The situations range from those where the integration model has not yet been developed or has just been proposed (as in the new host countries such as, Finland, Italy and Spain), to those where the integration model adopted for decades has been strongly challenged and is being revised (as in the case of the French model of assimilation). This means ranging from contexts where the integration indicators are being defined and specified, to places where the old measures are accompanied or replaced by new, more suitable ones, in correspondence with changes occurring in the way of conceiving the integration of newcomers in the host societies.

The differences in the categories of immigrants considered (first and second generation, or legal and unauthorized immigrants) and in the dimensions examined in the papers are linked also to the current interest for various aspects related to the stage of immigration and the

availability of the necessary statistical material. While in the new host countries attention should be focused on immigrants and above all on their job insertion, it is fundamental in the traditional host countries to obtain data on the educational success and socio-economic insertion of the second generation. This topic is becoming increasingly important also in Italy, Spain and Finland as immigration becomes more stable. With family reunion and the formation of new families the children of immigrants are likely to constitute an increasing and growing part of the population of interest. With regard to the statistical material required, it is useful to try to create ongoing monitoring systems on the basis of information deriving from continuous or periodical data collection. More importantly, one should take advantage of the experience acquired in the traditional European receiving countries which, by conducting specific sample surveys, have elaborated quantitative and qualitative measures of the process in order to highlight the areas of greatest difficulty of integration with respect to the native population, thus identifying the causes and providing a significant contribution to the formulation of adequate social and welfare policies.

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Analysis of integration: changes and continuity

The labyrinth of Knossos and Ariadne's thread

International migrations have a special place in the formal and informal relations that weave between nations. Macro-dimensions intersect with micro-, suggesting a variety of interpretations to the researcher and inevitably reflecting the complex, multi-dimensional nature of the migratory phenomenon.

The leading players are obviously those who leave their places of origin and move to another country, either temporarily or permanently. This is the classic micro-dimension, where specific phases in an individual life cycle combine with forms of international mobility over a medium or long range.

So young people with a high professional profile of human capital decide to move to working contexts with more advanced technologies and know-how, in the hope of putting their acquired skills to good use and improving them. Likewise, precarious states of survival or negatively perceived life styles spark off expulsive drives, which at an individual level are transformed into a partial or total rejection of their own frame of reference together with an opening towards the outside world, the "new" place where they will be able to find more favourable living conditions.

The decision to emigrate may also result from a mutual solidarity pact made by members of a family group, whether nuclear or extended family. They come to an agreement as to which members should spearhead the move abroad, with the express aim of finding a common objective, such as the best education for the younger generations, a guarantee of several incomes to cover any downturn in the family fortunes at home or extra capital to invest in property or anything instrumental to improving the productive capacities of the micro, family economy.

Then there are the numerous political, ethnic and religious conflicts that force thousands of people to flee their homes and seek shel-

ter quite often in makeshift camps, assisted almost exclusively by international volunteer organizations.

Yet all these factors lying behind the personal and / or family budgets of emigrants are only one piece of the puzzle in its wider and more complex terms of reference. If the researcher's attention turns to the general context, such as economic resources, social customs, cultural norms and political conditions, the approach becomes macro, and grouping some of the individual pieces into objective categories for analysis makes it possible to put more parts of the puzzle together. The importance of this recovery of facts or conditions of single life stories at the macro level becomes particularly significant when the outgoing wave from areas of departure and / or the incoming wave to areas of destination assume socially visible appearance.

When unsatisfied personal aspirations of whatever kind link together a growing number of people, driving them to move "elsewhere", we are confronted with examples of collective phenomena. Seen from this perspective, the economic and social conditions in the areas of origin acquire great significance in identifying the causes and effects of emigration. So do the economic and social conditions in the countries of destination, where the growing presence of foreigners and their participation in the various spheres of the host society will have to be recognized as a more or less *fait accompli.*

Micro / macro dimensions and the bipolar relations of the migrants with the places they belong to, that is places of departure / destination, thus form the nub of any analysis of migration. This is also valid for the matter under discussion here, the integration of foreigners, that is the relations between two parts of a specific social reality: native-born citizens on one side, those from outside on the other. Literature on the subject is plentiful and varied not only for the time-span – over a century or so of studies – but also for the variety of approaches taken (anthropological, sociological, political, etc.).

The very awareness of this wealth of material makes it necessary to ask oneself a question: "how to analyse the ways native-born and foreigners co-exist in a specific social context?" It is evident that questions of "scale and time" dimensions are two essential references, since it is only where the number of immigrants is large enough to present itself as a "socially visible" reality that we can reasonably claim that the "dynamics for comparison between us and aliens" have been set in motion and are fully operative. These social dynamics evolve diachronically with evident repercussions on questions of terminology and the theories connected with them. Moreover, at least in retrospect, the terms and theories themselves seem to impose a recall of the economic and political backgrounds characterizing the single nations that have been gradually absorbed into the circuits of international mobility.

Before this whirling, ever-changing canvas one feels like Theseus who, lost in the labyrinth, managed to find his way out thanks to Ariadne's thread, thus avoiding the risk of falling prey to the Minotaur. In our case the inability to find this thread – even if a single thread can be presumed to exist – advises us to proceed in the analysis pretending we have managed to obtain a few frames of an imaginary film through which it has been possible to reproduce a comparative history of relations between national majorities and immigrant minorities over the last hundred years.

Assimilation and integration: some blurry, pre-1970 frames

In the first half of the 20th century questions of co-existence between native citizens and foreigners were tackled by various writers belonging predominantly to the cultural context of the USA, but the working out of definitions and paradigms does not seem to have gone far enough at the time to reach a fixed, generally acceptable standard for scholars in the sector.

This is the picture that emerges, for example, from the international debate called for by Unesco just after the Second World War, with the aim of collaborating to produce an authoritative statement on the problems of cultural assimilation or a comprehensive program for research in the field (Glass, 1950). The initiative was welcomed by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), which at the Assembly held in Geneva in 1949 proposed two sessions on the theme. The final outcome of the works failed to provide a standard pattern of reference in line with Unesco's wishes, but this was perhaps foreseeable bearing in mind that the term "assimilation" is understood in philosophy as the reduction of what is different or opposite to what is identical or similar. In such an interpretation the process of assimilation may produce two results: a condition of "identity" through the radical elimination of differences or the formation of a residual, authorising the term "distinction of assimilated elements". It is possible to catch the sense of this dichotomy of output by comparing the proposals made by the two speakers, Henry Bunle and George Mauco.

According to Bunle, «When we speak of an assimilated person we refer to someone who has become part of the receiving country and who resembles its inhabitants, as closely as can be, in certain essential points. This means unreserved acceptance of all legislation enforced in the territory where he settled, together with the rights and the duties which that entails. It also means severing all legal and political ties with the country of origin. However this general acceptance is not enough. An immigrant is assimilated only when he speaks the lan-

guage of his new country by preference, has adopted its customs, and when his general conduct and way of life become those of his new compatriots and his original outlook gives way to that of his new surroundings» (Bunle, 1950: p. 6).

For Mauco «Assimilation consists of taking a free part in communal life on a footing of equality. In this sense assimilation presupposes adaptation. The interest of foreigner is the same as that of receiving country, since adaptation makes both for the individual's happiness and for improvement in his professional and social output. Adaptation of this sort can only occur in an atmosphere of confidence that only thrives under democratic conditions, where all individuals take part in communal life, on a footing of equality, and where assimilation policies, nationalist propaganda and *a fortiori* ill-treatment of minorities are ruled out» (Mauco, 1950: p. 14).

Both these ways of thinking seem to belong to a universalist view of culture, hinging on an evolutionist theory of human progress. From this perspective, «Modernity would seem to contain the premise for the widest cultural unity, for a culture that at its height would become a universal value. The more humanity progresses, the more individual cultures are called to merge into what can then be termed "civilization"» (Wieviorka, 2002: p. 15). But belonging to the same line of thought does not translate into a homogeneous management of cultural differences, since ethical, political and legal factors enter into play, varying both in time and space.

Thus an assimilation process modelled on Bunle seems to apply particularly to the case of the USA, prototype of a "nation of immigrants", where the social, economic and cultural history has been forged over the last two and a half centuries, through the settlement of successive waves of millions of foreigners. If the first great wave was made up of immigrants from England of Anglo-Saxon origin, later – in the 19th century – the range widened to include, first, north-western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, Scandinavia) and then, in the last twenty years of the century, the nations of central, southern and eastern Europe, such as Italy, Austro-Hungary, Russia and Poland (Federici, 1979). They form a substantial group of representatives of Old Europe with different, if not differing, customs, values, ways of working and consumption habits. The great open spaces of the American prairies, the starting up of the first industries and growth of urban centres along the Atlantic coast were magnets for thousands of people looking for better living conditions. The problem of the "cultural distance" between successive waves of immigrants grew enormously where the "new" immigrants were concerned, that is the late 19th century waves from largely rural backgrounds who settled in urban or newly industrialized areas.

Against this backdrop, in the early 1900s, the movement known as "Americanisation" begins (Savorgnan, 1950). With the slogan "Many people, one Nation" the aim was actively pursued to induce the immigrants to assimilate the language, ideals, traditions and way of life of the Americans. But this movement did not account for the entire cultural landscape of the period.

In 1912 Perry Graunt put forward the idea of the "melting pot". Paraphrasing the title and contents of the drama by Israel Zangwill (1908), a softer version of assimilation is anticipated, to be created through a process of amalgamation between the "culture of the old immigrants" and "those of the new ones of European origin" (Vlachos, 1968; Gastaldo, 1987). Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (1921) point in the same direction. For them assimilation is to be understood as «a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life» (Park, Burgess, 1921: p. 735). Any outbreak of conflict on the way to assimilation is dealt with by means of accommodation whereby: "... the antagonism of the hostile elements is, for the time being, regulated, and the conflict disappears as overt action, although it remains latent as a potential force... It is only with assimilation that this antagonism, latent in the organization of individuals or groups, is likely to be wholly dissolved" (*ibidem*, p. 665).

However, the principle that Anglo-Saxon culture was and should remain the basic "identity" model of the American people seems to have been dominant at a political level. The Quota Act of 1921 and the Natural Origins Act of 1924 pointed the way to a long-term migratory policy that aimed at fixing an annual ceiling for new permits, shared out among the various countries on the basis of their percentage weight in the US population census of 1890. Through these provisions priority was basically given to people from northwest Europe, and it was only in the mid-1960s, with the Immigration and Nationality Act, that the national origin system was abandoned in favour of general criteria for annual quotas.

France, a pole of attraction since the late 19th century, can be cited instead as a case belonging to the Mauco model. Recognizing as inviolable the principle of equality, French policy gives priority to an active participation on an individual basis. The instrument used to facilitate the co-opting of foreigners and to grant them equal treatment with native-born citizens is naturalization, obtained on the basis of length of residence, and citizenship, based on the principle of *ius soli* (Tribalat, 1991). In line with an ethno-centric vision of one Nation State, no formal recognition is given, however, to cultural heterogeneity or specific-

ity, both destined to die away through active acceptance in the society. Formal rules stamped with universalist criteria play a marginal role, however, where little contact exists between natives and newcomers. It is what happened, for example, in the case of rural immigration between the two World wars, when a stopgap was put to the desertion of the countryside by the local population through the arrival of waves of Italian and Polish farm-workers, who repeated *in loco* the ways of life and community organization of their places of origin. In those conditions the supposedly active participation in French society as a means of learning and assimilation of the host society's culture remained a purely abstract principle, and the responsibility of blending the home culture and the habits and customs of French society was left to the second and third generations, moving to other districts.

The 1950s, however, seem to have brought with them a more relaxed relationship between natives and immigrants. In fact, in 1956, at the General Conference of Unesco held in Havana, and on the indication of the US speaker, William Bernard, who himself spoke of the desirability of renouncing the Americanisation objective, the term "assimilation" was formally replaced by the term "integration" (Baglioni, 1965; Caranti, 1967). With the annulment of the principle of complete conformity in all social and cultural areas of the host society, a path favourable to a greater degree of cultural pluralism on the part of immigrants is opened up. In this way the right of groups and individuals to be different is recognized, provided that such diversity does not go so far as to undermine social unity. The prerogatives of the receiving countries are, however, reaffirmed.

To this goal they are expected to identify and define "protected areas", that is areas where immigrants are required to comply fully and completely with established norms. Likewise, in order to encourage the integration process the host country is expected to control incoming waves in accordance with economic requirements, to select migrants and provide them with all the information they need on the conditions they will have to face, to encourage co-operation between intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies for the training of immigrants before their arrival and assistance afterwards, to guarantee basic individual and economic rights.

The definition of integration and the proposal of a canon of "reasonable policy management" combine to identify the centrality both of the figure of the migrant worker and of the questions of co-existence between natives and foreigners. In this regard, it does not seem superfluous to recall how in the 1950s and '60s great waves of workers from the south of Europe flowed towards the most advanced economies, such as West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and France. Between countries

of origin and countries of destination, bilateral and multi-lateral agreements aimed at harmonizing regulations on workers' rights and social security policies; attempts were made to channel recruitment but in actual fact the vast majority of migrants did not follow this route.

In this context it seems logical that the experts should concentrate on the issue of migrant labour itself, paying special attention to matters concerning the political management of integration. As an example, it is interesting to consider a publication sponsored by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding foreign workers and their adaptation to industrial work and urban life (Descloitres, 1967). The aim was to produce a detailed scheme of policies and instruments to be adopted in Europe in order to facilitate the social and cultural integration of migrants.

To this end some specific terms were proposed to serve as headings for a sequential treatment of the themes. Starting from the observation that social adaptation can refer both to a process (dynamic aspects) and to the result of this process (a static situation), it was proposed to use the term "integration" to analyse the dynamic dimension and the term "adaptation" to indicate the intermediary or final results of the process. Social integration depends on the opportunities offered to the immigrant to come into contact and interact with the various social groups. A first threshold of adaptation, therefore, is crossed when the immigrant joins some group – for example finding a job in some basic sector of a specific work environment – while successive thresholds correspond to steps towards higher categories in the group (vertical mobility) or sideways moves towards participation in other groups (horizontal mobility).

Since a coherent functioning of any system is based on a hierarchy of social positions endowed with formal or informal, explicit or implicit prescriptions, incorporating the immigrant in a group requires a process of "regulating integration", that is of harmonization between real behaviour and prescribed norms. It is generally supposed that in the various national contexts every social group is able to tolerate some discordance between individual behaviour and norms; but beyond a certain threshold, variable from territory to territory and time to time, alienating sanctions and exclusion from the group may occur.

In this framework proposals for action of a political nature were made, partly based on what was proposed in 1956. Reference was therefore made to preliminary questions (before leaving: general information, selection and recruitment; language initiation and reception); questions of social assistance; questions of adaptation to the "industrial environment" (initiation to industrial work, training, participation in representative organs of staff and union organizations); ques-

tions of adaptation to an "urban environment" (access to housing, reuniting of family groups, free time activities).

Mention has been made of these political schemes since they explain the thread underlying the heated debates in course between managing classes, representatives of private enterprise, union organizations and public opinion, in an international context where economic development is driven at an advanced stage of industrialization.

In these same years, the production of research on questions of the relations between migrant and civil society – on both sides of the equation, that is departure and arrival – was vast and varied. Bibliographical reviews on migrations (*inter alia*, Ascolani, Birindelli, 1971) and on integration literature (*inter alia*, Baglioni, 1965) reveal the huge number of case studies, with scattered glimpses of realities not only in North America, but also in Latin America and Europe.

Owing to such a rich volume of material it is possible to supply only a few examples of the schemes of analysis worked out in the 1950s and 1960s – which in any case goes beyond the aim of reconstructing a retrospective frame of reference standard. Basically, what Eisenstadt observed in 1953 still holds good: «Despite the voluminous literature on migration, absorption and assimilation of immigrants, and allied subjects, systematic and comparative analysis of the subject is still inadequate. Almost every work on this subject is confined to its own setting and specific problems, its own point of view, with only a minimal amount of more general orientation» (Eisenstadt, 1953: p. 167).

As a first example of a scheme of analysis conceived expressly to answer the question: "How can integration be measured?", it is possible to take Landecker's model (1950-51) into consideration. This author starts by assuming «a) ... the existence of different types of group elements, b)... that the smallest units of group life are cultural standards, on the one hand, and persons and their behaviour, on the other. If one uses this premise as a criterion of types of integration, three varieties suggest themselves: integration among cultures, integration between cultural standards and the behaviour of persons, and integration among persons» (Landecker, 1950-51: p. 333). The term "cultural integration" refers to the degree to which the norms representing the culture of the various groups that enter into contact are cohesive and integrated. Reviewing Linton's scheme (1936) which distinguishes between categories of cultural traits: "universals" (norms valid for all the group members), "specialties" (norms valid only within sub-groups) and "alternatives", Landecker believes that «it is possible to restrict the concept of cultural integration to a relationship among traits which constitute cultural standards in the sense that they require adherence. ... It is possible to measure cultural integration in terms of frequencies

of inconsistency among universals. ... The earmark of inconsistency among standards should be an *experienced* difficulty» (*ibidem*, p. 334). The "normative integration" refers to concordance between cultural standards and behaviours: in contacts between natives and immigrants, the process of integration requires the sharing and interiorization of common cultural norms. As an example of an indicator of conformity to social standards, Angell's index of social integration is cited, obtained by combining a crime index (negative measure of integration) and a welfare effort index (positive measure of integration). For integration among persons two aspects are distinguished: "communicative integration" concerns the exchange of meanings throughout the group; a mapping of the network of interpersonal communication and relations can be obtained through socio-metric techniques. «"Functional integration" is the degree to which there is mutual interdependence among units of a system of labour. Measurement is difficult because interdependence is a phenomenon with several dimensions. Indices have been developed which measure the spatial area within which functional interdependence exists and a promising beginning has been made in measuring the degree of interdependence among spatially defined units» (*ibidem*, p. 338).

Another approach can be had by considering Eisenstadt's analysis (1953). Noting the difficulties of linking hypotheses and results of the various researches on immigrant integration, Eisenstadt directed his work towards constructing a "framework of comparative analysis", extracting some hypotheses implicit in the literature and transforming them into three indices suitable for measuring the principle stages of the "absorption" process, a term coined for his research on immigrants into Israel. The final stage of the process corresponds to the situation of "institutional integration": «The index refers mainly to the extent to which immigrants are "disseminated" within the main institutional spheres – family, economic, political, religious – of their new country» (Eisenstadt, 1953: p. 167). The intermediary stages are defined with a) «"index of acculturation": extent to which immigrants acquire the various norms, *mores* and customs of the country, b) "index of personal adjustment and integration", which the immigrants succeed in maintaining in the face of difficulties of transplantation» (*ibidem*, pp. 167-168). An appropriate use of the three indices requires a precise reference to the various types of «"pluralistic structures" or network of substructures – a society which is, to some extent, composed of different subsystems which are allocated to different (ethnic) groups» (*ibidem*, p. 168). The consolidation of an ethnic group within the receiving community becomes a positive fact when the group presents a balanced structure, both internally and in relation to the overall social structure. Ac-

cording to the kind of institutional structure of the receiving societies, the success or failure of communication between immigrants and the new environment is played out in three main areas: 1) performance of stable roles in various fields of social relations (classified by the institutional spheres: family, economic, etc.), 2) achieving positions which confer status established within the society and are recognized as valid by the immigrant group, 3) achieving basic identification with new society.

As already mentioned, there are many ways of defining and describing the beginnings and consolidation of co-existence between native citizens and immigrants, and the terms themselves can take on different meanings. Thus for Taft and Robbins (1955), "acculturation" is the general term referring to kinds and degrees of contact between the different cultures: cultural relationships between native citizens and immigrants can lead to partial agreement (accommodation), the total abandonment of the original culture (assimilation), or the co-existence of different cultural systems (cultural pluralism). Duncan and Lieberson (1959) use the term "absorption" with reference to the assumption by the immigrant of a working activity, while they use the two terms "assimilation and acculturation" to indicate respectively integration in the social structures of the host society and the adoption of local customs with the abandonment of cultural characteristics ascribable to the original ethnic group.

On the other side, content convergences are labelled in alternative pairs. The distinction adopted by Eisenstadt between the individual level (acculturation) and group level (institutional dispersion) is paralleled in the first two levels of the paradigm of analysis proposed by Gordon (1964). According to this author there are seven dimensions to the assimilation process: behavioural assimilation (absorption of the cultural patterns of the host society), structural assimilation (entrance in social cliques, institutional bodies, etc.), matrimonial amalgamation, identificational assimilation, attitude and behaviour receptional assimilation, civic assimilation. On the basis of its multi-ethnic reality, the USA is a case where widespread behavioural assimilation co-exists with negligible structural assimilation.

From these admittedly sketchy and fragmented examples from the pre-1970s it would seem that there is a remarkable accumulation of knowledge to be shared, while it is necessary to proceed with caution, without claiming to find any standard frame of reference. At the same time it does provide space for some reflections that are basically valid also where more recent analyses and researches are concerned. In the first place it seems evident that questions of co-existence between native citizens and immigrants are inextricably bound to the two variables of "time and place". The dual declination along the two axes

makes it possible to pick up the characteristics of the "process" of the ways relationships develop between first, second and successive generations of immigrants and the societies in which they put down their roots. In the second place, the paradigms of analysis and concomitant terminologies also proceed along these dual track, proposing functional interpretations both for understanding co-existence / conflict issues in the various relational contexts in the receiving society and for identifying management issues related to the institutional points of view. Most attention however focuses on the "points of arrival", since it seems an implicitly shared idea that the migratory act in itself represents a definitive break with place of origin; the "place of reference vs places of reference" "place of arrival vs place of departure" question has on the contrary given more options for analysis in recent years.

From the 1970s onwards: a crystal prism?

As regards the past thirty years or so, is it possible to claim that integration questions have continued to follow the same lines established in the previous decades? In other words, have questions of co-existence between "us and them" developed along so-called "natural" lines, that is following the progressively formed order provided by the two axes of "time and place"? A positive reply implicitly assumes the idea of a natural, autonomous evolution of the "social process of co-existence". From this point of view an analogical criterion could be used in order to explain integration paths in socially similar contexts, but placed in different stages of the migratory process. A negative reply on the contrary implies the assumption that history changes all the time and every country finds its own solution, which cannot then be exported elsewhere.

Both hypotheses are evidently in contrast with reality, and asking the question might seem to have been unnecessary if not redundant. This is not the case, as it seems important to draw attention to two problems: the first concerns focusing on the elements that can be traced back for continuity or for natural development to the political and sociological matrix of the pre-1970s stage; while the second is connected with the aim of highlighting some aspects that did not exist in the past or were considered more or less side issues to the central theme of integration.

From this point of view and as a kind of premise, some facts of recent history can be recalled. As is well known, the 1970s brought notable transformations both in the overall picture of international migration and in the conditions of economic, social and cultural development on both sides of the equation linked in various ways by the flows of mi-

grants. Together with economic and family motivations, other causes also came more forcefully into play than they had done in the past, such as violent ethnic and religious clashes and environmental disasters. The migratory map has been enriched with new networks linking countries of departure and receiving countries (Population Division, 2002) with overlaps or turnovers of migratory typologies, varying in time and space: e.g. labour migrants vs. family reunion; voluntary migrants vs. forced migrants and displaced people; circulators vs. sojourners vs. settlers; legal labour migrants vs. undocumented migrants; refugees vs. de facto refugees vs. economic refugees.

It is plausible to think that the increasingly complex structure of the migratory universe should bring out endogenously more facets and wider perspectives in the political management and analysis approaches of questions concerning co-existence between "us and them". It is worth remembering, however, that the widening mesh of migrations and the thickening web of international mobility are tightly bound up with economic dynamics, and Europe can be considered a kind of a "geo-political workshop" for these networks.

Against the background of economic change connected on one side to the oil shocks of the 1970s and the ensuing economic turmoil, and on the other to the technological re-structuring of various productive compartments with a traditionally high intensity of labour, the policies, adopted both by nations with a long-established reputation as migrant magnets, and by new entrants into the arena of receiving countries (such as Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal), aim at blocking new arrivals in search of work and/or at temporarily loosening the strings attached to short-term foreign labour demand. Taking advantage of this hardening towards new flows of immigrants, policies are reinforced with the aim of encouraging family reunion for those foreigners who do not opt to return to their countries of origin in spite of one-off financial incentives to do so. The positive evaluation of the effects of reuniting families, which is seen as a strong point for putting down roots and thus accelerating the various stages in the integration process, seems therefore to have become a permanent feature in migration policy.

On the evidence of what emerged in the 1950s and 60s it could be concluded that there remains a model of "useful integration": the more functional the economic and social role of immigrants for an increase in overall productivity, the better the chances of their being incorporated positively into society (Zincone, 2000). In this sense aspects already incorporated in the standard policy packet of guest work countries continue to exist, such as learning the language, professional training courses and work safeguards. Taking into consideration family reunions enters naturally into the inherent logic of a migratory process, now at a fully mature stage.

However, the mechanisms in motion in the labour market contain some loose pieces that make it difficult to solve problems concerning access and long term stay for foreign workers not belonging to the European Community. In terms of relationships between employers and workers, the coexistence of three macro-economic aggregates becomes increasingly obvious. «In an enterprise's primary labour market one finds steady jobs with good promotion possibilities, high remuneration except at entry points, many fringe benefits and a below average danger of unemployment. The enterprise's secondary labour market is characterised by less stable, more precarious or marginal jobs, limited promotion possibilities, low remuneration, fewer fringe benefits and an above average exposure to unemployment. In enterprises' informal markets one aspect or other of the employers' or workers' economic activities contravenes the legislation in force» (Böhning, 1995: p. 4). In this segmenting of the labour market the greater part of the transactions that end with the hiring of foreign labour occurs in the two most disadvantaged macro areas (secondary and informal labour markets).

Another problem is that the human capital possessed by immigrants is often unusable (for example the non-validity of educational qualifications acquired in the immigrant's country of origin) or of little relevance with respect to the working possibilities offered by enterprise.

Where the immigrant finds himself in the double predicament of not having an employment status in conformity with the labour or social laws or a residence status in conformity with the legal authorisation to enter or to stay in the country, he runs a greater risk of being exploited in the workplace and of being discriminated against in the wider social sphere where the individual and collective lives of foreigners are concerned.

The growing number of women immigrants (whether they arrive autonomously for work or in the framework of family reunions) is something like a chemical reagent that brings to the surface questions somehow collocated in the grey area of problems "to be solved later", for example extortionate housing contracts, black market work, exploitation and blackmail in the workplace, etc. There is also an increase in the international smuggling and trafficking of human beings, while criminal networks extend their geographical spheres of influence more and more, turning their activities also to the recruitment of women with the intention of sending them (often with coercive means) into the prostitution market.

It is becoming apparent how weak the boundaries are that define the rights of immigrants (and their families), codified simply with the label of "workers" and human rights. This demarcation tends to lose the characteristic of a clear line able to keep separate and distinguished the questions of managing the integration of immigrants –

considered to be the natural jurisdiction of the host nations – and the instruments for preventing and fighting discrimination which, on the contrary, require the overcoming of national boundaries and the adoption of a global vision.

An example of this presumed jurisdictional conflict can be seen in the case of the meagre number of adhesions to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990 (Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNOG). One of the various obstacles mentioned in 1999, that prevented the agreed ceiling of twenty nation signatories being reached, for the Convention to enter into force, was «a jurisdictional conflict between the UN and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) on the basis that it has generally been understood that the ILO was to be concerned with migrants as workers and the United Nations was to be concerned with their status as aliens. As a consequence, some nations have stated that a new convention on the right of migrant workers was not needed to already existing ILO provisions» (UN Human Rights System, 1999).

The recognition of how it has become necessary for the managers of integration policies to make a kind of ideological, supranational leap where questions of human rights are concerned is revealed, for example, in the identification of legal elements for a successful integration policy where "... the concept of integration is used as meaning the achievement for migrants of participation: social, economic, educational and civil on an equal footing with the host population» (Guild, 2000). Six legal steps are indicated: security of residence (consisting of two parts: a) a status which is durable and is not subject to periodic review, b) protection against expulsion); family life; legal measures against racial hatred and violence; the right to equal treatment (non-discrimination on the basis of nationality); acquisition of citizenship and affirmative action. In actual fact, however, the distinction between native-born citizens and foreign citizens is still the traditional watershed between enjoying complete recognition of the rights in force in a specific national context, and the result of this is that the concession of citizenship is considered the most important factor in the process of integration, at least from a juridical point of view.

Against this backdrop where discordance between egalitarian principles and what actually happens in reality has become increasingly obvious, researchers are turning their attention to side issues. Thus, the comparison between existing regulations in various countries (*inter alia*: Melotti, 1992; Natale, Strozza, 1997) provides a useful key to exploring the degree of rigidity manifested by the single political

systems in encouraging or discouraging the full incorporation of foreigners on an equal footing with nationals.

The same direction is taken by studies based on international comparisons aimed at showing the greater or lesser willingness of states to offer foreign workers formal room and means of guaranteeing them safeguards for their rights (Zegers de Beijl, 1995).

Other ideas have also been aired, that is alternative kinds of citizenship – "residence citizenship" (Whitol de Wenden, 1992) or "economic citizenship vs. social citizenship" (Zucchetti, 2002) – concepts that appear more flexible for grasping the specific dynamics *in loco* rather than questions of self-reference of the Nation-States. The need to use interpretations of definitions alternative to the traditional idea of citizenship is also confirmed by surveys on the institutional action taken at "local community" level, aimed at softening or eliminating the social "vulnerability" of the weakest groups, which includes foreigners (e.g. Houle, 2000).

Cultural differences and social inequalities come back into play whenever there is the formation of collective identities that claim a right to recognition at an institutional level. Taking actual cases of multiculturalism as a reference, two management options emerge, according to Wieviorka (2002). With the first, identified with the term "integrated multiculturalism", laws or actions are adopted that are designed to associate in a single plan of action the cultural recognition of a minority group and the fight against social inequality experienced by members of the collectivity. This policy has been adopted, with slight variations in form, by Canada, Australia and Sweden. In the second option, termed "fragmented multiculturalism", there is dissociation between the management of social issues and of cultural recognition. An example is given by the case of the USA. With the instrument of "affirmative action" the aim is basically to fight social problems through measures (e.g. equal opportunities or more even-handed distribution) destined for groups chosen on the basis of ethnic, racial or gender criteria. The management of cultural recognition is on the contrary delegated to a varied universe of pressure groups, which acquire a more or less durable identity cohesion. For example, in the field of education the right is claimed to rewrite history according to a specific perspective (of woman, ethnic minority, etc.).

Considerations of cultural differences and social inequalities, a central point for integration, open up a vast range of questions, such as: how to combine equity and equality; is it admissible to accept the principle of tolerance distinct from the principle of reciprocity; is deliberative democracy capable of creating institutional arenas of confrontations?

Even though the theoretical approach focused on "countries of arrival" still remains a fruitful visual angle for proposals of mono or mul-

tidimensional schemes on integration (for a review on this matter see, *inter alia*, Tronti, 1997; Cotesta, 1997), a promising area for reflection opens on relations between migrants and their "twofold place of reference", that is to say the area of origin and the area of destination. From this comprehensive point of view, the most organic sets of theories can be found in the sphere of the migration system approach and the social network analysis (*inter alia*: Boyd, 1989, Fawcett, 1989; Pollini, Scidà, 1998). As an example of a model worked out according to the migration system approach we can cite Fawcett's framework (1989), which is intended to have heuristic value both for theory and research in international migration. The linkages are divided into four columns labelled "categories" (State to State relations; mass culture connections; family and personal networks; migrant agency activities) and three rows labelled "types" (tangible linkages; regulatory linkages; relational linkages) and the final framework assumes the form of a matrix with twelve cells, corresponding to the linking of categories and types. From this angle the integration process can be analysed along the axis linking place of departure and place of arrival, encompassing relational aspects of a macro type (e.g. migration policies, labour supply and demand, officially channelled remittances) and micro types (e.g. remittance flows, cultural similarity, family obligations).

Another example of spatial models linked to the labour market is the typology of sources and outcomes of contemporary migration within a global system, proposed by Portes and Böröcz (1989) with an exclusively heuristic aim. On the side of the country of departure (column matrix) three classes of origin are identified: manual, professional technical and entrepreneurial workers, while the context of reception (row matrix) can be handicapped, neutral or advantaged. The nine cells which result from the intersections of the rows and columns identify the typology of incorporation. For example, manual labour migrants arriving in the handicapped context tend to be incorporated in the secondary market while, if they arrive in the neutral context, they may be found in either the primary or secondary sector jobs; secondary market incorporation and mixed labour market participation form the predominant output for the case of *gastarbeiter* flows of non-EEC citizens in Western Europe.

The parallel development of studies of the structural relationships between individuals and collectivities, that is the social network analysis, matures into the right conditions for presenting the questions of coexistence between "us and them" in a wider vision than the one bound to a unilateral reading reflecting the perspective of the receiving nations only. In this way it is possible to catch aspects that have so far been sidelined – e.g. the social construction of migratory processes

and the role of the ethnic networks (Ambrosini, 1999) – or are just rising – e.g. "transnational communities" and transnational migrations (Bailey, 2001).

Brief conclusive considerations

It was stated from the outset that this attempt to put into some sort of order the currents of thought and political management strategies, adopted in the course of the twentieth century, would not be a systematic account of everything produced by the literature on integration. The procedure therefore used broad guidelines, looking for some of the elements that made up the pre-1970s texture of the subject and going on in the more recent period to identify themes that can be considered the natural continuation of what had been previously created, how new sources of reflection were developed inside the questions concerning integration itself, or were externally introduced.

At the end of this undertaking one is left with the awareness that the mountain of knowledge available provides an indispensable background for selecting a specific interpretative key and for proposing paradigms of analysis for studies or practical research.

Whatever the hypotheses of work or aims pursued in the analysis, it is essential to be clear and explicit concerning the logical line to follow in order to guarantee an ample dissemination of the knowledge acquired. In closing, I would like to provide an example of this procedure by referring to the monitoring set in motion by the Commission for the political integration of immigrants, instituted by law in Italy in 1998. In the first stage a model of "workable integration" is produced, as part of good government practice. Two objectives are defined: a) personal integrity and a good life, and b) positive interaction and peaceful co-existence (Zincone, 2000). The second stage contains a battery of four indicators concerning 1) socio-demographic morphology and geographical locationing of immigrants; 2) relations with the communities of origin and destination; 3) inclusion in the working environment and socio-professional mobility; 4) life in society (Golini *et al.*, 2001). Reflections, arguments and details supplied in the course of both stages of analysis form a definitive guide to a correct and transparent line of research for social accounts in an institutional context.

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Summary

In this article we attempt to put into some sort of order the currents of thought and political management strategies adopted in the course of the twentieth century but as it was stated from the outset, it would not be a systematic account of everything produced by the literature on integration. The procedure therefore used broad guidelines, looking for some of the elements that made up the pre-1970s texture of the subject and going on in the more recent period to identify themes that can be considered the natural continuation of what had been previously created, how new sources of reflection were developed inside the questions concerning integration itself, or were externally introduced.

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Challenging the 'French model of integration': discrimination and the labour market case in France

Introduction[1]

Recognition of France's 150 year history of immigration has only recently come about due to an awareness campaign both on the part of social science researchers and through the increasing demands for recognition made by immigrants and their descendants. Following on the heels of this awareness, the management of immigrant diversity has acquired an important place on political agendas, reflecting the changing ways in which French society views itself.

Yet, the sociological and political construction of the 'immigration issue' remains unique in France, neither following the immigration path of other countries in Europe and North America, nor employing the same vocabulary. In France, the obfuscation of the ethnic division of society results from a long tradition of assimilation techniques, forming what is commonly called the 'French model of integration'. The emergence of formal "rules", and the description of the ways in which the present and past processes of incorporation of foreigners into the Nation over the last 150 years has occurred, has taken place only recently, at the end of the 1980s. In 1989, a new body was established, the High Council for Integration (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration: HCI) whose purpose was to inform and give advice to the authorities on the integration of immigrants. The Council quickly announced that a voluntarist policy was on the agenda. The HCI in 1991 devised the most precise institutional definition of the objective of any official integration policy:

[1] Parts of this article come from a contribution for the EUMC in Vienna, coordinated by Malcom Cross at the CEMES: *Migrants and Ethnic Minorities on the Margins*, French report, CEMES-EUMC, May 2001. I would like to thank Richard Van Deusen for his help in improving an earlier draft of this paper.

"Integration is a way to obtain the active participation to society as a whole of all women and men who are lastingly going to live on our land while overtly accepting that specific, mostly cultural, features will be preserved and nevertheless insisting on the similarities and the convergence, with equal rights and duties for all in order to preserve the cohesion of our social fabric. [...] Integration considers that differences are a part of a common project unlike either assimilation which aims at suppressing differences, or indeed insertion which establishes that their perpetuation is a guarantee for protection".[2]

While renewing the assimilationist tradition, an essential feature of the French national model, the HCI struck a delicate balance between the rights and duties of "women and men who are lastingly going to live on our land",[3] the acceptance of the basic values of the Republic, and the necessary transformation of French society in order to "leave some free space" for newcomers. This "integration model" sums up the long history of immigration in France and captures the essential principles of the *French* integration policy:

– integration is an *individual* process. The State will not recognize immigrants in structured communities because such institutionalization poses a threat to the unity of the Nation.

– Naturalization, i.e. becoming a French national, remains the pivot of the integration process. Maintenance of an open code of nationality[4] allows for a rather sizeable admission of foreigners according to various procedures and ensures an ongoing "mixing" of populations. This is also a way of avoiding the emergence and perpetuation of "minorities" with specific legal statuses as a result of confusions between the notions of citizenship and nationality.

– The concept of integration is linked to the principle of equality in that it tries to enforce the practice of equality in social life.

Yet, despite this wording, the integration doctrine often clashes with social practices, especially institutional practices, which do not reflect these general principles. The opposition to the recognition of

[2] This is a revised and more precise version of the definition presented in the first HCI report (HCI, 1993, p.8).

[3] Note the use of the circumlocution that obscures rather than clarifies any appropriate term.

[4] The degree of "openness" of the code of nationality is a matter of dispute since the granting of nationality is partially a specific attribute of the State. Although there are few refusals, especially on grounds of "lack of assimilation", there is a reported increase in adjournments on grounds of job precariousness, which in turn has an aggravating effect on the economic instability of migrant populations. Adjournment criteria in cases of lack of professional employment have been eased at the end of 1998, in order to better take into account all "insertion efforts made by applicants".

any structured communities which would add an intermediate layer between the State and the citizens is not present at the local level. The line between "tolerating specific cultural features" and promoting multiculturalism seems quite slim.[5] French integration policies mark a permanent quest to strike an unlikely – and unattainable, according to many observers, – balance between an active form of tolerance towards differences (including some concessions to the public expression of such differences) and the vigilant reassertion of a "principle of undifferentiation".

However, since the end of 1970s, France has experienced a massive surge of immigration. While fuelling social tensions that are exploited by the *Front National*, an extreme right party, it has, at the same time, also emerged as a relevant topic of research for the social sciences. This shift has been generally interpreted as a crisis of the 'French model of integration' (Lapeyronnie, 1993). The visibility of immigrants, notably from the Maghreb, in all domains of social life is shedding light on the organisational difficulties of French society, namely its reluctance to manage its diversity. The integration policy was the answer both to the claims for recognition by certain groups of immigrants and to the growing effects of social exclusion that happened to affect them more significantly than other members of the lower classes. This policy consisted mainly of reducing the political representation of the cultural and social specificities of immigrants in order to absorb them into the population. Such policies quickly reached their limits (Favell, 1998).

Since the mid-1990s, discrimination has become a new preoccupation of public authorities, if we accept the increasing number of reports and stances taken by the highest authorities of the State as evidence. By placing the 'principle of equality' at the heart of the French model of integration in its 1996 report, the Conseil d'État produced new thinking about the relationship between integration and equality. This new thinking raises the idea that illegitimate and illegal differences of treatment, and the disparities in terms of access to rights, goods and services, do not only affect foreigners, but French people as well on the basis of their race or origin. Thus, the French model of integration seems to have failed, not only from the viewpoint of immigrants who remain distant from the standards and values of French society, but from that very society that continually reproduces mechanisms of discrimination based on social prejudices and ethnocentric and racist behaviours.

[5] Indeed the HCI tries to balance the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the ties and solidarities between ethnic groups with the warning of the danger in cultivating "long lasting community gatherings" and, even more so, to any institutional recognition thereof.

The public condemnation of racism and xenophobia, as well as the laws which punish them, have not prevented discriminatory practices from multiplying, or helped stave off a growing sense among the French that these practices are escalating. There exists a wide consensus condemning not only racism and xenophobia, but also their daily translation into acts of discrimination. The annual barometer established at the request of the CNCDH[6] clearly indicates disapproval of any form of discrimination, notably in employment (CNCDH, 1999). More than 85% of the people interviewed considered that denying professional promotion or the prior dismissal of a 'person of foreign origin' are serious and racist acts. This greater sensitization results partially from the campaign engaged during the European Year against Racism, which saw a large number of initiatives against discrimination in the workplace. This demonstrates that general opinion at least reflects anti-discrimination discourse. Contributing to this opinion, the media has also widely reported the development of discrimination against immigrants and/or 'youth of immigrant descent'.

Nevertheless, this awareness and the mobilization which should accompany it, face several stumbling blocks:

– the current interpretation of the principle of equality and its practical application aim for the erasure of differences, rather than the identification of the criteria which serve as a basis for dismissing the principle of equality;

– knowledge of the mechanisms at work in the processes of discrimination remains very much fragmented, while no coherent awareness of the institutional actors involved exists. Contradictions of the 'French model' obscure a full recognition of the specificities of discrimination, tending to dissolve them in the traditional analytical framework of social inequalities;

– for all these reasons, it has remained difficult for the legal means by which discriminatory actions are prevented and punished to achieve their objectives. At this stage, general statements of intention remain powerless in producing real change.

This brief summary of the context in which questions of immigration, integration and discrimination are analyzed and addressed clearly indicates that scientific knowledge and public policies are closely linked together. The deficit of cumulative knowledge on discrimination produces gaps in public policies, whilst the French doctrine of equality obscures, directly and indirectly, possibilities of scientific investigation. Although, historically framed by the legal categories of nationality, immigration studies, and currently those that deal

[6] Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme.

with discrimination, alternative ways of naming 'otherness' have opened up: 'immigrants', 'second generation' or 'persons born in France of immigrant parents'. They begin to indicate more precisely the scope of discrimination, and even more on its underlying mechanisms. I will now discuss these issues specifically in terms of the labour market.

Demographic categories and statistical sources

International legal texts define discrimination as distinction, exclusion or preference (see Convention 111 of the ILO), referring to unwarranted characteristics which has the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation. There then follows a list of these characteristics from which the group of potential victims of discrimination can be defined (in the order appearing in the article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty): sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. While some of these characteristics can be easily converted into population categories (sex or age), most of them cannot be translated directly into administrative or demographic classifications, because they make reference either to practices which are not codified (sexual orientation, notably), or to attributes/memberships which are the object of a *definition* that, *a fortiori*, represent broadly variable claims, according to the countries considered. This is particularly the case for 'racial or ethnic' categories for which few European countries have devised statistical tools (Krekels and Poulain, 1998).

France does not collect statistical data that describes and analyzes discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or race (Simon, 1999). Unlike that of Great Britain, the French census only records variables relative to nationality and country of birth. Administrative sources do not include more detailed information than that. Since most of them note only nationality, a variable that is very often not the object of computer analysis, it is consequently never published. For a long time, the definition of populations, subject to potential discrimination on legal nationality, constituted the essence of the French approach, a definition that has only recently changed. While the various censuses have contained questions about nationality and country of birth since 1881, the data published until 1990 merely used the category 'nationality' and subsequently distinguished between those who were French born, those who were French through nationality acquisition and those who were foreigners. Between 1946 and 1982, the previous nationalities of new French citizens were not recorded by the census. Consequently, the statistics used in academic studies and mentioned in public debates concerning 'foreigners', an administratively constructed population, have

had little sociological relevance (although nationality produces real effects in terms of rights and in terms of freedom of movement) and are especially inadequate in terms of dealing with discrimination.

Convinced of the methodological and conceptual limitations of the category 'foreigner', in 1990 the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration (High Council for Integration) proposed the adoption of the category 'immigrant', defined as follows: 'a person born abroad with a foreign nationality'.[7] This category has since been used by INSEE,[8] in association with the usual classifications of nationality, in its census-related publications. Naturally, the category 'immigrant' does not cover all the populations 'stemming' from immigration. It includes only first generation migrants, adults or children ('the foreign-born'). Due to the peculiarities of French nationality laws, it is also necessary to clarify another complexity of existing classification. Not all foreigners are immigrants since, with a few exceptions, the children of foreigners born in France remain foreigners until the age of 18.[9] In 1999, 510,000 foreigners were born in France, whereas 1,580 million immigrants became French (36%). By adding foreigners and those who became French through nationality acquisition, a new category was obtained – 'foreigners and people of foreign origin' – which contains a proportion of the descendants of immigrants. In total, this new category included nearly 10 % of the population of France in 1999 (Table 1).

However this category is unsatisfactory for several reasons. Firstly, the declaration of nationality in the census is misleading as regards the children of foreigners born in France. Estimates have shown that 14% of immigrants answered the question on nationality inconsistently. Notably, 13% of naturalized immigrants declared themselves to be 'French born' when it would have been more appropriate for them to have answered 'French by acquisition'. The statistical tendency to 'naturalize' is even more marked for the children of foreigners of whom nearly two thirds declare themselves to be French by birth. In order to estimate fully the size of the 'second generation', we should abandon this variable.

[7] The objective of using a combination of country of birth and nationality at birth is to distinguish between French expatriates and foreign migrants, in particular the 800,000 Algerian French, who were repatriated in 1962.

[8] Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.

[9] The cases of French nationality acquisition before 18 years old are:
– the double *ius soli*, that is to say those born in France to French parents born in France who are French at birth. This situation essentially applies to the children of Algerians born before 1962, thus on recognized French territory, as well as those children of territories formerly under French dominion (Western and central Africa);
– a prior declaration, made by the parents (arrangement overruled by the law of 1993, then re-established conditionally in 1998);
– a collective effect resulting from the naturalization of parents.

Table 1 – *Population living in metropolitan France according to nationality and place of birth, in 1999* (thousands)

Nationality	Place of birth		Total	%
	Born in France	Born abroad		
French by birth	51,340	1,560	52,900	90.4
French by naturalisation	800	1,580	2,360	4.0
Foreigners	510	2,750	3,260	5.6
Total population	**52,650**	**5,870**	**58,520**	**100.0**
Of whom				
Foreigners by nationality or origin	1,310	4,310	5,620	9.6
Foreign-born			4,310	7.4

Source: INSEE, Census 1999

Yet not only 'foreigners' are affected by discriminatory phenomena; discrimination persists for those who acquire French nationality and their descendents. Thus, there is a need to identify the second generation since discrimination plagues both immigrants who become French as well as their descendants. Ethnic ancestry, whether it is discernible by name or skin colour, places individuals in a position similar to that of immigrants, even when the original migration is so distant that it no longer carries any meaning for these same individuals. The French model of integration holds that these descendants of immigrants – the majority of whom are French citizens[10] – should no longer be distinguished by their ethnic characteristics. The logical consequence of this is that public action does not consider intervention according to populations defined by racial or ethnic origin, and that statistics neither grasp the question of origin directly (through self-declaration of origin), nor indirectly (through asking for parents' birthplace, for example) (Simon, 1999). A headcount was carried out, based on the 1990 census, which attributed the characteristics of the parents to the children still living in their household (Tribalat, 1993). In the 1999 census, 2.6 million children born in France lived in a household whose reference person, or partner, was an immigrant. Another approximation using the data from the vital statistics show that, between 1946 and 1999, 3.6 million births came from at least one foreign parent, reaching almost 10% of the total number for this period.

[10] More than 92% of people born in France of foreign parents became French at the age of 18 for those generations born after 1975 (Richard, 1997).

The limitations of administrative sources (including the census) can be partially overcome by the use of surveys that more directly concern the populations affected by discrimination, or which include variables enabling a construction of subtler and more suitable categories. Regrettably, most of the surveys reproduce the variables present in the census, thereby reproducing problems in identifying populations who are potential targets of discrimination. Several surveys are exceptions, notably the MGIS survey (Geographic Mobility and Social Insertion) carried out in 1992 by INED with the cooperation of INSEE, concerning life conditions of immigrants and their children (Tribalat and al., 1996). More specialized surveys have also provided more focus on immigrants and the children of immigrants: the FQP[11] survey (Vocational training and Qualifications) conducted in 1993 by INSEE; the survey on disadvantaged position in 1996 by INSEE, the sample group of school leavers from the school system of CEREQ,[12] and the survey 'trajectories of job-seekers of DARES'.[13]

Since a significant proportion of them are not regarded as potential victims of discrimination, the categories 'immigrant' and 'descendents' of immigrants seem too wide. The notion of 'ethnic minority' used in Great Britain, as that of 'visible minority' in Canada, manages to distinguish amongst immigrant groups so that truly stigmatized origins can be identified. Yet, it is easy to imagine that immigrants who are native to the United States or to Germany are not exposed to the same discriminatory practices as those native to Algeria or sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, among all immigrant groups, those native to the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), Sub-Saharan Africa and Turkey, and their descendants, form the heart of the population most susceptible to racial or ethnic discrimination. Other groups may also, in some respects, be included in that population. Although those from Southeast Asia seem to display a greater degree of socioeconomic integration than those of the other groups, they still confront discriminatory practices in certain domains (notably housing). Similarly, those native to the Antilles or Reunion who live in Metropolitan France still experience great difficulty in finding accommodation, despite their French nationality that, in theory, should grant them privileged access to public sector jobs. Young people from the Antilles encounter similar problems to those of African origin as regards access to services. Considering these restrictions, the population directly belonging to an ethnic minority (primary migrants) represents about 11% of the population over 15 years of age.

[11] Formation et Qualification Professionnelle (Training and Qualifications).

[12] Centre d'Etude et de Recherche sur les Qualifications.

[13] Direction de l'Animation de la Recherche et des Etudes Statistiques (ministère de l'emploi).

Immigration in the last thirty years

Since the halt of unskilled worker immigration in 1974, French doctrine has practiced stream-centred control in order to reduce applications for resident permits. The reforms undertaken in 1998 (the law of March 16, 1998 regarding nationality; the 'Reseda' law of May 11, 1998 regarding foreign entry and period of stay) were meant to ease admission procedures for college graduates, professionals and other highly qualified employees. But those reforms failed to deliver the professionals who were expected. Rather, the large-scale regularization operation of undocumented migrants launched in June 1997 acted as the main source of admission. Since then, about 100,000 immigrants, out of a total of more than 150,000 candidates,[14] have been regularized.

The years from 1995 to 1997 were marked by a continuous decline of permanent entries contributing to the lowest levels ever registered since the end of the Second World War: 91,500 entries in 1994, 77,000 in 1995 and 75,500 in 1996. In 1997, the streams began to increase once more and, once again, exceeded the 100,000 entry mark (102,000 to be exact, of which 78,000 foreigners came from outside European Economic Space with 24,000 nationals of the EEE). Between 1980 and 1995, the flow stabilized between 110,000 and 120,000 entries. Applications for asylum dramatically increased at the end of 1980s, reaching 22,500 demands in 1982, 34,300 in 1988, and 61,400 in 1989. The turn towards political asylum on the part of immigrants, who were no longer able to move freely due to the establishment of visas and the stiffening of entry conditions that follow other procedures (labour, study, family entry and settlement), explains the dramatic increase of these requests. However, the high degree of bureaucracy in the management of applications coupled with the decreasing tendency to attribute refugee status (between 1980 and 1995, the number of refugee status granted fell from 85% to less than 20 % in 1995) considerably reduced the number of requests. The majority of entry requests were granted to family members who wished to rejoin either a French spouse, or those who would benefit most from family entry and settlement. In 1997, 67% of entries granted to non-EEE countries went to 'family members', with 7% going to workers. For EEE nationals, entries for labour purposes were more frequent as they totalled 29 %, whereas family member entry represented for no more than 39%.

[14] The exact figures are difficult to obtain. The administration produces evaluations which are contested by 'illegal' immigrant support associations. The utilization of regularization files has provided an acquisition of better evaluations (Thierry, 2000).

These migration streams have supplied France with a relatively stable supply of immigrants since the beginning of 1980s. In 1982, a total count of a little over 4 million immigrants was made, rising to 4,310,000 in 1999, an increase of 6.8%, which is slightly lower than the increase recorded for the entire French population over the same period (7.7%). In 1999, 36% of immigrants were of French nationality, compared with 31.4% in 1990. 116,000 foreigners became French in 1997 through a mixture of procedures (naturalization, marriage, birth on the territory, etc.). In 1999, 3,260,000 foreigners were counted, among whom 510,000 or 16% had been born in France. Thus, the annual statistics are beginning to reflect the long term effects of such relatively open naturalization policies.

The increase between the last two censuses results in particular from family entry and settlement, whose effect has been to rebalance distribution by sex (Boëldieu and Borrel, 2000). The proportion of women in the immigrant group was 50% in 1999 compared to 46% in 1982. Moreover, the geographic origin of the immigrants has changed considerably since the 1950s; increasing numbers arrive from Africa and Asia. New waves of immigration have replaced the Algerians who arrived between 1950 and 1975 (575,740 people as of 1999, or 13.4% of all immigrants) and the Portuguese who migrated between 1963 and 1973 (570,000 in number or 13.2 %). Whilst the Italian and the Spanish populations have gradually thinned out (381,000 or 8.8% and 316,500, or 7.3%), other trends are proving to be particularly dynamic: Moroccans (521,000 or 12.1%), Turks (176,000 or 4.1%) and natives of sub-Saharan Africa (400, 000 or 9.3%). With an increase of 43%, these last groups have undergone the greatest increase in the period between 1990 and 1999 (compare with the total 3.4 % increase of the immigrant population over the same period). Finally, in order to identify the present main communities in France, those native to Southeast Asia (170,000 or 4%) should be added. The most recent streams of movement are those of the Chinese from P.R. of China, those originally from the Indian subcontinent (Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) and those from Eastern European countries (see Table 2).

The characteristics of the various immigrant communities are very diverse, from a demographic viewpoint as well as an economic, residential or cultural one. The proportion of French citizens varies, from 70% for Southeast Asian and Polish origin, 57% for Italians, 14% for Algerians and 17% for the Portuguese. The ageing of the populations from previous flows is now very advanced. Two thirds of Poles and 41% of Italians are over 65 years old, compared with only 3% of the Portuguese or 5% of Algerians. Additionally, increasing numbers of women, naturalization and ageing processes have played an important part in transforming the immigration landscape in France, instituting a set of

Table 2 – *Distribution of immigrants[a] by origin at different censuses, France*

	1982		1990		1999	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Total population	**54,295,612**		**56,651,955**		**58,518,395**	
Immigrants	4,037,036	7.4	4,165,955	7.4	4,306,232	7.4
Of whom						
Algeria	597,644	14.8	555,715	13.3	574,208	13.4
Morocco	367,896	9.1	457,456	11.0	522,504	12.1
Tunisia	202,564	5.0	207,127	5.0	201,561	4.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	122,392	3.0	275,182	6.6	400,000	9.3
Italy	570,104	14.1	483,695	11.6	378,649	8.8
Spain	471,968	11.7	397,126	9.5	316,544	7.3
Portugal	638,492	15.8	599,661	14.4	571,874	13.2
EU Total	*2,014,148*	*49.9*	*1,782,598*	*42.8*	*1,629,094*	*37.1*
Turkey	121,212	3.0	168,359	4.0	174,160	4.1
South-East Asia	124,420	3.1	158,075	3.8	159,750	4.0
Other	820,344	20.3	863,559	20.7	997,249	23.1

(a) Foreign born with a foreign citizenship at birth. At the moment of the census, the immigrant can be either a foreigner or a French citizen.

Source: INSEE, 1982, 1990 and 1999 Censuses

practices that employ common law management and attention of authorities on ensuing generations. Such concerns for second generation immigrants reveal a shift in the immigrant *problematique*. The last big waves of immigrants into France are now taking place. Evidence suggests that a new phase is opening up, one that centres on diversity and cultural pluralism.

Integration and discrimination in the work place

Discrimination in the workplace has been the subject of several recent studies (Bataille, 1997; Poiret and Vourc'h, 1998). These studies have widely contributed to raising the awareness of the authorities to a problem that has been little known or publicized in France. Although discrimination permeates all levels of economic and social life, its relationship to employment has been the most widely exploited; the media and public officials represent those most critical of the integration of immigrants and their descendants into the French labour market. While unemployment and precarious jobs weaken the social situation

of the most vulnerable populations, the intensification of the inequalities instigated by discrimination appears, more than any other expression of racism and xenophobia, particularly unacceptable.

Discriminations within the labour force market are both "global and structural [and are related to] the organization of the labour market itself [...] rather than related to the individual discriminatory behaviour of such and such company" (Cerc-Association, 1999; p. 19). Due to its very nature and goals, the labour world reproduces forms of competition and selection which are more or less similar to discrimination. However, the criteria for selection employ a logic of adaptation to the workforce in production posts, depending on, for the most part, parameters of competence, qualification and the capacity to become integrated into a working group. To these criteria appropriate for the labour world, clauses have been added that address the nationality of foreigners, thereby influencing their ability to participate in the national market, and sometimes excluding them altogether from certain occupations. Such discriminations, or rather 'legal restrictions,' are henceforth relieved by new forms of illegal, or otherwise illegitimate unequal treatments, which do not only affect foreigners, but also impact a population that is largely moving beyond the vague and unstable outlines of the legal criteria of nationality. Origin, skin colour or other markers distinguish sub-populations who are dealt with differently in the workplace. Among these 'sub-populations', the descendents of immigrants form a diverse group that tends to build its collective identity by default from such unfair treatment. It is they who have been receiving greater attention from public authorities and who are situated in the heart of the questions related to discrimination in hiring practices.

Legal restrictions

Since the mid-nineteenth century, French immigration policy has maintained a double aim: to meet the needs of the national economy by easing entry of immigrant workers, and to ensure the integration of migrant families into the national body, thereby helping to sustain their families, and serving to compensate for the failings of French demographic growth. In reality, the first axis of this programme has always prevailed over the second and this is apparent in the main texts which codify the entry and conditions of stay of foreigners, notably the Immigration Act of 1945, which subordinated the acquisition of a work permit to the impossibility of recruiting a national for the same task. During years of economic expansion, this arrangement was never used and the OMI,[15] the body charged with supervising the streams of man-

[15] Office des Migrations Internationales.

ual labour, found its main function was to regulate the workers who entered 'illegally'.[16]

The notion of a 'national preference' connotes excessively broad ideological ramifications. It remains however that the legal means for regulating immigrants in the labour market prioritize nationals in the form of preferential recruitment or, more directly, through a ban on access to certain occupations. The list of these occupations published in the recent CERC-association report (CERC-association, 1999) is not limited to the public sector, even loosely defined by including public institutions. Numerous liberal professions have enacted restrictive access clauses directed at non-nationals, clauses that at the same time eased restrictions for EC nationals, in order to conform to European Union directives. The health professions employ *numerus clausus*, as do architects, accountants, the judiciary and a significant list of other independent professions. The total number of posts statutorily closed to foreigners represents between 6.5 to 7.2 million positions, almost a third of available positions.

These provisions derive from a very wide-ranging conception of the privileges of the citizen in the Nation-State and therefore are the object of numerous criticisms. The extension to European Union nationals of the prerogatives open to French nationals aggravates the disparity of treatment reserved for 'nationals of third-world countries' and makes the clauses of nationality seem excessive for numerous posts which do not involve state authority.

Beyond the de facto inaccessibility of jobs to immigrants, legal discrimination continues to have prolonged consequences on their descendants. Indeed, there is no doubt that foreigners who become French rarely obtain public service positions, although on paper the reason would appear to be due to the age constraints found in most competitions of admittance.[17] Low numbers of young descendents of immigrants working in the public sector also testifies to such an absence. This has been reported by numerous trade-union representatives; however, due to a lack of statistical data, an objective validation has yet to be established. It assumes that a sort of domestic *habitus* exists, acquired through membership in the public sector, which would

[16] Regularization concerns more than 75% of streams registered between 1965 and 1968. According to Viet, out of a total of roughly 2.35 million immigrant workers who entered between 1948 and 1981, 60% were regularised (Viet, 1998, pp. 238-239). This figure does not include Algerian employees, the majority of sub-Saharan African natives, or EEC workers from 1969 until now.

[17] The acquisition of French nationality is mainly obtained by relatively older first wave immigrants, revealing the link between duration of stay and projection in the society of installation.

then pass on to children through their parents. More decisively, the recruitment methods (form and content of the competitions; the composition of the juries, etc.) do not act in favour of young descendents of immigrants who too often fall short of expected employment standards. The implementation of a specific means of entry to public or quasi-public employment, called 'Emploi-jeunes (youth employment)', partially aids the facilitation of recruitment to non-statutory positions over a five year time frame for young descendents of immigrants.

The tertiarisation and gendering of immigrant employment

In 1999, immigrants represented 8.1% of the working population. This proportion has remained relatively stable for 20 years, due to the abatement of migratory streams, but it masks deeper changes: alterations in the occupational trajectories of immigrants, shifts in gender composition of the workforce, and transformations in the composition of the economic sector itself, influencing the kinds of occupations available. These evolutions result from a double structural movement: demographic and economic. While on the one hand the immigrant population is mainly male at the first stage of migration, on the other hand, a gender balance is achieved through family reunification, and then women enter the labour market to compensate the unemployment of immigrant males.

Between 1982 and 1999, the bulk of positions occupied by immigrant men decreased by 11%, whereas that of immigrant women increased by 49%. The gender-ratio of the immigrant working population testifies to the growing participation of women in the labour market: from 28.3% in 1982, the figure reaches more than 40% in 1999. Rates of employment for women consistently increased, surpassing 33% in 1982 (for the population aged 15 years and over), reaching 42 % in 1995 and 43.5 % in 1999. However, despite this progress, the difference between them and the overall employment of French women remains significant (4.5 %).

Amongst the immigrant population, the differential of labour force participation according to gender is always higher than that generally observed in France. Indeed, male immigrants maintain an employment level slightly above the average (65.7%, a difference of 12% between immigrant gender groups). These differential levels of participation in the labour market vary considerably according to previous national origins. The rates of female employment are the lowest amongst those native to the Maghreb, Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa, while at the other extreme women born in Portugal or in the French Antilles are much more involved in professional labour activities (Table 3).

Table 3 – *Participation in the labour force by ethnic origin and gender, 1999* (%)

	Men	Women	Total
France	78.5	66.1	72.2
Antilles	89.9	72.2	80.9
Algeria	78.2	44.8	61.6
Morocco	74.2	32.3	53.7
Tunisia	79.4	32.3	58.5
Africa	78.5	46.7	61.8
SE Asia	73.0	52.5	63.3
Italy	86.4	56.9	75.3
Spain	90.7	63.0	78.8
Portugal	87.7	72.1	80.2
Turkey	78.9	32.9	56.6
Total	**78.7**	**65.2**	**71.8**
Foreign born	*80.1*	*49.0*	*64.9*
Ethnic minorities	*79.3*	*45.3*	*62.6*

Source: INSEE, Labour survey, 1999 (personal interpretation) population from 15 to 59 years.

Thus, the proportion of immigrant women being held back from the labour market remains very important within certain groups. Domestic organization and domestic roles that are not suited to active participation as a wage-earner can explain these results. Moreover, the low educational level of women from the Maghreb, Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa solidifies their position in the domestic sphere, or, when they appear in the labour force market, intensifies their exposure to precarious jobs or unemployment. The pursuit of current job-hunting methods by immigrant women, at least those belonging to groups demonstrating the weakest rates of labour activity, will probably change due to an escalation of unemployment, or a particular period of stagnation depending on the sustainability of the current economic recovery.

If the rates of labour activity amongst immigrant women have firmly and regularly increased since 1982, their entrance into the labour force features a particularly high level of unemployment (42% of new workers between 1982 and 1990 were unemployed in 1990) and, to use the expression of the Economics Ministry, unstable or 'atypical' employment. It is in the tertiary industries that these new workers find employment (84%), notably in service jobs for private individuals or companies, which includes caretaking and cleaning jobs, but also in education and health services where they hold subordinated positions. Five occupations constitute half of all immigrant wage earners: caretaking, housemaids, babysitting, maintenance and security jobs, and

food service jobs. These professions are characterized by specific constraints: unstable and temporary contracts, atypical and irregular schedules, and part-time hours. Whilst 31% of women of French origin work part-time, almost half of immigrant women do so, with the exception of those native to Spain and Turkey. For the most part, these 'a la carte' jobs do not fulfil the need by women for full time jobs, as shown by the heavy underemployment[18] declared by immigrant women. It appears clearly that there are structural obstacles to the entry of female immigrants into the labour force market.

Although it tends to be blamed on the massive reorganization of the sectors traditionally occupied by immigrants, the ethnic and gender segmentation of the labour market originated at the *beginning* of the immigration process. For a long time, industry and construction constituted the main outlet for the immigration of the 60s and 70s. It is in these sectors that restructuring has largely occurred, opening up a reorganization of the economic activity of immigrants. Industry represented 32.5% of occupied immigrant employment in 1982, 25.5 % in 1990, 20.6% in 1995 and 19% in 1999. However, the construction sector has seen its immigrant workforce steady decrease: from 20% in 1982, to 14% in 1999. Naturally, these changes are part of a general process of transformation within production processes, but the dimensions of the reorganization seem much more pronounced in the case of immigrants than in that of the French population. The drastic reduction of the immigrant workforce in the two big industrial sectors, notably car production and construction, explains the move towards employment in the service industry and the development of independent work.

Table 4 – *Rate of unskilled employment, amongst wage earners, by nationality and gender, in 2000 (%)*

	Total	Men	Women	Blue-collars	Clerks	Industry	Construction	Tertiary
French	27.0	18.6	38.4	33.5	50.9	20.9	15.3	29.7
Immigrants	46.4	34.2	68.7	44.0	80.8	34.9	25.6	55.3
EU	40.0	20.8	67.8					
Maghreb	51.6	43.2	73.9					
Africa (non-Maghreb)	61.9	50.5	80.6					

The variable of skillness is based on professional functions.

Source: Labour Survey 2000, INSEE, DARES (2000a), p. 5. Field: wage earners, aged 20 to 60 years.

[18] Underemployment is defined as the proportion of the available people working part-time who would like to work more. It is therefore a measure of actual unwanted part-time work.

The tertiarisation of labour has remained constant since the end of the 1970s: from 43% in 1982, this sector now represents 64% of immigrant employment. Operational service jobs, and service jobs for private individuals and companies have become the main activity of immigrants and, in certain areas, they have provided an economic niche for immigrants due to their flexibility. These unskilled workers remain massively over-represented in the occupational stratification: 44% in comparison with 26% of workers in France. This is especially the case for those native to Turkey, Portugal and Morocco. Unskilled employment has remained very high among immigrants, and especially for women (Table 4).

Immigrants as crisis-shock absorbers

Subordinate professional positions held by immigrants are not just a legacy of the migration process. Engaged in low-level positions, immigrants do not later experience professional mobility at the same rate or to the same degree as that of their French colleagues. The scaling down of immigrant social mobility was revealed by Dayan, Echardour and Glaude (1997), who noticed that after 20-25 years of employment, roughly three-quarters of migrant workers remained unskilled labourers, of whom more than a third were unqualified. For those born in France (control group of the survey), the proportion of unskilled labourers drops to 30% and the proportion of unqualified labourers becomes one fourth. These gaps in career employment indicate that opportunities differ significantly according to origin. The study also noted the mobility potential of the Spaniards – which is higher than average – and those of Turks and Moroccans – which is lower than average.

The lack of access to company training for immigrant employees is obvious. The FQP survey by INSEE (1993) indicates that 44% of French male wage earners aged from 25 to 59 had benefited from training during their career, compared with 26% of immigrants from European countries and 17% of Maghreb natives (FQP, quoted in Sysdem, 1999). Bataille's qualitative study (1997) on racism in companies provides a means to account for the less successful trajectories of immigrants: at each stage of their working lives, the selection and preference operate against them and limit their chances for promotion.

The consequences of this reduction in professional mobility seem crucial when the transformation of the economy over the last 20 years is considered. The restructuring of industry has quite seriously affected those sectors where migrant workers were concentrated, particularly among the low qualified jobs they occupied. This population was the first affected by lay offs, due to its vulnerability. Thus between

1975 and 1982, the textile industry and the building industry lost 6.9% of their French employees and 24.3 % of foreign workers. In all branches of industry there exists not only a process of replacement of immigrants by French employees, who are often more qualified, but also the dismissal of foreign workers, significantly exacerbating the effects of restructuring (Merkling, 1998). Maurin observes that if labour cutbacks deleteriously affect foreign workers, notably 'recent arrivals', the 'policy of internal promotion and recruitment linked to the recovery of 1988 operates exclusively to the advantage of French workers'. He concludes with the idea that foreign workers will be exposed to a 'spiral of precariousness' and, controlling the effect of qualification and the length in the workplace with a logistic analysis, calculates that the risk of being unemployed is 79% higher for immigrants from the Maghreb compared with French natives, and less than 49% for the Portuguese (Maurin, 1991, p. 41).

A more recent study by DARES (Canaméro and al., 2000) finds approximately the same results: 'For a man aged between 35 to 44 years old, who is a skilled worker, with a primary level education, the probability of unemployment is 10.7% if he is French; increasing by 14.5 points if he is a native of a country outside Europe and decreasing by 1.5 points if his nationality is European'. The authors thus acknowledge the specific effect of nationality on the probability of unemployment. They also find this to be the case for those identified in the survey on jobseeker trajectories as foreign origin French or French born to foreign parents. The survey sample is made up of 11% of foreigners and 20% French of foreign origin, which clearly explains their over-representation amongst the unemployed.

The unemployment rates for immigrants clearly demonstrate their disproportionate exposure to unemployment (Table 5). The disparity reaches particularly high levels for those from the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and Turkey. With unemployment rates surpassing 40%, women native to Morocco, Turkey or sub-Saharan Africa experience severe difficulties in entering or returning to the labour market. The waiting period before finding employment is, generally, much longer for immigrant women, but the variations between groups are important.

The detailed analysis of unemployment experienced by immigrants belonging to ethnic minority groups illustrates the combination of factors linked to job opportunity (lower qualifications or educational level, lack of language knowledge, ignorance of employment opportunities, etc.), as well as those negative provisions established on behalf of companies based on ethnic or racial origin. The DARES survey previously quoted (Canaméro and al., 2000) puts forward very convincing arguments regarding the particular structure of unemployment of non-

Table 5 – *Unemployment rates by origin and gender, 1982-1999 (%)*

	1982		1990		1995		1999	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Spain	7.4	12.1	8.7	15.6	13.2	11.3	7.3	13.0
Portugal	6.1	10.5	7.0	16.1	7.9	8.9	9.2	6.9
Italy	6.0	12.0	7.6	16.0	11.9	11.2	18.4	26.0
Algeria	16.1	37.0	21.9	41.0	26.5	36.0	29.3	35.8
Morocco	11.6	28.1	19.3	36.8	28.7	43.3	33.4	45.7
Tunisia	13.7	22.8	19.1	31.7	28.1	38.5	24.3	33.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	16.5	29.1	20.8	38.6	26.2	31.2	25.2	42.3
Turkey	10.9	30.4	23.7	45.2	29.3	44.7	24.3	43.9
South East Asia	19.9	36.1	15.5	30.1	17.4	25.1	29.4	22.4
Foreign born	*10.5*	*16.8*	*14.7*	*23.5*	*16.8*	*21.8*	*19.7*	*23.1*
France	**6.7**	**11.9**	**8.2**	**14.6**	**9.1**	**13.5**	**10.2**	**13.6**

Source: INSEE, Census 1982 and 1990, Labour Survey 1995 and 1999

European foreigners or people of non-European origin. The rates of returning to employment within one year are significantly less for people of non-European origin or nationality (45% compared with 64%) and the succession of periods of unemployment are more frequent. Finally, the use of a model of logistic regression ('all being equal') on the probability of finding employment within 18 months confirms the special effect of national origin. The figure of unemployed non-European foreigners that enter the job market is 10% less than that registered for French workers. More worrisome still, second-generation descendants are 15% less likely to find employment within 18 months when they are of non-European origin. Neither does level of education suffice to explain differences in unemployment rates (Table 6). It is striking to note that, for Moroccan, sub-Saharan African or Portuguese immigrants, with a high school diploma, the unemployment rates are higher than those who left school without a diploma. In their case, educational capital cannot be converted into employment potential. We might consider this as a sign of discrimination when we realize that those immigrants are qualified to apply for managerial positions. At this level of socio-professional stratification, the selection practices are based more on the suitability of the candidate and his or her capacity to obtain the confidence of the recruiter. Prejudices against the descendents of minorities constitute an active obstacle to the recruitment of immigrants in positions of responsibility that correspond to their ability.

Table 6 – *Rate of unemployment by ethnic origin and qualification, 1999* (%)

	Baccalaureate degree and higher	Vocational training diploma	Without diploma or secondary school	Total
France	7.7	10.2	16.0	11.0
West Indies	8.6	15.5	14.5	13.3
Algeria	24.4	33.3	33.2	31.6
Morocco	38.1	47.8	34.8	36.9
Tunisia	13.3	22.6	30.8	26.6
Africa	31.7	30.3	32.3	31.9
SE Asia	21.3	11.8	66.9	26.6
Italy	13.1	20.2	23.6	20.6
Spain	4.0	8.8	11.7	9.4
Portugal	10.0	9.5	7.8	8.2
Turkey	27.5	12.4	32.6	29.8

Source: INSEE, Labour Survey 1999 (personal interpretation)

The over-representation of the "second generation" among the unemployed

The situation encountered by immigrants in the labour market can nevertheless be explained analytically by their function as poorly qualified outsiders, temporarily exploited and undergoing the setback of labour market trends. On the one hand, this situation corresponds to the usual analysis of the functioning of the economy in a society maximizing profits and renovating the means of production. On the other hand, the subordinate position of immigrants, in theory, should not bear on their children, born and socialized in France, who supposedly benefit from conditions that assure social mobility, including for those of working class origin.

Recent studies indicate that the social advancement from one generation to another has not taken place, and that the exploitation of the parents has been followed by the exclusion of their children from the labour market. For this 'second generation', that is the young descendents of immigrants, the problem is to avoid the lowest paid and most physically-taxing positions, seeking to obtain instead better working conditions. The rate of unemployment experienced by these young people demonstrates the differences of professional opportunities according to origin. Paradoxically, although the second generation youth have obtained equal education, a new kind of discrimination distances them from employment.

Data from various statistical sources provides clues on the conditions experienced by young people of immigrant ancestry when entering the job market. Using the panel set up by CEREQ[19] one may follow the job history of young people from the time they leave school (Brinbaum and Werquin, 1997). Unemployment figures among young people without the baccalaureate degree and whose parents were both born in Turkey or Morocco are nearly twice as high compared to youth in the total population. The difference is even sharper for young men than for young women but the trend is similar. Higher educational skills are not sufficient to eradicate above-average unemployment rates, suggesting that the lack of training can't be solely blamed for the high unemployment rates. Silberman and Fournier (1999) conducted a very detailed analysis of the mechanisms at work in the job market, using the same database. According to their conclusions, the trajectories followed by young people of North African immigrant ancestry are much less successful than those of other young people of immigrant origin (especially from the European Union), and of French origin. During the first 4 years after they leave school, they experience higher unemployment and benefit less from measures that facilitate employment, than others do. This situation is similar regardless of the degree they have achieved, and is dependant first on the kind of social capital available (families and networks to the job market), and secondly on the bigger differences between their levels of qualifications and the level of jobs offered on the labour market. These conclusions confirm the analyses made from the MGIS survey conducted in 1992 (Simon, 2000). Entry into the labour market has been more turbulent for young people of Algerian origin: 38% of them hold a permanent position after leaving school, whilst for other young people the figure reaches 60%. They experience much higher unemployment: 30% have been unemployed for at least one year, more than twice the national average. Although equal qualifications should by fiat reduce the degree of difference, this difference nevertheless remains significant. These disparities in access to employment produce relatively spectacular variations in unemployment rates. Young people of Algerian origin are twice more likely to be unemployed than any other group of young French, and this supplementary exposure remains when the educational level is equal (Table 7).

Such disparities point to the existence of specific disadvantages which are not based on qualifications, but originates from ethnic or racial origin. By contrast, the situation of young people of Portuguese or Spanish origin stands out against the special position of young people

[19] Centre d'Etude et de Recherche sur les Qualifications.

Table 7 – *Rate of unemployment of young employees aged 20 to 29 years, by origin of parents, educational level and gender, 1992 (%)*

	Born in France to parent(s) born in:			Whole of France
	Algeria	Spain	Portugal	
Without qualifications	51	33	37	24
Below the degree	37	20	17	16
Degree and higher	32	19	17	15
Men	41	19	19	14
Women	36	25	24	21
Total	39	22	20	16

Source: INED, MGIS survey, conducted in conjunction with the INSEE, 1992.

Table 8 – *Means of obtaining work, young employees aged from 20 to 29 years, by parent origin, 1992 (%)*

	Algeria	*Spain*	*Portugal*	*Whole of France*
Through family	9.7	14.4	19.1	12.7
Through ethnic relations	1.5	0	1.7	2.1
Through networking	20.0	20.2	18.6	16.9
Through ANPE	17.8	7.9	10.5	5.5
Through personal effort	21.8	24.8	20.6	22.6
Through ads	7.1	10.8	9.4	12.0
Other	22.1	21.9	20.1	28.2
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: INED, MGIS survey, conducted in conjunction with the INSEE, 1992.

of Algerian origin. While those of Portuguese or Spanish origin show unemployment rates a little higher than the national average, they reveal less difference from the norm than their Algerian counterparts. Notably, the acquisition of vocational training qualifications (such as the BEP and the CAP) offers a guarantee of employment for second generation Portuguese. Moreover, more than any other second generation group, young Portuguese undertake this field of training and thus find it easier to enter a labour market partially controlled by, or at least strongly invested in, the extended family (parents, cousins and uncles).

In this way, the model of professional entry of second generation Portuguese, based on peer choice in a professional environment where their reputation is a positive one, contrasts with the reasons behind

the relative failure of second generation Algerians: they can not rely on their kinship or ethnic networks for their social mobility. The preliminary steps needed to obtain jobs demonstrate the importance of kinship networks in accessing employment (Table 8). The role of the family is considerable for young people of Portuguese origin, and in a lesser measure, for those of Spanish origin. On the other hand, young people of Algerian origin are three times more likely to use jobcentres than do other young French people. Yet job centres discriminate against young people of Maghreb origin, who are rejected by many employers, producing even more striking results. Their exposure to discrimination is all the more intense as they are dependent on institutional methods of gaining employment.

Unemployment and 'representation capital'

Most of the studies led by people in the field (local missions, job centre liaisons in charge of training courses, etc) reveal that there is a feeling of impotence and fatalism when faced with the discriminatory practices of employers (Noel, 1999). If the gaps in the qualification levels of young people of immigrant origin are frequently employed to explain their difficulty in entering the labour market, other specific obstacles nevertheless still exist.

Competition to gain increasingly scarce employment not only draws on qualification or professional experience, but also directly taps stereotypes that employers use in their assessment of the applicants. Faced with a plethora of applications, employers use evaluation criteria to screen potential employees, where reputation, what we might call 'capital of social solvency', plays a determining role. Young descendents of immigrants fail to overcome such stereotyping in an environment of such elevated competition. Seen as undisciplined, unfit to follow the rules of behaviour in a working force, prone to tardiness, and incapable of diligence in the workplace, young descendents of immigrants tend to internalize these stereotypes and conform to the behaviour for which they are being reproached. Without exaggerating the extent of this vicious cycle (the renowned 'Pygmalion effect'), it is certain that the rebuffs and indefensible refusals these second-generation youths endure and reinforce their feeling of arbitrary and unjust exclusion from the labour market.[20]

Deroche and Viprey (1998, p. 78 ss.) noted such activity in their study of the conditions of access to companies for young foreigners or

[20] See in this case the testimonies collected by the Association for the Support of Professional Advancement of Young Graduates (AFIJ, 1998).

those of foreign descent. They also observed modes of organization that were differentiated by the professional transition of equally qualified young descendents of immigrants, an observation that in part explains their higher levels of unemployment. According to these authors, 'in the organization of professional careers, young French people are directed more towards temporary employments in the trade sector while the young foreigners or those of foreign origin are guided towards substitute employment'. In concrete terms, young descendants of immigrants are referred to placement institutions without contact with the hiring companies because their ability to access employment directly is much lower than that detained by those with a better education. Thus, the mediocre results obtained by young descendents of immigrants, after passing through placement institutions, can be explained by the heavy segregation in the subsidised labour market.

Employment which requires contact with clients is also often withheld from immigrants or their descendents, mainly those from the Maghreb, Turkey or Africa, either because of prejudices held directly by the employer, or because of the anticipation of a reaction on behalf of the customers. A pharmacist from Solesmes (a town in the north of France), refused to hire a French pharmacist of Moroccan origin, explaining that his clientele 'did not have a taste for his foreign origins'.[21] Other such cases are frequently reported by the press and clearly illustrate how discriminatory actions are justified by projecting onto, or blaming, a non-specific, unidentifiable and impersonal third party (customers, the market, economic rationality, etc.) In other words, while employers do not admit to racist prejudices, they attribute discrimination to these third parties which would, directly or indirectly, bar immigrants or young people of immigrant origin from employment.

Table 9 – *Perception of discrimination in labour market, second generation aged 20 to 29 years by parent origin, 1992* (%)

	a	*b*
Algeria	32.2	28.9
Spain	15.9	2.4
Portugal	13.7	3.5

a) Thinking that discrimination in labour market is common
b) Claiming to have personally experienced at least one discriminatory situation in employment

Source: INED, MGIS survey, conducted in conjunction with the INSEE, 1992.

[21] *Le Monde* on January 12, 1999. The pharmacist was found guilty of discrimination and sentenced on February 23.

Conclusion

In view of the alarming conclusions of recent studies, discrimination has become a major issue on the agenda for the Government. After ignoring for a long time the specific themes of discrimination in order to focus more closely on the most obvious instances of racism and its violent or ideological consequences, authorities have only recently recognized another, more diffuse or «faint» form of racism. It is one that is not directly expressed, but produces a threat against rights and the principle of equality. These discriminations reinforce inequalities in individuals and reproduce subordinate employment positions among ethnic and racial minorities in French society. A majority of public opinion acknowledges the disastrous effects of racism. Racism nowadays is no longer limited to its ideological contents; rather, it has become a perceptible daily, «routine» phenomenon.

Despite the inadequacy of the French statistical system to monitor ethnic and racial discrimination, many indicators can be collected which describe the position of immigrants in different areas such as labour, housing, schooling and health fields. These data highlight a situation which is in most cases unfavourable and which may be primarily accounted for by the socio-economic conditions of immigrant populations. With a lower than average income in France, and belonging to a lower social strata of society, immigrants are also confronted with obstacles deriving from their negative social capital and their poor environment, i.e. training deficit, language difficulties, a smaller awareness of opportunities and rights, residential segregation in disadvantaged districts, large families. In light of this, immigrants experience very high unemployment rates and become stuck in low-paying and physically taxing jobs in specific industrial sectors, in a job market which tends to be split along ethnic and racial lines. Finally, their children are less successful at school, either because they leave school earlier than French children, or because they are directed to alternative educational routes to obtain less prestigious diplomas.

These features nevertheless are not true for all immigrants and one should distinguish the various groups according to origin. The successful socio-economic integration of European immigrants in France has often allowed them to obtain higher positions than the French average; additionally; their European citizenship has afforded them quasi-legal and political equality. Finally, their public image is fairly positive, which reinforces their relatively easy incorporation to the French social fabric. Immigrants from the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, the Indian sub-continent and, to a lesser extent, South East Asia, however, are part of what we may call an "ethnic minority,"

in that these groups combine high social inequalities with a poor public image. The subordinate position of «ethnic minorities» in France is obviously not limited to the immigrants themselves, but is passed on to their descendants who are then considered, despite the fact that they are French by birth and nationality, and that they have grown up in France, as «foreigners» within the French society. The limited social mobility of these French citizens of immigrant origin demonstrates that the mechanisms that produce inequalities are not just of a socio-economic nature, but rather they can be explained by way of an ethnic and racial differentiation which French society is rather reluctant to recognize.

The mobilization of public authorities against discrimination is a landmark in the acknowledgement of the dramatic scale of the phenomenon and is likely to precede a fundamental transformation of public policies. Beyond such spectacular discourses and announcements, changes are taking place at the grassroots level of local practices. The sponsoring program for young people facing professional insertion difficulties, which was launched in 1996, is explicitly targeting «young people born from immigrant parents».[22] Similarly, the «emploi-jeunes» job scheme for young people reveals a higher than average representation of youths from ethnic groups who have been poorly represented in certain professions. Another sign that ethnic and racial representation is undergoing an evolution and that attitudes are changing is a declaration by the Minister of the Interior stating that he wished the police were «more accurately representative of the population» and that it should reflect the diversity of the citizens of France.[23] He also undertook recruitment campaigns currently under way to specifically target young people of North African and African origin. Finally, a public agency against discrimination was inaugurated in July of 1999 and has improved the collection of facts and their distribution in administrative local centres, to handle the claims of the victims. Even if the outcome of this scheme is far from satisfactory (the number of cases receiving justice are very weak: less than 20 per annum since 1998), its existence stimulated awareness in the public and the administration.

These timely steps represent only one aspect of a general move towards modifying the conditions for public intervention. They testify to the late adaptation of the «French model» to match the context of multicultural societies. A strong push was given by the European Commission which put forth two directives in 2000 on racial discrimi-

[22] These represent 46% of the 4,000 sponsored young people in 1997. In 1998, the number of young people involved in the programme was 13,000 (Aubert, 1999).

[23] *Le Monde*, January 28, 1999.

nation whose effects on French law and policy are very important. European influence is particularly visible in the new anti-discrimination law of November 2001, which introduced the concept of "indirect discrimination" into French law. In fact, as several models overlap and compete with one another, often combining with each other, the elaboration of a new integration policy currently provokes heated political confrontation and debate. The Anglo-Saxon spectrum of multiculturalism is being actively opposed through a reactive and regressive interpretation of republican mythology. Amidst the uncertainties raised by the decline of the «French model of integration», the objective of fighting discrimination is likely to rally the whole political spectrum. Still, what practical measures may be adopted to really put to practice what is being announced in speeches? Obviously, it will not be possible to straightforwardly introduce into the French context any devices used in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands without downright changing the principles that underpin public policies. In this way, the somewhat hidden implementation of a few positive actions is a convenient way to postpone any direct confrontation with real societal and political decisions.

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Summary

French integration policy regarding immigrants has recently encountered a shift from assimilation to a fight against discrimination. This new objective on the political agenda can first be accounted for by the emergence of the issue of the «second generation», i.e. the children of immigrants who arrived in France in the '60s and '70s. According to the French model of integration, the offspring of immigrants – a vast majority of whom are French – should follow the same trajectories in schools or labour market as those from the same social class. The persistence of unequal treatment of immigrants and the "second generation" in the school system and on the labour market proves that such equality has not been obtained. We provide a synthesis of data on the position of immigrants and second generation in the labour market, which reveal many obstacles on the path to integration. Discrimination casts a shadow on the promises given by the "model of integration" and forces us to reconsider its contents.



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Assessing migration and integration in an immigration hesitant country: the sources and problems of data in Germany

In modern societies, migrants' immigration and integration are accompanied by an array of attempts not only to steer these processes, but also to measure them. Immigration countries differ with regard to rules of entry, rights to which foreigners are entitled, and the methods applied to measurement of the newcomers' immigration and adaptation patterns.[1] Even in a hesitant immigration country like Germany, migration and integration processes have received a considerable amount of scholarly attention; however, systematic accounts of data are hard to find.[2] The primary aim of this article is to give an overview of existing official and unofficial sources of statistics regarding immigration and integration, while highlighting the lack of information and other difficulties experienced by researchers.

This paper consists of the following sections: after a short introduction to the evolution and characteristics of immigration to Germany and the basic features of the policies related to it, an overview of the available and most important official and unofficial aggregate and individual level data on immigration and integration will be presented. In order to demonstrate what kind of analyses can be done, a summary of some exemplary studies will follow. This section will also give the reader an idea about the *status quo* of integration in Germany. The paper concludes with a discussion of the problems and shortcomings of existing statistical approaches to immigration and integration in the country.

[1] For reasons of simplicity, we will use the terms "immigrants" or "migrants" not only for people who actually migrated to Germany but also for the immigrant-origin population, even when they were born in Germany. "Second-generation migrants" are people who were born in Germany or migrated before age six.

[2] For an exception see Bretz 1992.

Immigration to Germany since WWII

Looking at post WWII immigration to Germany, several phases can be distinguished:[3] until 1950, immigration was marked by the arrival of German refugees and expellees from the occupied territories. From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, Germany experienced an unprecedented economic growth that led to labor shortages and the onset of the "Gastarbeiteranwerbung" – the recruitment of guest workers started in 1955. Agreements were made in this regard with Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Morocco, and Tunisia. The oil crisis in 1973 marked the end of this period of growth and labor shortages. In the same year, a recruitment stop was implemented and many migrants returned to their home countries, with the first half of this decade experiencing a net out-migration. However, once they knew that returning to Germany would have become substantially more difficult, a number of migrants decided to settle in the country permanently; thus, this period was followed by a phase of family reunification and a change in the demographic structure of the immigrant population, that until then, dominantly consisted of young males. In the late eighties, two other groups became more visible – asylum seekers and refugees, and *Aussiedler* from Eastern Europe who claimed German ancestry and were thus allowed to enter Germany as well as to obtain citizenship rather easily.

In 2002, 9% (7,3 Mio.) of the people living in Germany are foreigners without a German passport. About a quarter of the foreigners are EU citizens (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 2002: 7). Former guest-workers, their families and descendants, asylum seekers, and refugees are the most important groups, followed by international students, and former contract workers from the GDR.[4] The Aussiedler (ethnic Germans) from Eastern Europe are a category with immigration background, but they are not considered "foreigners". The 10 largest communities are: Turks (27,4% of tot. foreigners), former Yugoslavs (9,1%), Italians (8,5%), Greeks (5,0%), Poles (4,1%), Croats (3,0%), Austrians (2,6%), Bosnians (2,2%), Portuguese (1,8%) and Spaniards (1,8%) (see Fig. 1). Most of them have been living in Germany for a long time. Thirty-three percent of all migrants and 43% of the Turks have stayed for longer than 20 years in Germany. One third of all migrants have an unlimited permit to stay in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000b).

[3] See Fijalkowski 1994, Rudolph 1996, Thränhardt 1988, Bretz 1992, Bade 1994.

[4] Hungary, Poland, Algeria, Cuba, Mozambique and Vietnam. See Gruner-Domic 1999, Müggenburg 1996.

Fig. 1 – *Foreign Population in Germany in 2001*



Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2002: 65. Number of foreigners by citizenship.

Immigration and integration policies in Germany

The 1990s were marked by important changes in the legal framework of immigration. The liberal German asylum law, that had lead to the country becoming a main port of entry, was reformed in 1993, and the number of people who were granted asylum decreased considerably (see Bade 1994: 91 et seqq). At the same time, legislative reforms started to reflect the fact that integration and immigration were no longer temporary phenomena that could be regulated on an *ad hoc* basis, but a new reality that needs to be faced and managed.

With regard to migration, fundamental reforms have been passed recently, most of them after the coalition of the Social-Democrats and Greens won the federal elections in 1998. In 2000, the so called "green card" regulation was introduced, that allows highly qualified specialists to live and work in Germany temporarily (Mahmood and Schönmann 2002). Immigration reforms culminated into the new immigration law (*Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern*) that was envisioned to take effect in 2003.[5] This law, however, has not been accepted by the Constitutional Court since it

[5] The first draft of this paper was submitted in November 2002.

only passed the Chamber of the German States (*Bundesrat*) in a highly contested procedure. At the time of this writing (January 2004) the bill is stuck in the Conciliation Committee (*Vermittlungsausschuss*), where government and opposition are trying to find a compromise. The original bill aims at regulating and limiting migration to Germany, while opening up other channels of entry in addition to the few ones that had remained open after the recruitment stop in 1973:[6] asylum law, family reunion and temporary immigration of the numerically limited "new guest workers".

The form of labor migration that is supposed to be attracted with this bill differs sharply from the guest-worker recruitment policy in the 50s and 60s. Immigration is no longer open to unskilled labor, but to young and educated immigrants that might help to alleviate current labor shortages and demographic problems.

In addition, the bill contains several paragraphs on the promotion of integration by means of classes that encompass learning German, as well as German law, culture, and history. Most newly arriving migrants are entitled to participate in these classes, while these are even mandatory for those without any German language skills.

One important aspect of integration is the policy on naturalization. In this regard, substantial reforms have been implemented even before the new immigration and integration law. They culminated in the introduction of a reformed citizenship law that took effect in January 2000, stating that the children of non-naturalized immigrants living in Germany would be granted at birth both German citizenship and the citizenship of their parents' country of origin. Every child is entitled to citizenship as long as one parent has lived in Germany for at least 8 years and holds a permanent residence permit. By the age of 23, each person has to choose between the two nationalities. The length of stay required for naturalization of people who were not born in Germany has also been reduced. Immigrants no longer have to live in Germany for 15 years in order to become eligible for citizenship but only for 8 years. Migrants who fulfill these – and a few other – conditions are legally entitled to acquire a German passport. Only under special circumstances is dual citizenship an option in Germany. According to these reforms, the majority of "labor migrants" and their descendents are entitled to German citizenship (Diehl and Blohm 2003).

As we will show in the following sections, past and present political approaches to immigration and integration in Germany are reflected by the available data in many different ways.

[6] E.g. contract workers from firms cooperating with German companies (Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer), nurses or young workers, who mostly came from Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (see Rudolph 1996: 176).

Keeping track of immigration, the immigrant stock, and integration

The following review of available data sources is ordered by content as well as by type of data. First, we will depict aggregate data that is officially collected about *immigration and emigration* processes. Second, we will give an overview about the *immigrant stock* (meaning the composition of the foreign population and of the foreign-origin population by nationality, legal status, demographic traits). Third, we will present the available data on migrants' *integration*. In this section, we differentiate further between official aggregate data and (official and unofficial) survey-based individual data. With regard to the latter, we will describe the type of information available about migrants' *structural, socio-cultural* and *political integration*.

Data on immigration and emigration

With regard to immigration and emigration, the Federal Statistical Office (*Statistisches Bundesamt*) is the only source for data.

Official aggregate level data

Data on migration within and beyond the German borders are gathered by the local resident registration bureaux (*Einwohnermeldeämter*). They collect information on the number of persons moving in and out of any community in Germany, compiled by the statistical offices of the states (*Statistische Landesämter*) and published by the Federal Statistical Office. Since registration is obligatory for any native and foreign resident living longer than two weeks at a given place (in the case of temporary workers, the time frame is two months), legal migration can be measured directly. Data are available at the local, state, and federal level. Based on these data, population movements can be differentiated by citizenship and place of origin, whereas emigrants are differentiated according to citizenship and place of destination. The section "population" of the statistical yearbook of the Federal Statistical Office (*Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*) is relevant in this respect as it contains a chapter on spatial mobility (*Räumliche Bevölkerungsbewegungen, Wanderung*) and provides information on the number of German and foreign intakes by place of origin, the number of German and foreign out-migrations or return migrations by place of destination, the amount of net migration, and migrations by country of origin in the German states.

Although return migration is not measured directly, it can be estimated from the out-migration of foreigners from Germany, which is

strongly related to return migration. However, the place of destination of the registered foreign emigrants can differ from their place of origin or citizenship. Therefore, return migration cannot always be measured accurately. Despite these shortcomings, the total number of in-migrations and out-migrations is accessible, except for unregistered illegal or irregular migration (for a discussion of data quality see the last section of this article). No reliable figures on the number of illegal migrants living in Germany are available (Lederer and Nickel 1997, Vogel 1996).

With regard to the traits of the migrant population, a special series on population (see Statistisches Bundesamt 2000a) contains information on migrants' country of origin and destination as well as their sex, age, and marital status. Additional information at the local level are available from the regional statistical offices that release the regional statistical yearbooks.

Data on the immigrant stock

With regard to information on the foreign or foreign-origin population already living in Germany, three data sources can be distinguished: the population update (*Bevölkerungsfortschreibung*) that provides basic demographic data; the Central Aliens Register that contains information on migrants' demographic traits, naturalization, and legal status; and the microcensus (*Mikrozensus*) that is the exclusive official source of information on families and households of the foreign population.

Official aggregate level data

The population update (*Bevölkerungsfortschreibung*) contains basic data on the demographic traits of the foreign and foreign-origin population. It is a constant update of demographic census results collected in 1987 on the basis of data from the local registration offices (*Einwohnermeldeämter*) and the municipal registries of births, marriages, and deaths (*Standesämter*). A more important data source is the Central Aliens Register (*Ausländerzentralregister, AZR*) the results of which differ substantially from the population update. Founded in 1953, the AZR collects data on all foreigners that live in Germany, excluding those with temporary residence permits. The information are transmitted by the public authorities responsible for aliens (*Ausländerbehörden*). The following traits are registered:

– name (including its German and original spelling, pseudonyms, and former names)

– date, country, and place of birth, sex, marital status, citizenship, and spouses citizenship

– immigration and emigration

– legal status (i.e. asylum seeker, refugee, naturalized person, ethnic German from the East) that was attributed to a person, or that a person applied for.

Strictly speaking, this information are available on the individual level; however, it is accessible only as aggregate data. The AZR also contains a file with basic data on foreigners that have applied for a visa (*Visadatei*). Currently, the AZR is located at the Federal Administration Office. Data are made accessible to other concerned authorities and are the basis of many statistics issued by the German Federal Statistical Office (see Statistisches Bundesamt 2002). The Federal Statistical Office occasionally publishes summaries on migration and the migrant population, as well as on some indicators of integration from different data sources (see Statistisches Bundesamt 1995, Statistisches Bundesamt 1997, Statistisches Bundesamt 2001). An overview of data of the Central Aliens Register can be found in the special series on *foreign population* (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000b). There one can find tables on citizenship, sex, age, states of residency, marital status, place of birth (in Germany or outside), duration of stay, legal status, and former nationality. Similar information are available for naturalized foreign-origin migrants.

Other demographic data on migrants (e.g. on fertility or marriages between migrants, as well as between migrants and natives) are registered at the municipal registries of births, marriages, and deaths, which is collected by the Federal Statistical Office and published in the Statistical Yearbook (Statistisches Bundesamt 2002) or in the special series on population (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000a). Fertility and marriages are displayed for Germans and foreigners, but migrants can not be differentiated by citizenship. Some data on migrants' health can be found in the medical statistics (*Gesundheitsberichterstattung*) of the Federal Statistical Office, elaborated in cooperation with the Robert-Koch-Institute.[7]

Official individual level data

If one is interested in more detailed information, on e.g. immigrants' family structure, the German microcensus is a reliable source. Every year, 1% of all households in Germany are interviewed on the basis of a rotating area sample, where each household is included in the survey for four consecutive years. Participation in the microcensus is mandatory, except for some questions. Researchers can access for scientific purposes a file of the German microcensus made available by

[7] http://www.gbe-bund.de.

the Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden. Researchers outside of Germany can only work with the microcensus at a few research institutions in Germany.

The sampling units are households. People with a migration background are also included in the survey; they can, however, only be identified as belonging to the immigrant-origin population when they are still foreign citizens. Unlike in the US census, ethnic origin is *not* measured in the microcensus (for a more detailed discussion of this topic see the last section of this article). People are asked if they are German citizens. If this is not the case or if they are citizens of another state besides Germany, they are asked for their country of citizenship, their length of stay in Germany and if they have relatives (spouses, children, or parents) in their native homeland.

The microcensus contains information on the household level on about 370.000 households and 820.000 individuals. Besides demographic and household related data, the microcensus includes labor market issues (working time, type of contract, job related features, job mobility, second jobs etc.), income, savings, social security, educational and professional training. Every four years, additional questions are asked (e.g. about commuting, work situation, health, housing, etc.). Often, these questions on special topics are restricted to a subsample of respondents.

Some information on the migrant population are published in the special series on *households and families* (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000c). It contains information on households by citizenship of the head and on household size, civil status, number of children, income, and living arrangements.[8]

Data on integration

While data on immigration, emigration and naturalization is relatively easy to access in Germany, things become more difficult when it comes to the field of migrants' integration. With regard to the term "integration" itself there is no consensus on its meaning, neither in the public or in the scientific debate. Since we cannot discuss this issue in more detail, we want to mention that we understand it in the sense of migrants' participation in different societal spheres such as the labor market, the educational system, social networks, and the political sphere (see Esser 2001: 8). Integration can occur in the form of assimilation. It is, however, also possible that migrants' integration takes place on the

[8] For an overview of analyses of data on migrants in the German microcensus see Roloff and Schwarz 2002 and Statistisches Bundesamt 2001.

group level.[9] This is for instance the case when a considerable portion of the migrant population is employed in the ethnic business.[10]

Official aggregate level data

The Federal Statistical Office issues an array of aggregate data on different indicators of migrants' integration. *Educational statistics* contains data on the number of students in the school system and apprentices and university students. Since education is the responsibility of the German *states (Länder)*, data are collected in the schools and universities, and reported to the respective states. Aggregated data are published by the Federal Office of Statistics and can be found in a number of issues of the series on *education and culture*.

– *Educational statistics* (Schulstatistik): contains data on students by sex and citizenship (German or foreign nationality) and educational attainment by sex and citizenship (German or foreign nationality), both reported at the state and federal level; foreign teachers by citizenship at the level of the states and the federal level, and participation in native language education (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000e).

– *Professional training statistics* (Berufsbildungsstatistik): includes data on enrolled foreign students by sex and citizenship (selected nationalities) and foreign apprentices by profession (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000f and 2000g).

– *University statistics* (Hochschulstatistik): on type of university, state, field of study and type of final examination of students by citizenship can be found in the *statistics of students* data (German or foreign nationality). All data are available at the level of the universities, of the states and at the aggregated federal level (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000h). These data can also be downloaded from the GENESIS database on the Internet (https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/logon). Data on students by federal states, field of study and type of final exam differentiated by selected nationalities are listed in a special table that is available by request from the Federal Statistical Office. Data on foreign students by type of university as well as on students who qualified for university admission in Germany (Bildungsinländer), are published for selected nationalities (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000h). The *statistics of exams* contains data on field of study, duration of university schooling and type of final exam differentiated by citizenship (German or foreign nationality) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000h). A table with data on type of university and state of schooling by citizenship is

[9] Elwert, 1982.
[10] See Wilson and Portes, 1980.

available on request – as well as information on foreign students who visited a German university. Information on these students' exams are published in the series (*Statistisches Bundesamt* 2000h) only when they qualified for university admission in Germany (Bildungsinländer).

– *Statistics on students' financial support*: information on grants for *university students* by citizenship (German or foreign nationality) are available at the federal level (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000i), and a differentiation by nationalities is also issued in a special report. Data on grants for participants in *vocational training classes* preparing for a master of craftsmen title by sex and citizenship (German or foreign nationality) are also provided (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000j).[11]

The employment statistics contain important information on migrants' integration as well. Individual level data are collected in the census (*Volkszählung*) and the microcensus (*Mikrozensus*, see below), the latter being the basis for EU statistics on foreign workers. The most important official data source on the aggregate level are the statistics of employees (*Beschäftigtenstatistik*), which are based on the certificates of insurance (*Versicherungsnachweise*) of the employees who pay social security.[12] They are analyzed by the German Federal Labor Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*), the Federal Ministry for Economy and Labor, the Statistical Offices of the States and the Federal Statistical Office. Information (employees by sex, age, citizenship, branch of industry, occupational position, full or part time occupation, and occupational training) are issued quarterly, whereas bulletins on duration of employment and income are available annually.

Information on unemployment are also collected by the German Federal Labor Office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*). Their statistical focus is mainly on job-seekers, unemployment and vacancies, as well as public activities to further occupation (i.e., job placement, enrolment in employment and training schemes etc.).

Other aggregate level data on migrants' structural integration are the statistics on social security recipients (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000k). The annual *criminal statistics* that contain information on the number and nature of offenses, are differentiated by selected nationalities and by reason of stay.

These data give a taste of immigrant integration in Germany. They allow comparisons between educational degrees, job related issues of

[11] Data can also be downloaded at the Statistics Shop of the Federal Statistical Office (http://www-ec.destatis.de).

[12] With the exception of self-employed persons in Germany, unemployment-, pension, and health insurance contributions are mandatory for every employee, and the employer is obliged to register his or her employees.

different immigrant nationalities and Germans on the aggregate level at different points in time. However, detailed information on citizenship, profession or other characteristics of foreign employees (unemployed or self-employed) is often lacking. Aggregate level analyses may lead to false conclusions since they are unable to identify the mechanisms at work at the individual level (see Schnell et al. 1999: 239). For instance, the criminal statistics show whether foreigners commit crimes more often than natives. In order to find out whether this is an effect of their lower social status, one needs individual level data (see Geissler 1995).

Researchers interested in analyses on the individual level have, thus, basically two options: either they can collect their own data, or they can use data from available population surveys. The following overview of these surveys will be restricted to those that allow – in terms of case numbers – reasonable analyses on different nationalities' integration, that are accessible for research, and that can be characterized as general population surveys. This excludes well-known population surveys such as the German General Social Survey (*Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften, ALLBUS*) that include foreigners only proportionally to their population share. Besides, only those surveys are presented that are not limited to one topic and include the majority of the immigrant population rather than a subgroup defined by age or nationality.

Official individual level data

The microcensus allows research mainly on migrants' structural integration. Based on microcensus data, the Federal Statistical Office publishes information on migrants' work participation in the Statistical Yearbook (Statistisches Bundesamt 2002) and in a series on *employment statistics* (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000d). One can find information on employment rates of foreigners by states as well as unemployment by age, marital status, occupational status, full or part time occupation and branch of industry.

Due to the fact that participating in the microcensus is mandatory, it can be assumed that the data quality of this survey is rather high. However, the range of topics that are covered is limited. The microcensus allows mainly analyses of migrants' structural integration in the labor market and educational system (see below), but does not include parameters such as social integration (intra and inter-ethnic links) or political participation. Researchers interested in these issues are likely to turn to unofficial data sources the most important one being the Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP).

Unofficial individual level data

The GSOEP is "a representative longitudinal study of private households in the entire Federal Republic of Germany". It is conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (*Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, DIW*) annually since 1984 (see SOEP Group 2001) and SOEP data can be directly ordered from the institute. In 1984, almost 6,000 households and more than 12,000 persons were surveyed, several new samples have been added since. About a quarter of all respondents are non-Germans. This means that immigrants or people with immigrant origin are oversampled (in the foreigners sample). Given their population share of less than 10%, analyses of survey data differentiated by nationality often raise case number problems unless migrants are oversampled. The GSOEP is therefore the most important data source for secondary quantitative analyses on immigrant- related topics that are not covered by the microcensus.

To be included in the GSOEP's foreigners sample (when the respondents for the first wave were selected) interviewees had to be at least 16 years old and live in a household where the head had migrated to Germany during the period of labor recruitment. Therefore, only those households having a Turkish, Spanish, Greek, "Yugoslav" or Italian head were interviewed in this sample. Non-Germans from other ethnic groups are included in the GSOEP as well but, given their small population share, analyses differentiated by national origin are only possible for groups included in the foreigners sample. Approximately a fifth of the respondents with a migration background belong to the second-generation. A person who leaves his or her parents' household usually remains in the survey, but as a new household. In 1994, an additional immigrant sample was drawn, the Immigrant Sample (*Zuwandererstichprobe*), in order to gather data on migrants that came to Germany after 1984 (independent of their nationality). This sample includes many ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe holding a German passport and allows for separate analyses for this group.

The GSOEP covers a broad range of topics: household composition, occupational and family biographies, employment and professional biographies, earnings, health, personal satisfaction, social security, education and training, allocation of time, family and social services, participation, political attitudes, etc. However, not all topics are included every year. Migrants are also asked about their attitudes. Examples include questions about naturalization, their identification with Germany and their country of origin, cultural habits and media consumption, contacts with other Germans and co-ethnics, language skills and experiences of discrimination.

Another important data set is the employees' sample of the Institute for Employment Research (*Beschäftigtenstichprobe des Instituts für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung IAB*), which can be ordered at the Central Archive of Empirical Data (*Zentralarchiv für empirische Daten*). It contains extensive information on the employment biography of a 1% sample of all employees who are registered in the social security system. There are two kind of data sets – a base file (1975-1990, 1975-1995) and a regional file (1975-1990, 1975-1997). The 1975-1990 base file contains 426.363 cases. The employees' sample covers the following features: sex, marital status, age, citizenship (nine nationalities and seven groups of nationalities), education, duration of contracts, work status, profession, branch of industry, features of the firm, hours of work, income, reasons for contract termination, and receipt of social insurance benefits. Detailed analyses on the regional level are possible on the basis of the regional file. However, unlike the base file the regional file does not contain any information on the employees' citizenship (see Bender et al. 1995, Haas and Hilzendegen 1997).

In addition to the GSOEP the *Ausländer-Mehrthemenbefragung* is one of the surveys that asks a sufficiently large group of migrants about several aspects of their lives. Turks, migrants from former Yugoslavia, Italians, Greeks, and Spaniards (400 each) are recruited using a random-quota-mix sampling strategy and interviewed face-to-face using questionnaires in the respondents' native language. This survey is an important source of data on migrants' consumption patterns.

Studying integration in Germany: some examples from the Microcensus and the German socio-economic Panel

In order to show what kind of research can be done and has been done using the individual-level data sets described above, we will now present some exemplary empirical studies on migrants' integration in Germany. In doing this, we will differentiate several dimensions of migrants' integration, most importantly their structural (educational system, and labor market), social (contacts and marriages) and political integration (naturalization and participation).

Structural integration

An often quoted study on migrants' adaptation into the educational system is the 1994 study by Alba et al., which used data from the microcensus and the German socio-economic Panel. They asked "How strongly are first and second-generation migrants in Germany disad-

vantaged in the German school system and which mechanisms account for differentials between children with and without a migration background?" Using data from the 70 percent subsample of the 1989 microcensus (ZUMA file, *Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen*), the authors investigated the determinants of immigrant children's likelihood to attend different branches of the German school system.[13] In doing this, they differentiate between 13 to 15, 16 to 18, and (for the descriptive analyses only) 19 to 21 year old first- and second-generation immigrant children from Turkey, Italy, Greece and the former Yugoslavia. All other nationalities were summarized in the category "others".

The influence of the following factors has been investigated: duration of stay and generational status (second-generation is defined as those who immigrated prior to the age of five or were born in Germany); socio-economic status of the parents (education of the head of the household, his or her job, his or her status as a self-employee, and his or her dependence on social security or joblessness insurance); and, conditions related to the place of living. The authors argued that the curricula as well as the degree to which migrants' children are segregated in school varies by state and region. Thus, they differentiate between states with a high and low share of foreigners and by community size. They also controlled for sex and number of children living in the household.

Their descriptive findings suggest that immigrant children between the age of 13 and 15 of all nationalities attend the *Hauptschule*, the lowest branch of the school system (above the schools for special needs children), more often than German children. This difference is the highest for Turkish and Italian children and the lowest for children belonging to the "others" category, for Greeks and, to a lesser degree, for children from the former Yugoslavia. The results for older children are similar, except that students from Greece attend the Gymnasium even more often than German children. Since the question of what follows *Hauptschule* is especially interesting for this age group, the authors compared the share of those students who start an apprenticeship to those who leave the school system with a minimum education. They showed that only 9 percent of the German students do not start an apprenticeship after *Hauptschule*, whereas this holds true for al-

[13] This analysis would no longer be possible with microcensus data from 1991 on, since the school branch a person attended is no longer asked for. In order to increase the comparability of the microcensus with data sets in other countries, it is now only asked whether a student is in class 1 to 4, 5 to 10, or 11 to 13 (Lüttinger and Schimpl-Neimanns 1993: 114).

most a third of Italian and Turkish children. In the oldest age group, the students 19 to 21, the differences in the educational level are even more dramatic. This finding suggests that the situation is ameliorating for younger cohorts. The differences are less dramatic when one looks exclusively at second-generation children but are far from vanishing.

In their multivariate models, the authors assessed the importance of the determinants mentioned above for explaining the placement of a child in the educational system. In sum, they showed that generational status, as well as duration of stay in Germany, is of crucial importance in this regard (besides the educational level of the head of household, community size and sex of the student). The most important finding is that even after controlling for socio-economic status of the household, generational status, etc., the effect of nationality differences does not vanish in the multivariate models. Turkish, Italian, and – to a lesser degree – children from the former Yugoslavia attend *Haupschule* more often than German children. A similar pattern is visible with regard to older children and their likelihood to start an apprenticeship after they leave Hauptschule.

In order to take a broader range of potential factors into account (e.g., cultural ones that are not included in the microcensus), the authors continued their analyses by using data from the GSOEP that allowed them to broaden their focus by introducing cultural factors, homeland orientation, and discrimination into the analyses.[14] Even though Alba, Handl, and Müller could not differentiate between different nationalities due to case number problems, similar multivariate models to the ones presented above show that immigrant children attend *Hauptschule* more often than German children. In addition, they showed that cultural factors do have an influence on the dependent variable even if socio-economic status, etc. are controlled for. Children of parents with weak language skills and children who attended school in the homeland for a while are more likely to end up at a Hauptschule than those children with parents that posses at least moderate language skills and those who attended only schools in Germany.

[14] In terms of the cultural factors, the authors built an index out of several variables measured in the SOEP – the parents' language skills and the cultural climate at home. With regard to the cultural climate at home, respondents were asked whether they listened to music, cooked meals, and accessed the media of the homeland rather than those of the host country. With regard to homeland orientation, respondents were asked if they transferred money to their country of origin, whether they identified themselves as Turks/Italians etc. rather than Germans, and if their child was at least temporarily raised in the homeland. As a proxy for discrimination the authors use the ethnic composition of people's neighborhood.

Another topic of crucial importance to assessing migrants' integration in Germany, is their labor market performance. The findings of Alba, Handl and Müller raise mainly two questions. First, can the disadvantages of migrants in the educational system also be found in the labor market? And if so, are the differences between migrants and Germans in the labor market completely explained by the differences in the educational success or do other factors intervene as well?

An article that tackles these questions using microcensus data is the one by Granato and Kalter on the persistence of ethnic inequalitiy in the German labor market (Granato and Kalter 2001, see also Kalter and Granato 2002). The authors observe that labor migrants and their descendents still occupy lower positions in the German labor market even though many of the factors that generated this phenomenon some decades ago (i.e., a high demand for low skilled labor) no longer play a role. The authors question the assumption that this is the result of discrimination against migrants. They argue, instead, that migrants' underinvestment in human capital is an alternative and more straightforward explanation.

According to the authors, migrants can be assumed to control less human capital than natives for several reasons. They can, for instance, owe homeland-specific human capital that looses its value through the process of migration. They may be more reluctant to invest in human capital because they might have plans to return at some point. They may have more difficulties accessing internal labor markets; or they may be insecure about the returns to human capital investments, due to a lack of successful role models and experiences within the educational system. In order to test which explanatory approach – the one that stresses the importance of migrants' underinvestment in human capital or the one that puts the main emphasis on labor market discrimination – is more suitable in explaining migrants' low status on the labor market, the 70% subsample of the microcensus is examined (ZUMA file). This analysis allows the authors to state that migrants are in fact disadvantaged in terms of their labor market position. In 1996, 62,6% of all Germans but only 12,5% (Turks) to 34,8% (Spaniards) of all migrants were employed as salaried employees. In addition, German workers held a qualified or executive function more often than migrant workers. The same holds true for employees. The authors continue by assessing the determinants of migrants' chances to work as an employee rather than as a worker using logistic regression models. In doing this, they control for age, sex, nationality and generational status, and – as an indicator for a person's human capital – educational degree. They can show that the first-generation had a smaller chance of being employed as an employee instead of a worker even after con-

trolling for their human capital. Things look different with regard to the second-generation. Except for Turks, differences between migrants' and Germans' likelihood to work as an employee rather than a worker disappear after controlling for individual human capital. Similar results can be found with regard to the dependent variable "position within worker segment". Things look a little different for the dependent variable "position within employee segment". In this regard, differences remain even after controlling for migrants' human capital for Turks, Italians and migrants from former Yugoslavia, though not for Greeks, Spaniards, and the Portuguese. The authors interpret these findings as a possible indicator for labor market discrimination for some ethnic groups, but stress that other factors (i.e. differences in migrants cultural skills that add to human capital) might play a role as well.

Both Alba, Handl, and Müller's and Granato and Kalter's studies nicely show the advantages and shortcomings of microcensus data in assessing migrants' integration in Germany.[15] The microcensus has a high data quality due to the fact that participation in the microcensus is mandatory. Besides, case numbers are big enough to allow studies of the integration of migrants differentiated by nationality and generational status. The scope of the available data is, however, rather limited since the microcensus covers only a small, though important, range of topics. Thus, it would be impossible to analyze in further detail the remaining effects of nationality – as Granato and Kalter have found, after controlling for differences in educational degrees using microcensus data. Alba, Handl, and Müller try to take cultural factors into account by using GSOEP data, but, as it was shown above, they are no longer able to differentiate between different nationalities due to case number problems.

Social and political integration

Migrants' social integration is altogether impossible using microcensus data. Even though social integration can be investigated using GSOEP data, there is surprisingly little and mostly descriptive research on this topic (for a newer study see Haug 2003). Münz et al. (1997) analyze, for example, migrants' contacts with Germans and base their analyses of social integration on a GSOEP question. It has been asked, to respondents with immigration background, how many German people they have among the closest 3 persons they relate to. The authors present results for migrants in general and separately for

[15] See for example the studies by Alba, Handl, and Müller (1994), Granato and Kalter (2001).

three subgroups (second-generation migrants, Turkish migrants, and female migrants). It appears that the share of migrants without any German friends is smaller for second-generation migrants than for all migrants (54% to 31% in 1991 and 57% to 43% in 1995) even though the share of second-generation migrants who do not have German friends increases in the time period under consideration (1991 to 1995), especially for Turkish migrants. It remains unclear whether the two points in time the authors have chosen for their analyses indicate a pattern; however, their study is significant as it gives at least about a taste of other indicators for migrants integration in the GSOEP, besides the ones that refer to the educational system and the labor market. In fact, in order to assess migrants' socio-cultural integration, the authors look at migrants' German language skills, intentions to stay in Germany, and self-identification as a German (Münz et al., 1997: 100 et seqq).

The GSOEP also allows us to look at migrants' political integration in terms of naturalization processes and political participation. With regard to the former, Diehl and Blohm (2003) have shown that naturalization is an option that is mostly made use of by Turkish migrants, whose adaptation is generally considered to be rather slow compared to other ethnic groups. Analysis of the determinants of a migrant's decision to naturalize shows that Turkish migrants are particularly prone to naturalize when their individual social integration increases whereas, for migrants from former Yugoslavia, integration and naturalization seem to be less closely related to each other.[16] The same authors show, in another study, that immigrants and Germans differ significantly with regard to their political interests and in the extent of their identification with German political parties. Migrants are substantially less likely to be interested in politics and to identify themselves with a German party; furthermore, it has been shown that this is not purely an effect of their lower socio-economic background (Diehl and Blohm 2001).

Problems and shortcomings: migration-related data in an immigration hesitant country

Researchers using data on immigration and integration in Germany are confronted with several problems. *First* of all, there is no reliable up-to-date census data in Germany.[17] Even though the stocks of the native and foreign population are regularly updated (on the basis

[16] Case numbers for EU migrants are too small to analyze their naturalization behavior separately.

[17] The last census is 15 years old.

of data from local registration offices, the municipal registries of births, marriages, and deaths, and the public authorities responsible for aliens) this only holds true for demographic data.

Secondly, official aggregate data often suffer from over or under-reporting of migration- related events. There are systematic errors in registration that undermine the validity of available data sets from year to year. It can, for instance, be assumed that official data underestimate the correct number of emigrants because of non-registration, or due to an unknown number of people that actually live in another country without giving up their residential status in Germany. The same holds true for return migration. Significantly large differences between the statistical offices of the countries of origin and destination can be found with regard to the registration of in and out flows.[18] This leads to an underestimation of out and return migration in the official migration statistics, and an overestimation of the immigrant stock, especially of the elderly, in the central registration of foreigners. Statistics on migrants' mortality are therefore rather unreliable. Migrants appear to have lower mortality levels than the native population, and this is almost surely a result of the biased official statistics, due to non-registered return migration of elderly migrants. Publications on migrants' mortality levels are hard to find.

Thirdly, official data, as well as the publications based on it, are not always reliable and informative when it comes to the correct classification of migrants' nationality, since immigrants' registered place of origin can differ from their place of birth or their citizenship. The nationality of migrants arriving via a third country may not be properly identified. With regard to migrants' integration in the education system or labor market, official data sets often lack a differentiation not only by citizenship, but also by sex or age, that would allow for more detailed analyses.[19] However, detailed tables and data sets can often be provided upon request by the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the States.

Fourthly, in accordance with the German concept of "foreigness", naturalized migrants, as well as naturalized ethnic Germans, are systematically excluded from research on adaptation. As mentioned above, in Germany, immigration has been considered as a temporary phenomenon, and German citizenship was understood as an ethnocultural rather than a political category. Accordingly, naturalization

[18] See Haug 2001 for a comparison of immigration and emigration statistics between Germany and Italy.

[19] Except for few special editions on structural aspects of migrants' integration, see Statistisches Bundesamt 2001.

policy was rather restrictive, and naturalization rates have long been very low. Ethnic origin was therefore a superfluous category. This no longer holds true, since naturalization rates increased after the recent legislative reforms.[20] The definition of "foreigner", however, that is applied in most of the data mentioned above, does not yet reflect this new reality.

The microcensus, for instance, does not contain any questions on respondents' origin. People who are German citizens but immigrated (or whose parents were immigrants) can thus no longer be identified as belonging to the foreign-origin population. Analyses of migrants' integration processes that are based on these data tend to be increasingly biased, since integration and naturalization seem to be positively related to each other (Diehl and Blohm 2003, Haug 2002). Fortunately, this does not hold true for the GSOEP. In 1984, respondents had been recruited on the basis of their citizenship as reported in the local registers (Pannenberg and Rendtel 1996). This was a reasonable sampling strategy, since naturalization rates were still very low at that time. Luckily, naturalized migrants are still included – and identifiable – in the survey.

These problems will become more and more acute in the future. An increasing share of the German population with an immigration background will be systematically made invisible in many surveys, even though there is evidence that naturalized migrants still differ from people without a migration background (Haug 2002, for France see Dumasy 2000). Particularly, the addition of elements of *ius soli* to German naturalization law (see above) will render the sampling procedures of immigrant surveys more difficult. To use screening procedures in order to identify migrants (a strategy that was applied in the New Immigrant Sample of the GSOEP) is very consuming in terms of time and money. This raises the question of whether an identification of the minority population by name as in the BiB Integrationssurvey (Haug 2002, Mammey and Sattig 2002) might become a viable option (Humpert and Schneiderheinze 2000).

Finally, appropriate data on immigrant groups other than the labor migrants and their descendants is rather limited. For instance, research on ethnic Germans (the Aussiedler, who moved to Germany after 1990 mostly from Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, or from other Central and Eastern European countries), is hard to conduct. These groups often face similar problems as the "foreign" immigrants in terms of their integration, but they can hardly be identi-

[20] Especially for the biggest ethnic group in Germany, the Turks (Diehl and Blohm 2003).

fied as immigrants, due to the fact that they often have German names and German citizenship.

Another group that is nearly invisible in most quantitative data sets are asylum seekers and their families. This also holds true for immigrants of the former GDR, who were recruited from socialist countries like Cuba, Mozambique, Vietnam or Eastern Europe and in part remained in Germany after 1989 (Mehrländer et al. 1996, Müggenburg 1996). The broad range of migrants' countries of origin, legal status and languages spoken, makes it hard to include all ethnic groups in standardized surveys. This holds particularly true for illegal or temporary migrants like those employed in IT services.

But even if population surveys covered the variety of immigrant groups living in Germany, subgroup analyses would lead to case number problems relatively quickly. The New Immigrant Sample in the GSOEP, for example, which includes migrants that immigrated after 1984 and thus after the recruitment curb to West Germany, is rather small and very heterogeneous. Researchers interested in studying small immigrant groups would have to collect and elaborate data on their own. This, however, is rarely being done, since it is a very time and money consuming process. Given the problems described above, the sampling procedures are rather complicated, especially if one wants to implement a nationwide survey. In addition, since most migrants belong to the first-generation, language problems can lead to biased results, unless migrants' are interviewed in their native languages. Bilingual interviewers, or at least questionnaires, should thus be made available (see Blohm and Diehl 2001).

Empirical social research almost always leads to some sort of data problems; researchers interested in studying migration and integration in Germany often have to cope with additional data shortcomings, partly caused by the fact that the permanence of foreigners through settlement and immigration was ignored for a long time. Today, people with an immigrant background make up an increasingly large share of the German population, and collecting reliable and informative data, that allow one to study the social processes related to this presence, is thus gaining importance.

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Summary

This article aims to survey the existing data on immigration and integration in Germany, as well as the difficulties that users of such data often face. It begins by introducing the evolution of immigration, the characteristics of foreign-origin population, and the basic features of German reception and integration policies. It follows an overview of existing official and unofficial aggregate and individual level data on immigration, emigration, and the size and characteristics of the immigrant stock. Finally, the article summarizes several exemplary studies that draw upon such information, and briefly discusses the shortcomings of the various data sources.

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Measuring immigrant integration: the case of Belgium

Immigration waves and types: facts and figures

Up to WWI, net migration flows into and out of Belgium have been negative (Lesthaeghe, 2000). At the turn of the century, emigration consisted mostly of impoverished Flemish farmers. Their main destinations, aside from Brussels as an emerging urban center and the industrial South of Belgium, were France and increasingly also the US and Canada (Caestecker, 2001; De Metsenaere, 1990; De Schaepdrijver, 1990). Similarly, early immigration into Belgium and Brussels had a strong rural component; but it also included skilled workers and traders from the neighbouring countries, as well as small groups of political refugees. Paradoxically, although the late 19th and early 20th century are known as the high times of nation building in European history, in the absence of inclusive social and political rights, national citizenship and immigrant incorporation were not an issue (Bade, 2000).

Ever since the 1920s, Belgium has known a positive migration balance (Lesthaeghe, 2000). The country attracted labour migrants (or so-called guest workers) from the neighbouring countries and from Central and Southern Europe, in particular Poland and Italy. Most immigrants were contracted by the metal and mining industries in Wallonia and in Limburg (Flanders). The economic recession of the 1930s however, put an end to the early recruitment of foreign labour. Workers were laid off in great numbers and Belgian trade unions supported legal restrictions on immigration, the institution of work permits, and the exclusion of migrant workers from unemployment benefits (Martens & Moulaert, 1985). After WWII and throughout the 1950s, immigration rates showed large annual fluctuations, reflecting the specific needs for temporary labour of the heavy industries and the ensuing stop-and-go immigration policies of the Belgian government (see Table 1).

Table 1 – *Growth of the foreign population in Belgium 1947-1997* (in thousands)

	1947 census	1961 census	1970 census	1981 census	1991 census	2001 population register	*1991 census (naturalisations included)*
Foreign population	368	453	696	878	901	861	*1.202*
% of total population	4.3	4.9	7.2	8.9	9.0	8.4	*12.0*

Table note. Lesthaeghe (2000; pp. 3-5); data sources: census data: NIS (1998); estimates including acquisition of nationality: Eggerickx et al. (1999); 01/01/2001 population register: Salt (2001).

From the 'golden sixties' onward, however, Belgian migration statistics show a large and steady intake of foreign labour (see Table 1). As in other European host countries, the massive intake of cheap migrant workers coincides with the development of the post-war welfare state, extending social rights and fair incomes to the national working classes (Deslé, 1992; Wieviorka, 1991). During the same period, Belgium extended the scope of labour recruitment to other Southern European (not only Italy but also Spain, Portugal and Greece) and non-European countries (mainly Morocco and Turkey). As it happened elsewhere in Europe, 'old' prewar immigration in Belgium had been almost exclusively white, Catholic and European. In contrast, the 'new' postwar immigration was much more diverse, with its large numbers of non-white, non-Christian manual workers from outside Europe (Lesthaeghe, 2000). At the same time, the settlement of new immigrants was spreading from the industrial belt to other urban and industrial regions in the North of the country (in and around the cities of Antwerp, Gent and Brussels). In parallel, the employment of immigrants was no longer restricted to the heavy metal and mining industries. Increasingly, foreign workers were also contracted by employers in other industries, construction, and menial jobs (Martens & Moulaert, 1985).

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the closing of the coal-mines and the rapid shrinkage of industrial labour in the South of the country marked the brutal transition to a post-industrial economy. In Belgium, the breakdown of the heavy industries was even more abrupt and less fragmented than in some other states (e.g. Germany or France). As most foreigners were employed in industrial labour, socio-economic restructuring has disproportionately affected the immigrant populations, leading to massive and enduring unemployment or withdrawal from the labour force (Lesthaeghe, 2000). Still, unlike in the 1930s and except for a short dip in 1980-1981, there was no significant turning point in immigration statistics. Instead, from the middle of the 1970s and well into the present, family reunification and family formation became the main sources of continuing immigration.

Family reunification has profoundly changed the nature of foreign populations: from temporary guest workers to residing households and minority communities. Permanent settlement and family formation gave rise to South-European, Moroccan and Turkish immigrant communities in Belgium. Today, the adult immigrant population is roughly categorised into four generations (Lesthaeghe, 2000): the pioneers are the first generation of guest workers who were contracted in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s; the intermediate or 1,5 generation are family members who joined the first generation in the late 1970s and in the 1980s; the second (or third) generation are their offspring who were born or raised in Belgium (usually including new arrivals at age six or younger); and the newcomers are mostly partners of the second generation who continue to enter through cross-border marriages. In this paper, we will use the term 'immigrants' to refer broadly to pre- and postwar, national and non-national, EU and non-EU immigrants and their descendants.

Due to the timing of successive waves and the differential fertility of immigrant families, major immigrant populations in Belgium have an atypically young age structure, as compared with the native population (Lesthaeghe, 2000). Thus, among Turkish and Moroccan adults in the 1991 Census, a majority of the second generation is under 30; the intermediate generation is still mostly under 40; and the first generation consists of a major age group over 40, a sizeable middle group in their 30's, and a minor group of newcomers in their 20's. The age distribution of Italians shows similar generational differences, with about half of the second generation under 30; and with a majority of the intermediate and first generations over 30 and 40 respectively. Hence, in comparing socio-economic attainment across communities and generations, one should take into account differential age structures (cfr. infra).

Table 2 shows the current sizes of the most numerous groups of foreign nationals in Belgium in 1991 and 1997 (cfr. Lesthaeghe, 2000: p. 5). Under the heading of (predominantly) labour migration, the 1991 Census counts 240.000 Italians, 142.000 Moroccans, 85.000 Turks, and 89.000 other South-European immigrants. Taking into account naturalisations and acquisitions of the Belgian nationality following the 1984-1985 legislative changes, the sizes of Italian, Moroccan, Turkish and other South-European immigrant populations in 1991 are estimated at 297.000, 153.000, 88.000, and 98.000 respectively (Eggerickx, Kesteloot, Poulain et al., 1999). Moreover, a comparison of the 1991 Census with the 2000 population register shows a marked decline in the numbers of the major foreign populations, which is entirely due to the greatly enhanced legal acquisition of the Belgian nationality. As distinct from other post-colonial host countries, Belgium has

not known a significant post-colonial immigration wave (currently estimated at 21.000; see Table 2). Most immigrants from the former colonies came in the 1980s and 1990s as part of an increasingly diversified inflow of refugees and asylum seekers (Lesthaeghe, 2000). The other most numerous categories of foreign nationals originate from the neighbouring countries. Finally, estimates of the numbers of undocumented migrants vary widely (Council of Europe, 2001). Most likely, the regularisation campaign of the last government will add further to the increased diversity of immigrant origins in the population statistics beyond 2000.

Table 2 – *Sizes of the most numerous foreign populations in Belgium by national origin 1991-1997* (in thousands)

National origins / refugee status	1991 census	1997 population register	2000 population register	*1991 census (estimates including naturalisation)*
Italian	240	208	200	*297*
Moroccan	142	139	122	*153*
French	93	102	107	*151*
Dutch	65	81	86	*96*
Turkish	85	79	69	*88*
Spanish	51	48	n.a.	*60*
German	28	33	n.a.	*54*
from Congo	12	12	n.a.	*21**
Refugees (all countries)	20	22	23	*24*
Asylum seekers (all)	15	12	36	*n.a.*
Total foreign population	901	912	897	*1.202*

* *Including Rwanda-Burundi*

Table note. Lesthaeghe (2000; p.5); data sources: census data NIS (1998); estimates in last column: Eggerickx et al. (1999); 01/01/2000 population register: Wanner (2001).

Integration models and policies

With the 'disappearance of work' and the emergence of a 'new second generation' in the 1980s (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Wilson, 1987), the integration of immigrants in the host society can no longer be taken for granted (in Belgium; e.g. Foblets & Pang, 1999; Ouali & Réa, 1994; Roosens, 1988). While immigrants are increasingly oriented towards equal opportunities, rights and access to social provisions in the host society, Belgians are often reluctant to accept the increasing presence and visibility of immigrants in their midst (Billiet, Carton & Huys,

1990). Still, we have to wait until the early 1990s for issues of immigrant integration to appear finally on the political and research agenda. In comparison with other North-West-European host countries, Belgium stands out by the belated adoption and diffuse implementation of formal integration policies. Only after the electoral breakthrough of the Extreme Right in Flanders in 1991, with a campaign which successfully exploited anti-immigrant feelings (Swyngedouw, 1992), and in direct response to the highly exposed urban riots involving immigrant youth in Brussels (Phalet & Krekels, 1999), the Belgian government and parliament finally agreed on the need for national integration policies.

The formal definition of integration, as it was approved in 1991, holds a middle ground between French-style assimilationism and Anglo-Saxon multiculturalism, with notably different policy practices and vocabularies in the South and North of the country (Martiniello & Swyngedouw, 1999). The common definition accentuates protection from discrimination, social inclusion and cultural adaptation in the public domain of the host country, while allowing for (and often actively supporting) diverse ethnic cultures and identities in the private domain of family and community life. In practice, the intricate institutional architecture of Belgium as a bi-national state complicates the effective negotiation and coordination of integration policies. Typically, policymaking is bogged down by fragmentation and competition between political agenda's, actors and competences across multiple local, regional, communal, national and European levels of governance (Favell & Martiniello, 1998).

Moreover, immigrant integration in Belgian society remains incomplete in the absence of formal political rights, extending access to full citizenship and (local) voting rights to immigrants. Since the mid 1980s successive legislative changes have greatly facilitated and effectively increased the acquisition of the Belgian nationality by significant portions of the immigrant population (Jacobs, 1999). At the same time, the volatile political balance of power between national communities and political factions has effectively blocked – until very recently – the access of non-EU immigrants to local voting rights. The issue of enfranchisement is especially sensitive in the region of Brussels, where foreign nationals outnumber a national minority of Dutch-speaking Belgians (Jacobs, 2000). Paradoxically, the formal enfranchisement of EU-citizens has not significantly affected the last local elections in Belgium (Bousetta & Swyngedouw, 1999). In contrast, the number of elected council members of non-EU origin has significantly increased. Consequently, the political representation of ethnic minorities in the region of Brussels is now on a par with that of the national minority.

Statistical treatment of immigration: data sources

Until the mid 1990s, public policies and debates with regard to immigrants in Belgium have not relied on (quasi) representative statistical data sources. Admittedly, this statistical void stands in stark contrast with a relative wealth of mostly qualitative case studies, that document the plight of immigrant families and communities in Belgium (e.g. Bensalah, 1994; Dassetto, 1996; Hermans, 1995; Timmerman, 1997). Fortunately, the late 1990s have seen the publication of a series of quantitative monographs, papers and books charting the trajectories, positions and orientations of major immigrant groups. The first opportunities and efforts to generate special survey data on immigrant populations in the early 1990s were a direct consequence of the rise of the Extreme Right in Flanders and the concomitant urban unrest in Brussels. Major special surveys have focused mainly on migration histories, family formation, education and socio-economic attainment (Lesthaeghe, 1997, 2000). In addition, the EU directives and the ensuing prospect of local voting rights for non-nationals caused a new interest in the political opinions, identities and languages of immigrant minorities, especially in the region of Brussels (Janssens, 2001; Swyngedouw, Phalet & Deschouwer, 1999). This review has a narrow focus on national census data and special survey data since 1990. It leaves out mostly qualitative case studies, generally less accessible administrative data sources, and cross-national general surveys (such as the European Labour Force Survey). In the following sections we will discuss the context and nature of data generation, the conceptualisation and measurement of immigrant integration, as well as some findings on integration outcomes and orientations among immigrants in Belgium.

One primary data source is the Census,[1] from which samples of anonymised records are available for research through an agreement of the National Institute of Statistics with Interface Demography (at VU Brussels). The census data offer basic information on household composition and age, labour market participation and employment status, educational and occupational attainment, housing and wealth. Specifically for immigrants data are available on: length of residence, current nationality and nationality at birth, country of birth and country/countries of schooling (Eggerickx et al., 1999). The obvious advantages of the census data are its nationwide scope and large numbers, and the possibility to compare immigrant and national socio-economic attainment. But there are also severe limitations. Both record and item non-response is higher in immigrant populations than in the na-

[1] 1981 and 1991; the 2001 Census will be made available in the near future.

tional population (3.4% overall record non-response; Stoop & Surkyn, 1997). More frequent language and literacy problems are one obvious explanation for it (census questionnaires are self-administered and use only national languages), the a-typical composition of immigrant populations is another (e.g. respondents with little education are over-represented). Moreover, the validity of immigrant responses to crucial questions (e.g. on education and occupation) is often dubious. In addition to language and literacy problems, some questions are not adapted to cross-border careers (e.g. educational systems in the home countries may differ from the Belgian system). Finally, the census omits crucial information that would be needed to analyse properly the emerging ethnic stratification of Belgian society. Thus, for reasons of privacy and political sensitivity, it does not include questions on language, religion, ethnic or class origins. Consequently, not only are we unable to disentangle the impact of ethnic and class origins on second-generation attainment, but also this second generation is rapidly becoming 'statistically invisible' (see Table 2).

Complementary data sources are special surveys that have specifically (over)sampled and approached immigrant minorities. The quality of data is greatly enhanced by: training co-ethnic interviewers for face-to-face personal interviewing; developing national and ethnic language versions of questionnaires; and closely tailoring questions, routings and response categories to reflect immigrant trajectories and orientations. In the 1990s, the collaborative efforts of several universities and ministries have generated a series of special surveys among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants.

(a) The 1991-1993 FFVP (*Family Formation and Value Patterns*) survey covers N=1700 women of Turkish or Moroccan national origin aged 17 to 49 in Flanders and Brussels. It was carried out by the VU Brussels and RU Gent IUAP (*Inter-University Attraction Pole 'ethnic minorities'*) and funded by the federal Ministry of Science, Technology and Culture (Lesthaeghe, 1997). Respondents were randomly drawn from the population registers of a stratified sample of municipalities (with N>100 Turks or Moroccans and with low, middle and high degrees of urbanisation). Non-response rates are 15% (5% refusals) for Turkish and 31% (16% refusals) for Moroccan women. Data are weighted to correct for differential non-response across municipalities. The thematic focus is on family formation (nuptiality, fertility and family structure), community building (migration, settlement and home/host country orientations), socio-economic attainment (language, education, segregation and labour market participation) and socio-cultural change (attitudes towards gender roles, child rearing, religion and modernity).

(b) The 1994-1996 MHSM (*Migration History and Social Mobility*) follow-up survey includes N=2750 men of Turkish or Moroccan national origin aged 18 and older nationwide (extending the IUAP with University of Liege; Lesthaeghe, 2000). Sampling and weighting are similar for female FFVP and male MHSM surveys. Non-response rates are 28% (11% refusals) for Turkish and 44% (17% refusals) for Moroccan men. The thematic focus of male and female surveys is largely similar, but the FFVP survey has more elaborate questions on family formation while the MHSM survey offers a more detailed reconstruction of educational and occupational careers, which includes pre-migration parental and individual ethnic and class origins.

(c) The 1997-1998 BMS (*Brussels Minorities Survey*) data cover N=1000 adult men and women of Turkish and Moroccan national origin, as well as a comparison sample of N=400 Belgian nationals, aged 18 and older in the Region of Brussels, which is the metropolitan area where most immigrants are concentrated (Swyngedouw et al., 1999). The survey was carried out by a consortium of research centers (CISB at VU Brussels, IPSOM at KU Brussels and ERCOMER at Utrecht University) and funded by the Ministry of Brussels Capital Region. Non-response rates are 20% (9% refusals) for Turkish, 26% (9% refusals) for Moroccan, and 31% (19% refusals) for Belgian nationals. Immigrant data are weighted to reflect the multivariate gender by age by education structure in the population (through iterative proportional fitting). The cross-ethnic sampling design is comparative, so that Belgian respondents are selected and weighted to match the structure of the pooled immigrant populations. Thematically, the BMS data is concerned mainly with immigrant and host attitudes towards ethnic relations, identity, language, culture and politics. In addition, a cross-national extension of the BMS involves the same minorities, comparative design and thematic questions in the city of Rotterdam (Phalet, Van Lotringen & Entzinger, 2000). In our view, combined cross-ethnic and cross-national comparisons are needed to arrive at a balanced understanding of related selection, treatment and adaptation processes, which explain more or less equal and open ethnic relations between immigrants and natives (Phalet & Örkeny, 2001).

Measuring immigrant integration: an interactive and multidimensional approach

In the political arena the term 'integration' is widely used to refer to a loose collection of policies towards immigrants and post-migration minorities. Looking across Europe, the political failure of hardline assimilationism and radical multiculturalism has resulted in a recent

convergence of national vocabularies and policy models (e.g. in France, Belgium and the Netherlands) around 'integration' as the default term (Favell, 2001). Although each host country to some extent reinvents its own history of nation building, the common concept of integration denotes the redefinition of national socio-political spaces to incorporate new immigrants. Thus, integration implies the selective extension to non-nationals of legal, social, cultural and political rights and opportunities that were once the exclusive entitlements of nationals. Notably, full social and political citizenship had only recently come to include the national working classes through the development of post-war welfare states in Europe (Deslé, 1992; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2001, 2002). Unfortunately, the political success of the concept of integration has not always been matched by its analytical and empirical merits in social science research. Part of the problem is precisely that key terms in the field of migration studies (such as integration, assimilation, multiculturalism, racism, ethnicity) are also used as operative tools in national policy making with regard to immigrant issues. Therefore, the term integration bundles analytic concepts together with normative notions or idealised projections of society, which are weighted with very different emotional and attitudinal valences in different groups and contexts.

Hence there is a need to explicitly define and theorise the concept of integration for the purpose of measurement and explanation across national borders. We will draw on recent reformulations of assimilation theory in debates over the 'new second generation' of non-European immigrants in the US in order to spell out a core concept and theory of integration (Alba & Nee, 1997). More precisely, we develop a qualified concept and theory of integration, which is at once interactive and multidimensional, and which incorporates challenges from segmentationalism and transnationalism as the major competing paradigms in migration studies (Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt, 1999; Portes & Zhou, 1993).

From an *interactive* perspective, the concept of integration refers to mutual interactions between (perceived) treatment and adaptation, which result in more or less harmonious or conflicted ethnic relations between immigrant and host communities (Bourhis & Bougie, 1998). Whereas host policies, institutions and societies constitute the treatment side of the integration process, differential resources, perceptions and strategies of immigrant communities make up the adaptation side of the process (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 1999). The interactive approach qualifies a deterministic notion of integration as a gradual shift towards parity/conformity with the life chances/cultural customs of the national population. Thus, 'straight line' assimilation theory in the US (Gans, 1973) predicts that the second and third generations of

immigrant origin will become socio-economically and socio-culturally indistinguishable from the native population (that is after controlling for social class origins). In contrast, and in line with a more general interactive approach of immigrant integration, segmentationalists in the US have predicted second-generation progress or decline, depending on the interplay between more or less resourceful immigrant communities and more or less welcoming contexts of reception (Gans, 1992; Portes & Zhou, 1993).

Furthermore, the integration process is best conceived as *multidimensional*. Major dimensions of integration in the European context refer to distinct aspects of an ideal conception of full citizenship (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 1999). Specifically, socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions of immigrant integration refer to the social, cultural and political rights of full citizens (over and above human and civil rights). The multidimensional concept of integration in European migration studies builds on Gordon's (1964) earlier conceptualisation of cultural, structural and identity dimensions of assimilation, which has been at the origin of much empirical research in the US and in Europe (Esser, 1980; Veenman, 2001). But researchers in the US and in Europe are studying different realities and have stressed distinct dimensions of assimilation or integration. Not surprisingly, given the centrality of race relations in the making of American cities, migration research in the US has emphasised structural assimilation, in the sense of ethnic and racial mixing, as a decisive branching point in the assimilation process. In Europe, migration studies have taken a more state-centered approach to integration, emphasising the political participation of immigrants as citizens in public debates and democratic institutions (Faist, 2000). Looking beyond different research traditions in the US and in Europe, assimilation and integration theories share the same theoretical expectation that distinct dimensions are functionally related (Alba & Nee, 1997). Thus, assimilation theory predicts that immigrant acculturation is associated with upward social mobility. Likewise, integration theory associates political participation with national identification (Faist, 2000). In contrast, alternative segmentationalist or transnationalist positions imply the decoupling of socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions (Bommes, 2002). More in general, a multidimensional concept and measurement of integration allows for the selective inclusion and exclusion of immigrants in different segments or institutions of the host society. Depending on their access to ethnic resources or transnational opportunities, some immigrants build successful careers without learning the language and culture, whereas others are fully acculturated yet socio-economically excluded from the host society.

Special surveys in European host countries with well-established integration policies – such as Britain (Modood, Berthoud, Lakey et al., 1997), France (Tribalat, 1995), the Netherlands (Veenman, 2001) and Germany (Weidacher, 2000) – have most often directly informed, and been informed by, national policy making. In the absence of coordinated national integration policies in Belgium however, the generation of special survey data has been dissociated from normative policy goals. One advantage of the political *impasse* in Belgium is that research has mostly been guided by an analytical approach, operationalising the interactive and multidimensional concept of integration outlined above. In addition to educational and occupational attainment and access to social provisions, Belgian surveys have extensively covered socio-cultural and political dimensions of integration. In comparison with neighbouring countries, Belgian surveys stand out by their inclusive coverage of 'ethnic' and 'transnational' aspects of family and community building, social mobility strategies, and immigrant cultures and identities. Lastly, the cross-ethnic design of the Brussels Minorities Survey is directly informed by an interactive approach, as it compares immigrant and host orientations towards ethnic relations within the same urban context.

Socio-economic attainment: some measures and models of ethnic inequality

The socio-economic dimension of integration is broadly concerned with the social inclusion of immigrants (and nationals) in the host society. Below, we will briefly discuss selected Belgian findings on residential segregation, educational and occupational inequalities, which document the socio-economic attainment of immigrants.

Residential segregation and perceived discrimination

One type of measurement of socio-economic exclusion, which has received much attention, refers to degrees and patterns of residential segregation. In comparison with other European cities such as Amsterdam, Paris or London, the metropolitan area of Brussels is characterised by higher overall levels of ethnic segregation (Breebaart & Musterd, 1995). It should be added though that statistical sectors in Belgium are relatively fine-grained, so that segregation indices may have been inflated in comparative terms. Furthermore, they differ between immigrant communities and regional contexts of settlement (Lesthaeghe, 2000): the lack of inclusion is most pronounced for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants; less so for South-Europeans; and least

for North-Europeans. Across immigrant groups, degrees of segregation are relatively high in Brussels and Flanders but much reduced in Wallonia, where immigrant settlement has been more dispersed in suburbs. Differential residential patterns are strongly related to socio-economic inequality, so that high proportions of immigrants and economic disadvantage (e.g. more unemployment, lower income levels, inferior quality of housing) tend to coincide in the same urban neighbourhoods (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2000). Moreover, the perceived ethnic composition of the neighbourhood is associated with subjective perceptions of ethnic discrimination by Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Brussels. Thus, immigrants who were more ethnically segregated, also perceived more discrimination against the ethnic in-group (Derycke & Swyngedouw, 1997; Swyngedouw, Phalet & Derycke, 2001). To conclude, rather than protecting immigrants from discrimination by strengthening ethnic community ties, as predicted by ethnic competition theories, residential segregation was found to aggravate ethnic inequality and perceived discrimination.

Educational attainment

Another measure of the socio-economic dimension of integration is concerned with educational attainment. Using the 1991 Census, an inspection of the observed proportions of Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants vs. native Belgians with little or no education shows gross educational disadvantage across immigrant groups. To a significant extent, this 'ethnic' disadvantage persists in the second generation (see Table 3). To assess socio-economic integration, the imported human capital of the first generation should be distinguished from human capital investments made in the host country. Italian as well as Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are former 'guest workers' who have entered Belgium mostly with low or no qualifications – except for a separate stream of highly qualified Moroccans who are enrolling in French-speaking universities (Neels, 2000). Importantly, first-generation immigrant women have even lower levels of education than men, reflecting large gender inequalities in the home countries, especially in rural parts of Turkey and Morocco. At the same time, second-generation women are rapidly catching up with, or sometimes even surpassing, second-generation men (see Table 3). Indeed, the overall educational progress of second-generation women stands in clear contrast with seemingly limited and uneven generational changes among immigrant men. Significant portions of the second generation, however, are still in school, so that their (more often delayed) attainment level is almost certainly underestimated (Neels, 2000). Interestingly, second-

generation achievement varies simultaneously between immigrant communities *and* regions of settlement (see Table 3). Thus, the Italian second generation seems to outperform Turkish and Moroccan second generations, suggesting differential social/cultural resources (or treatment!) between 'old' European and 'new' non-European migration types. Furthermore, regions of settlement do not only differ in the 'quality' of the first-generation immigrants they attract, with Flanders receiving the least qualified immigrants, and Brussels skimming off those with higher education. But regional opportunity structures also play a decisive role in enabling generational progress. Most notably, the qualifications of Moroccan men suggest some progress in Flanders, but not in Wallonia. The latter observation should be qualified, as the first generation, which serves as a reference group, is less homogeneously disadvantaged in Wallonia than in Flanders. More fine-grained measures and analyses of educational practices and school careers would be needed to find out how regional educational disparities may contribute to ethnic inequalities within regions.

Table 3 – *Qualifications by gender, national origin, generation and region: proportions of Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and Belgians with primary education or none*

Primary school/none *(% of total population)*	Flanders		Brussels		Wallonia	
	men	women	men	women	men	women
Belgian national origin	24.4	28.7	30.8	27.0	27.6	27.0
Italian 1rst generation	65.1	68.1	55.0	60.7	60.4	66.1
Italian 2nd generation	38.3	44.6	55.6	51.8	30.6	29.1
Turkish 1rst generation	65.2	82.0	60.3	75.5	55.0	74.4
Turkish 2nd generation	44.6	45.3	59.4	60.6	47.0	48.3
Moroccan 1rst generation	69.7	84.9	56.0	76.4	49.6	76.7
Moroccan 2nd generation	50.5	54.7	61.7	60.2	60.4	49.3

Table note. Data source: anonymised records from the 1991 Census (10% of Belgian origin population, 50% of immigrant populations) in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia

Looking beyond observed disparities at the end of the road, Neels (2000) used the MHSM survey data to model the educational trajectories of young Moroccan and Turkish men, while statistically correcting for truncation due to delayed attainment. From his models, it appears that the Moroccan second generation in Flanders and Brussels is making more rapid (but also more uneven) educational progress than their Turkish peers. More precisely, the lower overall attainment levels of the Turkish immigrant community (after correction) are associated

with a common 'avoid demotion' strategy of educational investment, reducing school failure and dropout at the cost of more ambitious non-vocational choices. In contrast, Moroccans in Belgium have typically favoured more risky choices for higher forms of education at the cost of more frequent school failure and dropout. The latter strategy results in generally higher (after correction), but also more unequal, levels of attainment within the Moroccan community. We conclude that major immigrant communities in Belgium are marked by persistent educational disadvantage. At the same time, census and survey data document contextual variation in educational attainment and progress across immigrant communities and host contexts. Extending an approach from segmented assimilation in the US (cfr. supra), contextual differences can be attributed to the joint impact of differential resources, local opportunity structures and 'ethnic' investment strategies.

Occupational attainment

The critical measure of socio-economic integration is undoubtedly the occupational attainment of immigrants. A number of Belgian studies have used census and survey data to analyse differential labour market participation, protection from unemployment, access to higher occupations, and self-employment. Using broad categories by national origin in the 1991 Census (Eggerickx et al., 1999), we have estimated the 'ethnic penalties' (Heath & McMahon, 1997) for the first and second generations of Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (aged 18 to 50) as compared with native Belgian workers (Phalet, 2002). Our focus is on the second generation, which includes all immigrants who are born in Belgium, or who arrived at age six or younger. In comparison, the first generation is a broad reference group, which consists of the older generations, an intermediate generation, and newcomers. Technically speaking, ethnic penalties refer to the odds for immigrants (vs. Belgians) of being (a) economically active (vs. inactive), (b) unemployed (vs. employed), (c) employed in higher (vs. lower) occupations, and (d) self-employed (vs. employed). Consequently, 'net ethnic penalties' are residual ethnic disparities after controlling for differential age structures (age centered, age squared) and qualifications (tertiary, higher and lower secondary vs. primary or none). In addition, all models control for family situation (single, married, widowed or divorced), and separate models are estimated for men and women in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia. Taken together, the analyses map the varying occupational destinations of immigrant communities and generations within distinct regions of settlement. Although regions share the same federal immigration and redistributive (taxation and welfare) re-

gimes, they differ considerably in their socio-economic opportunities and integration policies.

Economic activity. With few exceptions, immigrants are much less often economically active than native Belgians (see Table 4). In addition, the participation of Turks and Moroccans lags behind that of Italians. Overall, female participation is lower than male participation, with the largest gender gap among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. At the same time, second-generation immigrant women are more active than the first generation, in particular the younger first generation of 'imported brides' (Stoop & Booms, 1997). Conversely, second-generation men are rather less active than the first generation. On a cautionary note, second-generation inactivity is due in part to significant portions of Turks and Moroccans who stay on in school and postpone the transition to work (Neels, 2000). In general, withdrawal from the labour market has been attributed to the restructuring of post-industrial economies, which has disproportionately affected immigrant workers (cfr. supra). Mirroring regional disparities in economic opportunities, the gross reduction in economic activity across immigrant generations is least severe in Flanders, which is on the whole more prosperous and economically active.

Table 4 – *Labour market participation by gender, national origin, generation and region: proportions of economically inactive Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants vs. Belgians*

Economically inactive (*i.e. housewife, student, disabled, retired, other; % of total population*)	Flanders		Brussels		Wallonia	
	men	women	men	women	men	women
Belgian national origin	16.3	30.5	17.4	28.8	22.1	34.3
Italian 1rst generation	18.4	51.2	14.2	35.6	14.4	49.9
Italian 2nd generation	24.0	32.8	44.9	46.7	22.0	30.9
Turkish 1rst generation	27.0	75.9	19.7	45.6	22.5	75.0
Turkish 2nd generation	37.5	43.1	47.0	50.6	42.6	52.2
Moroccan 1rst generation	15.7	82.2	21.4	65.6	26.1	71.7
Moroccan 2nd generation	41.1	62.1	58.9	62.5	61.3	60.6

Table note. Data source: anonymised records from the 1991 Census (10% of Belgian origin population, 50% of immigrant populations) in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia

Looking beyond marginal distributions, we have estimated net ethnic penalties on labour market participation across communities and regions (Phalet, 2002). In line with expectations from human capital theory, proportions of economically active (or available) immi-

grants and hosts alike increase with age and qualifications. Furthermore, marriage significantly reduces the economic activity of women. Comparing immigrants with native Belgians however, ethnic penalties mostly persist after controlling for human capital deficits (i.e. age and qualifications) and marital status. In addition, the size of net ethnic penalties varies across gender, generations, communities and regions. While they are often zero or even positive for first-generation men, they are consistently (more) negative for second-generation men. Such evidence of male generational decline in economic activity is to be qualified in light of regional differences. Only in Brussels, with its advanced urban service economy, ethnic differentials are completely reversed between generations. But also in Flanders and Wallonia, ethnic disparities have widened across generations. Most notably in Wallonia, we find a segmented pattern of male economic activity, with marked ethnic disparity for second-generation Moroccans as opposed to parity for Italians (Turks are in between). To some extent, however, the lower activity levels of Moroccans may be due to their more often prolonged school careers. Finally, for immigrant women, net ethnic penalties are generally negative and significant in the first generation, but their sizes vary greatly between ethnic communities and regions. Most importantly, net ethnic penalties on female economic activity are generally reduced in the second generation.

Unemployment risk. Turning to the active population, we find dramatic ethnic differences in gross unemployment levels, so that Turks and Moroccans in Belgium are most exposed to unemployment, Italians are less and native Belgians the least (see Table 5). Overall, women are also more unemployed than men, especially immigrant women. But second-generation immigrant women are somewhat less often unemployed. In contrast, second-generation men are as much or more often unemployed than the first generation. Again, the loss of employment across generations coincides with economic restructuring. Accordingly, the fates of second-generation men differ between the North and the less prosperous South of the country, where native unemployment levels are also higher.

In their study of young Turkish and Moroccan men, Neels and Stoop (2000) find that ethnic differences in education, age structure and settlement pattern explain only part of the dramatic ethnic gap between immigrant and national unemployment levels. Phalet (2002) has extended the analysis to include Italians and women between the ages of 18 and 50. As predicted by human capital theory, younger (hence less experienced) immigrants and hosts alike are more often unemployed. But for immigrants, higher qualifications offer only limited protection against unemployment, so that significant ethnic pen-

alties remain after controlling for differences in human capital (i.e. age and qualifications). In contrast with gross unemployment levels, however, net ethnic penalties are mostly reduced in the second generation. Again, there is considerable contextual variation in size: they differ between immigrant communities, being larger for Turks (followed closely by Moroccans) than for Italians. But regional differences are at least as important. Paradoxically, Flanders has at the same time the lowest gross unemployment levels and the greatest ethnic disparities in unemployment risks. Apparently, Flanders is not only the most prosperous, but also the most ethnocentric region in Belgium. More fine-grained multi-level analyses of local contexts across regions would be needed to find out what economic or political factors may account for this 'Flemish exclusionism'. Possible explanations range from urban segregation and economic segmentation (e.g. the mines or the textile industry), over public ethnocentrism and the anti-immigrant attitudes of employers, to ineffective anti-discrimination policies and measures at the level of political and judicial elites. On the positive side, net ethnic penalties (not gross unemployment levels!) are less severe in Wallonia and in the region of Brussels. Finally, large gender differences in gross unemployment do not affect the pattern of net ethnic penalties, which is mostly similar for immigrant women and men.

Table 5 – *Unemployment by gender, national origin, generation and region: proportions of unemployed Italian, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants vs. Belgians*

Unemployment (*ILO definition; % of active population*)	Flanders		Brussels		Wallonia	
	men	women	men	women	men	women
Belgian national origin	4.2	14.7	9.5	15.0	10.8	23.3
Italian 1rst generation	12.9	44.4	17.7	30.2	15.9	45.3
Italian 2nd generation	14.5	43.0	17.6	24.3	15.0	38.5
Turkish 1rst generation	34.0	75.4	29.3	47.1	38.7	74.5
Turkish 2nd generation	34.8	73.5	35.1	46.5	47.4	75.9
Moroccan 1rst generation	31.4	55.2	31.6	52.5	33.7	58.6
Moroccan 2nd generation	31.3	44.4	41.0	46.6	41.5	57.3

Table note. Data source: anonymised records from the 1991 Census (10% of Belgian origin population, 50% of immigrant populations) in Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia

Most studies of labour migration in the European context have focused on various aspects of exclusion at the bottom end of the stratification heap. But the evidence of ethnic exclusion into inactivity, unemployment, or low-end jobs tells us little about ethnic differences in inclu-

sion at the higher end of the labour market. Socio-economic inclusion refers to the employment of immigrants in non-manual work or in higher occupations (i.e. the service classes), or alternatively to successful ethnic self-employment. Thus, Neels and Stoop (2000) have demonstrated the ethnic over-representation of young Turkish and Moroccan men in unskilled work rather than skilled or non-manual work, after controlling for ethnic differences in education, age and place of residence.

Employment in higher occupations. From the marginal distribution of occupational attainment in Belgium, it appears that immigrants are dramatically under-represented in the higher occupations, especially Turks and Moroccans. Women have less access than men, yet there appears a limited but overall progress in the second generation. Again, marginal distributions show no consistent progress, and sometimes even decline, for second-generation men. In view of the younger age of the second generation however, marginal distributions can be misleading. Hence our main question: to what extent is the limited access of immigrants to higher occupations explained by their younger age or lower qualifications (Phalet, 2002)? As predicted by human capital theory, age and especially qualifications of immigrants and hosts alike greatly increase their access to higher occupations. But ethnic penalties remain significant and large for immigrant men and women across generations, although their sizes are somewhat smaller for Italians than for Turks and Moroccans, and they are most often reduced in the second generation. Interestingly, net ethnic disparities at the top end of the labour market are smaller in Flanders than in Brussels and Wallonia. For the second generation in Flanders, therefore, the excessive unemployment risk is clearly the major hurdle, whereas in Brussels and Wallonia, ethnic competition over high-end jobs may be fiercer, in particular for Moroccans and Turks.

Ethnic self-employment. A separate strand of research on socio-economic attainment is mostly qualitative and has focused on ethnic enterprise as an alternative route to upward mobility. Suffice it to say that ethnic self-employment has remained a marginal phenomenon in the Belgian context (Moors, 2000). While levels of self-employment are generally low (ranging from 0.4 to 6.9% of the active population), they vary across ethnic communities, regions and generations (Phalet, 2002). In line with human capital theory, older and more qualified immigrants and hosts alike are more often self-employed. Estimates of net ethnic penalties are mostly (but not always!) negative. The pattern reveals complex setting effects, suggesting the existence of very specific ethnic niches or enclaves, especially in the region of Brussels. It is too early to infer whether first-generation immigrants will pass on their entrepreneurship to the next generation.

In summary, major European and non-European immigrant communities in Belgium experience cumulative and enduring socio-economic disadvantage. On the basis of the 1991 Census, net ethnic disparities are dramatic and persistent across generations for various measures of socio-economic exclusion (e.g., residential segregation, school dropout, economic inactivity or unemployment). Although ethnic disparities are also mostly significant at the higher end, measures of socio-economic inclusion (e.g., in higher occupations or ethnic self-employment) differentiate more between immigrants with lower and higher qualifications and between first and second generations, in line with predictions from assimilation theories. Although it could be argued that the census measure of immigrant qualifications lacks sufficient validity (cfr. supra), more sensitive measures of educational *and* occupational careers in special surveys yield very similar findings of net ethnic disparities.

Looking beyond generally large ethnic penalties in Belgium, our analysis also shows great and often decisive contextual differences between immigrant communities and regions of settlement. Thus, the Italian community is making more progress across generations than more recent non-European Turkish and Moroccan communities, suggesting an emerging segmented pattern of assimilation. Especially in the latter non-European communities, combined gender and regional disparities can tip the balance between second-generation progress and decline. Thus, second generation women are making more socio-economic progress than men, as they are rapidly making up for marked gender inequalities in the first generation. In addition, regional opportunity structures also differ. Thus, Flanders, with its more developed post-industrial economy, is at once more prosperous and more exclusionary than Wallonia, as it appears from dramatic ethnic disparities in spite of lower overall levels of unemployment. In contrast, Wallonia is less prosperous but also less exclusive, when immigrant and native unemployment risks are compared. At the same time, we find a segmented pattern of occupational destinations within immigrant communities, with second-generation Moroccan men faring worse than most other immigrants. Lastly, the metropolitan region of Brussels, with its most ethnically diverse and economically advanced urban service economy, shows a somewhat atypical pattern of reduced ethnic disparities in unemployment along with enhanced ethnic competition and niche formation in higher occupations and self-employment.

Ethnic relations: acculturation and social mobility strategies

In addition to the socio-economic dimension, the cultural dimension of integration has also received much attention. A central tenet of assimilation theory is the coupling of socio-economic progress with acculturation, in the narrow sense of cultural adaptation to the host society (Alba & Nee, 1997). Hence, the theory predicts a gradual shift from ethnic to host cultural orientations with increased length of residence and with higher levels of socio-economic attainment. Measures of acculturation in the Belgian context have been mainly concerned with the cultural orientations of the new second generation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. Across special surveys, questionnaire measures cover such diverse topics as cultural values and norms, gender roles, partner choice, child rearing, modernity, religion, languages, media use and ethnic relations between immigrants and hosts (Lesthaeghe, 1997, 2000; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003; Swyngedouw et al., 1999). The general picture that emerges from multidimensional and multivariate analyses is reminiscent of similar findings in the US, which have been qualified as 'bumpy line' ethnicity or segmented assimilation (Gans, 1992; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Thus, there is converging evidence of 'multiculturalism from below', blending or alternating ethnic and host cultural values, beliefs and practices. Typically, the cultural values of immigrants differ between public and private contexts, with an emphasis on conservative family values and cultural continuity in private life (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003). In addition, cultural changes are uneven across generations, gender and levels of education, so that second-generation immigrant women with higher education are the most open to alternate visions of values in the host society (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2001, 2003). Finally, ethnic communities differ in the degree of cultural closure or 'resistance to acculturation'. Thus, Turkish communities in Belgium tend to maintain higher levels of cultural continuity and consensus across generations, gender and levels of education, in comparison with more fragmented and conflicted Moroccan communities (Lesthaeghe, 2000).

Immigrant and host acculturation strategies

The diverse and uneven pattern of acculturation sketched above, is best understood from an interactive approach to immigrant integration. To document the dynamic and interactive nature of integration, we will briefly discuss the orientations of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and native Belgians towards acculturation and social mobility in Brussels (using the 1997-1998 BMS data; cfr. Phalet & Swynge douw, 2003). From an interactive approach, converging or diverging

immigrant and host acculturation orientations result in more harmonious or more conflicting ethnic relations. To assess immigrant acculturation orientations, Turkish and Moroccan respondents were asked to what extent they want to maintain the Turkish or Moroccan heritage culture and/or to adapt to the Belgian host culture in private and in public life. In parallel, host acculturation orientations refer to the extent to which Belgian respondents want immigrants to maintain the heritage culture and/or to adapt to the host culture. Importantly, respondents gave separate ratings to maintenance and adaptation dimensions of acculturation, first in the private context of family life and next in the public contexts of school and work. Based on Berry and Sam's (1996) widely used typology of acculturation strategies, balanced preferences for culture maintenance *and* adaptation are categorised as 'integration'; alternative preferences for one-sided culture maintenance (without adaptation) or cultural adaptation (without maintenance) are labeled 'separation' or 'assimilation' respectively; and a residual category (neither maintenance nor adaptation) is called 'marginalisation'.

Table 6 – *Preferred acculturation orientations of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and Belgian hosts in Brussels*

	Separation	Integration	Assimilation	Marginalisation
Belgian hosts				
public domain	3.1%	43.0%	44.0%	9.9%
private domain	25.8%	43.3%	27.6%	3.4%
Turkish immigrants				
public domain	18.2%	61.5%	10.5%	9.8%
private domain	40.5%	50.8%	6.4%	2.4%
Moroccan immigrants				
public domain	31.1%	47.4%	17.1%	4.5%
private domain	53.7%	40.1%	4.7%	1.6%

Source: 1998 BMS data.

As can be seen from Table 6 and in line with other findings (Lesthaeghe, 1997), Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Brussels opt primarily for integration in public life: in the context of school or work, they attach about as much importance to heritage and host cultures. In private life however, they prefer separation as much or more than integration. From their side, Belgian hosts are roughly equally divided between expectations of integration and assimilation in public contexts, but they are clearly in favour of integration in private contexts. When we compare immigrant and host orientations across con-

texts, Belgian hosts attach less importance to culture maintenance, and expect more cultural adaptation, than Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. But immigrants and hosts alike make a difference between public and private contexts, so that less cultural diversity is expressed and accepted in public than in private life. In addition, acculturation orientations are most divergent, and ethnic relations most conflicted, between the most disadvantaged segments of immigrant *and* host communities. Finally, relational outcomes also differ between public and private contexts. In particular, the accommodation of immigrant cultures in school or work contexts is a potential source of ethnic conflict: many Belgian hosts, as opposed to most immigrants, do not accept cultural diversity in the public domain. In the private domain, resistance to acculturation within immigrant families is the main source of ethnic tension: most Belgian hosts, as opposed to many immigrants, expect some degree of cultural adaptation also in private family life.

Individual and collective mobility strategies

According to assimilation theories, acculturation – in the sense of adaptation to the host culture – should be associated with upward social mobility. Along those lines, the acculturation orientations of immigrants and hosts have been associated with their social mobility orientations, namely their strategies to improve socio-economic position in the host society. Specifically, Turkish, Moroccan and Belgian respondents in Brussels were asked to pick and order individual (i.e. qualifications and hard work) and/or collective (i.e. family and community-based) strategies 'to get ahead in society' (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003). Table 7 shows commonalities as well as ethnic differences in preferred mobility strategies.

Table 7 – *Preferred mobility strategies of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and Belgian hosts in Brussels*

	Individual mobility	Family mobility	Ethnic mobility
Belgian hosts			
first choice	38.5%	16.8%	3.4%
second choice	17.7%	28.9%	7.4%
Turkish immigrants			
first choice	17.8%	14.1%	17.5%
second choice	10.2%	19.7%	19.5%
Moroccan immigrants			
first choice	35.8%	15.5%	9.9%
second choice	12.5%	18.5%	18.7%

Source: 1998 BMS data.

Running counter to the alleged primacy of individual mobility in modern societies, not only immigrants but also lower-class Belgians combine individual mobility with collective strategies. Specifically, family solidarity plays a significant role in the social mobility of immigrants and hosts alike. At the same time, individual mobility becomes more important, and family solidarity less important, with length of residence and higher levels of education. Interestingly, Turkish mobility strategies differ from both Belgian and Moroccan strategies. Not only do Turks prefer collective over individual mobility, but their collective strategies are also primarily community based. In line with existing evidence of cohesive Turkish communities (Lesthaeghe, 2000), many Turks in Brussels perceive individual careers as hazardous, and ethnic solidarity as a more reliable way forward. Lastly, we found that the acculturation strategies of immigrants have implications for social mobility (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2003). Thus, separation and integration are related to collective mobility strategies, whereas assimilation predicts individual strategy preferences. Apparently, family and community based strategies both depend on culture maintenance, although some measure of cultural adaptation may be required for successful community building. Overall, the pattern of findings offers qualified support for the expected associations between acculturation and social mobility orientations.

Political participation: identity and citizenship

In European research on immigrant integration, a distinct political dimension has been added. In particular, the political incorporation of immigrants as new citizens is central to theoretical reflection, political analysis and policy comparison with regard to immigrant integration (e.g. Bousetta, 1999; Favell, 2001; Jacobs, 1999). Yet, there is a relative scarcity of survey data and measures of the (most often informal) political participation of immigrants. A basic assumption of national integration models has been the coupling of political rights with national membership or identity. From an integration approach therefore, immigrants are expected to gradually shift from ethnic to national identities, and from home to host country oriented participation, with increasing length of residence and levels of education. Most often, however, immigrant communities extend enduring (informal) political attachments and investments across state borders. Consequently, their political identities and orientations are seen to exemplify alternative 'transnational' forms of citizenship (Faist, 2000). As a multi-nation state, Belgium is an interesting case to test the limits of national integration and the significance of transnational citizenship (Favell &

Martiniello, 1998; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2001). To document the political dimension of immigrant integration in Belgium, we have compared immigrant and host identities and informal participation in the context of Brussels (using the 1998 BMS data; Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw, *forthcoming*; Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002). In light of competing expectations from national vs. transnational approaches, our analysis addresses the following questions: to what extent do Turkish and Moroccan immigrants identify and participate politically across ethnic boundaries and state borders; and how similar or different are their political orientations in comparison with those of Belgian hosts?

Ethnic and national identities

In line with expectations from transnationalism, multiplicity is a defining feature of immigrant as well as host identities (see Table 8). When immigrants are given the opportunity to pick and order more than one identity category, most of them combine ethnic and national identities in the context of home and host-countries (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002). In addition, sub- and supra-national levels of identification also play a role. Interestingly however, immigrant identities are far less fragmented across local, regional and European levels of identification than the identities of Belgian hosts. For Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, multiplicity is a direct consequence of enduring identifications with Turkey or Morocco. Although ethnic identities are sig-

Table 8 – *Ethnic, national and other self-identities of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and Belgian hosts in Brussels*

	Belgian hosts	Turkish immigrants	Moroccan immigrants
National identities in home country *Turkish or Moroccan*	6% (5%)	95% (84%)	95% (78%)
Ethnic identities in home country *Kurdish, Assyrian or Berber*	—	2% (1%)	17% (11%)
National identity in host country *Belgian*	72% (49%)	60% (8%)	44% (5%)
Regional identities in host country *Flemish, Walloon, French- and Dutch-speaking*	72% (32%)	12% (4%)	16% (4%)
Local identity in host country *Brussels*	44% (14%)	7% (2%)	15% (4%)
European identity *European*	27% (12%)	16% (4%)	17% (6%)

Table note. Proportions are cumulative percentages of first and second choices (proportions between brackets are first choices only). *Source*: 1998 BMS data.

nificantly less important to more highly qualified and second-generation immigrants, they continue to be of prime importance to most Turks and Moroccans in Brussels. Overall, the evidence of multiple identities among immigrants and hosts alike lends qualified support to the notion of transnational citizenship in Brussels.

Informal political participation

A central claim of integration models, which has been challenged by transnationalists, is the coupling of national identity with political participation as complementary aspects of full citizenship in the host country. In Brussels, informal political participation was measured as the self-reported active membership of a list of ethnic (Turkish or Moroccan) and cross-ethnic (Belgian) socio-political organisations (Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2002). The list includes political parties and trade unions, but also service organisations (e.g. school boards, free time clubs), voluntary associations (e.g. religious or neighbourhood associations) and social movement organisations (e.g. anti-racist or women's movement). In support of national integration, we find that Turkish and Moroccan immigrants are more often involved in Belgian than in Turkish or Moroccan organisations. Also, the overall degree of immigrant political participation in the informal sphere does not systematically differ from that of Belgian hosts (after controlling for social-class background). Rather, the Turkish community in Brussels is more active and better organised politically than both Moroccans and Belgians. Moreover, ethnic and cross-ethnic forms of political participation are positively related. Hence, the dense network of Turkish associations in Brussels has an inclusive 'civil' rather than a narrow ethnic character.

In summary, the informal participation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants is strongly oriented towards the host country. This finding is remarkable in the absence of formal political rights for non-EU immigrants in Belgium. Taking together the findings on immigrant identities and informal participation, we find that strong and enduring ethnic identities go together well with predominantly cross-ethnic forms of participation in Belgium. Apparently, transnational identities are largely decoupled from active political participation. We conclude that national integration is still the most valid framework when it comes to the actual political participation of immigrants in Belgium.

Conclusion

This review has presented facts and figures about the migration histories and current numbers of the main immigrant groups in Bel-

gium. Major immigrant communities are 'old' South-European (mostly Italian) and 'new' non-European (mainly Turkish and Moroccan) labour immigrants and their descendants, as well as a more recent and increasingly diverse inflow of refugees and asylum seekers. Next, we have sketched the onset of Belgian integration policies, which coincided with urban unrest in Brussels and the rise of the Extreme Right in Flanders in the early 1990s. Over the last two decades, issues of immigrant integration have periodically reappeared on the political agenda. This sustained political interest has enabled major efforts to generate special survey data on immigrant integration in the 1990s.

From a cross-national perspective, the few Belgian data sources that are currently available for research have the comparative advantage of a relatively high quality and wide scope. Thus, the special surveys cover socio-economic, cultural as well as political aspects of the integration process, including extensive questions on 'ethnic' or 'transnational' aspects of immigrant communities, economies and cultures. Furthermore, immigrant perspectives have been contextualised (taking into account local opportunity structures) and compared to the perspectives of Belgian hosts (controlling for social class origins). But there are also severe limitations. In particular, the statistical disappearance of the second generation (due to rapidly growing numbers of naturalisations and acquisitions of the Belgian nationality) and the continuing neglect of the diversification of new immigration (with increasing numbers of asylum seekers or refugees from Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Africa) are causes for concern.

As distinct from special surveys in host countries with more established national policy models, data generation in Belgium has been largely dissociated from narrow policy targets. Instead, it has been informed by an analytical approach, articulating immigrant perspectives on integration from the bottom up. Specifically, the choice of measures and comparative designs has been guided by key multidimensional and interactive features of the integration process. The multidimensional concept of integration distinguishes between socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions, and allows for (partial) dissociations between distinct dimensions. In addition, the interactive approach is aimed at explaining more or less successful immigrant trajectories as a function of ethnic community, context of settlement, and ethnic relations between immigrants and hosts.

The main aim of our discussion of empirical measures and findings in Belgium has been to highlight the comparative potential for an emerging cross-national research agenda. To this end, we have focused on central contextual and interactive features of the integration process, which have guided the design, measurement and analysis of Bel-

gian data. The integration concept and measures have been simultaneously informed by competing approaches from assimilation vs. segmentation, and from integration vs. transnationalism, in the field of migration studies. To conclude, we will briefly summarise the main findings with regard to political, cultural and socio-economic dimensions of integration.

Measures of a political dimension of integration have taken into account transnational aspects of immigrant identities and citizenship. In line with integration theory, immigrants are mostly oriented towards political opportunities in the host country. Apparently, immigrant political participation is largely dissociated from enduring ethnic identifications with the home countries. Turning to the cultural dimension of integration, Belgian surveys have gone beyond the measurement of cultural adaptation and competence in the narrow sense. Instead, they have amply documented the multiplicity of immigrant cultural values and practices in various life domains, and the uneven character of cultural change across generational, gender and class divides within immigrant communities. While most Belgian hosts accept some degree of cultural diversity in the private domain, the public expression of ethnic cultures is revealed as a major source of ethnic tension between immigrants and hosts. At the same time, the instrumental role of ethnic cultures in supporting ethnic solidarity and overcoming ethnic disadvantage is worth mentioning. Taken together, the analyses qualify expectations of cultural assimilation or integration. and highlight often overlooked contextual and interactive aspects of acculturation.

Finally, studies of immigrant socio-economic attainment in Belgium have consistently found large unexplained ethnic disparities. Although net ethnic disparities are mostly reduced in the second generation, in line with expectations from assimilation theory, they remain significant and often quite large. As a multi-nation state, Belgium allows for crossed comparisons between immigrant communities and between semi-autonomous regions of settlement. As would be expected from segmented assimilation, the sizes of ethnic disparities show great contextual variation (after controlling for differences in human capital). Not only do ethnic community contexts matter (with the Italian community doing better than Turkish and Moroccan communities), but local contexts of settlement also make a difference. Thus, Flanders is at once more prosperous and more exclusionary towards immigrant workers than Wallonia, while Brussels exhibits its own pattern of ethnic competition and niche formation at the higher end of the labour market. More in general, simultaneous comparisons across immigrant and host communities are needed to map institutional, socio-economic

and ethno-cultural sources of contextual variation in the fates of immigrants. In all, comparative findings in Belgium reveal the intricate interplay of ethnic resources and local opportunities in more or less open and equal ethnic relations.

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Summary

Belgium, like its neighbours, has received pre- and post-war European and non-European labour immigrants and their families, whose children are forming an emerging second generation. Likewise, Belgium attracts an increasingly diverse inflow of refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants and EU free movers. As a multination state, however, Belgium is also unique. Specifically, it stands out by the late and diffuse implementation of its official integration policies, with considerable discrepancies in policy practices between the semi-autonomous regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. This review presents the main national data sources on the integration of immigrant communities in the 1990s, including the 1991 census and a series of special surveys. The main part of the paper discusses exemplary measures and findings pertaining to socio-economic, cultural and political dimensions of immigrant integration. The analyses document contextual variation in enduring socio-economic disadvantage, along with cultural pluralism and multiple identities in ethnic relations between immigrants and hosts. We conclude that the Belgian case has wider comparative relevance, as it demonstrates that the varying contexts of immigration *and* settlement, *and* the more or less conflicted ethnic relations between immigrant and host communities, make the difference between integration and exclusion.

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The socioeconomic and cultural integration of immigrants in the Netherlands

Approximately 2.2 million people live in the Netherlands who could be considered ethnically non-Dutch, either by their own birthplace or that of at least one parent. Altogether, they comprise about 14 per cent of the Dutch population. Three categories can be distinguished: a) the so-called 'classical' groups – labour immigrants and (post)colonial immigrants –, b) 'new' refugee groups, and c) immigrants from industrialized countries. These categories comprise about 50 per cent, 25 per cent and 25 per cent respectively of the foreign population. Taken separately, in 2001 the largest groups are the Turks (320,000), the Surinamese (310,000), the Moroccans (275,000), the Antilleans (120,000) and the Moluccans (40,000). They all belong to the 'classical' immigrant groups in the Netherlands. Those from the southern European countries comprise about 90,000 people, who have different nationalities. Even more diversity of nationality is found among the refugees, who comprise about 250,000 persons.[1]

Apart from the immigrants from industrialized countries, the aforementioned groups have a much lower average socioeconomic position than the natives. For this reason for the Dutch integration policy they are considered to be *ethnic minorities*, defined as 'those who originally come from other countries with other cultures, and who on average have a disadvantaged socioeconomic position' (Van Amersfoort, 1975, Penninx, 1988). The main question to be answered in this article is why the ethnic minorities lag behind the natives as far as their socioeconomic position is concerned. We will also elaborate on the question whether or not Dutch social policy is able to combat the social deprivation among ethnic minorities. We will therefore shortly describe the

[1] The people from (former) Yugoslavia are included, although a number of them came to the Netherlands as labour migrants.

immigrant and immigration policies of the country (section 2), and subsequently the social integration of ethnic minorities with the help of large scale survey data (section 3). We will try to explain the social deprivation of ethnic minorities by using a general model which is deduced from labour market research among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (section 4). Firstly, we give a short introduction on the evolution and characteristics of immigration in the Netherlands (section 1).

1. Immigration into the Netherlands

Although the Netherlands has been an 'open' country for a long time (for example, it received large numbers of French Huguenots in the 17th Century), it only became an immigrant country at the end of the 1960s. Since then the number of people who have settled in the Netherlands has overtaken the number of people who have left the country. The immigration flow has shown considerable fluctuation between about 40,000 and 130,000 people per year, while the emigration flow has demonstrated a stable pattern of around 60,000 people per year since 1953. The percentage of immigrants who arrived after World War II has accelerated from no more than 1 per cent of the total population in 1947, to 2 per cent in 1970, 3,5 per cent in 1980 and 6 per cent in 1990 up to 14 per cent at the present moment. The increase is the result of both the relatively high natural birth rate of immigrants and the ongoing immigration trends.

Immigration follows a well-known European pattern, characterized by (post)colonial inflow, recruitment of unskilled labour migrants, chain migration (family reunification and family formation), and the arrival of refugees in large numbers. In the Netherlands, decolonization refers to Indonesia and Surinam. The first large immigration flow was from Indonesia, which had been a Dutch colony until December 1949. Another immigration wave occurred in the early 1960s after the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia over New Guinea. Unlike the Eurasian immigrants from Indonesia, the Moluccans caused a serious integration problem. This group consisted mostly of former soldiers in the Royal Dutch-Indies Army and their families. Since the Dutch government assumed that they would return to Indonesia, they were kept off the labour market for some time and located in purely Moluccan districts of small villages, far away from the employment centers. Even in the 1980s they still had a very disadvantaged labour market position with an overall unemployment rate of 40 per cent and about 50 per cent unemployed youngsters (Veenman, 1990). After a period of specific labour market measures for Moluccans, their labour market position improved in the early 1990's (Veenman, 2001).

Two large immigration flows occurred after the decolonization of Surinam in 1975 and in 1979/80 prior to the expiry of the transitional agreement on the settlement and residence of mutual subjects (Lucassen and Penninx, 1997). At first, most Surinamese migrants were students. Gradually immigration increased and became more labour-oriented. When the economic situation in Surinam deteriorated, a more problematic immigration began. Student migration from the Dutch Antilles started only in the 1950s, and labour migration did not begin to increase until the 1960s, the numbers being relatively small. In the 1970s more women and economically inactive people began to take part in the migration process (Muus, 1983). Since all Antilleans hold Dutch citizenship, 'to and from' migration is high.

During the long post-war boom, the demand for unskilled workers increased while the supply of unskilled native Dutch workers was decreasing. The shortage of unskilled workers was compensated by the inflow of Mediterranean workers who were actively recruited from countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Yugoslavia and Tunisia. The total number of labour migrants reached 235,000 in 1970 (Penninx, Schoorl and Van Praag, 1993). The recruitment policy stopped during the first oil crisis (1973) but the immigration from the recruitment countries continued as a chain-migration, at first in the form of family reunification and later also in the form of family formation. Additionally, the flow of refugees and asylum seekers from politically unstable areas in the world also increased.

While chain-migration from Turkey and Morocco continued during the 1980s, the number of south European immigrants did not grow much after the end of formal recruitment and even experienced a decrease. Migration flows from the EU area remain within a small range, possibly due to the relative concomitance of the business cycle of European economies (Zorlu, 2002).

In the 1990s, restrictive immigration policies has led to a decline and relative stabilisation in the flow of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants. Obviously the restrictive policy had a certain impact on immigration flows generated by family formation and reunification. However, until very recently the overall immigration flow has not decreased. Immigration streams are now increasingly dominated by refugees and asylum seekers, whose inflow decreased since 2001 due to more severe admission rules.

Since the Netherlands is a comparatively 'young' immigrant country, the number of second generation immigrants is still relatively small. Obviously, the 'classical' immigrant groups have a higher percentage in the second generation (40 per cent on average), while only 18 per cent of the 'new' refugee groups belong to the second generation. The data fluctuate between groups within each category. In the 'classi-

cal' groups, the highest percentage exists among the Moluccans (58 per cent) and the Italians (52 per cent) and the lowest among the Antilleans (35 per cent). The latter can be explained by their 'to and from' migratory movement. Among the largest groups (the Turks, Surinamese and Moroccans) about 40 per cent belong to the second generation, most of them under 25 years of age. In the 'new' groups the Vietnamese have the highest percentage (30 per cent) and the Afghani the lowest (8 per cent).

In general, the immigrant groups are over-represented in the large cities in the Western part of the Netherlands. Roughly one-third of the population in these cities belong to an immigrant group from a non-industrialized country, while they constitute 80 per cent of the population in some districts in the old city centers. This means that the immigrant issue in the Netherlands is largely a 'big city-issue'.

2. The Dutch national policy on migration and immigrants

It took a very long time before the Dutch government recognized that the Netherlands had become an immigration country. Until about 1980, the authorities had acted on the assumption that guest workers were only staying on a temporary basis and would eventually return to their countries of origin, even though they were already being joined by their wives and children in large numbers. In that period the central government pursued an *accommodating policy*, partly aimed at sustaining the ties between immigrants and their own communities in the Netherlands. This course was followed even though the authorities believed that a certain level of integration into Dutch society was desirable. But since immigrants were expected to return to their own countries, the government had long clung to the notion that immigrants should 'integrate while retaining their own identity'. In 1979 the Scientific Advisory Council for Government Policy (known by its Dutch abbreviation WRR) proposed policy changes. On a structural basis attention was to be focused on the immigrants' socioeconomic position, which was deteriorating. As a consequence of this plea for an *anti-deprivation policy*, the Dutch central government no longer took an ethnicity-based and therefore compartmentalized approach. On the contrary, in accordance with the principle that immigrants form an integral part of Dutch society, the authorities started following more general policies and abandoned special policies for immigrants. More specific measures are only taken to benefit selected disadvantaged groups within the broader immigrant community, such as the long-term unemployed and young immigrants, in case that general policies turn out to be ineffective.

This policy was laid down in the 1983 *Policy Document on Minorities* (original Dutch title: *Minderhedennota*). The basic premise is that most immigrants and their descendants will stay in the Netherlands. The government, however, did not adopt a policy of assimilation. It actually chose to pursue a 'salad bowl' policy, which means that different cultures have the right to co-exist, although the Western culture dominates the public domain and therefore the core institutions such as education, the labour market and the social security system. In the aforementioned document it was also announced that the government was going to develop a policy geared toward the socially disadvantaged areas in the big cities, where large numbers of immigrants had settled. In doing so, the authorities turned the spotlight on the severe problems these cities were facing.

Even though immigration policy had become more restrictive, the influx of foreigners had not decreased, as became clear after a few years. While the 1979 WRR report concluded that 'migrants will continue to stay', the 1989 WRR report stated that 'they will continue to come'. For this reason, the WRR advised that a restrictive immigration policy be maintained. Moreover, the WRR recommended that proper integration measures be taken in relation to the newcomers, so that they could fully participate in Dutch society. Given the worsening socioeconomic position of those immigrants who had stayed in the Netherlands for a longer period, the council also advised taking more specific measures for their socioeconomic integration into Dutch society.

A change of policy came about with the publication in 1994 of the *Outlines of Policy document* (*Contourennota*). The perception that little or no progress was being made in combating socioeconomic deprivation, resulted in a new and tougher integration policy for newcomers. Moreover, there was a growing feeling that the traditional social democratic approach, based on providing support to disadvantaged groups such as immigrants, was creating a culture of dependency rather than the desired economic self-reliance. Policies almost exclusively based on government-provided support were replaced by a new *citizenship policy* that created the conditions in which self-reliant citizens could build up their own lives and take responsibility. There was a new emphasis on their obligations toward society, particularly their responsibility to build up an independent existence. The policy requiring newcomers to fully integrate into society, established in law since 1998, gave top priority to this obligation. This step put an end to the notion that the central government is solely responsible for providing support to immigrants. The emphasis is on shared responsibility; all parties have to pull their weight, including the central government, the municipalities, the trade unions, the employers' organizations and the immigrants themselves.

The greater importance attached to the role of local government fits in well with the process of decentralization, which began in the early 1980s. Prompted by the 1981 *Draft Policy Document on Minorities* (*ontwerp-Minderhedennota*), the central government provided extra money to municipalities for this purpose. The process of decentralization gained fresh impetus in the early 1990s, partly thanks to the conclusion in the 1989 WRR report that many matters cannot be addressed exclusively at the level of the central government. Among other things, decentralization meant that some of the funding of community-work programs was shifted from central to local government. Beyond that, additional funding was made available to local governments to provide new educational initiatives tailored to disadvantaged groups. The Policy on Big Cities is also worth mentioning. It is not specifically geared toward immigrants, but does center on socially deprived neighborhoods in cities. All in all, municipalities have many more possibilities to give shape to their own policies. This has led, for example, to the introduction of the so-called *diversity policy* by the municipality of Rotterdam, which was more aimed at promoting multiculturalism than the national integration policy. The main aim of the Rotterdam policy was to adapt to the changing composition of its population by giving immigrants, women and youngsters more influence on policy-making.

One exception to the growing competence of municipalities is the policy on immigration, which will remain the domain of the central government and partly even of the EU. Nevertheless, some municipalities recently indicated that they are prepared to deviate from national policy by refusing to participate in the deportation process of non-accepted asylum-seekers. This added to the already increasing number of non-documented foreigners in the Netherlands, resulting from the combination of growing international migration and increased restrictiveness of immigration policy. Given recent political development, this problem may well become more severe. The populist party of Pim Fortuyn emerged as the winner in the 2002 Dutch national elections and participated in the new government. The striving for 'closed borders' is part of the party's political programme. Given the difficulties in enforcing border control, an increase in the number of non-documented foreigners is to be foreseen.

3. The social integration of immigrants in the Netherlands

Since most of the immigrant groups are only represented by small numbers in the official statistics, it is impossible to present a complete picture. However, data on the four largest groups are such that we are

able to give representative and fairly detailed information on their social integration. Data come from the 1998 national survey SPVA (*Sociale Positie en Voorzieningengebruik Allochtonen*).[2] We are able to add information on the social position of Moluccans[3] and in some instances also on four refugee groups.[4] We will first describe the educational achievements, then the labour market and income position, social contacts with and social distance from native Dutch people and finally cultural orientation.

Educational achievements

Dutch society is developing into a meritocratic society, in which the achieved status of individuals is decreasingly dependent on ascribed characteristics, such as socioeconomic descent, gender and ethnicity. Instead there is growing emphasis on the importance of individual talents and competence. The educational system fulfills a substantial role in discovering and developing talent, both in the interests of the individual concerned and society as a whole. In a fully-fledged meritocracy ethnicity no longer has any connection with the educational achievements. That stage has not yet been reached in the Netherlands, as will be shown below.

There are various possibilities of determining the educational level of a population group. In primary education, for instance, the school achievements and the school-leaving tests can be considered. In secondary education the entrance level can be used as an indicator, but the school achievements and the transfer figures are also useful indicators. The dropout rate (i.e. the proportion of students who fail to gain any secondary education certificate) deserves special attention. Finally the degree of participation in higher vocational and university education is of importance, as well as the overall picture of final examination certificates obtained.

[2] This survey is a co-production of the Institute for Sociological and Economic Research (ISEO) of the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) in The Hague. The survey, subsidized by the Ministry of the Interior (Directorate for Integration Policy), has 22,398 respondents (6,024 Turks, 5,622 Moroccans, 4,771 Surinamese, 2,442 Antilleans, and 3,539 native Dutch). They were randomly chosen in 13 cities, throughout the Netherlands. Interviews on the household characteristics were held with the heads of households, and on individual characteristics with every member of the household, aged 13 and above.

[3] Data come from a nation-wide survey among Moluccans in the Netherlands, carried out by the Institute for Sociological and Economic Research (ISEO) of the Erasmus University Rotterdam (Veenman, 2001).

[4] Data come from a large scale survey among immigrants from Afghanistan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Iran and Somalia, carried out by the Institute for Applied Social Research (ITS) of Nijmegen University (Van den Tillaart et al., 2000).

On all these indicators the four largest immigrant groups clearly lag behind the native Dutch, although to a different extent per group: the Turks and Moroccans are the furthest behind, while the Surinamese and the Antilleans occupy a position between the Turks and Moroccans on the one hand and the native Dutch on the other. We shall use the two strongest indicators as an example; the educational qualifications of the total populations (15-65 years), and the educational attainment of young people who are still at school.

Recent data (1998) on the *educational qualifications* of immigrant groups demonstrate that 75 per cent of Moroccans only have primary education or less (almost 50 per cent have had no formal education), while about 65 per cent of Turks only have primary education (almost 30 per cent have no education). Thirty per cent of Surinamese and Antilleans only have primary education, compared with 18 per cent of the indigenous Dutch. Thus, although the Surinamese and Antilleans have higher educational qualifications than the Turks and Moroccans, they still lag behind the indigenous Dutch. Almost 55 per cent of the native Dutch have at least a senior secondary education diploma, compared with about 40 per cent of the Surinamese and the Antilleans (the latter most closely approximate Dutch education levels).

In comparison with the Surinamese and the Antilleans, a lower percentage of Moluccans have no formal education and a lower percentage have higer education, which implies that they are strongly concentrated in primary and secondary education (Veenman, 2001). We underline that the Moluccans have a much higher percentage of second generation in the category 15-65 years than the other immigrant groups (respectively 58 per cent and 40 per cent). At the moment of their arrival in the Netherlands, the four refugee groups had an average higher educational level than the labour migrants in the 1960s and 1970s. About 27 per cent have a diploma from higher vocational colleges or a university education. The percentage of highly educated is higher in particular among Afghanis (50 per cent) and Iranians (32 per cent). Few refugees participate in Dutch education.

In each minority group women lag behind men in educational achievements. A higher percentage of women are on the lower educational levels, a lower percentage on the higher levels, although the differences are small among the Antilleans.

Previous indications concern mostly the first generation, which is more numerous in most of the immigrant groups. Therefore, the educational attainment of young people must be examined separately (Table 1).

The educational levels of young people are higher than those of their elders. This is true of all groups, including the native Dutch. It does not alter the fact that immigrant youths still lag behind their native peers.

Table 1 – *Educational attainment of immigrant pupils and native Dutch pupils (15-30 years), 1998*

(%)	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	native Dutch
Primary Education	2	2	1	1	0
Junior Secondary Education	37	40	25	25	14
Senior Secondary Education and Grammar Schools	42	44	45	29	38
Higher Vocational Colleges and University Education	19	14	28	45	48
(N =)	*393*	*385*	*505*	*309*	*223*

Source: ISEO/SCP, SPVA 1998.

Neither does it change the pattern: Antilleans most closely approximate Dutch education levels, while the Moroccans and the Turks are the most disadvantaged.[5] The young Moluccans, belonging to the second and even third generation, compare most with the Turks and Moroccans. This indicates that integration is not necessarily a linear process, in which the next generation improves the achievements of the former generation (Veenman, 2001). Again, women lag behind men in all immigrant groups, with the greatest differences among the Surinamese and Antilleans.

In addition to the information given above, it should be added that immigrants also compare unfavourably with the native Dutch as regards the *dropout rates*. Of the youth aged between 15 and 30 years who have left formal education, some 50 per cent of the Turks and 55 per cent of the Moroccans failed to gain a secondary education degree. This applies to 20 per cent of Antilleans, including many young people who only started to participate in Dutch education at a later age. The relatively high proportion of newly arrived immigrant school entrants among the Antilleans is connected with the freedom of residence enjoyed by this population group in the Netherlands, as the Antilles were part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. For the Surinamese the dropout rate is 25 per cent, while for the native Dutch between 15 and 30 years of age it is under 10 per cent. Moluccans compare most closely with the Antilleans: 20 per cent dropouts. We emphasize that most of these dropouts have a disadvantaged starting position in the labour market.

[5] The high percentage of Antilleans in higher education may be somewhat biased by the fact that large cities are overrepresented in the survey, while most institutions for higher education are found in these cities and the Antillean population is somewhat underrepresented in these cities, compared with the other immigrant groups.

Empirical research shows that several factors are of special importance in explaining differences in educational achievements. These factors are:
- migration characteristics,
- socioeconomic status (the so-called SES-factor),
- cultural aspects,
- school factors.

Migration characteristics are connected with the language problems of immigrants, their restricted knowledge of Dutch society in general and the formal educational system in particular, and also with the moment an individual arrives in the Netherlands. Young people who do not participate in the Dutch educational system from the first year on, appear to have a difficult time 'catching up' at school. Many of them also have great difficulty in acquiring the Dutch language and this prevents the start of the learning process. But even those immigrants who speak Dutch well and are familiar with the school system, still tend to lag behind the native Dutch. This indicates that factors other than the migration characteristics have their influence on educational achievements. The first one to mention is the fact that many minority youths are from the *lowest socioeconomic strata*. Although the Netherlands seems to be becoming a meritocratic society, the SES-factor is still strongly correlated with achievement levels. However, even minority children with good language skills, who enrol in the Dutch educational system early, perform less well at school than indigenous Dutch children of the same age, gender, ánd social class (Martens, Roelandt and Veenman, 1991). So it would appear that *cultural aspects* also contribute to lower performance among immigrant children. This is shown by recent research: although the educational ambitions are often high, particularly with the parents, there are cultural charcteristics which thwart the actual success at school. This applies, for example, to the attitude adopted by traditional islamic parents with regard to the career of their daughters and the expectations which they nurture of their sons: they are expected to demonstrate their adulthood at a fairly young age by taking upon themselves the care for a family. In many cases this leads to early school leaving (Veenman, 1996a,b,c). Finally, there are strong indications that many *Dutch schools* are not really effective in combatting the disadvantageous educational position of immigrant children. Recent policy reforms are directed at improving the quality of these schools, by spending more money on them and by providing them with better equipment and facilities.

It is noteworthy that the aforementioned factors may explain the differences in educational achievement between ethnic minorities and

the native Dutch, as well as those between the various ethnic minorities. Turks and Moroccans, who lag behind most, have the lowest socio-economic status, the largest 'cultural distance', and the least acquaintance with Dutch society and the Dutch language (since Surinam and the Antilles are (former) Dutch colonies with the same educational system as in the Netherlands). Furthermore, because of their residential distribution, Turks and Moroccans have the highest concentration in urban schools in the older centers of the largest cities, which may well be another harmful factor. Within immigrant groups, cultural aspects seem to be relevant for the explanation of the disadvantaged position of women. Finally, migration factors are far less important for the second than for the first generation, which certainly helps to explain why the second generation have better educational achievements than the first generation.

Labour market position

The development into a meritocratic society does not apply exclusively to education. Selection processes in the labour market concentrate less and less on ascribed characteristics and more and more on achieved characteristics, in particular on the level of education achieved. Given the educational differences mentioned earlier, one would expect certain minority groups to be especially disadvantaged in the labour market. Indeed, *unemployment rates* (based on registration at the Employment Office) among the largest immigrant groups were in 1998 indeed at least three times as high as among the native Dutch. The pattern is well-known: Moroccans and Turks have the highest unemployment rates (18 per cent), while Surinamese and Antilleans (respectively 10 and 12 per cent) still have higher rates than the native Dutch (4 per cent).

Moluccans compare most closely with the native Dutch (4 per cent was unemployed in 2000). Despite their relatively high educational achievements, the four refugee groups show very high unemployment rates (50% on average). The Afghani, with the shortest average stay in the Netherlands (4.5 years) tower above all the others with 70% unemployment in 1999-2000.

Women have higher unemployment rates than men, among the native Dutch as well as among immigrants. Morevoer, there are indications that working women have lower average job levels than men and also have higher general inactivity rates (which means that a relatively high percentage of the immigrant women do not appear in the labour market at all or disappear fairly quickly when they do not succeed in getting a job).

With regard to the *duration of unemployment*, it is remarkable that 60 percent of unemployed Turks and Moroccans and half the unemployed Surinamese and Antilleans had been unemployed for over 2 years, compared with almost 45 per cent of the unemployed native Dutch. We add that among all ethnic groups, men have a higher percentage of long-term unemployed than women. The latter is probably due to 'discouragement effects', which lead women to withdraw sooner from the labour market when their unemployment seems lasting.

The disadvantaged position of immigrants in the Dutch labour market also appears from data on the *workers' position*. They more often have temporary instead of permanent jobs compared with the indigenous Dutch, they have less job promotion opportunities and lower quality work. Moreover, there is a significant difference in job levels as is shown in Table 2.

Table 2 – *Job levels among immigrant workers and native Dutch workers (15-65 years), 1998*

(%)	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	native Dutch
Very simple tasks	28	33	14	12	6
Simple tasks	46	42	36	34	27
Medium-level jobs	19	19	33	34	33
High-level jobs	6	5	12	14	24
Scientific activities	1	1	4	7	9
(N =)	*1.169*	*871*	*1.659*	*757*	*1.418*

Source: ISEO/SCP, SPVA 1998.

It is not difficult to recognize the pattern: a high percentage of the Turks and Moroccans are on the lower job levels, a low percentage are on the higher levels. The opposite holds true for the native Dutch, while the Surinamese and Antilleans are in-between. Moluccans now compare most closely with the Surinamese. The pattern just described applies to women as well as to men, although Moroccan women stand out with a very high percentage on the lowest job levels. Antillean women most closely approximate the pattern of the Dutch women.

Notwithstanding the high unemployment rates among ethnic minorities, *labour income* is the most important source of income for all groups (be it more for the native Dutch than for the immigrant groups). Given the data in Table 2 on the workers' job levels, it comes as no surprise that the native Dutch have higher average earnings than the minority groups. The complex tax and subsidy system in the Netherlands makes disposable income the best way to compare the income of indi-

viduals and groups. Expressed in euro, their average net hourly wage in 1998 was € 8.65, while the Surinamese and the Antilleans most closely approximate to the native Dutch with € 7.30, followed by the Turks (€ 6.55), and the Moroccans (€ 6.45). Again, Moluccans are comparable with the Surinamese and the Antilleans and therefore earn less than native Dutch workers, and more than Turks and Moroccans. On the basis of regression analysis it was found that immigrants' lower earnings can partly be explained by *indirect* wage discrimination (meaning: different job levels for those with equal educational achievements), but not by *direct* wage discrimation (meaning: different wages for those on the same job level). This is probably due to the Dutch system of collective wage agreements in almost every sector (Niesing and Veenman, 1990; Hartog and Vriend, 1990, Dagevos, Martens and Verweij, 1996). Recent research among second generation immigrants shows a sharp decrease in indirect wage discrimination, which may indicate the continuing development of meritocracy in the Netherlands (Van Ours and Veenman, 2002).

Although there are some differences in the *level of support* that various groups receive from the government when they are not working (differences induced by factors such as work history, family size and family structure), immigrant groups do not appear to be in a disadvantageous position with respect to government assistance. Because immigrants are more likely to have larger families and/or be part of a lone-parent household than indigenous Dutch households, they are likely to qualify for relatively generous income support. Nevertheless, the average immigrant household has only about 60 per cent of the Dutch disposable income.

Besides the socioeconomic position, social contacts and cultural orientation are decisive for the degree of social integration. This can be shown schematically by the following figure (Veenman, 1994).



Up to now we have discussed the formal participation in education, labour market and social security and therefore were able to sketch the socioeconomic position of immigrant groups in the Netherlands. We will now elaborate on their ethnic-cultural position, and thus on the informal participation (contacts with the native Dutch outside the formal institutions) and on their cultural orientation. Again, we will use data from the SPVA-1998.

Social contacts and social distance

The pattern discovered during the description of the socioeconomic position emerges again when we look at the immigrants' *social contacts* with the native Dutch during leisure time. More than 50 per cent of the Antilleans allege that they often have contact with native Dutch people, and 45 per cent state that they even have more contact with the native Dutch than with other Antilleans. In this respect they are ahead of all other immigrant groups. Among the Surinamese 41 per cent report having frequent contact with the native Dutch, while 21 per cent say they have more contact with the native Dutch than with fellow Surinamese. The Turks and Moroccans have less contact; only 14 per cent report having frequent contact with native Dutch people during leisure time and respectively 10 and 13 per cent allege having more contact with them than with people from their own population group. Moluccans compare with the Turks and Moroccans in this respect. In each immigrant group young people have more contact with the native Dutch than older people and the same goes for the more highly educated compared with the less educated.

Concerning interethnic marriages, the Antilleans show the highest percentage (60), followed by the Surinamese (38 per cent). The Turks and the Moroccans (6 and 8 per cent respectively) follow with a much lower percentage (Dominguez Martinez, Groeneveld and Kruisbergen, 2002).

The concept of *social distance* connects informal participation to cultural orientation, since it relates to the appreciation of the social contacts with the native Dutch. We measured social distance with questions on the appreciation of native Dutch friends and a native Dutch partner for one's children. Summarizing the results, we find that the Turks and Moroccans have a much greater social distance from the native Dutch than the Surinamese and the Antilleans (Martens, 1999). The Moluccans now compare most closely with the latter (Veenman, 2001).

Cultural orientation

Social contact and social distance may be related to differences in language (relevant for the Turks and Moroccans and less for the Surinamese and Antilleans), and certainly also to differences in culture. In trying to measure the *cultural orientation* of immigrants and native Dutch people, we used a scale for modernization. This scale contains several dimensions: individualization, democratization, secularization, emancipation, and the development of 'modern opinions' on topics such as divorce, abortion, euthanasia, etc. In general, the native Dutch seem

to be the most 'modernized', followed by the Surinamese and the Antilleans. The Turks and Moroccans appear to be far less 'modernized' (Martens, 1999). The Moluccans occupy a position between the Turks and Moroccans on the one hand and the Surinamese and Antilleans on the other, closer towards the latter than towards the former. In every group young people appear to be more 'modernized' than older people, and higher educated more than less educated. A recent study on the relationship between the socioeconomic position and the ethno-cultural position of immigrants indicates that education is a variable: it is the catalyst for participation in the process of modernization as well as in the labour market (Odé, 2002).

All in all the indicators used to measure immigrants' social integration in Dutch society reveal a clear pattern: the Antilleans and the Surinamese are well ahead of the Turks and Moroccans, while the Moluccans occupy a position in-between (although they already have a third generation at school). The fairly strong correlation between the different dimensions of integration indicates the robustness of the concept. The data on the four refugee groups are too restricted to really use them in our analysis.

4. A general model to explain the immigrants' disadvantaged position

In section 3 we have discussed some factors that may explain the immigrants' disadvantaged educational achievements. We will now elaborate on the explanation of their disadvantaged position in the labour market, and to that end five hypotheses will be discussed, that are used in Dutch labour market research on ethnic minorities. The first two relate to labour demand, the third emphasizes the selection practices of Dutch employers, the fourth is on worker quality and the wage that workers at least want to earn (the so-called reservation wage), and the last one puts an emphasis on cultural competence and social networks as relevant supply characteristics.

Aggregate demand

The essence of the aggregate demand explanation is that the supply of minority labour is at the back of an imaginary hiring queue, which implies that when aggregate demand decreases (during recessions), the immigrant supply is disproportionately left without a job. This 'job competition model' (Thurow, 1975) assumes a rigid wage structure; workers at the end of the queue are unable, or unwilling, to increase their attractiveness to employers by accepting lower wages.

This hypothesis gains empirical support by the fact that during the period of relatively high immigrant unemployment there was indeed a slackening demand in the Netherlands. What remains to be explained is why ethnic minorities are at the end of the queue. We will turn to this question when we elaborate on supply characteristics.

Mismatch

The second type of demand-side explanation is a mismatch theory which posits that the immigrants' unemployment problem is not (or not only) that of being last in line, but (also) of being in the wrong place in the labour market. The argument is that immigrants are attached to particular industries, jobs or occupations, and that labour demand in these industries, jobs or occupations has decreased disproportionately in the last decades (Bell, 1973, Sassen, 1991). Analyses of the recent Dutch recessions have shown that some industries and jobs were indeed affected more than others, and that these were areas within which immigrant workers (even the younger ones) were highly overrepresented. This tallies with the theory, but a full explanation according to this theory requires an account of why demand has shifted, and of the immobility of the negatively affected minority workers. Traditional and cultural factors may be at work here, but the attachment to certain sectors of the labour market may also be due to various forms of exclusion from other segments. This brings us to the selection practices of Dutch employers as well as the relevance of a 'skills mismatch' hypothesis.

Selection practices

Explanations of massive immigrant unemployment that emphasize the importance of Dutch employers' selection practices, generally point to one of two phenomena: (a) direct racial discrimination, in the sense of Gary Beckers' concept 'taste for discrimination', and (b) indirect, unconscious discrimination, in many cases a consequence of ethnocentrism. Whatever the exact reason for the discrimination, it is always to the immediate disadvantage of ethnic minorities. Its limiting of access to (attractive) jobs relegates immigrants to a position even further back in the hiring queue. Empirical studies, focusing on the existence or not of labour market discrimination, have mostly answered in the affirmative. These studies have made use of various methods, such as 'situation tests', interviews and questionnaires, direct observation of selection procedures, and 'profile analysis' (e.g. Bovenkerk, 1977, 1995, Van Beek, 1993, Veenman, 1990, 1995). Although inconclusive about the extent to which discrimination affects the rate of im-

migrant unemployment, the results of statistical analyses do indicate that discrimination does have a significant influence.

Inadequate qualifications

The first supply-side explanation for massive immigrant unemployment emphasizes that ethnic minorities generally have inadequate qualifications, and at the same time cling to reservation wages which impede their chances of finding a job (Niesing, Van Praag and Veenman, 1994). This explanation is to some extent supported by covariant data on educational achievements and language proficiency. In addition to which, the reservation wages of immigrant job-seekers have, as predicted, been found to have a negative influence on their employment opportunities. This suggests that the theory is valid. However, multivariate analysis indicates that only one-third of the difference in Dutch and immigrant unemployment rates can be explained by the educational level, occupation, gender, age, and the regional labour market conditions (Niesing and Veenman, 1990).

Social capital and cultural capital

In terms of the Human Capital theory, the former explanation involves economic capital. Another supply-side explanation concerns, as the French sociologist Bourdieu puts it, social capital and cultural capital. The essence is that immigrants are not integrated (enough) into Dutch society, which implies that their lack of success on the Dutch labour market is impeded by (a) their lack of access to important social networks, and (b) their orientation toward their own group instead of the dominant culture. Although in a study on unemployment among young Moluccans a strong negative covariance was found between such integration factors and the unemployment rate (Veenman and Martens, 1991), a more recent study on successful immigrants indicates that some immigrants who have an advantageous labour market position (high job level, high income) are not at all oriented towards Dutch society (Merens and Veenman, 1992). At the very least, this means that cultural integration is not a necessary condition to find a job. None of which is to say that such integration is not of assistance in gaining an advantageous labour market position.

It should be emphasized that the aforementioned explanations are not equally applicable to all immigrant groups in the Netherlands. When using the aggregate demand theory, for example, one should not expect all ethnic minority groups to be placed similarly in the hiring queue: those with more marketable worker quality and/or a higher degree of social integration are better off than those without. At the same

time, such supply characteristics do influence the selection practices of Dutch employers. This corresponds to empirical findings that some groups are considered to be less attractive than others, and this is mostly because of greater cultural differences (Veenman, 1995). Moreover, some groups are more attached to particular industries, jobs or occupations, making them more vulnerable to falling employment in those sectors. In other words: these hypotheses are capable of explaining why the unemployment rates of the various immigrant groups, or those of men and women within these groups, differ.

The general conclusion from the discussion of different hypotheses, relating to the ethnic minorities' unfavourable labour market position, is that it is not simply a matter of changes in the quantity and quality of labour demand, but also of selection processes and, certainly, of the individual and collective resources of each immigrant group. These factor clusters, derived from the five labour market hypotheses discussed, have been assembled in the model below and related to one another.



The idea behind this model is that alterations to a population group's societal position are primarily dependent on developments in the *opportunity structure*. The opportunity structure consists of the educational system, the employment structure and the social security system. In the Netherlands the opportunity structure is above all characterized by a formal equality of rights, which implies that equal outcomes are to be expected for individuals and groups with equal characteristics. However, because the characteristics of groups and individuals often differ, formal equality of rights implies social inequality (e.g., lower paid jobs for less educated workers). This inequality is further reinforced by selection procedures which only appear to be fair on the surface. The gatekeepers of the various key institutions bear the responsibility for this. These are, for example, teachers and educational officers within the educational system, individual employers and the

staff of the Employment Office within the labour market, and social workers within the social security system. They interpret and implement the formal regulations, and are often in a position to decide on rules and procedures. It seems that procedural equality implies the use of similar rules for people of differing cultural backgroud (e.g., the same assessment methods – language proficiency and psychological tests – for ethnic minority pupils or job seekers as for the native Dutch). This affects the degree of *inclusion and exclusion* of individuals and groups, the second level of the model. Such inclusion and exclusion, inherent in selection processes, intensifies the social inequality. The individuals and groups concerned react to this either by adapting their *resources* to the new circumstances or by 'retreating', a form of self-exclusion which reinforces the social inequality (Lewis, 1969, Willis, 1977). Adjustment may involve attempts to attune already extant resources – human capital (endowments, qualifications), information capital (knowledge, experience), social capital (social networks) and cultural capital (norms and values, reference systems) – to the opportunity structure and the selection mechanisms of the relevant gatekeepers. Another possibility is that adaptation principally consists of coping with the situation. That is to say, an attempt is made to live with the new circumstances without altering them or the resources of those concerned (e.g. young Moroccans, who have a high school-drop-out and a very high unemployment rate and who work in illegal jobs and participate in criminal activities).

Interaction between the levels of the model is evident in that reactions at the third level (whether or not resources are adapted) have repercussions on the second level (gatekeepers' reactions to resource changes, or lack thereof, made by individuals and/or groups). On the labour market, for instance, an individual's or group's investment in their employability (via training and/or gaining work experience) will increase their chances of gaining employment. Conversely, employment chances decrease when socially-excluded groups or individuals seek 'alternative routes'via informal work or criminal activities. This influences the gatekeepers' image of and response to such groups or individuals.

What has been described in rather abstract terms can be illustrated by a few examples from research on second generation youth in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. It shows that the possible reactions, just outlined, do indeed occur in reality. The job structure of the metropolitan labour market has developed in such a way that the more highly educated have ever better opportunities and the less highly educated ever fewer. Moreover, a considerable transformation to a services economy has taken place, leaving those traditionally employed by the

industrial sector in a less favourable position. This includes a great many young people from immigrant groups, who are thus also victims of changes in the opportunity structure. The shift to the service sector is, in effect, a double blow for them. Their social experience is exacerbated by their having to deal with employers who have a stereotypically negative image of immigrants, formed through contact with the first generation. This stereotype image still applies in many cases to the second generation (Veenman, 1995). For many young people from ethnic minorities the developments outlined here call for new tactics, most importantly a broadening of their horizons through training and re-orientation toward more skilled work in the service sector. The rapid advances being made by many young Turkish and Moroccan women offer a striking example in this respect (Veenman, 1996a, 1996b).

At the same time there are subgroups which turn away from the key institutions in society; these are the school-dropouts, those in irregular or informal employ, the unemployed, and those engaged in criminal activity (Veenman, 1996a, 1996b). This applies more often to young males between the ages of 15 and 25 – particularly Moroccans – but certainly among other groups as well. These are the young people who, by turning their back on the Dutch key institutions, not only exclude themselves but contribute to their (and others) social exclusion by the gatekeepers. The negative image formed by the latter is, not surprisingly, reinforced by unfavorable experiences they may have with the young people in question. It is extremely difficult to break this vicious circle to break.

5. Conclusion: a battle to win

The disadvantaged socioeconomic position of immigrants is not a specifically Dutch problem. Other immigrant countries also experience the fact that many immigrants lack the endowments and qualifications to immediately and equally participate in the receiving society. But this is not the whole story. Immigrants who are well-equipped and ready to participate, also experience inequality. This is illustrated by many second generation youth and by more highly educated refugees in the Netherlands. Part of the problem is related to the time required to adapt to the rapidly changing circumstances, or – in the words of our model – to a rapidly changing opportunity structure. However, this leaves the question unanswered as to why immigrants with the same endowments and qualifications as the native Dutch still experience a disadvantaged position. The answer to this question lies in the selection mechanisms within the key institutions. The resulting inclusion and exclusion is to the detriment of many immigrants.

The reaction of the Dutch government to this situation concentrates mainly on trying to influence the opportunity structure (for example by creating additional educational programmes and jobs) and the resources of immigrants (for example by language courses and job training programmes). In relation to the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms, the Dutch government relies heavily on formal rules and regulations: an anti-discrimination law, complaint procedures, a law by which employers are obliged to report on the number of immigrant employees, et cetera. In accordance with the 'salad bowl'model, however, few substantive measures are taken to combat the hidden 'cultural bias' of the core institutions. An example of such a measure could be the relinquishment of emphasis on self-reliance in education, so that educational methods can be better adapted to the growing number of immigrant pupils, especially in so-called 'black schools' in districts with large numbers of immigrant inhabitants. Such 'interculturalization' is hardly present in education, nor in the labour market nor in the social security system. The continuing emphasis on the dominant culture is probably the most important reason why it turns out to be difficult to really improve the social position of immigrants. This is not to say that 'interculturalization' is an easy step to take, since policy makers have to change the rules and regulations that are implicitly based on their own norms and values. It needs what may be called a 'Baron Von Münchausen' approach, meaning that policy makers have to release themselves from the swamps by pulling on their own hair. No matter how difficult it may be, Western immigrant countries must take action against the new dimension of social inequality created by the inflow of immigrants. The impending crisis of a rapidly ageing population makes it all the more necessary to detect, develop and employ every talent that is available. In this sense, it is no coincidence that Western countries are becoming more 'meritocratic'.

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Summary

Like many other Western European countries, the Netherlands became an immigrant country in the second half of the 20th century. Most of the immigrants belong to population groups with an average disadvantaged socioeconomic position. In the Netherlands these groups, called 'ethnic minorities', are the target of social policy to combat social deprivation. Unfortunately, this policy is not very effective.

Three categories can be distinguished: 'classical' groups of labour and (post)colonial immigrants, 'new' refugee groups, and immigrants from industrialized countries. The latter are the best integrated into Dutch society. The 'classical' and the 'new' groups on the other hand have a disadvantaged position in education and in the labour market. This can be explained with the help of a general model, in which the (objective) opportunity structure, the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and the immigrants' resources are the determinants of the immigrants' socioeconomic position. From the Dutch experience it seems that the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion play a dominant role. They help to explain the restricted effectiveness of social policy, since this policy too is infected by a 'cultural bias' which makes it rather difficult for immigrants to fully participate in the receiving society. It needs what is called a 'Baron Von Münchausen' approach to really improve social policy and also the immigrants' socioeconomic position.

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Measuring immigrants' integration in Italy on the basis of official statistics

Introduction

Until the end of the 1960s Italy was a country affected by emigration. By as early as the second half of the 1970s it began to experience significant immigration flows that intensified in the 1980s and even further in the 1990s. Difficulty was immediately experienced with measuring this phenomenon, both due to the inadequacy of the data collection system, which was geared to look at Italian emigration and not immigration and the presence of foreigners, and due to the number of irregular immigrants. For these reasons various experts and research institutions looked closely at the data available, and proposed improvements to the existing statistical sources [Natale 1986; ISTAT 1998]. In addition, especially during the 1980s various estimates of the "overall" foreign component were put forward that also include the segment most difficult to assess, irregular immigrants.

The introduction of four extraordinary regularisation programmes (in 1987-88, 1990, 1995-96, and 1998-99), and the addition of a fifth just recently completed (2002-2003), made it possible for a significant percentage of illegal immigrants to come to the fore. In addition, over time the principal overall data collections were upgraded to deal with the new situation by first adding a question on current citizenship and, subsequently, citizenship at birth, which up to then had only been included in very few survey forms. Finally the revision by National Statistical Institute (ISTAT)of datasets concerning the Ministry of the Interior's permits to stay, and the adoption of specific form for acquiring information on foreigners registered at Municipal Population Registers, made it possible to have more exact indications on the foreign population.

* This article was done jointly although Nicoletta Cibella wrote paragraph 4.1, Domenico Gabrielli paragraph 2, Salvatore Strozza paragraphs 1, 3 and 5, and Enrico Tucci paragraph 4.2.

After a lengthy parliamentary debate, Law n. 40/1998 (known as the Turco-Napolitano Law) and the subsequent legislative decree n. 286/1998 were promulgated. Consequently an organic discipline was established in this regard, according to the terms of the implementing regulation issued in November 1999. This did away with a system of emergency provisions and provided a project aimed not only at controlling the entry and residence of immigrants, but also at managing their adjustment and integration. An Integration Policy Commission was set up for this purpose. During its activities, it proposed an operational definition of integration [Zincone 2000, 2001] and a plan for monitoring the conditions of the various immigrant nationalities [Golini, *et al.* 2001]. The inadequacy of available statistical information which at best allowed indicators providing only a partial picture and, in some cases, showed a completely distorted view of the actual situation, was clearly demonstrated.

The point of this article is to provide an overview of the development of immigration and the presence of foreigners in Italy, so as to analyse the information that would be required to monitor the situation of the major immigrant communities and their integration, as well as evaluating the effective availability and reliability of data. It also proposes an initial reading of the characteristics and some situations or behaviour patterns of the largest foreign communities in Italy, making use of measurements and indicators that highlight especially the socio-demographic characteristics of the group examined and their working insertion. The brief conclusion evaluates the reliability of the information currently available, especially in relation to sample surveys, which could be a valid instrument for extending our knowledge of the integration of foreign immigrants in Italy.

International migration and foreign immigration

The main statistical source on international migration in Italy is the overall survey on the mobility of the resident population. Data is gathered from records in Population Registers of Italian municipalities reporting changes of residence, either from another Italian municipality or from abroad. Insofar as mobility involves a change of residence, it can be considered as long-term mobility. While measuring migration flows, of both Italian and foreign citizens, is the main objective of this source, data on permits to stay for foreign citizens, which is processed by Istat from the archives of the Ministry of Interior, is useful for measuring the number of legally present foreign population. Foreigners who are allowed to stay in Italy may stay for a short or long pe-

riod of time, in which case they will probably also ask for registration in Italian municipal Population Registers.

As with the survey on changes of residence, the survey on permits to stay was one of the first sources to detect changes in international migration. Even in the early 1970s, when the immigration of foreign citizens was still characterised by inflows from developed countries, the first inflows from the Philippines could be observed, which later gave rise to one of the most integrated foreign communities in Italy.

A complementary survey was introduced in 1993, still based on population registers. It collected data on migratory inflows and outflows (internal and international), natural flows, and size of foreign resident populations according to gender and citizenship. Compared to the survey on changes of residence it adds useful information (size and natural flows). Migratory flows are not broken down by municipalities/countries of origin/destination, but data is more readily available.

Until the end of the 1980s, a relevant source of information on international migrations was the expatriations and repatriations data of Italian nationals, based on communications from municipalities on Italians and their families crossing the borders for work reasons. This data clearly shows the turning point in Italian international migrations that took place during the 1970s when the continuously decreasing outflows of Italian nationals dropped below repatriations.[1]

It is only after the citizenship variable was first introduced in the form on changes of residence in the 1980s that this could be documented, as positive migration balances are due also to foreign immigration. Until that time foreign immigration was limited to European and other developed countries, and was on a very stable level. With the first regularisation, established by Law 943/1986 and held in 1987, positive migration balances due to foreign immigration from extra-UE countries became the most important component of Italian migration, overtaking the positive migration balances for foreigners from More Developed Countries (MDCs) and for Italian nationals.

During the 1990s international migration went through an irregular evolution. More specifically, the balance of inflows over outflows boomed in the second half of the decade. In fact, in the years 1996-2000, the number of registrations rose considerably compared to the previous period (in the last two years the increases were also substantial: +18.0% in 1999 and +23% in the year 2000). The two regularizations of irregular immigrants (the first started in November 1995 and the second started in the latter months of 1998), explain the huge increase in registrations.

[1] Current balances for the migration of Italian citizens are turning negative again, but on more physiological levels.

Cancellation from Population Register, on the other hand, stayed at more constant and lower levels over the years. Thus the net migration rate, which was particularly high with values of around 2 per thousand since 1996, increased to 2.9 in the year 2000. Currently, international migration in Italy basically relates to the movement of foreigners, although outflows of Italian nationals are also an important factor.

As a result of growing inflows, the number of foreign residents has doubled in the last five years as is documented in the survey on foreign residents carried out in Italian Municipalities. At 1st January 2001 there were almost 1,5 million foreigners, compared to 738,000 at the beginning of 1996 (Table 1). It is a grow from 1.3% in 1996 to 2.6% of the total population. The first results of the Census held on the 21st October of the same year (2001), however, yield a lower number, which is due mainly to the problem mentioned above, of people leaving the country without deleting their name from the Population Registers.

Since 1997 this survey also specifies the number of foreign minors, which is the only information available on this important and fast-increasing component of the foreign population. In 2001 foreign minors accounted for almost one fifth of the foreign population, due to increased inflows because of family reunification, but also to a sizeable number of new-borns in Italy. Over the last few years about half of the "new" minors were born in this country.

Individual records of permit to stay provide information on the demographic characteristics of immigrants as well as on the characteristics of the migration project, starting from the year of arrival in Italy and reason for immigration. Citizenship as well as the main variables for analysis are also registered. Information on the volume of inflows (and outflows) can also be retrieved from this archive, even for short-term movements, but these are more difficult to process. In fact, both the administrative procedure and the data processing procedures are more oriented towards stocks than flows.

During the 1990s the Laws dealing with the regularisation of irregular immigrants, along with exceptional factors giving rise to emigration in the countries of origin, resulted in unexpected variations in the figure of the legal foreign population (Table 2), with significant changes in terms of citizenship, gender, and age.

Back on 1st January 1992, more than 1/3 of the 649,000 regular immigrants took advantage of the regularisation in the so-called Martelli Law. These were prevalently Africans and Asians, and mostly young, single males. However, most of them did not find any work that would allow them to renew the permits to stay obtained as a result of regularisation, resulting in the drop in regular numbers on 1st January 1993 (589,000). This reduction was reflected in the demographic structure,

with an unexpected lowering of the percentage of males, especially those that were young and single.

During 1993 and 1994, in addition to typical immigrants, individuals and families fleeing the ex-Yugoslavia area also flocked to Italy due to the worsening of the conflict that affected the Balkan regions, causing a sharp increase in the number of permits: on 1st January 1995 there were 678,000 regular immigrants.

Table 1 – *Foreign residents in Italy on 1st January in 1996-2001* (thousands)

Year (1st January)	Total foreign population		Foreign minors[a]	
	Number	% of total population	Number	% of foreign population
1996	738	1.3		
1997	885	1.6	126	14.2
1998	992	1.7	150	15.1
1999	1,116	2.0	187	16.7
2000	1,271	2.2	230	18.1
2001	1,465	2.6	278	19.0

Note: (a) Data on minors is only available as from 1st January 1997.
Source: Istat.

Table 2 – *Permits to stay, Italy, 1992-2000* (thousands)

Year	Permits at 1st January	New and expired permits		Permits at 31st December	Yearly variations	
		Granted	Not renewed		Number	%
	1	2	3	4=1+2-3	5=4-1	6=5/1*100
1992	649	100	160	589	-60	-9.2
1993	589	122	62	649	60	10.2
1994	649	118	89	678	29	4.5
1995	678	132	81	729	51	7.5
1996	729	339	82	986	257	35.3
1997	986	124	87	1,023	37	3.8
1998	1,023	153	85	1,091	68	6.6
1999	1,091	370	120	1,341	250	22.9
2000	1,341	170	131	1,380	39	2.9
2001	1,380	155	87	1,448	68	4.9

Source: Istat processing of Ministry of the Interior data [Istat 2003].

Despite a reduction in these flows in subsequent years, the number of permits also increased in 1995 and especially in 1996 (+35%) due to the issuing of regularisation permits granted according to Legal Decree 489/1995 (Dini decree). Thus, the number of permits reached almost one million on 1st January 1997.

This time regularisation did not affect only Africans and Asiatics, but also those from Central and Eastern Europe, with the number of Albanians doubling compared to the previous year. This confirms that regular arrivals, significant numbers of which occurred in 1991, were accompanied by significant flows of irregular immigrants coming from this country. Of the Central American communities, the Peruvian community almost tripled. Once again on this occasion, the foreigners that were regularised were predominantly male, although to a lesser extent than the previous amnesty, with a significant percentage of young single males.

Despite the fact that 1998 was the year in which most of the 246,000 regularisations granted in accordance with the Dini decree expired, the number of permits to stay continued to increase due to the entry of regular immigrants. On 1st January 1999, the number of regular foreigners stood at 1,091,000.

During 1999, about 370,000 permits to stay were issued, compared to 120,000 that were not extended. This resulted in a positive balance of 250,000 units. The number of permits to stay as of 1st January 2000 stood at 1,341,000 units. The great increase, especially in the case of men, is not due to new entries: rather, it is due to individuals that emerged from an irregular situation thanks to the regularisation allowed for by the Turco-Napolitano law (Law 40/1998). During 2000, the flow of regularised foreigners came to an end and the normal inflows and outflows started again.

More recent data (after 2001) are not yet available, but the size and characteristics of the legal foreign presence in Italy will undergo significant fluctuations as a result of the most recent regularisation (connected with Law 189/2002, known as the Bossi-Fini Law). A huge number of applications for regularisation were received (more than 700,000), which is significantly higher than the numbers recorded in previous regularisations.

An empirical approach to the Italian situation

The term integration expresses a complex concept, the meaning of which may vary over time and space, depending on the country being considered, the political and historical circumstances, and the phase of immigration. Significant difficulty is encountered in providing an un-

equivocal and precise definition of the term. In broad outline, one could say that the integration of immigrants into their country of destination is a *dynamic and multi-dimensional* phenomenon. An attempt can be made to measure the evolution and level of integration attained starting from the role immigrants play in the economic, social, and cultural life of the country they are living in, and then the development of status held in various sectors such as employment, housing, education, and participation in politics.

Integration is considered a process involving two distinct entities: the individual seeking integration and the adaptation in the receiving society, and the host country that helps immigrants, allows them to progress, or obstructs them in attaining their personal goal. When accepting the situation as a process, integration includes all means by which the immigrant may be "incorporated" into his adopted situation. This integration may take forms and characteristics that vary greatly, in a *continuum* that ranges from assimilation to a multi-cultural way of life [Coleman 1994]. Depending on the model chosen, the dimensions considered significant, and the manner in which the possible measures and indicators of interest can be established, may change at least partially. The need has often arisen to set up synthetic measures for highlighting differences or similarities in behaviour and in the situations involving immigrants and local nationals [Council of Europe 1997]. Some attempts have been made to monitor a process that is, in itself, difficult to quantify, by adopting comparative statistical measurements or indicators to expose general or specific situations of non-integration or discrimination towards immigrant communities.

In Italy, the government only proposed an integration model for immigrants[2] in 2000, but the time for it to be fully applied was limited as it was partly rejected with the passing of the most recent legislation. Nevertheless, various experts and research institutions have proposed measurement systems and specific integration indicators of an aggregate type, both in theoretical terms and in empirical terms, making use of the available statistical data [Casacchia and Strozza 1995; Natale and Strozza 1997; Golini, *et al.* 2001]. The proposed measurements

[2] The model put forward by the Commission for Policies of Integration of Immigrants used "integration" to refer to both the *integrity* of the people, of the communities involved in this process, and the *positive interaction and peaceful coexistence* among all communities, including the nationals [Zincone 2000]. To apply this model it was necessary to recognise and respect the needs and differences of the various groups, without laying the groundwork for arising segregation and discrimination. The basic objective of integration is to create positive interaction between local nationals and immigrants, against a background of dialogue on a number of levels, thereby spreading to all spheres of coexistence, capable of enriching the various parties involved.

were broken down according to nationality and/or area in which the immigrants have settled, as these two dimensions were deemed to be the most significant. The distinction in terms of citizenship seems essential, given the fact that immigration of foreigners to Italy is comprised by a large number of nationalities and ethnic groups that differ from one another by migratory history, and demographic and social characteristics. Most importantly, they differ by the way in which they have settled in the country and the extent and form in which they have been integrated into the various (economic, social, and cultural) spheres of society. The reference to the territorial context also seems fundamental as the ease of integration of newly arrived immigrants differs in various areas and situations in the country (one needs simply consider the significant differences between two macro areas like the North and the South of the peninsula, for example). In addition, the concentration in some specific areas, especially in the large metropolitan municipalities, of specific groupings of immigrants, makes it necessary for the analysis to look at the spatial dimension as well.

In this regard, in order to provide a complete picture of the possibility of measuring the integration of immigrants based on the official sources available and of introducing the data that will be dealt with in the rest of this contribution, some specific areas will be dealt with on a theoretical basis, identifying characteristics, categories or events that need to be surveyed in order to construct some indicators that are essential. We will then go on to discussing the effective possibility of constructing these indicators in terms of the availability and adequacy of existing statistical material [Strozza, *et al.* 2002].

It would therefore be useful to put forward at least a few general comments:

– in some cases it may be useful to replace the elementary indicators (one of the numerous possible examples would be the activity rate), with ratios between these indicators (*odd-ratios*), where the indicator for each foreign community is designed in relation to that for the national population used here as reference (the degree of activity of each group is therefore indicated in relation to that of the Italian population).

– In other cases it could be useful to look at discrepancies between distribution of a given phenomenon for the foreign groups, compared to the distribution found among the Italian population (this could be the case with the economic sector in which they are employed or with territorial distribution).

In addition, ten specific integration areas were identified, within which some characteristics, categories or events are located, making up the numerator for possible measurements or indicators used to monitor the situation for the immigrant groups.

The first set of observations concern *demographic characteristics*, which can be used to outline the "morphology" of the foreign communities, which is essential for preparing specific social policies. The breakdown in terms of the principal structural characteristics is of basic importance in specifically evaluating imbalances and any needs [Golini, *et al.* 2001]. The *migratory characteristcs*, expressed essentially in terms of the distribution per year (cohort) of immigration, in terms of the reason for arrival and/or presence on the territory, and in terms of the legal residence status (stable legal foreigners, semi-stable legal, and illegal) constitute a very important specific area. The duration of stay indicates the phase of immigration and summarises the process of adaptation to the new situation. The legality of a person's stay in the country is an essential condition for his full economic and social integration. Some data on demographic and migratory characteristics for foreign communities (especially in terms of gender, age, and year of immigration) are also necessary as they can be used as denominator for some specific rates. This refers particularly, but not exclusively, to the measurement of intensity and timing used for analysing the *demographic behaviour* of foreign communities (the principal analytical measurements used are the rate of fertility, nuptiality or divorce for specific age groups). Next, the usefulness of standardising some measurements in terms of year of immigration is examined. This is done in order to keep a check on the differences and variations in duration of the time spent in Italy, comparing the situations of the immigrant communities.

Education level and knowledge of Italian are aspects that are significantly relevant in terms of the integration of foreigners in their new situation. For the first generation of immigrants, the education level and extent of knowledge of the language of their adopted country constitute respectively the general and specific human capital. These have a significant impact (especially the latter) on employment opportunities and, above all, on professional promotion. Scholastic integration of both children that immigrated along with their parents, and second-generation immigrants (children born in Italy) represents a crucial variable for the integration of the entire group. In many cases children remain "trapped" between a lack of fluency in Italian and the gradual loss of their original language [Golini, *et al.* 2001]. It is important to monitor participation and falling behind in school, because school is still a fundamental stage in improving their conditions and for the positive intergenerational social mobility of communities of foreign origins.

Demographic behaviour (marriage, birth of children, and divorce) can also be signs of the level of stabilisation in the society of adoption, from various points of view. Immigrants experience phenomena such as getting married and having children in a particular way, and often

are subjected to difficulties and delays due to the experience of being transplanted into a different situation. Special attention is generally given to changes in fertility among immigrants, especially those coming from high fertility countries, towards the levels found among the population of the adopted country. It is necessary, however, to assume an initial decline in fertility, due to difficulties related to emigration [Maffioli 1996] and imbalance in the sex structure [Natale and Strozza 1997], and subsequent resurgence, which in many cases does not reach the levels found in the country of origin. This is partly due to delayed fertility not being recovered, and/or the reproductive model tending to become similar to the one of the indigenous population. While marriage represents another indicator in terms of the demographic behaviour of immigrants, mixed marriages also can be taken as an indication of integration and a factor in increased mingling of population residing in the country [Coleman 1994]. One should bear in mind however, that mixed couples may be found to be less stable than those made up of spouses of the same nationality, because cultural differences between partners.

Relations with the country of origin and with the country of adoption are summarised in terms of three specific phenomena: family reunions, belonging to ethnic associations in Italy, and acquiring Italian citizenship. Reuniting families certainly reduces the strength of the ties with the country of origin, although this may constitute an ambivalent, yet essential, step, in the process of integration. While, on the one hand, reuniting a family may be seen as a sign of stable settling down in the host country, on the other hand it reinforces basic ties and resurrects the values and traditions of the country of origin in the country of adoption [Natale 1995]. Obviously, as with the forming and developing of new unions, reconstituting nuclear families leads immigrants to having new needs, especially in terms of housing and health. Thus, one is dealing with a change from the needs of a single person to those of a family unit. In the early stages of the migratory experience, joining ethnic associations may constitute a valid support for the new immigrant on a psychological level, due to the reproduction of the community of origin on a small scale, and on a material level, as an important point of reference for acquiring necessary information. In subsequent migratory phases, belonging to ethnic associations may also indicate a certain closure with sometimes no wish of interaction nor mingling with others. Finally, obtaining Italian citizenship through naturalisation may be seen as an instrument that could facilitate the integration process. On the other hand it can be seen as the crowning or last stage (or at least fundamental stage) in this process, as equality with the national population is achieved in terms of rights and duties [Bisogno and Gallo 2000].

One area that is certainly of prime importance in the integration of immigrants is the *working* situation, which could act as the forerunner and as an essential support for integration in other fundamental dimensions of the society of adoption. Of the information required, it seems useful to indicate first the professional status, which can be used to determine a situation of unemployment that generally brings with it a high risk of marginalization, especially among immigrants. Other essential information includes the number of jobs the immigrant has, his position in the profession, the industry and the type of occupation. According to Bauböck [1994], the concentration of some immigrant communities in specific sectors (such as, the informal economy), in some segments of the production system, and in positions that are at the bottom of the professional scale, is often indicative of limited integration or even of a situation of segregation. Information on the number of hours worked per week and on injury in the workplace indicates the importance and effort made on the job on the one hand, and the risk involved in the tasks carried out on the other.

The income received by the immigrants and partial indications of how it is spent are related to the working situation. Individual earnings can express the level of success achieved at work and, more generally, total income is a clear indication of the potential individual and family living conditions of new arrivals, which is also dependent on the possession of some important durable goods [Strozza, *et al.* 2002]. The structure of consumption also provides indications on the habits of immigrants, in relation to expenditure that is not structurally necessary. The reduction in savings and the growth of the consumption of goods other than the basics could indicate a change in future prospects and the adoption of behavioural models that are more similar to those of the local population. One aspect that clarifies, at least in part, the position of the immigrants within the migratory system is the amount of available income set aside for family members still in their country of origin. These money transfers or sending of goods of various kinds (monetary and non-monetary remittances) make it possible, within certain limits, to measure the strength of the ties that the immigrant communities have with their areas of origin. These ties naturally affect the standard of living in the area of adoption. Ongoing strong ties with the country of origin imply greater sacrifices being made in the country of adoption, with a view to eventually returning to the home country.

Information on *housing* in terms of the type of accommodation, form of tenure, as well as the number of rooms available (and density of population), and the presence of toilet facilities and other *comforts* appears to be of great significance. This is also important for studying the dispersion of the immigrant communities in the country and within

any specific city, to determine whether any sort of residential concentration has taken place, perhaps due to productive specialisation or the setting up of ethnic areas.

Health and deviance of foreigners are also two aspects that are particularly relevant in the life of new arrivals in their society of adoption. The possibility of protecting one's own health and reducing the occurrence and prevalence of unhealthy conditions are indispensable for exerting one's working, educational, and relationship potential, and more generally for positive integration in the social situation of adoption. In this regard, the information to be looked at deals with the subjective state of health and the occurrence chronic pathologies, as well as the use made of hospitalisation and other forms of health benefits. The abortion rate is also of relevant significance in terms of mother-child health and mortality in general, especially in relation to the first years of life and conditions of survival in the new territorial context of the foreign communities. An analysis of these aspects draws attention to the general living conditions of immigrants and the effective usefulness of the assistance offered by the public health service.

Numerous studies have shown the existence of a link between deviance among foreigners and the degree of social and economic integration. Recent theories have also highlighted the importance of cultural conflict – that is, the differences that exist between the behavioural standards and value system of immigrants and those of the local population – as one of the factors that influence foreign deviance. In fact, cohesion within the same foreign group and unfavourable economic conditions experienced by immigrants play an important role in favouring their concentration in "risk" areas, characterised by higher levels of deviance [Baldacci and Natale 1995]. It therefore appears that being able to analyse this phenomenon using data on charges brought and on convictions of immigrants, as well as the flow of foreign population in and out of prison, is also relevant.

In determining integration indicators, one crucial point is defining accurately which segments of the population the data refers to. Schematically, at least three interest segments can be identified, relating to different needs and degrees of social participation: naturalised citizens, regular foreigners (which may be divided into stable and semi-stable components), and irregular immigrants. The immigrant communities show signs of internal structuring in terms of these subgroups that also vary greatly, reflecting diverse migratory phases and models. The communities constituted more recently have a higher percentage of irregular immigrants and a limited number of naturalised citizens. To those variations correspond different levels of propensity to integration into the society of adoption. It would certainly be very in-

teresting to be able to look at all three segments, or at least to come to some evaluation of how they are made up, as each of them has a different influence on the host society and is subject to specific social policies [Golini, *et al.* 2001; Strozza, *et al.* 2002]. Often, however, the data gathered and/or available refers mainly to the central segment that is made up of the foreigners with a regular status. In addition, some indicators are difficult to construct due to the reference communities not corresponding to the numerator and denominator of the ratios. The frequent lack of some data is compounded by the limited extent of other data in terms of both ethnic groups and the territorial area considered.

The sources of data available, or those that could potentially be available, can be described by seeking to specify the type of foreign population the information refers to and the institution involved in the data collection [Strozza, *et al.* 2002].

The demographic characteristics of the foreign population, for example, can be gleaned on an annual basis from the Ministry of the Interior's data collection of permits to stay, as well as, in part, from the survey on foreigners registered in the Municipal Population Registers. With reference to 2001, the demographic census will make analytical information available on the characteristics of resident foreigners and people that are temporarily resident in Italy. Obviously, this is limited to those the census managed to reach. Most information on the migratory characteristics of foreigners (year of immigration and reason for staying in Italy) is to be found in the census count and the permit to stay archives.

Demographic events (births, marriages, and divorces) are specifically available for stable legal foreigners. Data on family reunification and acquisition of Italian citizenship (through marriage or naturalisation), are supplied respectively by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior respectively. It refers to the regular foreign population in general, although conditions required should limit it to the more stable portion of the group [Strozza, *et al.* 2002].

Sufficiently analytical information on labour is currently available from the demographic census, and substantially fragmentary information is available using data (sometimes jointly) from the various administrative sources: Ministry of the Interior permits to stay broken down in terms of reason for issuing; formal unemployment and new employment by the Ministry of Labour; social security contributions to National Social Security Institute (INPS) and insurance matters related to Italian Workers' Compensation Authority (INAIL). In addition to gathering only specific segments or aspects of the phenomenon, this information can also give some indications of employment in regular jobs. Unfortunately, at time this is not a true reflection of reality, but it essentially covers the formal rather than the actual situation.

The issue relating to the possibility of gathering information on the living conditions of foreigners seems to be particularly delicate; no data seems to be available on income and how this is used, while information on accommodation can only be derived at this point from the census.

As to health, reference can be made to some continuous data collections, such as that on deaths, those on voluntary abortion, and those on people released from hospital. Information on deviance among foreigners can be obtained from some continuous surveys by the Ministry of Justice on charges and convictions, as well as from the data collections run by the Prisons Administration Department (DAP) on entry and numbers in the prison population.

The general picture that emerges from this brief study appears to be rather problematic if one is seeking to monitor continually (or at least periodically) the living conditions and degree of integration of foreign communities in the various areas of Italy [Strozza, *et al.* 2002]. In fact, it seems clear that statistical material, that will be rather extensive when the 2001 demographic census data is released, is greatly lacking for other periods. This gives rise to a picture with light and dark patches, with some strong shading for specific areas of detail. Some essential dimensions of the economic and social integration of foreigners is found to be impossible to monitor based on the statistical data currently available or what can be gleaned from statistical and administrative sources. Information on labour that can be gathered from the major administrative sources is not adequate and not always reliable, while almost no information is available on the housing, while data on income and its use is practically non-existent and is not even recorded in the demographic census.

In general, in seeking to reduce the information gap it seems necessary to resort to some sample surveys of a general type (covering Italians and foreigners) and/or specific surveys on the foreign population (or population of foreign origin), which need to be repeated periodically. For a number of years the most important national sample surveys have included a question on citizenship and/or country of birth (or at least a distinction between Italians and foreigners and those born in Italy and those born abroad). In the specific case of the labour force survey the citizenship question was added in 1992, while in the case of multi-purpose social surveys on families citizenship is asked (or at least a distinction is made between Italians, foreigners and stateless people) and, in some cases, the country of birth of the members of the families selected. However, this information has never been used, as the survey criteria adopted do not guarantee statistical representativeness of this specific segment of the population. It goes without saying that some sample surveys could be used to gather information on

income and how it is used, which is currently unavailable and difficult to glean to any extent from administrative sources.

The analyses included in the next paragraph only cover a limited part of the extent of integration. Attention is mainly focussed on social and demographic aspects, which make it possible to drawn a general picture of the characteristics and needs of the major foreign communities. Secondly, we will analyse integration in the labour market, which is of fundamental importance for full integration of foreigners in Italy. To gain some idea of the changes in the situation over the last decade, reference will be made, as far as possible, not only to the most recent situation, but also to that in the mid and early 1990s.

Some characteristics and behaviour patterns of immigrant communities

Demographic characteristics and behaviour

Foreign immigrants make up a very heterogeneous group in terms of area of origin. In terms of permits to stay, the leading ten nationalities among immigrants from High Migratory Pressure Countries (HMPCs) account for about half of all immigrants. Thus, there is no sense to limiting attention to the overall group of foreigners, while at the same time, it does not seem to be of much use limiting our study to only the 3 or 4 largest immigrant communities. In the former case, the values measured and the indicators put forward would be a weighted average of situations for nationalities that are also very different. In the latter case, only a minor portion of the entire group would be taken into consideration. In analysing the integration processes and preparing integration policies, the multiplicity of experiences, cultures, and behavioural patterns that characterise foreign immigration into Italy must be taken into account. In this case, we have decided to distinguish between foreigners coming from Most Developed Countries (MDCs) and those originally from HMPCs , and to look at the principal nationalities in the second group.

The first analysis concern foreigners holding permits to stay by gender, large areas of origin (MDCs and HMPCs) and major nationalities. Particular attention is given to changes that have taken place over the last ten years. The Moroccan community, which has been the largest for a number of years, went through a significant decline in the percentage of males between 1992 and 2001 (from 90.2% to 69.8%). The Albanian community showed a similar pattern (the male contingent dropped from 85.9% to 63.7%) following a significant increase in

the female contingent (Table 3). According to the most recent data, there are communities in which there is a large female predominance (such as the Philippine and Peruvian communities) while others, have a very high male prevalence (especially the Senegalese). However, a clear trend of a new balance of the two genders could be observed during the 1990s, which could be seen as a positive sign for the integration of the foreign communities. As we will see in more detail later, especially in the case of communities with a male predominance, the reduction of the imbalance between genders is often a result of families being reunited, which testifies to a process of stabilisation of new arrivals in the country of adoption.

Table 3 – *Foreigners with permits to stay by gender and duration of residence. Italy, 1st January 1992, 1996, and 2001*

Area or country of citizenship	2001		Males (%)			More than 10 years of stay (%)	
	Absolute values	% by country	2001	1996	1992	2001	1996
TOTAL	**1,448.4**	**100.0**	**54.0**	**52.7**	**60.1**	**25.7**	**24.1**
MDCs	**219.1**	**15.1**	**39.6**	**39.8**	**40.9**	**42.4**	**44.8**
HMPCs [a]	**1,229.4**	**84.9**	**56.9**	**57.7**	**67.1**	**22.5**	**16.2**
Morocco	167.9	11.6	69.8	78.3	90.2	38.1	11.4
Albania	159.3	11.0	63.7	67.3	85.9	0.9	3.6
Romania	83.0	5.7	50.7	30.7	42.0	2.6	5.3
Philippine	67.6	4.7	34.4	30.1	32.8	39.0	26.9
China	62.2	4.3	54.5	55.2	60.2	17.7	16.1
Tunisia	53.4	3.7	76.7	83.1	91.0	51.5	12.7
Yugoslavia	39.3	2.7	58.5	64.6	62.9	18.5	13.2
Senegal	37.8	2.6	92.1	94.4	97.1	45.4	6.1
Sri Lanka	38.8	2.7	56.6	57.0	69.0	21.1	19.1
Egypt	31.8	2.2	81.4	76.1	85.8	30.9	35.1
Peru	31.7	2.2	32.8	28.0	36.3	10.0	8.8

Note: (a) Includes countries of Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia (excepting Israel and Japan) and Latin America.
Source: our processing of data from the Ministry of the Interior, revised by ISTAT.

The table clearly shows that, between the beginning of 1996 and 2001, the percentage of foreigners coming from the HMPCs, and living in the country for at least 10 years, grew from 16.2% to 22.5%. This change is even more significant if one considers that in this five years

period two extraordinary regularisation programmes were implemented (in 1995-96 and 1998-99), which together resulted in the granting of about 500,000 permits to stay. The regularised foreigners mostly arrived in Italy during the 1990s and so by 2001 they had been in the country for less than 10 years. Among foreigners regularly in Italy at the beginning of 2001 there is therefore a significant number of people that came before the early 1990s, which means that they could be candidates for naturalisation.[3] There is a large, significant growth in the number of people that have stayed in the country for a long time, especially in the case of immigrants from African countries bordering the Mediterranean, from Senegal, and from the Philippines. The Tunisian community holds the largest proportion of long-term permits to stay (51.5%). This proportion reaches 55% in the South of Italy and the Islands, where the Tunisians have set up home mainly in nearby Sicily, where they have found employment principally in the fishing industry. An opposite situation is found in the case of the Peruvian, Rumanian, and Albanian communities that grew significantly in the 1990s and have a net prevalence of recently immigrated people.

The structure in terms of marital status can be used to characterise the various communities, while at the same time highlighting the presence of people with or without marital ties. Naturally, only foreigners whose spouses are in Italy can be said to have long-term migratory plans, if not permanent. Most importantly, one could expect them to express needs that are related to a more advanced stage of the integration process. Those whose spouse is in the country of origin (or in some other countries) can be considered as being more involved in a state of suspension between two different situations. They preserve strong ties with their areas of origin, which may have a relevant influence on their integration strategies and the living conditions in the receiving countries.

The proportion of male spouses is increasing especially among Albanians, Tunisians, and Singhalese, while the trend for Chinese is different, with a reduction in the number of both male and female married people. Despite the lack of elements indicating with any certainty that two married individuals belong to the same family unit, where a substantial equality is registered between the number of spouses in terms of gender, it seems reasonable to detect a migratory plan centred on the family and therefore long-term, if not permanent, migratory project. This situation is found among Chinese, Singhalese, Rumanians, Slavs, and Albanians. Thus, for the three European countries, It-

[3] The necessary conditions for ordinary naturalisation is continuous registration in a Municipal Population Registers for at least 10 years.

aly has been a destination since the 1990s, but the already significant percentage of married people indicates that the phenomenon involved entire families right from the outset. For the other communities in this study, individual spouses undertook the experience most often on their own, with preponderance of males among the African communities, and of females for the other communities. This could imply a lesser involvement of the family and opting for a limited period of residence in the country. It should be remembered however, that the data relates to a situation that may be the result of various events. For example, one should not forget that in many cases the family unit is created after immigration, including unions with people from the indigenous population (mixed unions).

Reproductive behaviour is certainly a significant aspect in the evolution process of families and may, in some way, indicate the aggregate level of the stage of the process of integration of the immigrant communities in the country of adoption. In fact, having children is an important decision that immigrants take after having attained a certain stability and security in the receiving country. The number of births from at least one foreign parent, originating from an HMPC grew strongly during the 1990s. This figure went from a little below 9,000 in 1992 to more than 33,000 in 2000. When both parents were foreigners, births increased from just over 5,000 to almost 25,000. These represented less that 2% of all births, but now accounts for more than 6%. When compared to the country of origin, the current level of fertility can be used to identify similarities and differences in behaviour, the reasons for which can only be investigated based on a historical series of period data or of cohorts data.

While differing greatly in terms of the percentage and total number of children born, the North African communities show levels of fertility that are higher than that among other nationalities, and in line with the levels found in their countries of origin (Table 4). These "oldest" immigration countries saw a significant number of family reunions in the second half of the 1990s. This could be taken as indicating that the fertility levels observed were related to reunion factors in addition to the element of cultural and religious homogeneity in the reproduction choices.

The opposite is found in the case of communities from the Philippines or Peru, which are characterised by a prevalently female labour immigration, of an older age, with a recorded total fertility rate (TFR), that is significantly lower (1.2 and 1.1 children per woman respectively) than both the other communities considered and their countries of origin.

It does not appear possible to rely on the various interpretation theories put forward in the literature to attempt to evaluate the possi-

ble reasons for the differences found, as no historical series of data is available for analysing fertility trends by citizenship. In fact, initially the fertility of foreigners will reflect the models found in their community of origin. Subsequently it will move towards the levels found among the population of the country of adoption, and in some cases may reach the same levels. In addition, persistent levels of fertility that are significantly lower than those in the country of origin could also depend on the selective character of migration, especially international migration. In terms of the average age of giving birth interesting differences can be observed within the group, from less than 26 for Albanians to more than 30 for the Peruvians (Table 4). In some way, this is related to the age of immigration and the duration of stay in Italy.

Table 4 – *Fertility indicators for some foreign communities. Italy, 1999*

Country of Citizenship	Females of 15-49 years [a] (absolute values in thousands)	Births (absolute values in thousands)	Mean age at birth	TFR in Italy	TFR in the country of citizenship [b]
Morocco	36.4	4.6	27.5	3.04	3.04
Albania	29.4	3.2	25.7	2.07	2.06
Poland	13.0	0.9	26.9	1.08	1.05
Romania	15.9	1.0	27.0	1.06	1.03
China	15.6	1.5	28.1	2.04	1.08
Tunisia	10.3	1.3	26.5	3.03	2.03
Peru	13.9	0.6	30.2	1.02	3.00
Brazil	10.1	0.5	27.1	1.06	2.03
Philippine	32.1	1.2	28.9	1.02	3.06
Egypt	6.3	0.8	27.0	3.04	3.04

Notes: (a) This indicator was drawn up by relating foreign births to the resident female population, with an average age of between 15 and 49, estimated by Istat data. (b) Average value for the 1995-2000 period.
Source: ISTAT and UN data.

Labour market participation and regular employment

Regarding the insertion in the labour market, the available data derives essentially from administrative sources. In case there are no adequate data on the immigrants' professional status, their participation to the labour market (labour force participation rates) and difficulties to access employment (unemployment rates), data will be taken from the Ministry of Interior on permits to stay distinguished by reason of issue and from INPS on contributions' payments for non-community workers.

Table 5 – *Permits to stay by reason. Italy, 1st January 1992, 1996, 2001. Percentage values*

Country of citizenship	2001			1996			1992		
	family	work	others	family	work	others	family	work	others
TOTAL	**26.5**	**60.7**	**12.7**	**21.4**	**59.5**	**19.1**	**14.2**	**65.3**	**20.5**
MDCs	**29.9**	**34.8**	**35.4**	**30.3**	**36.3**	**33.4**	**28.5**	**36.5**	**34.9**
HMPCs [a]	**25.9**	**65.8**	**8.3**	**18.0**	**68.3**	**13.7**	**8.9**	**75.9**	**15.2**
Morocco	28.0	71.2	0.8	17.4	81.3	1.3	3.8	93.2	3.1
Albania	31.4	61.9	6.7	22.4	67.6	10.0	3.9	69.8	26.3
Romania	25.4	67.2	7.4	32.9	40.2	26.9	22.9	25.1	52.0
Philippine	12.1	81.7	6.2	8.6	81.2	10.2	5.5	87.1	7.4
China	25.8	72.8	1.3	27.9	68.2	3.9	12.4	83.6	4.0
Tunisia	24.7	74.5	0.8	16.0	82.4	1.6	3.9	88.6	7.6
Yugoslavia	25.2	61.3	13.5	7.4	81.0	11.6	8.7	69.5	21.8
Senegal	6.2	93.3	0.5	4.0	95.2	0.8	0.6	96.4	3.0
Sri Lanka	28.9	69.3	1.8	18.8	78.7	2.5	10.5	85.3	4.2
Egypt	20.6	77.8	1.6	24.8	72.3	2.9	11.7	85.3	3.0
Peru	20.6	75.3	4.1	20.5	68.5	11.0	11.3	66.5	22.2

Note: (a) See note a of table 3. *Source*: our processing of data from the Ministry of the Interior, revised by ISTAT.

Employment remains the main reason for the foreign presence in Italy (Table 5), even though it has lost some importance during the period being examined, especially for foreigners from HMPCs, as permits for family motives have increased. In other words, while among foreigners form MDCs the quota of permits for family motives is stable at around 30% during the period examined, the quota for foreigners from HMPCs reached 9% in 1992 and rose to almost 26% in 2001. This is explained by the high number of family reunions, especially in the second half of the decade, following the regularisation in 1995-96.

Analysis by communities has revealed that Senegal has the highest quota of work permit (more than 90%) due to the huge preponderance of men, even though values under 70% of all permits have seldom been registered, especially for the last period. Moroccans, Tunisians and Albanians experience a more evident growth of permits for family motives: from about 4% of all permits issued in 1992, they reached values that ranged from 25% for Tunisians to 31% for Albanians in 2001. Likewise, the proportion of presence for family motives is higher than a fourth of the total for Rumanians, Chinese, Slavs and Singhalese.

There are significant differences of types in the structure of permits to stay in 2001. While 83% of men from HMPCs had a work permit,

the quota for women dropped to 43%. Immigrant women are mainly present for family motives (about 47%) and they immigrated in many cases to rejoin their families over the last years. Philippine and Peruvian women are an exception. They distinguish themselves as prevalent in the collective bargaining area of services to families and as precursor for other male relatives.

Based on INPS data regarding contribution payments, it is possible to calculate a subordinate regular employment rate by gender and nationality, dividing the number of persons having at least one week of contribution payment in one year by the person-years with a work permit. As this rate was established using two different data sources (INPS and permits to stay) having a different reference setting, it is influenced by inconsistency between the numerator and the denominator.

The evolution of these rates from 1993 to 1999 (Table 6) highlights clearly the role of the regularisations, which determined an increase of the values during the years when acts of amnesties were issued. This increase resulted from the increase of work relations formalised during that period and necessary to obtain regularisation. This aspect is particularly evident in 1996, following the act of amnesty introduced by the so-called Dini decree and subsequent amendments. After this regularisation, employment rates considerably decreased for all nationalities as part of the work relations drawn for benefiting of the act of indemnity were rescinded. Nevertheless, compared to past years, the group of foreigners regularly living in Italy with a work permit grew considerably (table 3 gives some ideas as to this phenomenon, even though are considered all permits).

Data presented here are a clear example of the difficulties encountered when analysing the integration process of immigrants, based on data that do not allow distinguishing the aggregates by cohort of immigration. An exceptional event (even if it is not too exceptional in Italy), such as regularisation, determines a partially temporary increase of regular work relation and, at the same time, modifies the internal structure of the cohort, increasing the weight of the most recently arrived cohort of immigration, which also presents more integration problems.

The employment rates for all nationalities increased on average from 1993 until 1996, and diminished in 1997 and 1998 due not only to a slight drop of employees but also to an increase of the regular foreign population,[4] before increasing in 1999. The communities that had the highest rates in 1999, were the Philippine, Yugoslav and Peruvian communities (74, 70 and 68% respectively), while the Chinese and Egyp-

[4] This growth is basically determined by the regularisation effects provide for by the law Dini.

Table 6 – *Subordinate regular employment rates[a] by gender distinguished for the main foreign countries from the HMPCs. Italy, 1993-1999. Percentage values*

Country of citizenship	Total 1999	Males							Females						
		1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993	1999	1998	1997	1996	1995	1994	1993
Morocco	44.7	51.8	43.7	46.3	57.7	51.9	48.0	46.0	25.8	24.1	27.6	33.3	31.9	31.1	33.7
Albania	49.0	62.0	59.3	61.2	87.0	73.5	72.6	69.3	24.9	23.3	26.2	38.3	30.7	29.7	32.4
Romania	51.7	59.4	59.0	58.1	88.8	66.5	63.3	61.4	44.1	38.4	37.6	43.8	31.6	31.5	32.2
Philippine	73.8	71.7	72.8	73.5	92.2	75.7	69.4	71.0	74.9	77.4	76.8	91.1	76.5	71.5	74.1
China	36.5	43.0	49.3	53.3	78.9	51.9	53.8	49.2	28.7	31.2	36.0	53.9	31.4	31.5	28.3
Tunisia	49.8	59.0	51.7	53.9	63.5	64.7	64.7	61.5	16.8	16.5	19.8	25.7	26.8	32.2	38.1
Yugoslavia	70.0	83.4	70.4	74.9	72.9	60.4	49.3	39.8	50.2	47.0	51.7	53.1	46.1	43.7	40.3
Senegal	57.9	60.2	53.1	55.0	70.5	70.1	61.1	57.0	27.0	23.9	22.6	26.1	22.0	20.0	20.9
Sri Lanka	50.3	59.3	63.8	65.9	83.6	71.6	68.4	69.9	38.2	43.4	46.3	55.0	46.5	45.6	50.8
Egypt	37.1	43.6	43.4	40.8	53.2	51.4	51.7	49.7	9.4	10.1	11.9	13.0	13.3	14.9	16.2
Peru	67.7	60.5	56.7	58.6	89.1	73.5	64.3	65.1	71.0	70.7	71.2	99.6	74.9	65.8	71.4

Note: (a) The subordinate regular employment rate by gender and nationality was obtained dividing the persons with at least one week of contribution payment in one year by the person-year with a mean of the work permits at the beginning and the end of the year.

Sources: our elaboration on data of INPS and of Ministry of Interior revised by ISTAT.

tian communities had the lowest subordinate regular employment level among the nationalities examined (about 37%): the remaining immigrated communities had their values at about 50%, except for the groups from Morocco (44.7%) and Senegal (57.9%).

The subordinate regular employment rates were higher for men than for women (with the largest difference to be found among Tunisians, Albanians, Yugoslavs, Senegalese and Egyptians). The difference of employment rates among men and women increased a lot between 1993 and 1999 for Moroccans, Tunisians and Yugoslavs, while it diminished for Chinese and Romanians. Only Peruvian and Philippine women, who are generally employed for housework, had employment rates higher than their male compatriots.

Moreover, lower regular employment rates can indicate difficulties in accessing the labour market or, at least, in obtaining a regular employment. The increase of values in 1996 and the subsequent decrease probably reported first a decrease of the irregular employment and subsequently a massive return in the informal economy. Regularisation and access to regular employments are essential stages of the integration process. However, the risk of returning in precarious working situations cannot be neglected. Even more significant is the impact of the link between the renewal of the permit to stay and the availability of a regular employment, established in the so-called Bossi-Fini law. This means to make precariousness permanent as the irregular employment implies the return to a situation of irregularity in the territory.

Some final considerations

The presence of foreigners in Italy has now reached a considerable absolute number and a relative growing weight on the national population. These considerations result even more adherent to reality if we consider how the last regularisation, currently in the process of being completed, can increase significantly the regular component of the phenomenon. Moreover, beside the irregular component, which makes up the less integrated segment of the foreign immigration and the most difficult to quantify, we must also think about the group of naturalised immigrants and the second generation. In other words, foreign immigration in Italy is not only assuming a major weight in the host society but it is also more complex and articulated, requiring to adopt more analytical definitions and conceptual categories.

Likewise, the large range of nationalities and ethnic communities involved makes it necessary to carry out a detailed analysis, taking into account the specificities of the different immigrant communities.

The various nationalities in Italy present indeed demographic and social characteristics, migratory histories, working integration forms and modalities, as well as economic, social and demographic behaviours that can be considerably different.

The demand for better information is strong, not only in the scientific field but also from institutions and the public opinion, often bombarded with contradictory news and from uncertain sources. However, the available information remains today inadequate, flawed and unreliable, when wanting to go beyond the data on number and characteristics of foreigners legally living in Italy. In other words, it does not seem yet possible, as underlined in this article, to establish a set of indicators enabling to continually monitor the conditions of immigrant communities in the various territorial contexts of the country's. As soon as the 2001 demographic census' final data will be available, we will have numerous data on foreigners living in Italy. After 2001, the situation will be that of a strong information deficit that will make harder to follow the integration path of the immigrant communities. Only a greater coordination between the various sources, using the same criteria for identifying the population, the same definitions and the same classifications, will enable to obtain an important improvement of information. The use of record linkage procedures between different administrative archives and the extension of representativeness of some national sample surveys (first of all, the labour force survey) to the subset of foreign population (or of foreign origin) or the carrying out of a specific national survey on immigrants constitute the essential steps to guarantee the continuous increase of statistical base and its availability.

The enormous attention given to the foreign population and the need of having an effective evaluation of interventions adopted on national, but also by specific territorial levels are all conditions favourable for initiatives that will be concretely improve the informative setting.

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Summary

This contributions analyses the problems involved in the creation of a system of indicators for the integration of immigrant communities in Italy utilising the official statistics. In the first section, the evolution of foreign immigration in Italy is reconstructed since the 1980s, focusing in particular on the past decade. This rich and complex portrait, however, increases the difficulties of the analysis, due to the considerable differences in almost all the profiles of the immigrant communities in Italy.

In the second section, aspects and measurements of integration process are identified considering the definitions of integration adopted at the political level or discussed in the scientific debate. The reference spheres of the integration process are considered to be the migration characteristics, demographic aspects (in terms of characteristics and behaviour), economic aspects (work and income), social aspects (relations with the receiving and sending countries, housing, health and deviance), and cultural aspects (education and language knowledge).

The last section of the article examines the ways in which the available statistics enable us to analyse some of the features of integration identified previously. Attention is focused on the social and demographic aspects enabling us to make a general portrait of the characteristics of the main foreign communities, and on the insertion in the labour market, a fundamental condition for achieving a full integration in the host society. An examination of the data shows a growing immigration with an increasingly complex structure.

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Measuring migrant integration in the nineties: the contribution of field surveys in Italy

Introduction

Special surveys are an essential instrument for analysing in depth the integration processes of immigrants in the host society. Although official statistics may prove effective in measuring these dynamics, it is practically impossible for them to cover the innumerable aspects of a phenomenon that is so complex and manyfold. In the case of the new European countries targeted by immigration, and of Italy in particular, surveys have been a fundamental instrument of information on immigration long before the need arose to study and measure the integration processes. The lack of reliable statistics on immigration has, for example, fostered the Italian scientific research community since the early 1980s to use field surveys as a priority instrument to know characteristics and sometimes the size of migration.

Evaluating over twenty years of research after the initial attempts, lead to the conclusion that this has been a particularly positive experience with regard to contents and methodologies. The prevailing cultural orientation of the researchers participating in these early initiatives, with a demographic and quantitative approach, contributed to focusing attention on the methodological aspects, leading to what have perhaps been the most important results [Bonifazi, 1998]. With respect to the initial experiences, the main new aspect of these studies[1] was the attempt to create an overall analytical approach to migration, shifting the emphasis from the results to the method of the surveys

[1] Basically involving co-ordinated research between universities promoted by the Italian Committee for the Study of Population Problems (Comitato Italiano per lo Studio dei Problemi della Popolazione: CISP) and directed first by Nora Federici and then by Marcello Natale.

[Federici, 1983]. The consequence has been greater sensitivity and more attention to the methodological aspects of field surveys, in particular of those related to the type of sampling to be used for a reference population, which is substantially unknown and unidentified. This has led to the definition of various procedures for identifying persons to be interviewed, enabling the setting-up of an information and methodological basis usable for field studies on foreign immigration, above all through the sampling by centres of aggregation [Natale and Strozza, 1997; Blangiardo, 2000a].

In these years, field experiences have made possible to directly assess the proposed techniques, and have enabled a continuous refinement of the operational procedures and methodologies. At the same time, with the stabilisation of the immigration process, topics for research have been gradually extended. Attention was increasingly focussed on the more specific problems of integration. Despite these generally positive results and the existence of important knowledge and experiences, a representative sample survey at the national level has not yet been undertaken and does not seem it will be in the next future. The methods developed continue to be used above all on the local or at most on the regional level [Pane and Strozza, 2000]. In this regard, the most advanced situation is in Lombardy, where surveys have become a systematic monitoring of the situation of migrants. From the Milan metropolitan area, this was extended to the entire province of Milan and the other provinces of the region, and now, in the context of the activities of the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multi-Ethnicity (Osservatorio Regionale per l'Integrazione e la Multietnicità), covers the whole region [Provincia di Milano and ISMU 2000; Blangiardo, 2002]. The single attempt of a representative sample survey at the national level conducted in these years has not concerned immigration as a whole; rather, it has concerned two specific communities, the Ghanaians and Egyptians, significant but far from constituting the most relevant component of immigration [Birindelli *et al.*, 2000].

Although there is no national survey on integration, the contribution to the study of this particular aspect of migration through field studies conducted thus far is definitely interesting. In particular, the number of experiences and the amount of information collected can now allow an overall assessment, which besides being undoubtedly valid with regard to knowledge, can also provide indications on the usefulness of surveys in the acquisition of adequate information for the analysis of the integration process in the Italian context. This usefulness will definitely grow in the coming years, taking into account two different aspects. First, the dynamics of integration will necessarily involve more and more areas and increasingly profound aspects of the

Italian society and the world of immigration. Second, field surveys are a decisive instrument in the analysis of these social processes. In a situation of this type, the first step must be to exploit the research experiences previously acquired. In the case of Italy, these experiences are an important and significant aspect for their contents and for their methodological approach.

The first part of this paper is dedicated to an evaluation of the contribution that the surveys conducted in Italy can give to the analysis of the integration processes. Analysing the questionnaires used, we shall seek to identify the topics related to integration on which data has been collected in recent years, also trying to highlight the guidelines that have characterised the field research studies in this specific respect. The following chapters are dedicated to the more specific aspect of two particular surveys. One is a survey carried out at the national level regarding Ghanaian and Egyptian immigrants; and the other is a survey conducted in Rome in 2001 on the Filipinos, Moroccans, Peruvians and Romanians. In both cases, an examination has been done on the main results deriving from the various aspects of the living conditions of immigrants, seeking to highlight aspects related to participation in social life, besides the more strictly material ones.

Field surveys and their contribution to the analysis of integration

The first survey of some importance on foreign immigrants was conducted by CENSIS (Centro Studi Investmenti Sociali - Centre for Social Studies and Policies) [1979] in the late 1970s in some geographical areas of Italy. Subsequently, some local surveys were conducted and in 1983, a university research study at the national level entitled "The Foreign Presence in Italy" was promoted by Nora Federici and financed by CISP. This research study, involving 12 university groups formed by researchers from different disciplines, aimed at increasing knowledge on foreign immigration in various areas of Italy through a close examination of the sources of information available and utilising field surveys to acquire data as reliable and representative as possible [Natale and Strozza, 1997]. Between 1984 and 1988, approximately 3,200 interviews were conducted on various immigrant communities and professional categories in different areas of the country and, above all, adopting different sampling techniques mainly in order to overcome the difficulties of measuring the illegal component of immigration. A core questionnaire was prepared, in order to have a minimum basis of common and, therefore, comparable information. Single research groups were allowed to integrate the basic form with optional and/or specific information of the area concerned. The standard ques-

tionnaire contained information on the main demographic and social characteristics, on employment status at the time of the survey, on migration experience, on living conditions and migration prospects. The results of these surveys were published in various articles[2] and some monographs, regarding the conclusions of the research study in the specific local contexts. Some attempts based on a joint interpretation of the results of the various surveys have been proposed with regard to job insertion [Natale and Strozza, 1997] and to some problems related to social integration [Birindelli, 1991].

The differences between the communities and categories considered in the various areas and the lack of adequate sampling methods led the research groups to identify separate technical and operational solutions. The sampling methods differed from group to group, and in some cases also within the same research group, according to the different immigrant communities. This experience, however, led to the acquisition of important knowledge regarding the foreign presence in the research areas, and represented an important test of alternative sampling techniques for rare or elusive populations.

In the early 1990s, Blangiardo – continuing the trial of the sampling techniques on foreigners started in the national research – proposed in some subsequent surveys on immigrants in Milan and other areas of Lombardy a particular technique of probability-based sampling called "method by centres and places of aggregation" [Blangiardo, 1993] which has been further improved in recent years [Blangiardo, 1996; 2000a].

In the national university research on determining the integration of immigrants, ideally representing the continuation of the one proposed by Nora Federici, the sampling technique proposed by Blangiardo was adopted in the surveys on foreign immigrants coming from Third World and Eastern European countries. In the period 1993-94, 3,139 interviews were conducted on the basis of the same questionnaire with questions regarding the population and family characteristics, the migration experience, the working and living conditions (housing, income and consumption, association membership) of foreigners living in 10 different areas of Italy. Besides a series of contributions and monographs regarding some local aspects of the survey, on the whole the data collected was used to prepare estimates of irregular immigration at the national and sub-national level, according to areas of origin and/or by gender in the mid-1990s [Blangiardo and Papavero, 1996; Natale and Strozza, 1997]. Particular attention was paid to liv-

[2] See in particular, the three issues of *Studi Emigrazione* (71, 82-83 and 91-92) specifically dedicated to the approach and results of the research study.

ing conditions and to the possible integration paths of immigrants in Campania, a region of Southern Italy characterised by a widespread unofficial economy and considerable irregular foreign immigration [Conti and Strozza, 2000].

After 1994, many surveys were conducted at the local level, in some cases on immigrants with specific areas of origin (citizenship). We should also recall the periodical (more or less annual) survey conducted in some areas of Lombardy with the technique of sampling by centres and places of aggregation. These surveys were conducted by the *Cariplo* Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multiethnicity (Fondazione Cariplo per le Iniziative e lo Studio sulla Multietnicità: ISMU), that promoted an important group of interdisciplinary research in the second half of 1990s. Particular attention was focused on the analysis of the job insertion of immigrants, although in some cases other topics are also considered.

In the first half of 1997, an important survey was conducted by the Institute for Population Research (Istituto di Ricerche sulla Popolazione: IRP) of the National Research Council (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche: CNR), within an international project financed by Eurostat and managed by the NIDI (Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute), regarding the push and pull factors of international migration. Our paper contains an analysis of the survey data, examining some aspects of integration.

Continuing with the historical reconstruction of the surveys on foreigners, it should be said that in the period 1997-99, in a research of the "La Sapienza" University of Rome on "Movements of People and of Capital in Europe" [Acocella and Sonnino, 2003], a sub-project on foreign immigrants in Italy was developed. This part of the research involved a sample survey, conducted in 1997 and 1998, adopting the method of centres and places of aggregation on immigrants coming from some countries of the Eastern Europe (former Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland and Romania) and of Mediterranean Africa (Morocco). It was conducted in some areas of three Italian regions (for Veneto, in the provinces of Treviso, Verona and Vicenza; for Campania, in the Municipality of Naples and the province of Caserta; for Latium, in the Municipality of Rome). A total of 1,920 interviews were conducted with a recording model aimed at acquiring information not only on the specific research topics (insertion in the labour market, income, consumption, savings, and above all remittances sent by immigrants) but also on the main (demographic and social) characteristics of the interviewees, on the migration history and prospects, on the legal condition of stay, on the family situation in the migration context (area of settlement and of origin) as well as on housing conditions.

In 2001, a sample survey was conducted on the integration of Filipino, Moroccan, Peruvian and Romanian immigrants living in the metropolitan area of Rome [Conti and Strozza 2004]. A total of nearly 1,300 interviews were performed with adults, just over 300 for each of 4 communities, adopting the method of sampling by centres and places of aggregation. Some results of this survey will be considered below.

Particular attention has to be devoted to the experience developed in Lombardy. Over recent years, provincial observatories on immigration have been created under the management of ISMU, and the Regional Authorities have recently set up (in December 2000) the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multi-Ethnicity. This Observatory conducted a sample survey on the characteristics of the foreigners living in Lombardy in 2001 and in 2002. The survey was conducted by extending to the regional level the method and experiences accrued in the previous five years in similar surveys regarding first the Milan area and then also other areas of the region. Nearly 8,000 interviews were conducted with foreigners over 14 years of age coming from developing countries and Eastern Europe on the basis of a questionnaire containing basic information on the individual and family structural characteristics, employment status and housing conditions, future plans and relationships with the local environment and structures. Among the tasks of the Observatory, a periodical sample survey (annual) is planned on foreigners living in the region, with a questionnaire that remains the same in the general part but analyses a specific theme each time.

At the end of this *excursus* of the main surveys conducted in Italy on foreign immigrants, it seems important to stress how surveys have often been conducted with limited economic resources. The lack of funding and of extensive local organisational structures have led to a limited geographical coverage and a sample size that is rarely very large. However, these surveys seem to be essential for the monitoring of the situation, enabling the acquisition of data that is hard to find in administrative sources. Surveys also provide further information about the segment of the foreign population that is the hardest to determine, i.e. people who do not comply with rules on staying in Italy. The numerous experiences acquired have, likewise, led to the creation of *ad hoc* sampling techniques to overcome some specific problems, such as the partial nature of the lists from which the sample is derived, and the difficulty in identifying the large segment of the foreign population consisting of people who are highly mobile. Up to now, there is no national survey on the living and working conditions of foreign immigrants in Italy, but we can attempt to at least partially reconstruct this complex puzzle on the basis of the information collected in the numerous local surveys conducted in the various areas of the country. Here,

we shall try provide an initial contribution through the examination of the employment and housing conditions of the foreign communities included in the IRP survey carried out in 1997 and in the one conducted in Rome in 2001.

Egyptians and Ghanaians in 1997

In the context of an international project on push and pull factors in international migration, promoted by the Commission of the European Community and implemented by Eurostat and the NIDI, in 1997 the Institute for Population Research conducted a survey on Egyptian and Ghanaian immigrants in Italy[3] [Schoorl *et al.*, 2000; Birindelli *et al.*, 2000]. The research study was dedicated above all to the recent migrations, and thus the decision to focus on those who emigrated from their country of birth in the decade before the survey. In particular, a Main Migration Actor (MMA) was identified in each immigrant family. This category included migrants born in Egypt and Ghana, aged between 18 and 65 years at the time of the survey, aged over 18 years at the time of the last emigration from the country of origin and living in Italy for over three months and less than ten years. The complete questionnaire was presented to them while fewer questions were presented to the other groups. A total of 699 Egyptian and 827 Ghanaian migrants were interviewed. There were 503 MMAs among the former and 658 among the latter. A definitely large sample, especially if we consider that the number of regular immigrants of the two countries in Italy was 23,500 for the Egyptians and 15,600 for the Ghanaians at the start of the year in which the survey was conducted.

Particular attention was devoted to the identification of the areas where the survey was to be conducted in order to obtain representative data at the national level, while the sampling technique used is by centres and places of aggregation, providing the necessary flexibility and methodological standards for the numerous problems arising in the surveys that concerned populations for which the size and main characteristics are not yet known [Blangiardo, 1993]. The survey has collected information on the numerous aspects of the migration process: the migration history of the interviewees, the characteristics of the last emigration, the reasons leading to the decision to emigrate, the mechanisms determining the transfers, the situation in Italy and future intentions. In this article we focus on the living conditions of immigrants in Italy, the more direct source of information on the integration process.

[3] Among the data described in this paper and those shown in Birindelli *et al.* [2000], there are some slight differences due to some adjustments of the data.

Table 1 – *Egyptians and Ghanaians by duration of stay, and gender* (%)

Duration of the stay	Egyptians			Ghanaians		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Less than 1 year	5.6	11.4	7.1	4.2	1.7	3.5
1 year - < 5 years	31.5	49.9	36.2	36.7	38.6	37.3
5 years - < 10 years	58.5	33.7	52.2	53.3	56.7	54.3
10 years or more	4.4	4.9	4.5	5.8	2.9	4.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	521	178	699	581	246	827
%	74.5	25.5	100.0	70.3	29.7	100.0

Source: IRP survey, 1997.

Considering the duration of their stay in Italy and the gender distribution, we can begin to determine the structural characteristics of the two groups (Table 1). Few were staying for over ten years in Italy (4.5% for the Egyptians and 4.9% for the Ghanaians) and the female percentage did not exceed 25.5% for the former and 29.7% for the latter. The first characteristic is the direct consequence of the procedures for creating the sample, the purpose of which was to analyse the causes of recent migrations. Consequently, immigrants in Italy for over ten years could not be considered as MMAs and therefore they could openly be interviewed as part of a family in which there was a recent migrant [Farina, 2000]. Taking into account that the duration of stay in the host country has a direct influence on the integration process, these sampling procedures impact directly on the results. This is particularly true for the Egyptians, who are one of the most consolidated communities, and whose immigrants in Italy for more than ten years, probably the best integrated ones, were under-represented in the sample. Obviously results must be interpreted by taking into account this structural characteristic of the sample, although the interpretation of the data considering the duration of stay will in any case highlight the role of this variable within the integration processes. We cannot likewise deny that the criteria of identification of the sample have led to a selection and distortion of the sampling of longest residents in Italy, as immigrants whose family did not encompass recent migrants were excluded.

Although the female percentage is not substantially different, we can note how the structural characteristics of the two groups reflect different migration patterns and gender relationships. In fact, among the Egyptians most women (61.3%) arrived in the last five years, while

most of the men came to Italy in the previous 5-year period (58.5%). Among the Ghanaians, on the other hand, the distribution of arrivals is almost identical in the two genders that have very similar percentages in the various periods considered. The Egyptians are thus characterised by a more traditional migration pattern, based on the departure of men, joined subsequently by women, thus re-establishing a family or creating a new one in the host country. The Ghanaians, on the other hand, are characterised by migration flows with a balanced gender composition which may reflect both immigration by family group and a more active role of women in the process of initial insertion.

The duration of stay is a variable directly affecting the economic integration of immigrants (Table 2). The percentage of unemployed, in fact, falls considerably for those who have spent more years in Italy. Among the Egyptians, this rate falls from 33.3% for those who have been in Italy for less than a year to 4.7% among those present for over ten years. Among the Ghanaians, the difference is even clearer, since the two values are respectively 50.9 and 2.6%. The reduction of the share of casual labourers is less significant. This is an obvious sign of the on-going difficulty of insertion in regular jobs, especially for the Ghanaians, but also for the relevance of informal work in which immigrants are one of the main components in Italy. We should observe the percentage of employers among the Egyptians, which is surprisingly high at 43.6% of immigrants in Italy for over ten years. The low percentage of housewives among the Ghanaian women shows a more active female participation in the labour market for this community. In general, in any case, "the acquisition of 'economic citizenship' does not cause any particular problems for the communities surveyed. Actually, as duration of stay increases, the immigrants generally tend to find stable jobs even if sometimes, and especially for the women, there is a preliminary stage of unemployment or acceptance of occasional work" [Blangiardo 2000b: 88].

The duration of stay is a key variable also for housing (Table 3). The percentage of those who live in flats increases proportionally to their time of stay. This tendency is especially obvious among Ghanaians, where the values in the two extreme classes are 34.4% and 78.2%. This gap, however, is above all the consequence of the great difficulties encountered by this community upon arrival in Italy, since 36.4% of those present for less than one year are without fixed residence, or live in improvised dwellings. It is interesting to note that a small percentage of immigrants, 7.7% for the Egyptians and 4.6% for the Ghanaians, own the home where they live. Many immigrants (57.5% for the Egyptians and 40.5% for the Ghanaians) live in homes with no more than two rooms and almost all the rest of the sample have homes with three

Table 2 – *Egyptians and Ghanaians by economic activity, employment status, gender and duration of stay (%)*

Employment status	Less than 1 year			1 year - < 5 years			5 years - < 10 years			10 years or more			Total		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Egyptians															
Employer	1.9	–	1.1	1.2	–	0.8	11.7	–	9.7	39.9	53.6	43.6	9.0	2.3	7.3
Casual labourer	19.2	1.7	12.0	19.7	9.8	16.2	10.6	7.2	10.1	7.5	–	5.4	13.8	7.4	12.2
Employee	26.3	–	15.5	59.8	6.2	41.0	70.1	22.2	62.2	46.2	–	33.5	63.3	10.8	50.1
Other work	–	–	–	3.2	0.9	2.4	0.5	4.3	1.2	–	8.1	2.2	1.3	2.3	1.6
Unemployed	47.8	12.6	33.3	12.9	5.1	10.2	5.1	6.4	5.3	6.4	–	4.7	10.0	6.3	9.0
Other non-work	4.8	14.2	8.7	3.2	5.1	3.9	2.0	4.5	2.4	–	–	–	2.5	5.1	3.2
Work in household	–	71.4	29.5	–	73.0	25.7	–	55.4	9.1	–	38.3	10.5	–	65.9	16.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	29	20	49	164	89	253	305	60	365	23	9	32	521	176	697
Ghanaians															
Employer	–	–	–	0.6	1.1	0.7	4.5	1.2	3.5	–	–	–	2.58	0.82	2.06
Casual labourer	21.5	22.6	21.6	23.9	23.5	23.7	10.8	20.1	13.7	14.8	–	12.2	16.3	20.9	17.7
Employee	15.2	10.7	14.5	52.0	47.9	50.7	73.2	46.5	64.9	78.5	100.0	82.3	63.2	48.4	58.8
Other work	–	–	–	0.6	3.3	1.4	1.4	2.5	1.7	3.6	–	3.0	1.2	2.9	1.7
Unemployed	53.6	35.7	50.9	20.1	18.5	19.6	9.7	14.8	11.3	3.2	–	2.6	14.9	16.4	15.4
Other non-work	–	–	9.8	31.0	12.9	2.4	2.1	2.3	0.3	1.4	0.7	–	1.5	1.6	1.6
Work in household	–	–	–	–	–	0.4	3.5	1.4	–	13.4	4.2	–	0.2	9.0	2.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	24	4	29	213	95	309	310	140	450	34	7	41	582	244	826

Source: IRP survey, 1997.

Table 3 – *Egyptians and Ghanaians by type of housing unit, duration of stay and gender (%)*

Type of housing unit	Less than 1 year			1 year -< 5 years			5 years -< 10 years			10 years or more			Total		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Egyptians															
Whole flat or family house	54.7	100.0	73.4	46.9	91.8	62.7	74.7	99.2	78.8	82.2	100.0	87.1	65.2	95.5	72.9
Part of flat or family house	39.5	–	23.2	39.5	4.3	27.1	18.0	–	15.0	16.4	–	11.9	26.0	2.2	19.9
Dormitory	–	–	–	2.9	–	1.9	0.1	–	0.1	–	–	–	1.0	–	0.7
Improvised dwelling or no fixed accommodation	4.3	–	2.5	2.1	3.2	2.5	2.4	–	2.0	1.4	–	1.0	2.3	1.7	2.1
Accommodation at workplace	–	–	–	6.6	0.7	4.6	3.6	0.8	3.2	–	–	–	4.2	0.6	3.3
Other	1.5	–	0.9	1.9	–	1.3	1.1	–	0.9	–	–	–	1.3	–	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	29	20	49	164	89	253	305	60	365	23	9	32	520	178	698
Ghanaians															
Whole flat or family house	29.2	64.3	34.4	33.4	59.3	41.4	57.5	73.7	62.5	85.1	46.1	78.2	49.1	66.8	54.3
Part of flat or family house	19.7	30.5	21.3	38.1	29.9	35.6	30.7	22.9	28.3	12.9	16.8	13.6	32.0	25.5	30.1
Dormitory	1.3	–	1.1	13.8	4.1	10.8	9.5	0.5	6.7	–	–	–	10.2	2.0	7.7
Improvised dwelling or no fixed accommodation	42.7	–	36.4	5.4	–	3.8	0.2	–	0.2	–	–	–	4.0	–	2.8
Accommodation at workplace	3.2	–	2.7	4.7	3.5	4.3	1.5	0.9	1.3	–	–	–	2.6	2.0	2.4
Other	4.0	5.1	4.1	4.5	3.1	4.1	0.5	1.9	0.9	2.0	37.1	8.2	2.2	3.6	2.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	24	4	29	213	95	309	310	140	450	34	7	41	581	247	828

Source: IRP survey, 1997.

or four rooms (35.5% and 49.5%). The figure that probably best reflects all the difficulties of the integration process consists in the percentage of families forced to share a kitchen with other families. This percentages is 33.9% for the Egyptians and 46.5% for the Ghanaians, and the values – although considerably reduced – also remain high for the immigrants in Italy for over ten years (12% and 10.8%).

The gap between immigrants and the Italians is evident when we consider the ownership of some material goods. Although also in this case the percentage of owners rises with the duration of the stay in the country, these values are quite far from those recorded among the Italian families. Items now present in all Italian homes show ownership levels which do not always exceed 60%, also among immigrants living in Italy for over ten years. Thus, the percentage of ownership for radios is 65.9% for the Egyptians and 73.5% for the Ghanaians; for televisions, 67.8% and 59.5%; for cars, 49.3% and 50%; for telephones, 48.5% and 70.1%; and for refrigerators, 46.5% and 66.5%.

The survey has also collected information on some social activities among immigrants. Participation in the activities of recreation, political, religious and special interest groups seems greater among the Ghanaians than the Egyptians. This situation regards all types of organisations surveyed, although the difference is especially important in the case of religious ones, involving 48.6% of the Ghanaians and only 21.3% of the Egyptians. Unlike the variables analysed thus far, participation in the activities of organisations does not always tend to grow as the duration of the stay in Italy increases. This is probably due to two different factors. While the stabilisation and integration process tends to increase as the stay lengthens even fostering higher levels of participation, there may also be a reduction of the association needs more closely linked to the phases of initial insertion. A total of 45.4% of the Egyptians and 48.2% of the Ghanaians state they have close Italian friends. The values rise with the duration of stay, reaching 68% for the Egyptians and Ghanaians in Italy for over ten years. There is also a confirmation of gender differences between the two communities, with a rate of 44.6% for the Ghanaian women and just 32.1% for the Egyptian women.

The acquisition of citizenship of the host country can certainly be considered as a decisive opportunity for the integration process. Among the MMAs, the percentage of those who already have Italian citizenship is 1% for the Egyptians and 0.7% for the Ghanaians. Among the MMAs with citizenship of the country of origin, 3.2% of the Egyptians and 1.4% of the Ghanaians have advanced an application for Italian citizenship. If such low values are explained with the very strict criteria to obtain citizenship according to current legislation, when we con-

sider the future intentions the situation is characterised by a variety of migration projects. In fact, the percentage of those who intend to apply for Italian citizenship is 44.9% for the Egyptians and 39.3% for the Ghanaians. These two values also appear to correspond with the intentions to remain in Italy (31.9% for the Egyptians and 33.6% for the Ghanaians). These data confirm how the world of immigration is characterised by a variety of projects which must then be confronted with the realities of the country of arrival and with the links with the country of departure. These links seem to be especially close among the Ghanaians, 66.2% of whom have sent money to their own family in the past year; they are also close among the Egyptians for whom this value is 36.8%. The overall level of knowledge of Italian is low (27.3 for the Egyptians and 28.9% for the Ghanaians). The increase of values proportionally to the duration of stay seems much lower than one might expect. For the Egyptians, in fact, the share rises from 21 to 31%, while among the Ghanaians, the percentages in the two extreme levels considered are 17.3 and 32.3%. It is significant that among immigrants with children 57.9% of the Egyptians and 38.1% of the Ghanaians never speak Italian with their own children, a relative value reaching 48% for the Ghanaians in Italy for over ten years.

Although the survey examined was intended to study recent migrations, the results also proved useful to analyse some important aspects of the integration process. The choice of immigrants living in Italy for less than ten years as a unit of reference in setting up the sample involves an underestimation of the best integrated percentage of the two communities. This distortion is definitely greater for the Egyptians, and much less for the Ghanaians whose arrival in Italy is certainly more recent. On the other hand, our main aim was not to describe the situation, but rather to verify the usefulness of survey data in studying the dynamics of integration in Italy. In this sense, the answer is absolutely positive. The survey has, in fact, enabled us to collect information on important aspects of the life of immigrants, otherwise unavailable in such detail through official statistics. Also with regard to the interpretation of the integration process, the results seem very interesting. The importance of the duration of stay in determining the outcomes of immigration in terms of integration in the country of arrival has been highlighted, while showing that the relationship between these two variables is not always and necessarily linear. It has furthermore shown the differences of the patterns, projects and intentions of the varied world of immigration, thus confirming the need for a complex and not a single interpretation of the integration processes.

The Filipinos, Moroccans, Peruvians and Romanians in 2001

Work and living conditions

The four communities considered in the survey conducted in Rome in 2001 were chosen on the basis of their numerical relevance in the area concerned or at the national level, and on the basis of the different characteristics regarding the gender structure and immigration phase. A total of 1,297 foreigners, more or less equally divided among the four communities surveyed, were interviewed (over 300 interviews for each community). The Filipinos and Peruvians have a gender structure unbalanced in favour of the female component (70% and 64% respectively) while the Romanians and Moroccans have a male prevalence, very high in the latter case (the women share is respectively 37 and 21%). The Filipino community, which is the largest and above all one of the oldest foreign communities living in Rome, has an older age structure compared to the others considered in the survey. The Filipinos interviewed have an average age of over 37 and nearly 38 years among women, who in almost 14% of the cases are aged at least 50. Also among the other three communities, the female component has a higher average age than the male. This gap seems especially wide in the case of the Peruvians, with an average age of 32.4 for the males and 36.6 for the females.

There are considerable differences in the structure between communities according to whether or not their status is legal (holding a valid permit to stay). The Filipinos have a rather low percentage of unauthorized migrants (under 10%). The Peruvians and Moroccans, while being mainly in a regular status, have a large proportion of persons without a permit to stay (37.5 and 42% respectively), while the majority of the Romanians (almost 70% cases) are in an irregular status. There are no significant gender differences, although in all four communities, the percentage of unauthorized women is lower than that for men.

The differences highlighted so far are at least partly related to the different periods of immigration, and thus to the significant difference in the average duration of stay in Italy according to citizenship. The Filipino community is one of the "oldest" settled in Rome: many of the interviewees, above all among women, arrived over 10 years earlier (41% of the males and over 47% of the females). In general, the average duration of stay in the country since the last arrival is over 9 years, with considerable variations but in any case less than for the other communities surveyed. Also the Moroccans interviewed in Rome have been present for several years (on average for over 6 years), but the variation of duration is very high, indicating the current presence of old and new immigrants. Among the Peruvians, there are many cases – above all among the

women – of immigrants in the early 1990s, although there are more of them – above all males – who have come in the last five years. The Romanian community is the one of most recent immigration, with a high share of arrivals in recent years and a very low percentage of those present in the country for over five years (just over 10%).

A definitely important aspect of the integration process of immigrants is job insertion. There are different opportunities and systems of employing immigrants in the various geographical areas and local labour markets. This aspect should not be forgotten when attention is focused on the analysis of job insertion of the four communities living in the Rome area. At the time of the survey, the percentage of employed immigrants was quite high, though taking into account that persons under 18 years of age were not included. About 90% of the Romanians and Filipinos interviewed said they worked; also among the Peruvians the share of employed people was over 80% (Table 4). This was lower for the Moroccans who had high levels of unemployment (27.5%), above all among the women (over 38%). It should furthermore be pointed out the especially high percentage, among the latter, of those who are seeking first employment (almost 23% of the total of Moroccan women interviewed). They are almost always persons who have arrived in Italy for less than a year. The unemployment rate for the Filipinos and Romanians is also lower than that of natives. Among the Peruvians and Moroccans, the values are significantly higher and in any case greater than those of the Italians or residents in the province of Rome.[4] As we have said, higher levels of unemployment occur among the Moroccans, particularly among women. Also Peruvian women had higher levels of unemployment than men, while in the Filipino group the opposite is true.

Another element confirming the greater difficulties of these two communities with regard to absorption in the Rome labour market is evidenced by the degree of stability of the main work activity. Above all among the Moroccans, but also among the Peruvians, the percentage of those who undertake seasonal or casual work is especially high (for the former almost 25%, and the latter over 10%). The best situation seems to be among the Filipinos, who in only a very few cases have seasonal or occasional work as their main activity. This community is characterised by a high percentage of employed immigrants who have two or more employers per week. Since the main work is in the sector of domestic services, this aspect seems to show the importance of daily or hourly jobs.

[4] In 2001 at the national level, the unemployment rate was 9.0% (7.0% for males and 12.2% for females) of the active population, falling to 8% among the residents in the province of Rome (6.2% among males and 10.3% among females).

Table 4 – *Activity status and some labour market indexes of foreign immigrants interviewed in Rome in 2001, according to country of citizenship and gender*

Foreign group	Activity status (%)				Rate of unemployment[b]	Irregular employed	Index of occupational segregation[c]	Month work earning (thousand of lire)		
	Employed	Unemployed	Seeking 1st job in Italy	Not economically active[a]	(%)	(%)	(%)	Median	Average	V.C.[d] (%)
Filipinos	**88.6**	**5.3**	**1.5**	**4.6**	**7.1**	**20.6**	**73.8**	**1,500**	**1,509**	**30.4**
- male	84.5	9.3	2.1	4.1	11.8	20.7	56.0	1,500	1,562	33.1
- female	90.3	3.5	1.3	4.8	5.1	20.5	78.4	1,500	1,487	29.1
Peruvians	**83.9**	**10.1**	**1.8**	**4.2**	**12.4**	**48.8**	**58.9**	**1,400**	**1,429**	**33.9**
- male	88.5	7.4	–	4.1	7.7	54.7	44.6	1,500	1,542	34.2
- female	81.3	11.7	2.8	4.2	15.1	45.1	71.0	1,300	1,358	32.6
Romanians	**91.3**	**5.9**	**1.3**	**1.6**	**7.3**	**70.9**	**41.2**	**1,600**	**1,626**	**38.7**
- male	92.1	5.5	1.5	1.0	7.0	74.3	36.4	1,800	1,795	27.3
- female	89.8	6.8	0.9	2.5	7.8	64.8	50.0	1,200	1,324	55.2
Moroccans	**69.8**	**15.7**	**10.7**	**3.8**	**27.5**	**54.8**	**36.5**	**1,500**	**1,567**	**59.8**
- male	73.4	16.7	7.5	2.4	24.8	54.9	40.2	1,500	1,634	60.9
- female	56.1	12.1	22.7	9.1	38.3	54.1	58.1	1,200	1,224	34.0

Notes: (a) Includes students, housewives and retired. (b) Obtained by comparing the interviewees seeking a job (unemployed and seeking first job) with the total of the active population (employed, unemployed and seeking first job). (c) Simple relative index of dissimilarity with respect to the percentage distribution by branch of economic activity (agriculture, construction, manufacturing, trade, hotels and catering, services to families, other services) of the employed Italians excluding public employees. (d) Variation coefficient.

Source: Department of Demography - University of Rome "La Sapienza" survey.

It is a partial change from the initial pattern of continuous employment – which some have defined figuratively as "day and night" – at the employer's house.

The Filipinos, almost all dependent workers, in most cases have a regular employment contract. Also the Peruvians and Romanians have a very high share of dependent workers (respectively 93 and almost 96%), but undeclared employment is much more common (in 49% and 71% of the cases). Above all almost ¾ of Romanian males work in the informal economy. The Moroccan community has a major number of self-employed, mostly street vendors (approximately 40% of the employed). These are activities mainly conducted without the required license, and thus belong to the informal economy. A more detailed analysis has shown that for the Peruvians, self-employment is a form of upward social mobility, while for the Moroccans independent activities are often considered as a temporary and unstable employment, waiting for better job solutions.

The structure of occupation by branch of economic activity is arranged by nationality and gender. The communities surveyed have various levels of occupational segregation, characterised by the insertion in different sectors and activities. The index of occupational segregation indicates the dissimilarity of the structure of occupation by branch of economic activity of each immigrant community with respect to that of the Italian population, but which also inevitably reflects the differences in gender structures. This index is an important sign of the real opportunities for the immigrant to access the various employment industries. The continuation over time of a structure, that is substantially different from that of the local population, highlights the difficulties of the socio-occupational mobility of the foreign communities. In all four communities surveyed, the value of this index among women is always higher than that recorded among men. This is due to the fact that the former respond almost exclusively to the demand for domestic services, while the latter work in more branches of activity ranging from construction to some segments of less qualified services. Street vending remains the first solution, sometimes to fall back upon, above all for the Moroccan community. Filipinos are almost exclusively in the service sector, mainly in domestic services. Among men, this is the main branch of activity (48% of those employed), although not so exclusively as for women (just over 90% of those employed) who have very high levels of occupational segregation (the index is nearly 80%). Substantially, Filipino males have a wider range of job opportunities than females. Also among the Peruvians, there is a situation similar to that of the Filipinos, although less evident, as shown by the occupational segregation index (in total 59%). Domestic services absorb the largest

quota of employed women and men (approximately 82% and 32% respectively), although among the latter there is a significant job insertion in other industries, especially construction (almost 24%). Also for Romanian and Moroccan women who are at work, the main activity is in services to families as maids (41% and 32.5% respectively), although there is greater variety, above all among the Moroccans. Among men, as we have said previously, job opportunities are more varied than among women, also between the two communities dominated by females (Filipinos and Peruvians). In particular, there is a quite large proportion of Peruvians employed in construction (nearly a quarter), mainly as workmen and masons. Among Romanian males, two thirds of the employed work in manufacturing, and above all in construction. The work undertaken most frequently is general workman (22.5%), followed by mason and construction labourer (16.4% and 15.9% respectively). Among the Moroccans, almost half of the employed work in trade, above all in street vending conducted mainly on an independent basis, and as we have said, without a license. A distinctive factor of this community is, however, the wider range of jobs in various branches of economic activity. As we can see by the lower value of the occupational segregation index, males show considerable proportions of employed people in almost all the industries.

The analysis of net monetary earnings habitually earned by the interviewees employed at the time of the survey enables us to add further data to the examination of success in job insertion; it likewise provides some elements, on the individual level, regarding the economic situation and monetary resources of immigrants. The order of communities in the scale of the average monthly earning varies by gender. Among males, the Romanians declare the highest earnings (the median value and average value are respectively equal and just under 1,800,000 lire (930,00 Euro) with a rather low variation). Moroccans and Filipinos follow with an average monthly earning of over 1,500,000 lire (775,00 Euro). Moroccans are characterised by a considerable internal variability, due to a tendency of polarisation towards the two opposite extremes.[5] Among women, who have on average lower job income than men of the same community, Filipino women declare the highest earnings with the median and average values being around 1,500,000 lire (775,00 Euro) per month. This is natural if we consider that this is the "oldest" immigrant community among those

[5] It should in any case be stressed that this community is characterised by a higher percentage of people with precarious work and at the same time a lower average number of hours worked per month by the employed with respect to the other communities.

surveyed and that it undoubtedly has a predominant position in the domestic services. In this sector, as we have observed previously, the women of the other communities surveyed are employed exclusively or prevalently, and have an average income lower than Filipino women: almost 150,000 (80,00 Euro) less for Peruvian women, over 150,000 lire less for the Romanian and 250,000 lire (130,00 Euro) less for the Moroccan women.

The examination of some indicators on job insertion by duration of stay in Italy shows, as expected, a gradual improvement of job opportunities and working conditions in all four communities as we move from the more recent to earlier immigrants (Table 5). Though caution is required, since the data are derived from a cross-section survey, it seems possible to identify a path for improvement marked by the time spent in the new situation. In fact, the unemployment rate is especially high above all among foreigners living in Italy for less than a year. Instead, the proportion of those without a regular employment contract or without a license falls considerably for immigrants with over five years of stay in Italy. There is also a gradual increase in all the communities of the average monthly income as the stay in Italy lengthens. However, it should be noted in this respect that the Filipinos, who have the highest income among the immigrants in Italy for less than a year, are in the last position for average monthly earnings among those living in Italy for at least five years. The reduced improvement in terms of earnings is probably linked to the employment in the family-service sector, guaranteeing a certain income basis and security in the first phase of immigration without much opportunities for improvement in earnings and in the social and occupational position. In fact, the Filipinos, who among the more recent immigrants record a lower unemployment rate and a lower percentage of undeclared employment, do not show significant changes in sectorial segregation as time elapses; it remains very high also among those living in the country for at least 10 years and even higher than the level observed among foreigners of the other communities who have arrived more recently. The limited range of job opportunities makes a greater insertion of this community more difficult. For many Filipinos, Italy is a temporary destination, with a high percentage of those in Italy for many years still hoping to return to their country of origin. The situation of the other communities and in particular of the Romanians is quite different. In a short time, they have experienced considerable improvements in the opportunity of finding a job, in income received and in the extension of the range of economic activities. Access to a regular job seems to be more difficult, and it is in any case conditioned – considering the high rate of unauthorized immigration – by the possibility of obtaining the permit to stay following amnesty measures.

Table 5 – *Some labour market indexes of foreign immigrants interviewed in Rome in 2001, according to country of citizenship and duration of stay in Italy*

Foreign group	Unemployment rate (%)	Irregular employment (%)	Index of occupational segregation[a] (%)	Work earning (in thousand of lire)	
				Average	V.C.[b] (%)
Filipinos	**7.2**	**20.2**	**73.8**	**1,509**	**30.4**
- less than 1 year	34.1	52.5	74.4	1,350	32.6
- 1 year to <5 years	8.8	30.6	78.5	1,394	31.4
- 5 years to <10 years	1.0	15.3	73.7	1,476	27.2
- 10 years or more	3.7	12.6	71.8	1,603	29.8
Peruvians	**12.5**	**49.4**	**58.9**	**1,429**	**33.9**
- less than 1 year	32.6	79.5	64.1	1,173	41.0
- 1 year to <5 years	11.7	65.2	63.4	1,377	31.1
- 5 years to <10 years	6.7	27.0	63.2	1,511	31.6
- 10 years or more	5.0	22.2	45.0	1,644	34.6
Romanians	**7.3**	**71.7**	**41.2**	**1,626**	**38.7**
- less than 1 year	20.4	74.9	58.5	1,183	39.9
- 1 year to <5 years	6.4	77.2	41.9	1,604	30.9
- 5 years to <10 years	–	34.9	32.1	2,072	50.1
Moroccans	**27.5**	**55.0**	**36.5**	**1,567**	**59.8**
- less than 1 year	52.1	79.1	57.5	1,313	43.6
- 1 year to <5 years	26.9	70.6	40.7	1,457	74.7
- 5 years to <10 years	27.1	31.6	33.8	1,718	34.5
- 10 years or more	15.9	39.9	34.1	1,704	55.0

Notes: (a) see note c of table 4. (b) Variation coefficient.

Source: Department of Demography - University of Rome "La Sapienza" survey.

In the analysis of the integration process of the new-comers, it is important to take into consideration the family condition. The structure of the four communities by marital status at least partly reflects that by age, as it is connected to the stage of the individual lifecycle (overall and migratory). Among the Filipinos, the percentage of unmarried people is the lowest, while that of married people is especially high above all among males. The other communities have a percentage of unmarried people representing at least half of the group. An important aspect of the family situation of the interviewees in the host country specifically regards the presence of the spouse in Italy, and for un-

married people, the setting-up of an established couple.[6] This information is especially relevant with regard to the level of integration in the host country and the persistence of close links with the area of origin. The Filipinos have in almost 40% of the cases their partner in Italy (for the males, the share is just under 58%), while for the other communities this proportion is just over 20% of the entire community. However, it is interesting to focus just on married couples: in three cases out of four the spouse is living in Italy among the Moroccans and Filipinos, the two "oldest" communities. Among the married Peruvians and Romanians, the spouse is present respectively in 60% and just over half the cases. The gender differences seem significant: while among the Romanians and Moroccans, the spouse is more often present among the women (respectively in 67% and 100% of the cases, compared to 44% and 65% among the males), among the Filipinos and Peruvians the situation is the opposite. For the Filipinos 88% of the married males and 63% of the married females have their spouse in Italy; for the Peruvians respectively 67% and 56%. Among the non-married interviewees, the percentage of persons who have a stable partner is higher among the Romanians (21% of the unmarried) and Peruvians (20%), followed in order by the Moroccans (16%) and Filipinos (10%). The gender differences are basically in line with what has been observed regarding the presence of a spouse in Italy among married immigrants. It is interesting to assess the weight of "mixed unions", both in the case of formal marriage and cohabitation. As expected, in all four communities the partner is more often Italian in cohabitating couples than in married couples. Among the women who have a stable relationship (married or cohabiting), the proportion of mixed unions is definitely higher than among the males in all the communities surveyed, with exception of the Moroccans. This community, however, has the highest percentage of partnership with Italians both among the married (approximately one quarter for both genders) and the cohabiting couples (over half, for both genders).

Another important aspect of the path towards integration in the host society regards the housing conditions of immigrants. In most cases, foreigners live in private housing (at least in half of the cases) with some differences by gender and nationality (Table 6). In fact, a high proportion of women (43.7% among the Filipinos, 36.1% among the Peruvians and 31.4% among the Romanians) live at the workplace, almost always in the home of the family where they work. Instead,

[6] Attention is thus focused on the current family of the married interviewees, although the questionnaire also enables us to collect information on the family of origin.

among the Moroccans there is a significantly higher share of precarious situations (almost 16% live in an occupied house and 5% in hotels and shelters) or even homelessness (just under 6%). We further examine the living conditions in terms of housing adequacy and on the basis of the satisfaction expressed by the interviewees, excluding, from this analysis, those living in hotel and in shelter, or without fixed accommodation. The worst situation is clearly that of the Moroccans who most often state that housing costs too much (49.3%), is too small (48.4%), in poor conditions (24.7%) and too far from the workplace (32.6%). The Peruvians, on the other hand, generally complain about the lack of continuity in the provision of utilities (water, electricity and gas). Obviously, these two communities are also the ones with the highest proportion of dissatisfaction (32% and 29.5% respectively for Moroccan and Peruvian immigrants) and a higher percentage of persons who consider changing homes.

Table 6 – *Foreign immigrants interviewed in Rome in 2001 by type of housing, according to country of citizenship and gender (%)*

Foreign group	by type of housing (%)						
	Private home	Guest with relatives or friends	In an occupied home	At workplace	In hotel/shelter	Without fixed accommodation	Total
Filipinos	**57.5**	**4.2**	**0.6**	**36.0**	**1.1**	**0.7**	**100.0**
- male	73.7	5.6	0.6	18.2	1.3	0.6	100.0
- female	50.4	3.6	0.6	43.7	1.1	0.7	100.0
Peruvians	**62.9**	**7.2**	**0.6**	**27.2**	**1.1**	**0.9**	**100.0**
- male	76.2	9.3	–	11.5	2.4	0.7	100.0
- female	55.4	6.1	1.0	36.1	0.4	1.0	100.0
Romanians	**73.1**	**6.3**	**1.0**	**15.2**	**1.8**	**2.6**	**100.0**
- male	82.7	4.8	1.6	5.7	1.4	3.8	100.0
- female	56.7	8.7	–	31.4	2.5	0.6	100.0
Moroccans	**64.8**	**7.5**	**15.7**	**1.1**	**5.1**	**5.8**	**100.0**
- male	66.6	8.3	15.3	0.7	2.7	6.3	100.0
- female	57.9	4.2	17.3	2.5	14.2	3.9	100.0

Source: Department of Demography - University of Rome "La Sapienza" survey.

As the duration of stay in Italy increases, all four communities – though with significant differences – show an increase in the percentage of married couples and, among the latter, of the proportion of those with

their spouse in Italy. This aspect highlights the development of family-reunion processes in the host country, and the formation of new unions, indicating the stabilisation of their migratory project in Italy. The indicator of the proportion of interviewees, who live in private homes, also highlights the gradual increase, as time passes, of "normal" residential situations, thus reducing the risk of housing exclusion and also the coincidence – for some communities especially significant – between workplace and home. In any case, significant differences remain among the communities, also those with similar durations of stay, showing the persistence of various migration patterns and job-insertion processes.

The social relationships

Relationships play a fundamental role in determining the quality of life. It is undoubtedly true, that the immigrant – in the early phases of the migratory process – can be considered as *homo oeconomicus*. We should however reflect on the fact that relationships, though reduced to a minimum, cannot disappear completely, and remain, perhaps in a sporadic and occasional form, an aspect of the life of the individual. It is furthermore obvious that the reduction of social life can be considered "normal" for short periods of time. "Relational anorexia" persisting over time is more problematic or actually pathological.

It is fundamental, in the case of immigrants, to keep in consideration the fact that their "relational space" is multiple and fragmented. There are relationships with close persons who remain in the country of origin (through letters, telephone calls, sending or receiving money or gifts, etc.); relationships with fellow-nationals in Italy; and relationships with the Italians and immigrants of other nationalities. In Italy, foreigners do not interact only with actual persons, but also with organisations and institutions (police stations, hospitals, municipal offices, etc.) in "impersonal" relationships. Concentrating the analysis on the relationships in Italy, we can note that most of the interviewees spend their free time mainly in relationships with fellow-nationals. Nevertheless, there are interesting differences.

For the Filipinos, whatever the duration of stay in Italy, family relationships counts the most (Table 7). For the other communities, family members are the reference persons in leisure time only in the case of medium-to-long stay. In particular, the family has great importance for Romanians, only when they stay in Italy between 5 to 9 years, and for Moroccans only among those who have been in Italy for ten years or more. This can be considered as a further confirmation that in the case of the Filipinos, there is a family-based migration chain, closely-knit and at the same time very dynamic, immediately giving a warm wel-

come to the new-comers. In the case of the other communities, in particular for the Moroccans and Romanians, the opportunity of spending time with the family seems to be an achievement of those who have managed to settle down, perhaps calling their family from their country of origin.

Table 7 – *Foreign immigrants interviewed in Rome in 2001 according to the persons with whom they mainly spend their leisure time, country of citizenship and duration of the stay (%)*

Foreign group	Duration of stay				
	< 1 year	1-4 years	5-9 years	10 or more years	Total
Filipinos					
Together with family	47.5	44.3	51.1	58.5	52.7
Together with relatives and friends (same nationality)	45.1	44.5	44.9	35.0	40.3
Together with immigrants of other nationalities	2.6	2.1	1.0	4.4	3.0
Together with the Italians	–	–	–	0.9	0.4
Alone	4.8	9.0	3.0	1.3	3.6
Peruvians					
Together with family	30.5	43.7	58.1	57.4	46.0
Together with relatives and friends (same nationality)	49.4	39.6	34.9	29.5	39.6
Together with immigrants of other nationalities	3.4	2.8	–	2.1	2.1
Together with the Italians	7.7	5.2	0.9	2.3	4.3
Alone	9.0	8.8	6.1	8.7	8.1
Romanians					
Together with family	17.6	18.0	39.9	66.0	20.9
Together with relatives and friends (same nationality)	58.7	60.1	37.3	34.0	56.5
Together with immigrants of other nationalities	2.1	3.6	1.8	–	2.8
Together with the Italians	5.7	8.4	17.6	–	8.4
Alone	15.9	10.0	3.4	–	11.4
Moroccans					
Together with family	16.0	25.9	27.2	42.2	28.4
Together with relatives and friends (same nationality)	57.1	46.2	47.9	34.2	45.8
Together with immigrants of other nationalities	10.8	7.6	6.8	3.5	7.1
autoTogether with the Italians	5.2	5.9	15.9	11.4	9.0
Alone	10.9	14.4	2.2	8.6	9.7

Source: Department of Demography - University of Rome "La Sapienza" survey.

The presence of the family helps fight loneliness. The percentage of Filipinos who spend their leisure time alone is very small, while it is very high in the case of the Romanians. The percentage of those who spend their time alone falls as the stay in Italy increases. However, in some communities with a very long stay this percentage can rise again. At the same time, the presence of the family also seems to function as barrier against external relationships, particularly with Italians. For the Filipinos (the community most frequently recording the presence of family members in Italy), the percentage of those who spend their leisure time mainly with the Italians is virtually nil, regardless their duration of stay. On the other hand, among the Romanians and Moroccans, especially in the case of immigrants present in Italy for a long time, there is a considerable percentage of those who mainly spend their leisure time with Italian people. Once again we see the key, but not exclusive role of the family in migratory processes in general, and in the integration process in particular.

Filipinos have strong relationships with fellow-nationals, while this appear less intense for the other communities, in particular the Romanians. Meeting fellow-nationals does not seem to be linked with duration of stay. The local structure and organisation of the community probably play a key role. The Moroccans have the most frequent relationships with the Italians, followed closely by the Romanians. The duration of stay seems to be a factor closely related to the formation of inter-ethnic relationships. In the case of the Moroccans, over 50% of those who have been in Italy for 5-9 years spend time with Italian people and this percentage exceeds 60% for those residing over 10 years. For the Filipinos, on the other hand, there is again a definite exclusion of relationships with the locals. The shares of those who frequent the Italians range from 12% to 19%. Furthermore, it is significant that unlike the other three communities, there is no clear link between the longer stay and more relationships with the locals. Thus the Filipinos, while in many cases living in the homes of their Italian employers (as perhaps because of this), do not form relationships with them outside the job. In general, there are few relationships between foreigners of different nationalities, although among the Moroccans the percentage of those who frequent foreigners of other nationalities is quite significant.

Most of the interviewees perceive diffidence. For all the communities, the males have been the main victims of these episodes with percentages that are quite similar for the Moroccans, Romanians and Peruvians. The Filipinos seem be at least partly immune from prejudice, having experienced with a much lower percentage – compared to the other communities – the sensation of being looked at with diffidence.

Among the women, there is an especially high percentage of Peruvian females who have experienced this type of sensation.

The Moroccans are those most often treated with arrogance. Also in this case, the women and Filipinos are more "privileged" and the males and Moroccans are placed in the worst position. It is also true that the different lifestyles of the various communities are important. Obviously, those who live in frequent contact with the Italians – in open areas where they are not known – and those who do not have a native network to guarantee for them (as occurs, on the other hand, for domestic workers) may more easily experience diffidence. Also the more obvious acts of racism, such as insults and threats, were experienced above all by the Moroccans. In this case, there is a particularly high percentage of Filipino males who state that they have been insulted or threatened. Perhaps, the particular employment status of Filipinos, employed in domestic services, does not exempt them from this type of experience.

Little interest is shown for the political situation of the country of origin. The Peruvians are the community showing the greatest attachment and interest for the affairs of their country: over 60% state they take interest in political matters regarding their country of origin. Also the Filipinos, as we might expect on the basis of data regarding relationships, show more interest than the others in the political events of their own country of origin. The percentages of those interested in the other two communities are very low [Conti and Strozza, 2004].

With regard to participation in Italian political and social life, the Moroccans, and above all the Romanians, show a much higher degree of participation than regarding the political events of their country of origin. This is true also for the Peruvians, who nevertheless have a considerable interest in the political life of their country of origin. The situation is different for the Filipinos, who express a degree of participation slightly lower than that for their country of origin.

Once again, even if it is the community with the longest average duration of stay in Italy, Filipinos confirm that they are "closed" and with little interest in what takes place around them. In all the communities, women are generally less interested than men in politics, whether in the country of origin or in Italy, although in the case of the Peruvians there is a certain balance. Activities in associations, besides being an indicator of the relationships and participation, can also provide useful information on the structure of the various communities living in Rome. In particular, we note that the Peruvians (above all the men) and Filipinos (above all the women) have an intense association activity. These are mainly religious groups. In the case of the Romanians and Moroccans, participation in associations seems to be especially low. It thus

seems that in the better structured communities it is less easy to trigger a process of assimilation with others. The close-knit structure of the Filipino community is connected with few or non-existent relationships with the Italians. Therefore, it appears difficult for immigrants who live in Rome to maintain close links with the culture and the country of origin and at the same time to open up to the "new" world.

Conclusions

In Italy, the study of the integration of foreign immigrants must include data from sample surveys. The existing official sources provide information only on a sub-group of foreign immigrants. Above all, even the ones that are most "comprehensive" by categories, provide very little data on the characteristics and living conditions of immigrants. Currently, the Census is the official source collecting more detailed information on foreigners living in Italy. This source is likewise the only one also extended to unauthorized immigrants.

Specific surveys are thus the main reference for those who wish to reconstruct the integration scenario of foreign immigrants in Italy. Nevertheless, conducting surveys involves considerable difficulties, some of which do not seem to have been overcome yet. The previous paragraphs show that the integration processes seem to differ considerably according to the communities involved. The living conditions of foreigners in Italy also vary considerably according to the economic and social context of the area of settlement, an aspect not considered in the previous pages. All these factors combined make the identification and development of adequate data collection instruments especially complex. These factors, in fact, should be both homogeneous and designed to take into account the specific features of the different communities in the various geographical areas.

The studies conducted so far on the integration of immigrants, sometimes commissioned by institutions, are concentrated on a few communities and/or limited areas. Often the sampling methods used have led to a limitation of the area involved in the survey. In some cases, it is necessary, in fact, to have very accurate information on the local situations to define the sample. Despite the efforts undertaken by research groups, it has not yet been possible to conduct a survey extended to the national level, based on a homogeneous methodology (references, definitions, sample techniques, etc.) and structured on the basis of a shared concept of integration. Such a wide-ranging programme could best be implemented by the ISTAT (National Institute of Statistics). ISTAT could perhaps conduct – or at least co-ordinate – one

or more surveys on integration or at least on the living conditions of immigrants [Strozza, Natale, Todisco and Ballacci, 2002].

A survey of this type should aim at providing indications for implementing, thereafter, organic and structured local migration policies. For the formulation of measures at the national level, it is not enough to know about a few local situations (often the major cities) with reference only to some communities, but rather to have a broader, and at the same time detailed scenario of the living conditions of foreigners in Italy.

Finally, managing to conduct a survey to collect information on the life of immigrants could be the sign of the political intention to consider immigrants as an integral part of our society. This signal would also be important from the viewpoint of the opening of communication channels with foreign citizens. As we have observed, integration necessarily involves the opening of communication channels. In certain respects, "being counted" means to count. Considering as "normal" or "physiological" the lack of information on foreign immigrants means admitting that they are "second-class citizens" and assuming exclusion as an insurmountable principle, making the lack of communication structural. And foreigners know this well. Their willingness to tell their stories during the interview is really surprising. This means the desire to be finally considered with attention. If the Italians are tired of responding to surveys and opinion polls that occur with increasing frequency, foreigners rarely show signs of fatigue and boredom during the interviews. They hope that someone will finally listen to them.

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Summary

In Italy, field surveys have been an essential tool for knowledge on immigration, since this phenomenon first started in the early 1980s. Great attention has been paid to the sampling procedures to be used for a basically unknown or unidentified reference population. This contribution describes the main features of this process, in particular, with reference to field surveys that are more focused on the quantitative aspects of immigration.

The paper concentrates on the outcomes of two specific and relatively recent surveys: the one conducted in 1997 by the *IRP-CNR* on a national sample of Ghanaian and Egyptian immigrants. and a second one conducted in Rome in 2001 by "La Sapienza" University of Rome on Filipinos, Moroccans, Peruvians and Romanians. The results of first survey highlighted the relevance of the duration of the stay in determining the outcomes of immigration, particularly in terms of integration in the receiving country. The survey has likewise shown the differences of models, projects and intentions characterising the variegated world of immigration.

In the second survey, the duration of stay in Italy remains the core variable in defining the living conditions of immigrants. In fact, the longer is the period of stay, the more the level of integration improves and the percentage of irregulars decreases. From the employment point of view, compared to the other three communities, Filipinos appear to be rather well off (they have been in Italy for a number of years, with a much lower percentage of illegal immigrants). However, Filipinos (particularly women) record the highest rate of occupational segregation.

Surveys collected specific and analytical information on important aspects of immigrants' life that are not provided by the available official sources.

«Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies», XL, n. 152, 2003.

The integration of immigrants in Spain

Increasing immigration and its characteristics

Immigration from developing countries to Spain has risen sharply in the last two decades (table 1). Although the number of immigrants is still modest when compared with the rest of Europe, it has grown more in Spain, relatively speaking, than in any other country in Western Europe during the last decade (SOPEMI, 2001). Moreover, the actual increase is even greater if one considers the unceasing news about "pateras"[1] that arrive from the coasts of Africa crammed with immigrants, and the reality that many migrants live in Spain without documentation, which was brought to light by the most recent extraordinary regularisations implemented in 2000 and 2001 (481,910 immigrants applied).

The number of foreign residents in Spain increased by 11.9% annually between 1991 and 2001. Africans were the group that experienced a higher annual rate increase (+17%), closely followed by Latin Americans (15.2%), thanks to a sharp rise in their numbers in 2001. Asians were on a par with the national average (11.6% annually), while the number of immigrants from developed countries rose by 8.1%. Documented migrants from developing countries resident in Spain totalled 676,220 in 2001, or 61% of the total number of foreigners, of whom almost half were Africans (304,149), mainly from Morocco (77%). The pivotal role of the Africans is also made plain if we include only non-Community foreign workers, as they comprised half of the 200,000 foreign workers who had a valid work permit in 1999.

The rapidly increasing number of non-Community immigrants in Spain, mainly Africans, is due to the extraordinary regularisations. A total of 680,822 undocumented immigrants applied for permits in the five regularisations, implemented in Spain between 1985 and 2001 (43,815 applicants in 1985-86, 130,406 in 1991-92, 24,691 in 1996, 246,392

[1] Small, flimsy boats.

in 2000 and 235,518 in 2001). Africans comprised the largest undocumented group in all regularisations: for every 100 Africans officially resident in Spain in the year prior to the regularisation, 188 applied for documentation in 1985-86, 234 in 1991 and 49 in 2000.

Table 1 – *Foreign residents in Spain according to nationality, 1985-2001*

Origin	1985	1991	2001	Annual Variation 1991-2001
Europe	158,211	180,735	412,522	8.60
%	65.4	50.1	37.2	
Eastern Europe	711	6,377	81,170	28.97
United States + Canada + Japan	14,394	16,875	18,279	0.80
%	5.9	4.7	1.6	
Oceania	748	775	944	1.99
Total developed countries	**173,353**	**198,385**	**431,745**	**8.09**
%	**71.6**	**55.0**	**38.9**	
Latin America	40,796	68,877	283,778	15.21
%	16.9	19.1	25.6	
Asia	18,253	29,375	88,293	11.63
%	7.5	8.1	8.0	
Africa	8,529	63,054	304,149	17.04
%	3.5	17.5	27.4	
Morocco	5,817	49,513	234,937	16.85
Total undeveloped countries	**67,578**	**161,306**	**676,220**	**15.41**
%	**27.9**	**44.7**	**61.0**	
Stateless	1,039	964	1,095	1.28
Total	**241,971**	**360,655**	**1,109,060**	**11.89**

Source: Ministerio del Interior. Dirección General de la Policía, *Memoria* (anual). Comisión Interministerial de Extranjería, *Anuario Estadístico de Extranjería*.

Foreign residents in Spain represent 2.7% of the country's population in 2001, the smallest percentage of all countries in Western Europe; this amount falls to 1.7% if we consider only migrants from developing countries, and to 0.7% if only Africans are counted, the group that the Spanish feel is the most difficult to integrate. The dramatic rise in numbers cited above is an objective fact that, without doubt, encourages the feelings of disquiet engendered in Spanish society in the face of immigration from developing countries. Although the number of foreigners in Spain is still relatively low, their geographical distribution varies widely, and this may affect the way the Spanish people view immigrants in society.

Fig. 1 – *Number of foreigners resident in Spain, by province, on 31-12-2001*



Source: Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjería y la Inmigración, *Anuario Estadístico de Extranjería 2001*. INE, *Censo de la población de España de 2001*.

To be precise, foreign residents in Spain almost invariably congregate in the most populated areas with the most dynamic economies: i.e., the main concentrations of foreigners are to be found in Madrid, Barcelona, the Mediterranean coast and the archipelagos (fig. 1 and 2). Foreigners from developed countries (Western Europeans) predominate only in the provinces where there is a high level of residential

Fig. 2 – *Developing country immigrants resident in Spain per 1,000 inhabitants, by province. Year 2001*



Source: Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjería y la Inmigración, *Anuario Estadístico de Extranjería 2001*. INE, *Censo de la población de España de 2001*.

tourism: Alicante, Malaga, Balearics and the Canary Islands. Developing country nationals preponderate in the remaining provinces that have a high number of foreigners, mainly in Almeria, Murcia, Barcelona, Madrid and Girona. This predominance also extends to the Ebro Valley and throughout the southern half of the peninsula. The majority of immigrants in Spain come from developing countries (61%), and comprise the bulk of migrants in 41 of the 50 provinces, as well as in Ceuta and Melilla. The unequal geographical distribution of foreigners in Spain is a phenomena that occurs at both provincial (fig. 1 and 2)

and municipal levels, and even in urban neighbourhoods. The spatial concentrations of developing country immigrants have a profound impact on the Mediterranean's coastal areas, where the practice of intensive farming flourishes, especially in Murcia and Almeria, which over the last twenty five years have developed into the main farming zone in terms of horticultural production for export, mostly in plastic greenhouses. Their major source of labour are Maghrebians and lately Andean Latin Americans, groups that often suffer social rejection, and may even be the target of xenophobia.

Age and gender patterns for foreign residents in Spain differ, and are dependent on the reason for migration. Elderly people comprise a high proportion of developed country immigrants from Europe and North America (similar to the Spanish population), given that 16.3% were over 65 in 2001 and a scant 6.6% were under 15. On the other hand, only a small number of developing country immigrants are old people. Only 0.9% of all Africans in Spain are over 65, 2.4% in the case of Asians, 2.5% in the case of Latin Americans and 4.3% in the case of Eastern Europeans (Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjería y la Inmigración, 2001). The composition of the latter groups consistently reflects a preponderance of young people, in relative terms, which is not true for foreigners from developed countries. Thus, immigrants under 15 comprise 7.9% of Eastern Europeans, 11.8% of Asians and 17.8% of Africans, which denotes that among the latter groups the tendency for families to immigrate is on the rise. This situation is exemplified by African children under the age of 5, that compose 8.1% of the 304,000 Africans registered in Spain as of 31-12-2001, whereas they make up only 4% of Asians and 1.35% of Latin Americans. Therefore, young adults predominate among developing country immigrants resident in Spain: 71% were aged between 19 and 44 in 2001. Although the proportion of young adults is similar irrespective of the point of origin, the number of women varies widely, as they comprise merely 31% of Africans, but account for 58% of Latin Americans (Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjería y la Inmigración, 2001).

The above figures show that immigrants from developing countries still represent a small fraction of the Spanish population. The characteristics of immigration to Spain (increasing number of arrivals, differentiated geographical distribution, frequent clandestine arrival, an immigration still on its early stages within the European context) have created a degree of social unrest in the Spanish population and frequent amendments in the policies and legislation covering non-Community immigration in Spain.

Immigration policy

Up to 1997, the majority of foreign residents in Spain were from developed countries. However, immigration policy and social unrest, sparked off by the rising number of foreigners, were centred, from the outset, on immigration from undeveloped countries, above all migration from Africa and Latin America. Political and social concerns over foreign immigration were consolidated in Spain from 1985, through the enactment, on the 1st of July, of the Organic Act 7/1985 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners.[2] If we take into account the fact that the Spanish labour market shrank dramatically from 1985 on, and continued to deteriorate throughout most of the nineties, with unemployment levels often higher than 20%, we may deduce that the immigration policy blueprint was not excessively restrictive.

With regard to immigration policy, the following stages can be identified:

a) during the five-year period 1985-90, the Government starts measures to control the growing, generalised, illegal flow of immigrants, enforcing the Immigration Law (1985) and its implementing regulation (1986). A key issue was the potential of emigration from countries of origin, especially Morocco, because of its large birth rate and low mortality and the international economic recession. Furthermore, at that time, Spanish borders were easily breached by illegal immigrants. The fact that immigrants in Spain tended to concentrate in the same areas exacerbated negative social repercussions, as they had to endure highly unsatisfactory living and working conditions and inadequate accommodation. Government measures to control clandestine immigration were far from successful, while the number of immigrants in situations favouring the exploitation of labour and social exclusion augmented, thus laying the foundations for the outbursts of xenophobia in the future.

b) A more active and socially comprehensive immigration policy was developed between 1990 and 1994, on the basis of the document *The situation of foreigners in Spain. An outline of Spanish immigration policy*, which was presented by the Government to Parliament in December 1990, and passed virtually unanimously. From this document, the following actions merit attention: 1) over 110,000 foreign workers and 5,900 family dependants were regularised in 1991. This important operation, undertaken while the Spanish labour market was in serious difficulties, highlights the determination to implement a socially positive migration policy. 2) Several administrative-policy institutions related to immigration were reorganised or created. For

[2] Spanish Official State Bulletin, (BOE-3-7-85) – Immigration Law.

example: the Directorate for Migration was remodelled (1991), Immigration Offices (1991) and an Inter-ministerial Immigration Commission (1992) were set up. 3) Steps were taken to improve efficiency in the fight against the arrival of illegal immigrants and against the clandestine work normally undertaken by immigrants, 4) An annual quota, or block system for non-Community foreign workers, was initiated in 1993. Although the aim of the legislation was to hire workers in the country of origin – to fill jobs left vacant by the national labour market – *de facto* these quotas functioned, during the 1990s, as a mechanism for the regularisation of workers who were already present in Spain. Domestic service workers and intensive farming labourers have benefited the most from them, comprising 56% and 30% respectively out of the total of 143,161 non-Community workers included in the quotas between 1993 and 1999 (Ministerio de Trabajo, *Anuario de migraciones*). Morocco is the country that benefits the most, as 36.5% of these workers are Moroccan. The annual quotas fluctuate between 20,000 and 30,000 jobs, except in 1999 when 39,711 workers were accepted.

c) The third stage started in 1995, and was defined in the *Plan for the social integration of immigrants* already resident in Spain. This Plan intensifies control measures to prevent illegal immigration and the clandestine work of immigrants in Spain. Immigration policy aimed to focus on the integration of immigrants, foster co-operation with the immigrants' countries of origin to help them develop, and increase understanding of migratory flows in order to manage them appropriately. This Integration Plan, a governmental initiative, sought the collaboration of Autonomous and Municipal Administrations, as well as social organisations and the immigrants themselves. Two organisations were set up in 1995 to assist the Plan: the Forum for the social integration of immigrants, to act as a sounding board for consultation and dialogue between public administrations, social organisations and immigrant associations, and the Permanent Observatory of Migration, to act as an information-gathering macro-system to determine problems and suggest measures that would foment integration. Out of the activities developed from this Plan, it is worth highlighting the publication in 1996 of a new implementing regulation for the 1985 Immigration Law, which aimed at facilitating the long-term stay and integration of immigrants already resident in Spain. The third extraordinary regularisation of illegal foreigners (1996) was included in this regulation. The 1996 review of the Plan manifested that the change of Government that took place in 1996 (from the Socialist Party to the Popular Party) had not engendered a change of direction in the policy of integrating immigrants into society; the Congress of Deputies (24-9-1996) reiterated the guidelines established in 1991.

During the period 1995-1999, the number of immigrants in Spain proceeding from developing countries soared; resident Africans grew by 21.9% annually, Asians by 14.8%, Latin Americans by 11.6% and Eastern Europeans by 25.8%. At the same time, the rise in the number of illegal immigrants virtually corresponded to the figure registered in the mid-1980s, given that 246,392 immigrants applied for permits in the 2000 regularisation.

Within this migratory context, a new Immigration Law was put forward in the Congress of Deputies in 1999, replacing the 1985 law, which attributed a big role to the police, but was inadequate to handle the integration of immigrants. This new Organic Act 4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners and their integration into society, which came into effect in February 2000, was considered to be progressive and pro-integration. The new Act accepted that a large number of immigrants were present in Spanish territory, that the country needed immigration to provide labour force, that immigrants want to settle down permanently in Spain with their families and that there was a high number of undocumented. The Act therefore needed to encompass ways to integrate these immigrants, whether legal or unauthorised (Díez Bueso, 2002). The Organic Act 4/2000 was approved by the Congress of Deputies even if the Spanish Government opposed it, so that, when the party in power attained an absolute majority in the following elections, the Act was amended, as the Government felt that the Act 4/2000 provided a "strong incentive" for further immigration. The Government considered this Law to be "the most permissive in the European Union" (Fernández-Miranda, 2002). The Act 4/2000 was amended by the Organic Act 8/2000, which is currently in force. Although the most recent Act curtails the rights of immigrants, it did accept principles contained in the Act 4/2000, such as the need for new immigration and the necessity to maintain immigration stable in Spain, amongst others (Díez Bueso, 2002).

After the Organic Act 8/2000 had been approved, the Government decided that "no (more) extraordinary regularisations will be undertaken" as in its judgement they have no effect whatsoever on regulating migratory flows, and also they "undoubtedly provide a strong incentive for immigration". The Government created a *Delegación del Gobierno para la Inmigración*, with the authority of a *Secretario de Estado*, in order to develop the new labour immigration policy in Spain; it will co-ordinate and design policy for foreigners and immigrants, and will be empowered to implement policy in the relevant Ministries. According to the new Secretary of State, the main objectives are: a) to ensure that the foreigners and immigration policy is a State policy that avoids confrontation with political and social forces,

and is in line with the European Union guidelines. b) To organise and rationalise labour force immigration, to which end it will be assisted by existing institutions.[3] c) To provide a suitable legal framework to deal with immigration, along the lines indicated by the Act 8/2000, on the rights and freedoms of immigrants. d) To manage immigration, which means, amongst other things, controlling borders and integrating immigrants who are already resident in Spain. To this end, it is necessary to provide them with a job and the chance of family reunification after having worked for one year in Spain. The Government helps NGOs financially in order to facilitate the integration of immigrants (Fernández-Miranda, 2002).

The immigrants integration process

The term "integration" is usually associated with developing country immigrants. Integration is a social reality that is very difficult to measure, although one commonly accepted way of assessing it is by ascertaining whether or not foreigners and nationals have equal obligations, rights and opportunities, as long as the social groups under consideration are homogenous. This equality should translate into a pluralist civic coexistence. Measuring integration, or selecting the appropriate indicators to measure it in the different stages of immigration, is a complex process – which is compounded by the heterogeneous nature of the foreign groups, particularly in terms of culture, religion, race, which is true for the two main groups resident in Spain, Africans and Latin Americans. Furthermore, not only are there striking differences between groups, but also between individuals (e.g. in education, the immigrant's age on entry to the host country, the number of years they have lived in the immigration country, etc). Experts maintain that integrating immigrants into the host country is a long term process, and therefore the parameters set to measure the level of integration should only be applied to immigrant children born in the host country (Garson et Thoreau, 1999; Dewitte, 1999; Aparicio y Tornos, 2001).

At present, immigration policies of Western European countries, all of whom have a numerous, rapidly growing foreign population,

[3] Such as the *Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración*, the *Comisión Interministerial de Extranjería*, the *Comisión Interministerial de Asilo y Refugio*, the *Foro para la Integración Social de los Inmigrantes*, NGOs, unions, employers associations, the Administration itself and a *Consejo Superior de Política de Inmigración* and the *Programa Global de Regularización y Coordinación de la Extranjería y la Inmigración* in Spain (GRECO), in which seven Ministries participate, and which is reviewed by the *Congreso de los Diputados*.

have made integration of developing country immigrants a top priority. Integration policies are necessary as it is assumed that these immigrants will remain in Europe for a long time, a fact borne out by immigrant surveys, and because of the rising number of rejection and discrimination signs against them.

Nevertheless, immigrants and nationals in Spain are still far from enjoying the equal opportunities that should be created by integration. Obstacles in the path to integration are exacerbated, amongst other factors, by: the recent and accelerated pace of immigration; the fact that immigrants are usually undocumented; family reunification very rarely occurs; cultural and religious differences, mainly applicable to those who practice Islam; large waves of immigrants arrived in a period when unemployment figures in Spain were soaring (1985-1995); living and working conditions of immigrants are often precarious.

All surveys of how Spaniards feel about foreign residents highlight the fact that immigrants are discriminated against in daily life, in the workplace and in access to housing. Furthermore, surveys of the immigrants themselves clearly corroborate the fact that discrimination exists. Added to this, discrimination against developing country immigrants is prevalent throughout Western Europe, as the common opinion is that their integration is difficult, a view normally attributed to a hypothetical cultural gap, in particular for Muslims. (Dewitte, 1999).

In the case of Spain, immigrants from Morocco comprise the largest foreign group, with the highest expansion-rate in recent years, and are the most ostracised, according to surveys of Spaniards. Moroccans also class themselves as the immigrant group that is the least integrated into Spanish society, and the one that is excluded the most by Spaniards (Díez Nicolás, 2002). On the other hand, Latin Americans, the second-largest foreign group in Spain, manifests the most positive attributes needed for integration, as it emerges from surveys on the perception of immigrants by the Spaniards and vice versa. The cultural differences and similarities between these immigrant groups and local population are, without a doubt, the starting point of any explanation of why it is easier to integrate one community rather than another.

Indicators showing how Spaniards discriminate against the integration of immigrants have been determined by recent surveys. The surveys carried out among Spaniards are: 1) the "barometer" made by the CIS (*Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Madrid) in February 2001. 2) Study No. 2,257 "Youth and national identity" undertaken by the CIS in September 1997, consisting of 2,437 interviews made to young Spaniards, of both sexes, aged between 15 and 29. 3) Study No. 2,214 "Attitudes towards immigration" conducted by the CIS in June 1996, consisting of 2,500 interviews made to Spaniards, of both sexes,

aged over eighteen and 4) a series comprising 11 surveys of "Attitudes towards immigration" carried out between 1991 and 2000, with a population sample of 1,200 people of both sexes, aged over eighteen (Díez Nicolás, 2002).

The surveys involving resident immigrants in Spain are: 1) a survey undertaken in 2000 of 750 immigrants divided into four areas of origin (North African, black African, Latin American and Asian) (Díez Nicolás, 2001 and 2002). 2) Two surveys among immigrant Africans resident in eight provinces of Mediterranean Spain, between Girona and Almeria. The first survey (1991-1992) included a total of 498 Moroccans and 116 Senegalese, while the second one (1999-2000) included a total of 540 Africans (of whom 394 were Moroccans); both surveys were undertaken by professors from the Human Geography Department at Alicante University. 3) A survey carried out by the CIS (Study No. 2,216) in 1996 that comprised 1,981 illegal immigrants who applied for regularisation in the same year.

Immigrants are increasingly ostracised by Spaniards

Out of ten topics, labour immigration was ranked last by Spaniards in a 1996 survey, whereas by 2001 it was listed as third by the interviewees in the list of problems facing Spain, although it trailed far behind unemployment and terrorism. Even though the proportion of immigrants in Spain is one of the lowest in Western Europe at the present time, and is well below the European average (SOPEMI, 2001), 28% of Spaniards interviewed in 1996 affirmed that there were "too many" immigrants in Spain, and by 2001 42% were of that opinion.

In 1997, a high proportion of young people (41%) stated that immigration is "generally negative" for the host country; in 2001 half the Spaniards believed that immigration is "generally positive" for developed countries. In the case of Spain, half the young people thought that immigration has "more disadvantages than advantages". The growing number of those who see immigrants as a "burden" is likely to increase since the majority of Spaniards interviewed in 2001 (55%) believed that the number of immigrants will soar over the coming years, whereas in 1996 only 26% of the interviewees expressed such belief. Moreover, in 1996, over half the Spaniards were already convinced that violence against immigrants "will tend to increase" in the future, which led 13% to think that a political party with a racist or xenophobic platform would be successful in Spain; this matches the percentage given in the survey of young people.

According to the interviewees in 2001, the behaviour of Spaniards towards immigrants leaves a lot to be desired in terms of fostering inte-

gration, as the two most widespread feelings are distrust (44.5%) and contempt (15%), an opinion that has not changed since 1996. Eighteen percent of Spaniards interviewed feel that immigrants who wish to stay in Spain "should forget their traditions", although over three quarters view immigrants maintaining their language and traditions as positive. These "concerns" would not, to a large extent, appear to be based on first hand knowledge, as immigrants can still be said to be "complete strangers" to almost half the Spaniards, since they have never had any contact or dealings with them. This may be attributed to the fact that Spaniards have no wish to establish relations with immigrants, or that immigrants are still relatively few in Spain. Notwithstanding the above, the clear rise in immigrant ostracism may be influenced by the fact that people associate "immigrant" with "North African", an identification accepted by 70% of the Spaniards interviewed in 1996 and 77% of young people, and because Spaniards find it hardest to empathise with, or understand, immigrants from these countries of origin. There is still widespread ignorance about the number of non-Community citizens in Spain, as 43-48% of young people thought that Spain had the same number of immigrants as France or Germany, or even more.

In the face of obstacles to immigrant integration ascertained by the surveys, it is certainly encouraging that almost 100% of young Spaniards polled in 1997 were in favour of inculcating tolerance and mutual respect towards foreigners of different races and religions in schools, and also stipulated that Spaniards and immigrants should receive the same treatment from public sector personnel. Nevertheless, the fact that 12% of the same young people do not completely condemn violence against immigrants, occurred in some European countries, or that 5% feel that they might vote for a political group with a racist or xenophobic platform, sends a different signal.

Long-term immigrants who have relatives in the host country are far more likely to integrate successfully. Spaniards who support family immigration do not comprise a clear majority, as 36% were in favour in 1992 and 43% in 2000 (Díez Nicolás, 2002). These proportions are similar to those who prefer short-term immigration without relatives (from 46% in 1992 to 41% in 2000). The change of opinion registered among Spaniards is certainly due to evidence showing that immigrants who settle in Spain with relatives integrate better.

One indicator that Spaniards clearly feel is conducive to integration is the spatial dispersal of immigrants (45%); on the other hand, they believe that the concentration of immigrants hinders integration (66%) (Díez Nicolás, 2002). Moreover, when the Government presented the *Plan for the social integration of immigrants* in 1994, a policy to

spatially disperse immigrants was given high priority. However, effective measures by public Administrations and landlords aimed at implementing such policy have been virtually non-existent. The vast majority of immigrants also prefer spatial dispersal (83% to 93%, according to country of origin). According to Spaniards, the greatest obstacles to immigrant integration are differences in traditions, language (except for Latin Americans), religion (only applicable to North Africans), Spanish racism and the fact that many immigrants are in an irregular situation (Díez Nicolás, 2002).

Discrimination in the workplace is without a doubt one of the key issues as it has such widespread repercussions. Sixty percent of the Spaniards polled in 2001 felt that Spain needed immigrant labour, a belief that is closely linked to the recognised fact that intensive agriculture in the Mediterranean is highly dependent on African and Andean Latin American labourers (Gozálvez, 2001). Seventy-nine percent of the Spaniards polled in 2001 thought that immigrant labourers should only be allowed entry if they possessed a work contract, up from 63% in 1996.

Spaniards interviewed in 1996 recognised that foreign workers resident in Spain are discriminated against, since the most common response was that their rights should be increased. Seventy-seven percent think that immigrant living conditions are worse than for Spanish workers, mainly due to the fact that they occupy the worst paid jobs (70%), or they accept the jobs that Spaniards do not want to do (77% in 1996, 83% in 2001). Notwithstanding this widely accepted assertion, over half of the Spaniards interviewed in 1996 feel that foreign workers bring down the salaries of Spanish workers and take jobs away from them. These opinions are also shared by young people polled in 1997. However, the belief that rising unemployment is caused by immigrant labour, expressed in polls between 1992 and 1996, has weakened over the last few years in the face of evidence to the contrary – i.e. when the number of immigrants in Spain has escalated, at the same time unemployment has fallen (Díez Nicolás, 2002). Older Spanish people are the most "alarmed" by the negative consequences of foreign labour, together with those who would theoretically be competing with immigrants for jobs, i.e., the least educated and those belonging to the lowest social class (Gozálvez, 1998). Also, 82% of Spaniards interviewed in 1996 think that everyday life in Spain is more difficult for immigrant workers than for other citizens. Extremely harsh discriminatory measures in the workplace represent a large minority, since 16% of those polled in 1996 expressed the view that foreign workers do not have the right to belong to political parties or trade unions.

Immigrants' opinion concerning the likelihood of integration

When asked about equal opportunities between immigrants and Spaniards, the immigrants interviewed in Spain were pessimistic, although their "readiness" to become more integrated appears to have risen. This pessimism is to be expected to some extent, given the large waves of immigrants that have arrived recently, the clandestine way that most immigrants usually enter Spain or the high unemployment figures in Spain, amongst other reasons.

The indicators discussed below are drawn mainly from a comparison of two surveys of Africans resident on the Spanish Mediterranean coast, carried out by the Human Geography Department of Alicante University in 1991 and 2000. It is a young immigration (over 50% are aged between 25 and 34), mainly living in urban settlements (69%) and well-educated (26% went to secondary school and 9% to university, although one third do not possess any educational qualifications). However, irregular immigrants interviewed in Spain in 1996 (CIS, Study No. 2.216) were better educated, as 13% stated that they had a degree, a third had been to secondary school and only 7% were illiterate. The Africans who were interviewed had chosen Spain as a place to emigrate to because they had relatives or acquaintances (48%) (Human Geography Department, Alicante University), they believed they could find work (28%), for its geographical proximity (28%) and the ease of access or stay (18%). The only reason that has altered with respect to 1991 – it has actually doubled – is the presence of an immigrant's relative in Spain. Immigrants chose Spain as a destination country because they had been strongly swayed by the advice of relatives and friends already resident there (54%). Only 5% of immigrants who arrived for the first time had had a verbal agreement for work and merely 2% had had a work contract. Most Africans interviewed in 2000 gained admission to Spain as tourists (50%), and almost a quarter entered illegally, 12% came for reasons of family reunification and only 7.4% had a work certificate. However, the number of those gaining admission to Spain as tourists has fallen, as 69% of the undocumented immigrants interviewed in 1996 had entered in this way. Three quarters of Africans stated that their first job in Spain had not been regulated by any type of labour contract. Sixty percent of immigrants' first jobs were in farming, almost invariably in irrigated farming, virtually the only option open to Africans, and in the majority of cases not subjected to labour regulations. If we add to this the fact that most immigrants come from an urban environment, it is easy to explain why they are often unhappy with the work they do, as it will be shown below.

The main obstacles that immigrants feel hinder their integration into Spanish society, ranked in order of importance, are: problems in

the workplace, being undocumented, lack of Spanish language skills (except the Latin Americans), Spanish racism and difficulties in access to housing (Díez Nicolás, 2002).

It would appear that African immigrants have gained Spanish language skills: over half say they can speak and understand Spanish well, although the situation is far from being satisfactory as less than a third can read it and write it well. The number of those who say they have attended Spanish classes since arriving in Spain has grown (from 28% in 1991 to 36% in 2000), although the majority have not yet attended courses. Fifty-eight percent of Africans interviewed wanted to attend Spanish classes, whereas 9% rejected the idea. This is a great improvement since 1991, when, according to the immigrants, only 12% of Africans had a good grasp of Spanish.

In 2000, a third of Africans stated that they were doing a job that did not meet their expectations, although this is an improvement compared to 1991 (50%). The most common grievance is low salary (39%, as opposed to 49% ten years before), followed by over-qualification (17%), job insecurity (14%) and skills mismatch (13%). Two thirds of those who are dissatisfied with their work, mainly farming, do it because there are no other jobs available. Immigrants have usually found their present job by looking for it themselves (41%), although a third found it through the agency of friends. Africans interviewed in 2000 first emigrated for economic-labour reasons (74%), whereas only 12% did it for family reunification reasons (only 5% in 1991). Over a quarter of the Africans who work in the Mediteranean area of Spain affirm that few or none of the foreigners in their workplace possess a valid work contract; the survey was carried out at the same time as the 2000 extraordinary regularisation for which 246,000 immigrants applied. However, only 16% of Africans claimed to receive a lower salary for performing the same work as Spaniards, although 38% declared that the work they performed was harder.

A rise in immigrants' grievances against their employers may indicate a higher level of integration, since the immigrant demonstrates greater awareness of his/her rights. In this sense, the number of those who admit that they have had problems with their employers has risen sharply, from 4% in 1991 to 38% in 2000. The main complaints have been poor pay (37%), long working hours (27%), discrimination because of their foreign origin (24%) and the unregulated nature of their work (20%). Two thirds of those who had had problems with their employer had not approached any organisation to settle the issue, mainly due to their status as undocumented foreigners, or because they were afraid of reprisals.

In 2000, 44% of African immigrants felt that the salary they received was not enough to live on, which was virtually the same figure

as in 1991. One third of Africans sends part of their wages to their relatives on a regular basis, another third never sends any money back and the remainder do so from time to time.

Sixty-two percent of interviewees in 2000 feel discriminated against, since foreign workers are disadvantaged because they are paid less than Spaniards for performing the same job (39%), they are less likely to have a work contract (34%), they are treated badly (26%), with less guarantees of job security (15%) and poor chances of work advancement (14%). Furthermore, 56% of Africans feel that local employers discriminate against them, declaring that two thirds of them are reluctant to offer immigrants a job.

Spaniards may be reluctant to supply housing to immigrants for several reasons, not least of which are suspicion, xenophobia or the proven immigrant overcrowding of rented housing. Half of the Africans interviewed in 2000 shared housing with relatives, and 35% with other immigrants. The housing never has all the required infrastructure, not even electricity (only 89% has electricity), running water (85%) and refrigerator (85%). Almost half the immigrants feel that housing is in good condition, 44% declare that it is normal or inadequate and 7% feel that it is extremely hazardous. The previous occupant of the housing where the interviewees live had also been an immigrant in 40% of the cases, and a Spaniard in another 40%. Two thirds of Africans affirm that they are happy with their present accommodation as opposed to a third who say they are not. This appraisal has therefore deteriorated with respect to 1991, when 72% were happy with their accommodation. Despite the high level of satisfaction registered, 57% of Africans would like to change accommodation, but are not in a financial position to do so (49%), or no-one is willing to rent them housing (30%). Seventeen percent stated that the majority of their neighbours, in the building where they live, are immigrants, mainly from the same country of origin, which indicates that there are now concentrations of immigrants in the same housing. Over three-quarters affirmed that owners are usually reluctant to rent them housing.

Out of the African immigrants interviewed in 2000, 41% were alone in Spain, 38% had part of their family with them and 18% were living with their entire family. Consequently, the number of immigrants who had no family in Spain had fallen since 1991 (58%), and the number of complete families had almost doubled. Moreover, it can be noted that family reunification will increase, since 48% of the immigrants intend to bring their relatives, although half of the interviewees are not going to recommend immigration to Spain to their relatives or acquaintances.

One indicator of integration is how often Africans associate with other people. In their free time or outside the workplace, they almost always associate only with people of the same nationality (78%), only 30%

of immigrants have frequent contact with Spaniards, 42% hardly ever associate with Spaniards and 23% never do so. Notwithstanding this, relations are somewhat more fluid in 2000 than in 1991, when a third of immigrant Africans had no contact whatsoever with Spaniards.

Conclusions

As Spain was one of the last European states to become an immigration country, the proportion of immigrants is one of the smallest despite their frequent geographical concentration and the rate of increase, – the highest in Europe over the last decade. This was particularly due to large waves of Moroccans, the immigrants that Spaniards ostracise the most. Developing country immigration is likely to continue rising sharply, as the two main reasons for this immigration are still valid: the wide gap in economic development and the strong demographic pressure in the countries of origin. In any case, family reunification immigration, which is still in its early stages in Spain, and clandestine immigration, seem likely to increase considerably. It is now widely accepted by Spaniards that immigration in the near future is going to rise rapidly.

Taking into account the expected increase in immigration and the survey results, that show an important discrimination against immigrants' integration, it is difficult to envisage an immigration policy that can encompass the many complexities. Apart from the need for strict entry rules, immigration policies have to include the growing need for foreign labour in Spain, provide solutions for integration and against xenophobia, co-operate effectively at the international level in the development of the immigrants' countries of origin; in short, manage migratory flows in accordance with the needs of host as well as source countries.

A key challenge is education aimed at fostering an integral understanding of the present-day developing country immigration, given the expanding pace of immigration flows and the high levels of discrimination clearly demonstrated in the surveys, mainly in issues concerned with immigrant labour, access to housing, etc. These obstacles are the first hurdle that has to be overcome in order to set in place the minimum requirements necessary for establishing an acceptable level of immigrant integration, and more financial resources must be allocated to this goal in order to accomplish it.

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Summary

The number of legal foreign residents in Spain stood at 1.1 million in 2001, or 2.7% of the country's population. However, the rate of increase was one of the highest in Europe for the period 1991-2001, 8.1% annually for the totality of foreigners, 15.4% annually for developing country nationals, who are the large majority. The latter increase results from numerous extraordinary regularisations of non-community workers. Africans comprise the largest, fastest-growing group and also the one that seems to have the more difficulties in integrating into the Spanish society. Foreigners concentrate in Madrid and the Mediterranean coast. Immigration policies were initiated in 1985 and reformed in 1991, 1996, 2000 and 2001, in order to regulate illegal migratory flows and to facilitate the integration of immigrants already resident in Spain. Discrimination against immigrant integration has been studied using indicators obtained from surveys of Spaniards and the immigrants themselves. Whilst immigrants' "readiness" to become more integrated appears to have risen, Spaniards recently ostracise immigrants more, or at least view them as a "burden".

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Integration of migrants in Europe: the case of Finland

Introduction

At the beginning of 2003 Finland had about 5.2 million inhabitants. Of these 104,000, or 2% of the population, were foreign citizens.[1] Even though their number continues to be small on the European level, immigrants have quadrupled since the beginning of the 1990s. This country is thus changing from a demographically homogeneous and isolated corner into an international EU country.

This article will first examine recent migration from and to Finland (section 2), a country thas as been selected as a destination since the beginning of the 1990s, particularly with the arrival of refugees from Somalia and Yugoslavia. The first large wave of migrants came from the former Soviet Union, mainly composed of so-called ethnic return migrants, meaning descendants of Finns who had moved to Russia in the 1600s. Section 3 will examine Finnish migration and integration policy in the 1990s on the basis of the literature. Section 4 will be dedicated to evaluating how successful integration has been, on the basis of statistical data, describing the situation in year 2000 of immigrants who arrived in Finland in 1991-1994. Section 5 will examine the main results presented in surveys on economic, political, social and cultural integration. The final section will review ongoing Finnish research projects.

Finland as a country of migration

More than one million Nordic citizens have availed themselves of the opportunity to move freely in the Nordic region during the last hundred years. Traditionally, Finland has been a country of out-migration.

* This article was submitted in May, 2003.

[1] www.stat.fi/kk/tp/tasku (date: 4.5.2003).

Between 1880-1917 the destination area was North America, but after World War II the target became Sweden (especially in the late 1960s and the early 1970s): there are 400,000 Finns living there – approximately 30% of whom are still Finnish citizens. A noteworthy feature of most of the inter-Nordic movement is the high proportion of migrants returning to their country of origin: for example, about 50% of the Finns who moved to Sweden have eventually returned to Finland (Korkiasaari 2000, see figure 1).

The huge Nordic migration was based on two factors. First, in the Nordic area – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – a common labor market, a passport union, an agreement on non-discrimination and far-reaching social rights for all people migrating between these countries have been in place since 1954. Second, the great disparities between national economies created demand for labour. Sweden in particular needed an endless input of foreign workers in the 1960s. The so-called baby-boom generation of Finland formed the majority of the immigrants in this country, during the years of highest immigration (1969-70, see figure 1).

Compared to the rest of Scandinavia, Finland has been an isolated spot, virtually untouched by either global or European immigrants until recently. The situation has clearly changed, however, partly as a result of pressure from the Baltic area (especially from Estonia) and Russia. While the majority of the immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s were Finnish coming back from Sweden, since the early 1990s most of the immigrants have been foreign citizens (see also Korkiasaari and Söderling 1998). Today the number of foreign-born people in Finland is approximately 150,000, which means that about 50,000 of the foreign-born have become naturalized citizens.[2]

Among the characteristics of immigrants living in Finland are the following (Statistics Finland, Population 2002:8):

1. The largest group (23,000) came from Russia; the second is formed by the Estonians, comprising 12,000 persons. This means that about one-third of the foreigners are from the former Soviet Union, on the other side of the Finnish border. The biggest groups of immigrants with a refugee background came in the 1990s from Somalia and former Yugoslavia (both groups comprising about 4,500 persons). Russia is clearly the most common foreign language in Finland: one-third of all immigrants speak Russian.

2. The great majority of the immigrants (75%) are of working age (15-64 years). The corresponding figure among the Finns is 67%.

[2] This group consists also of foreign born Finnish return migrants.

Figure 1 – *Migration to and from Finland 1945-2002*



Source: Statistics Finland; *Figure*: Jouni Korkiasaari, Institute of Migration 2002

3. In 2001, 46% of the 100,000 immigrants were married. About 28,000 of the foreign-born were married to a Finn and, in addition, about 12,000 were living in a consensual union. The foreign spouses of the Finnish men came from Russia, Estonia and Thailand. Conversely, the spouses of the Finnish women were from Russia, Great Britain, Germany and Turkey.

The divorce rate of mixed marriages (divorces per 100 mixed marriages) in 1995-2000 was about 4, almost three times higher than among the Finns (non-mixed marriages). The highest divorce figures were found in marriages where the husband's country of birth was Turkey (10.3) or Morocco (11.3). In the case of women married to Finnish men, the prevalent nationalities are Estonia (6.5) and Thailand (4.9). Mixed marriages with foreign born women last longer than those with foreign-born men.

4. The unemployment rate among immigrants has been traditionally high in Finland. In 2000, it was 31% among foreigners , while the corresponding figure among Finns was 9%. Traditionally, the rate has been highest among the immigrants with a refugee background: for example, 77% of Iraqi immigrants were unemployed, while the corresponding figure was 64% among Iranians and 59% among Somalians.

5. About half of all the immigrants settle in the Uusimaa province, and especially in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area – the main destination

since when immigrants have moved inside the country. The Finnish refugee resettlement policy envisions referral of asylum seekers and refugees to different towns. Some years later the immigrants would leave most of these initial settlements and gather in the Helsinki area.[3]

The immigrant population living in Finland (2001) can be divided into four groups[4] (Statistics Finland 2002; Korkiasaari and Söderling 1998):

– *people with Finnish roots* (about 30,000), an outstanding share of whom were return migrants, that is ethnic Finns (called Ingrians) from the area of the Former Soviet Union;
– *spouses* of Finnish citizens (about 26,000 people);[5]
– *refugees*: the total number of asylum seekers and refugees with resident permits is about 23,000 people;[6]
– *labor migrants, students, family members and others* (approximately 22,000 – 25,000 persons).

Finnish migration policies and integration models

Migration policies

Finland's legislation concerning immigration and foreigners has been restrictive, after the Second World War (Söderling 2002; Lepola 2000). The first Alien Act has been approved in 1983; the second in 1991. Contents of the latter were influenced strongly by the fact that when Finland joined the Council of Europe, in 1989, the ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights called for some change in Finnish legislation.

The immigration policy debates of the 1990s both among the general public and among policymakers centered on three main themes: first on *refugee policy*, second on the immigration of *the Ingrians* (the ethnic Finns) and third, beginning in the late 1990s, on *active* immigration that gave preference to the workforce.

a) The immigration policy debate concerning refugees

The first group of refugees (around 200) fled from Chile in 1973 and 1974; later, in the 1980s, about 1,000 arrived from Vietnam. In addi-

[3] This is typical of the Somalians, for example.

[4] We should point out, however, that the categories are not clearly defined; for example, it is difficult to differentiate between the first and second group. However, ca. 1/5 of the Finnish immigrants are from western countries.

[5] Statistics Finland 2002, pp. 19-21.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

tion, rather large number of Somalians escaped from the Soviet Union, mostly from Moscow. The Government and the President in office at the time promoted the position that the applications of people arriving from a so-called safe country could be processed and brought to a decision in just a few days. There was even discussion of refusing the right of appeal to those who were to be deported (Lepola 2000). In regard to this issue, the public debate was very intense, even heated. However, legislation concerning foreigners was inadequate as illustrated by the fact that in 1992 a separate law had to be enacted for refugees arriving from Kosovo: on the basis of this act, Finland immediately resettled about 1,500 Kosovo Albanians.

The next refugee policy debate took place in the beginning of the 21st century, when Romas from Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria entered via other EU countries. In 2002, a flow of 3,443 asylum seekers reached Finland, of whom 1,304 (38%) were from three of the aforementioned countries.[7] The Finnish government inaugurated a so-called 'accelerated decision-making process'. A debate again arose over whether it is possible with this process to guarantee legal protection for those deported from the country (Sirva and Åberg 2003; Kaitila 2003).

The new Aliens Act presented to Parliament in 2002 included a proposal that also gave rise to a vigorous discussion. It has been the practice in Finland that an unaccompanied migrant under 18 years of age arriving has the right upon acquiring a residence permit to have his or her family come to Finland at the Government's expense. According to the Government proposal, family reunification would no longer occur automatically, instead the child could be returned to his or her parents if the situation in the country of departure so allows.[8] The primary cause for envisioning this provision was that, apparently, hundreds of unaccompanied minors have come to Finland, some of whom were the so-called 'sent' migrants (Helander and Mikkonen 2002). The Government withdrew its proposal from Parliament in January 2003, because, due to the approaching parliamentary elections, the immigration debate was threatening to become exacerbated and to focus the campaign on issues irrelevant to the whole.

b) The debate on ethnic immigration

As was noted earlier, in April 1990 the President of Finland stated in an interview broadcast on national television that the Finns living within the former Soviet Union, the Ingrians, can be considered return

[7] http://www.uvi.fi/doc/tilastot/turvahake00.htm (date: 4.5.2003).
[8] Turun Sanomat, January 10, 2003.

migrants. This was an issue going back to Finns who, in the early 1600s at the bequest of the King of Sweden, had been transported to what is currently the St. Petersburg region as a vanguard of Lutheranism. In the course of history these Finns remained within the borders of Russia and later of the Soviet Union. When Germany invaded the Baltic countries and the environs of Leningrad in the Second World War, the majority of the Ingrians (about 60,000 persons out of a total of 100,000) were transported to Finland. After the armistice between Finland and the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1944, most of them were resent to the Soviet Union: their condition, after return, was especially cruel. The 1990 Finnish President's statement, as the Soviet Union was dissolving, included the request for 'atonement' or 'restitution' to these kindred people (Lepola 2000). In the beginning of 2003, there were about 25,000 return migrants from the region of the former Soviet Union living in Finland. It must be noted, however, that a majority of them do not have an Ingrian identity:[9] the younger generation mainly identify themselves as Russian or Estonian, depending primarily on where they lived before coming to Finland (see Takalo and Juote 1995).

President Koivisto's statement started a large migration by Finnish scale. There was some controversy related to this migration, because it was not based on existing legislation. A committee report published in 1990 affirmed that immigration should not be based on ethnic kindred ties (Kom. miet. 1990: 46). The ethnic return migration policy was not brought before Parliament until 1996, six years after it began. At this time the Government proposed that a provision be added to the Aliens Act, that a person of Finnish origin coming from the former Soviet Union can be granted a residence permit as a return migrant. That same year an amendment was made to the Act, the most significant part of which was: "A person coming from the former Soviet Union can be granted a fixed-term residence permit, if he or she, one of his or her parents or two of his or her four grandparents is or has been registered in a document as being of Finnish nationality" (Aliens Act, 18 a §).

At the end of the 1990s, the limiting of ethnic Finnish migration came under discussion. The Government's Aliens Act proposal (2002), that expired because of the approaching parliamentary elections, included a Finnish language proficiency requirement for Ingrians, and, in addition, privileged the migration of those who had been living in Finland during the Second World War. The main aim was however to limit the number of permits given to Ingrians to about 1,500-2,000 per year (Lepola 2000, 107-108).

[9] It is mainly old people, settled in Finland during the Second World War that have an Ingrian identiy.

c) The debate concerning a less restrictive immigration policy (1997 -)

When Finland joined the European Union in 1995, a marked political change occurred once again in regard to immigration. The Finnish Government published an Immigration and Refugee Policy Program in 1997. According to this plan, Finland aimed for "controlled" promotion of the free movement of individuals and the labor force immigration of seasonal workers from neighboring regions (Sorainen 1999).

The Program stated that "The increase in migration across borders is an unavoidable result of general internationalization, of the profound changes which have occurred in our neighboring regions and of our country's joining the European Union as a Member State. Finland must resolutely utilize the positive aspects of this development and at the same time decrease its adverse effects as much as possible... Immigration can, as our previous history as well as the experiences of the rest of Europe have shown, signify an enriching and welcome resource for all of society..." (Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös,16.10.1997).

Gradually, the withdrawal of the large postwar age groups from the labor force has led to demands for change in the migration policy debate. An emerging labor force shortage is clearly visible in Finland (Söderling 2002; 2003), as the new age groups joining the workforce cannot replace the previous one (Parkkinen 2002; Salmenhaara 2002). According to a Ministry of Labor report published in February 2003, a definite turning point in the Finnish labor market will occur in 2005, when retiring people will outnumber the fresh employed (Työministeriö 2003). The annual difference will be about 10,000 persons. According to the report, by the year 2010 there will be 680,000 job openings in Finland, only 60,000 of which are new jobs, while the rest will be the result of retirements. (Parkkinen 2002; Salmenhaara 2002).

The new Aliens Act proposal brought before Parliament in the autumn of 2002 was based explicitly on a policy of promoting immigration as a means to solve this emerging labor shortage (Salmenhaara 2002). On the other hand, there was demand for a new law because the expansion of the EU will probably increase immigration from the new Member States, mainly from the Baltic countries and Poland. The law scheme was also prepared because the many amendments added to the 1993 Act made it difficult to understand and conflicting in parts. As was noted, however, the Government's proposal expired because of the approaching parliamentary elections.

A central issue in the new law would have been to allow an increasing number of foreign workers to come to Finland. The beginning would have been a cautious one, however, because the law would have primarily expanded the employment of foreign students in Finland, as

well as facilitated seasonal migration from neighboring regions (Estonia, Russian Karelia). This form of migration, well-known elsewhere in Europe for a long time, has been quite unfamiliar in Finland because of tight borders (see Sassen 1999; Söderling 2002).

Finnish integration policy and its three-phase implementation

The implementation of Finland's recent integration policy developed in three stages:[10] the laissez-faire phase (about 1973-1985), the preliminary integration phase (about 1986-1996), and the actual integration phase (1997-).

When the first refugees arrived in the early 1970s, Finland had a "laissez-faire" integration policy. The newcomers (for example, those from Chile) were generally highly educated. The concept of integration was unknown, as was the need for integration. Language and workforce training were arranged, but quite haphazardly. Housing was provided in separate reception centers (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002).

As the number of refugees increased in the 1980s (mainly from Vietnam) the discussion about their social security, housing and income went into greater depth. This "preliminary integration phase" (about 1986-1996) was characterized by the enactment of separate acts and regulations. The aim was primarily to guarantee social security and housing for the newcomers. Measures concerning employment were quite secondary, for throughout the early 1990s Finland was going through a period of extremely high unemployment: the rate among Finns in the beginning of the 1990s even exceeded 20 %, while among immigrants reached 60% and more. As in Sweden, from which the model was taken, refugees were scattered all over the country, into individual municipalities. In Sweden, strong criticism of this model started in the early 1990s, at the same time that it was being 'imported' into Finland (see Franzén 2003).

The "actual integration phase" began in 1997, when the Government approved the Program in Principle on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Measures were then undertaken in preparation for the enactment of the first integration law. The Integration Act was passed by Parliament in spring 1999 (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002). There was a substantial need for this law, as tens of thousands of people had immigrated to Finland and the presence of ethnic communities was widespread throughout the country.

[10] The first two being strongly associated with the development of Finland's refugee policy.

In this third phase immigration policy was examined as a whole, with integration playing a significant role, not only to promote the inclusion of immigrants into Finnish society, but also to diminish opposition to foreigners. At the same time that the Government passed the new Integration Act, it also set up strict demands on how the law was to be monitored. The first monitoring report was published in autumn 2002, just three years after the law was enacted (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002).

The integration model practiced in Finland resembles to a great extent that of Sweden, but it is more "young". Only recently, it has been attempted some kind of evaluation: on the whole, it has been found that attempts to emphasize the initiative of the immigrants often fails because they are supported for too long by social networks (Franzén 2003; Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002). Furthermore, the Finnish case confirms that the so called 'Whole Sweden Strategy'[11] results in lower employed income and a lower employment level for those coming under integration measures.

Implementing Finland's Integration Act in practice

Integrating immigrants(mostly refugees) into society became an administrative aim in Finland in the 1980s. The first law was enacted in 1999.[12] In the Finnish language integration is related to 'kotoutuminen' [domiciliation], where the root word is 'koti' – home. There has been much debate in Finland about the term and what it means (Peltonen 2002). The integration process is determined as the personal development of immigrants. Integration services should be based on individuality and reciprocity.

According to legislative provisions, *the individual integration plan* is an agreement between the immigrant and the employment office or local authority, dealing with the personal measures the immigrant should take to support him/her and his/her family in acquiring the essential knowledge and skills needed in society and at work. Immigrants are entitled to an integration plan for a maximum period of three years after the first registration in the population data system of a municipality. Those who have the right to an integration plan[13] are

[11] 'Hela Sverige Strategin', means that all of Sweden is a potential area of integration.

[12] *Act on the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum Seekers* (Act 493/1999).

[13] The obligation to draw up an integration plan concerns immigrants who: a) have moved to Finland after May 1, 1997, b) live permanently in Finland, c) are registered as jobseekers and/or, d) get a subsistence allowance (see: www.mol.fi/migration, January 11, 2003).

also entitled to access courses and training provided by the labor and social authorities. The measures provided in accordance with the law are mainly Finnish language courses, labor market training and various freely chosen courses seen as supporting integration. Interpreter services are also provided to immigrants in official contexts (Peltonen 2002).

The aim of the Integration Act is to promote the integration and employment of immigrants by coordinating measures and the provision of public services at the municipal level and in the administrative sectors. The law obligates the municipality to draw up an integration program, which is used in preparing individual integration paths for immigrants toward membership in society and employment.

During the integration plan period, an allowance is paid to the immigrant, which is a combination of subsistence grant and labor market support. According to Finnish law, the social security for immigrants is the same as the one for the native population. If the person neglects to carry out his or her integration plan, he or she may be liable for economic sanctions. Even though about 10,000 integration plans are made per year in Finland, the actual practical implementation of the law is rather discontinuous (cf. Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002).

An interesting feature is that there has been a definite increase in the number of immigrants entering the open labor market between 1999 and 2001. Nevertheless, among those who had drawn up an integration plan (and who also had to be registered at the employment office as jobseekers), only about one-third found a job on the open labor market in 2001 (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002, 160, see table 1).

Table 1 – *Immigrants with an integration plan and measures involving them*[14]

	1999*	2000	2001	Total
Total number of integration plans	8,771	10,770	10,371	29,912
Average number of integration plans per month	1,096	898	864	2,858
Entered the open job market				
N	1,434	3,077	3,311	7,822
%	**16.3**	**28.5**	**31.9**	**26.2**
Placed using labor market measures	897	2,072	2,655	5,624
Begun labor force training or the equivalent	2,900	6,532	7, 847	17,279

* May – December

Source: Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002 (Government Report on Integration)

[14] There may be several measures carried out per immigrant within one year.

There are several reasons why so little progress has been made in implementing the Integration Act. First, the municipal programs are diverse, and their accomplishment may vary from one municipality to another. Because there is no close regulation of the responsibilities of officials and the various administrative sectors, the actual realization depends on how committed and 'eager' municipal officials are about immigrant issues (Salmenhaara 2002).

The second evident problem is that, being the labor administration largely responsible for the integration programs, emphasis has been almost exclusively on job courses. Thus there is an obvious lack of general education and orientation to social services. This further weakens the employment and/or integration of immigrants with a poor basic education. For example, there are very few Finnish language courses compared to the demand (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002; Peltonen 2002). The National Board of Education recommends that language training for immigrants should last for 26-36 study units. Because of the Ministry of Labor cut in resources, immigrant language training has lasted an average of 18 study units (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002; Salmenhaara 2002).

The third observation is related to the fact that integration programs focus very little on family members. This means a substantial increase in the risk for exclusion among those outside the workforce (Teollisuus ja Työnantajat 2003).

The fourth and perhaps most problematic obstacle to inclusion is that the "integration plan" is often just another piece of bureaucratic paper, and many immigrants do not even know what it means. This is a problem, particularly if one takes into account that such a program is to be considered an agreement. To actually be of any benefit, more resources should be invested in information services to ensure that immigrants are aware of the meaning of the integration plan and the different opportunities it provides (Peltonen 2002).

The Government Report presented explicit reform measures for the existing Integration Act. There were a total of 77 reform proposals, including the following (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002).

1. Cooperation between officials should be increased. In particular, the activities of the municipalities and of the employment service officials should be clarified. More responsibility should be given to the municipalities.

2. In the current system, those staying at home (the elderly, at-home mothers, any other outside the workforce) are left outside the integration plans. It is interesting to note that, in their own report, Finnish employers have brought up this same problem; if Finland wants to actively increase foreign immigration, integration of the workers' family members should be encouraged (Teollisuus ja Työnantajat 2003).

3. The Integration Act should be reformed to ensure that permits concerning unaccompanied minors are processed more rapidly.

4. Settling immigrants in socially-supported housing areas[15] should be avoided. This can help prevent discriminatory and racist activity. On the other hand, provisions should be made to guarantee the birth of spontaneous immigrant networks – this necessitates regional concentration on the basis of ethnicity.

5. More resources should be given to cultural and linguistic mediators in the future, because the provision of language training has not been able to satisfy the demand.

Evaluation of the integration process in Finland

Statistics Finland published a report on foreigners in autumn 2002. The report examines annual trends in unemployment among foreign citizens who arrived in 1991-1994, as well as the length of unemployment, taxable income and education in 2000 (Statistics Finland 2002). During the years in question, a sizeable number of refugees came from former Yugoslavia and Somalia, among other countries. In addition, this was the period of mass migration of Ingrians from Russia. One feature of these groups was that when coming to Finland they did not have a readymade job waiting for them, and Finland also had no explicit integration legislation.

Unemployment. In 1995, the unemployment rate of all immigrants was 55%. The rate has since declined steadily and in 2000 it was 31% on average. Nevertheless, this figure was about three times that of the native population. The highest unemployment levels in 2000 were among those who had arrived as refugees (Iraq 61%, former Yugoslavia 52% and Somalia 49%). Outside the refugee population, the worst affected by unemployment were the Russians and Moroccans, considerably above the national average. An interesting observation is that the unemployment rate of the Chinese throughout this period (1994-2000) was about 14% (Statistics Finland 2002). This is mainly related to the fact that a marked proportion of the Chinese are employed either in the service sector (namely in restaurants, cf. Forsander 2002) or in the information technology (the so-called "Nokia phenomenon").

The nationalities with a high unemployment rate have also suffered from the longest periods of unemployment. Among the Iraqis, Somalians and those from former Jugoslavia only one-fifth of the workforce has been employed throughout the entire period. Those with

[15] Where immigrant residents receive housing benefits.

the longest duration of employment were from Western countries and China (Statistics Finland 2002, 33).

Forsander (2002) has observed that immigrants who have had a 'stable job career' were under 38 years of age or mainly Asian or Western immigrants. On the other hand, it is characteristic of those in the 'margins of the labor market' to be considerably older (over 50 years of age), with little education and a refugee background (Forsander 2002).

Taxable income. Because employment has been weakest among refugees, it is clear that they live primarily on social security. Thus their taxable income is also the lowest. In addition to the refugees, at least half of those coming from Russia, Thailand, Turkey and the Philippines and who were members of the workforce had an income of less than 10,000 euros in 2000. Citizens of Western countries earned the most: over 33,000 euros a year for at least one in four of all Dutch, Australian and German immigrants. When all foreign citizens are added together, only 5% of them earned over 33,000 euros a year – among the native population the figure was 16%.

One can generalize and say that, on the basis of their income, immigrants in Finland are divided into three definite groups: Western Europeans; former Eastern Europeans and the Chinese; and the refugees – who had had clearly the highest unemployment rate.

Education. Assessing the education of immigrants on the basis of data from "Statistics Finland" is particularly difficult. For over half of those who immigrated in 1994-95, there is no information in the statistics at all. Refugees seem to be the least educated, for only 6% of them have an academic degree. The most highly educated immigrants come from North America and Japan. It is interesting to note that citizens coming from the former Soviet Union are also highly trained (on average, more than those coming from other EU countries. Tilastokeskus 2002, 35). The employment problems among the Russians are associated with their old age structure (especially among Ingrians, the so-called ethnic return migrants), an education unsuitable for Finland and weak skills (see Forsander 2002).

Finnish research on integration – a brief review of the published research literature

Definition of integration and its contents

Ekholm's 1994 publication can be considered the first study carried out on the integration of immigrants in Finland (cf. Manninen 2001). The Author used the term integration mainly to signify multi-

cultural equality. In fact Ekholm's definition is quite close to the view held in the current Integration Act. According to the Act "integration means the individual development of an immigrant with the aim of participating in working life and the activities of society, while at the same time preserving his or her own language and culture".

Ekholm divided the indicators measuring integration into four categories; economic (employment, income and education), political (for example, applying for citizenship), social (language skills, friendships) and the internal cohesiveness of the immigrants (significance of one's own culture, desire to move back to one's former country).

In her dissertation, Valtonen (1999) presented integration as a practical process. In this respect, her views are close to the observation made in Sweden that integration is also experienced as an ongoing process that on average takes about 15 years (see Franzén 2003).

Salminen (1997) measures integration on the basis of the immigrants' management of life and identifies a few groups. *The successful* are those who have a job and good Finnish skills. *The perseverers* (the largest group) are those looking for work. Success in finding a job may push them up into the successful group. *The barely surviving* live one day at a time and do not believe in the future. The actual *isolationists* have shut themselves into their community or their family because they are willing to do so, or were forced by circumstances. According to Salminen, the isolationistis are mainly composed of at-home mothers, but also of those whose life is governed by religion.

What follows is a brief review of research related to integration and the main research results. Integration is divided into four dimensions: economic, political, social and cultural.[16]

Research on economic integration

Employment. According to Statistics Finland (2002) unemployment among immigrants was about three times higher than the native population (9% vs. 31%). Refugees had an especially poor employment rate.

Forsander (2002) observes that Finland has already acquired a clearly visible ethnic labor market, meaning that the career of immigrants is related to his or her country of departure and education. Westerners have been the most successful in their work careers in Finland, followed by immigrants coming from the former Soviet Union. Jaakkola (2000) has made a similar observation.

Paananen (1999) as well as Forsander and Alitolppa-Niitamo (2000) have found that 'informal capital' is of increasing importance on

[16] This classification resembles that of Ekholm mentioned above.

the Finnish job market. Thus, for example, Finnish language skills carry greater weight than normal among 'gatekeepers' (for example, recruiters). Being recommended by a Finn has been found to be equally significant. It has been also observed that the immigrants' own networks may help to provide access to entrance jobs, for example in the cleaning sector. Gaining access to a more demanding job usually requires action from employment service officials.

According to Forsander (2002; 2003), the unstable position of immigrants on the job market means that they are vulnerable to economic fluctuations. Thus, the job market position of immigrants in Finland is similar to that of the young or disabled members of the native population.

Valtonen (1999) is worried especially about wasting the capacity of the academic workforce. This continues to be true, for an estimated 200 foreign physicians in Finland do not have a work permit. This phenomenon is gaining wider attention. In 2003 the small University of Joensuu will begin to offer training for qualification for people who have acquired a teaching or medical degree in their native country (Turun Sanomat, January 30, 2003).

Education. It was noted earlier that the demand for language training exceeds the supply (Valtioneuvoston selonteko 5/2002). In this respect, the Finnish integration policy has clearly failed. What makes the situation worse is that high unemployment prevents immigrants from learning Finnish at work. According to Jaakkola (2000) it would be important to carry out initial assessments of the immigrants' language skills. This overall evaluation could be used to plan an individual employment path. For Jaakkola 'tailored training' for professionals in given sectors would also facilitate employment.

Salokangas and Tossavainen (1999) suggest on the basis of their study that language training should be provided for elderly immigrants.

If a young immigrant comes to Finland as a late arrival, but still at school age, he or she will be able to participate in schooling and integration measures (Kosonen 2002). The situation is worse if the individual has exceeded the mandatory school attendance age: there is then the risk that the young person will fall outside all security networks (Kosonen 2002). Räty (2002) has also focused attention on the integration problems of school age children. She has found that even though children integrate rapidly on a superficial level, this may result in an underestimation of their need for support. Integration is especially difficult for children coming from war and conflict areas: they have perhaps not attended school in his/her native country for several years, and may be behind others of the same age in the level of knowledge acquired.

Housing. In Finland, homelessness is extremely rare. The Nordic welfare is ideally based on the premise that society will provide everyone with housing. On the other hand, over-crowdedness is common and this is especially true among immigrants (see Ekholm 1994; Reiman 1999).

Often, in their countries of origin, they are not used to living in apartment buildings or in other permanent housing communities. Thus they may be unfamiliar with norms related to garbage disposal, using joint facilities or noise. Reiman (1999) suggests that immigrants be trained as housing advisors.

Salokangas and Tossavainen (1999) found that, surprisingly enough, foreigners make use of few social services meant to help in housing, such as municipal home help or childcare. According to researchers, refugees did not use these services either because they were not aware of them or they had their own social networks.

Research on political integration

Valtonen (1999) highlights that ethnic organization has increased in Finland. On the other hand, she observed that organizations could take a clearer role as interest groups – with the state providing support for their activities.

The effectiveness and expediency of society's measures is a key theme in the publication edited by Lepola (2002). The many articles in the book demonstrate how, for example, the so-called informal cooperation between officials has helped immigrants integrate.[17]

Research on social integration

Jasinskaja-Lahti (2000) has noted that, among Russian-speaking adolescents arrived in the early 1990s, acculturation and identity-seeking are still in progress. Feeling a sense of belonging to the Finnish society is strongly related to learning the Finnish language and making contacts outside one's own language group.

According to Kataja (1997) it is essential to give advance information to the residents of a small municipality before the arrival of refugees. This preparatory stage, focusing on young people, succeeded particularly well in the municipality studied. When advance information was not extended to elementary school students, it has been discovered later that refugee children had been the focus of peer victimization.

[17] One example is Kiesiläinen's article *Ylitse hallintorajojen – kotoutumisyhteistyötä Jyväskylässä [Across administrative boundaries - cooperating on integration in Jyväskylä]*.

In Finland, exclusion of immigrants is a serious problem (Jasinskaja-Lahti, *et al.* 2002; see also Hytti and Paananen, 2003). The greatest causes for worry are related to the long-term unemployment among immigrants – as well as to mothers with small children continuously remaining at home and thus increasing their risk for exclusion.

Research on cultural integration

In Finland, the so-called 'scatter' policy has been traditionally used in the resettlement of refugees and asylum seekers. According to this procedure, immigrants are spread in different parts of the country with no consideration for existing ethnic communities. In this respect Finland has been a faithful follower of the path forged by Sweden. Nevertheless, the outcome has been that those who were settled later move to the large population centers (Salminen 1997; Tilastokeskus 2002).

In Ekholm's opinion (1994), the 'ideal size' of an ethnic community should be about 100-500 persons. According to immigrant workers, however, it should be about 70 persons. The starting point must be the number of inhabitants, where friendships are based on factors other than ethnic choice.

The local concept of family differs markedly from that of most immigrants: in Finland the nuclear family and family networks are very small. The most typical Finnish family is a two-generation group (parents plus minor children, see Reuna 1997). According to Jasinskaja-Lahti (2000) the more traditional family structure among Russians makes life and integration easier for young people.

Many Finnish studies have pointed out the divergent position of immigrant women. For example, the handicraft skills of women should be encouraged and their entrepreneurship advanced. It is also important to arrange language courses tailored for them (Mäkinen 2002).

Ongoing integration research in Finland – a brief review

'Research in Finland related to integration is expanding and becoming more diversified. A central factor is the program financed by the Academy of Finland, 'Marginalization, inequality and ethnic relations', carried out in 2000-2003. Several studies have already been published, including some presented in this article. There will be more to come: for example, the book project led by Dr. Leena Suurpää exploring the ideas of young people in regard to immigration and integration.

The University of Turku has had an ongoing doctorate program already since 1995 called the *'Graduate School of Cultural Interaction*

and Integration and the Baltic Sea Region Cultural History'.[18] The school's third financial period began at the beginning of 2003 and will last until the end of 2006. This project has already resulted in numerous dissertations, including those of Valtonen (1999) and Forsander (2002) mentioned here.

At the Population Research Institute at the Family Federation of Finland, Anne Alitolppa-Niitamo is doing research on the education of Somalian children and adolescents. At the same Institute, Anna Mikkonen studies the lifestyle of immigrant households, with a special focus on housing satisfaction and family roles.

Finnish immigration is a few decades behind the European mainstream. Sweden, for example, became an immigrant-receiving country already in the 1960s. In Finland, this phase began only in the early 1990s: consequently, in the country there are not so many researchers with an actual immigrant background. The assumption can be made that the topic of immigrant integration will gather increasing interest in Finland.

Conclusion

Up till the early 1990s Finland was a country of emigration. Only with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the significant flows of refugees foreign population began to grow rapidly. In fact, the increase rate has been the fastest in Western Europe: in the beginning of the 1990s, there were still only about 25,000 immigrants in Finland, but by the beginning of 2003 the figure had increased to 104,000 persons (measured by foreign citizens).

Two factors have had a marked effect on the development of Finland's immigration and integration legislation. First, when Finland became a member of the EU in 1995, the issue of foreigners became crucial in the field of legislation. On the other hand, it has been customary in Finland to follow the Sweden's integration model and procedures.[19]

The national immigration debate developed in three fields: refugees, return migration on the basis of ethnic origin and less restrictive immigration. This last theme is very recent in Finland. Studies published over the last two years have shown that the natural increase of the Finnish population is coming to an end. This trend is reflected in

[18] www.utu.fi/hum/historia/kh/gschool. The coordinator of the project is Keijo Virtanen.

[19] As in the policy of geographically scattered refugee resettlement: in Sweden, they moved rapidly to larger centers of population; the same can now be observed in Finland – 10 years later.

the job market: it is estimated that, on the yearly level, there will be about 10,000 – 15,000 more people leaving the workforce than those entering it. Demographic forecasts show that Finland is advancing relentlessly toward a shortage of workers: this fact is linked to the so-called large age groups (those born in 1945-1950) entering retirement at the same time.

Finland's integration legislation is young, for the first law was enacted in 1999. It has been noted, in many studies and investigations, that the implementation of legislative provisions has gotten off to a poor start: the analysis has specifically focused on the lack of cooperation among officials, and on the fact that, when signing the integration documents, immigrants are not fully aware of all implications.

Because the unemployment rate among immigrants in Finland continues to be at a high level (about 30%, while it is 9% within the native population), not every newcomer has the opportunity to use work as a means for learning Finnish. Therefore language courses arranged by the authorities would be of primary importance in increasing integration. The only problem is that, because of the lack of funds, not enough language training is arranged to meet the demand. Resources in this sector should be increased, new groups at risk for exclusion should be included in language training.

A significant corpus of integration-related literature has been published in Finland during the last ten years. The focus on given ethnic groups living in certain areas have been the characteristics of this research. In this respect, there will be a definite change, for both the Academy of Finland and the Ministry of Education have invested more in national research projects related to integration. Compared to Sweden, Finland has only a very few scholars with an immigrant background. Gradually, this too will change, thanks to the broad research and education projects now underway.

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Summary

Traditionally, Finland has been a country of emigration. The situation has changed since 1990 and today the number of immigrants is 104,000, 2% of the total population. The Finnish immigration policy has been quite restrictive. Gradually, the withdrawal of the large post-war age groups from the labor market has led to demands for change in the migration strategy – with the new concept being "an active migration policy". Integration approach has been implemented in three phases: a) the laissez-faire phase (1973-1985), b) the preliminary integration period (ca. 1986-1996) and c) the integration phase (1997 onward). The first Integration Act (still in force) was passed in 1999. The model carried out in Finland resembles to a great extent that practiced in Sweden. It has been found in both countries that attempts to emphasize the initiative of the immigrants often fail because they have been supported for too long by public social networks. Several specific reasons were seen for so little progress in implementing the Integration Act. First, the municipal programs are diverse and their achievement may vary in practice. Second, integration programs are work-based – there is an obvious lack of general education or training in social issues. The third remark is related to the fact that these programs focus very little on family members. The fourth and most problematic obstacle is perhaps that, in practice, the integration plan is often just another piece of bureaucratic paper and many immigrants do not even know what it means.

The Finnish authorities are aware of these obstacles and comprehensive reforms are being prepared. Research on integration is also being strongly promoted by the Government and the Academy of Finland.

recensioni

ALFREDO ANCORA, *La consulenza transculturale della famiglia. I confini della cura*. Milano, Angeli, 2000.

Il volume può essere definito un libro di *confine*, aperto alle suggestioni del nuovo presente nell'altro, nell'estraneo e, contemporaneamente, teso a definire, secondo criteri e metodologie ben riconoscibili, la nuova epistemologia della psichiatria transculturale. Libro dai tanti *volti*, complesso, colto ed erudito, ricco di immagini e stimoli, aiuta, da un lato, a definire un "pensiero altro" e un "pensare oltre", che consente di arricchire la conoscenza della cultura, nell'incontro con e tra le culture; dall'altro, offre spunti di applicazione per conoscere ciò che è estraneo-straniero e strumenti per l'incontro con esso. Libro dai molti *linguaggi*, filosofico, etnografico, antropologico, psichiatrico, sociale, etico, culturale, psicologico, sistemico, sollecita la formazione di un linguaggio nuovo per quegli operatori di confine che nella loro attività attraversano "frontiere", incontrando volti, lingue, stati di salute e di malattia, storie e culture nuove.

Nella prima parte del libro, l'A. definisce le premesse epistemologiche della psichiatria transculturale e invita il lettore a considerare il problema psichiatrico in senso etnologico. In questo senso la cultura viene considerato come "esperienza vissuta", ossia come momento in cui un individuo vive ed apprende la propria identità culturale, sia in stato di salute che in stato di disturbo psichico. In tal modo, questa branca della psichiatria apre "sistemicamente" la mente e considera transculturale ogni incontro, ogni esperienza vissuta, ogni relazione con l'altro.

"L'uomo è incontro", diceva Bateson, e l'incontro può "narrarsi", utilizzando la "narrazione" come momento per ricostruire il senso di alcune storie, per aprirsi a nuove connessioni e possibilità di lettura, condividendo il continuo attraversamento di confini, frontiere, limiti. Aprirsi alla cultura è aprirsi al dialogo, rendere visibili le differenze, riconoscere le diversità come risorse. Con questi presupposti, gli operatori dei servizi psichiatrici che incontrano persone migranti, individui o famiglie, "straniere" a volte anche a se stesse, si pongono come operatori di confine: nella loro attività, attraversano frontiere, con faticosi viaggi di andata e ritorno, in territori dove lo specifico clinico non è l'unica cosa a cui sorreggersi.

Nel secondo capitolo vengono offerte indicazioni metodologiche su concetti e processi non clinici, più attinenti ai significati culturali. Il capitolo è ricco di definizioni differenziate di tipo antropologico sui termini di inculturazione, acculturazione, deculturazione,

identità culturale, multiculturalità e multietnicità. Il terzo capitolo consente invece di entrare più in contatto con l'idea di incontro tra culture, su un piano pragmatico più che teorico. L'esperienza dei servizi territoriali di accoglienza e di cura consente di andare a toccare "con mano" le difficoltà e le risorse dell'incontro con lo straniero, con l'altro in genere e con l'altro malato, psicotico, in particolare.

Spesso l'altro, e soprattutto lo straniero, è pensato come un diverso, la cui differenza culturale è vista come elemento di separazione e non come risorsa di conoscenza, senza poi considerare che egli è diverso da noi quanto noi lo siamo da lui. Il problema risiede proprio nel fatto che non è facile delineare dove inizio/finisco io e dove iniziano/finiscono gli altri. Ma l'incontro, e in particolare l'incontro in terapia, rappresenta un dialogo delle differenze, il momento in cui bagnarsi nel mare dei contatti e delle relazioni, perché la diversità emerga non come elemento di distanza, ma come ponte attraverso cui comunicare come persone.

Nel quarto capitolo l'A. riporta sue personali esperienze con "traditional healer", sciamani, e con il "dottore delle tarante", qualificandoli come esperti di incontri tra culture, nuovi costruttori di realtà e conoscenze, come uomini-tramite. Nell'ultimo capitolo, infine, vengono riportate storie vere, di persone e terapie, che aprono una finestra sul mondo dei rumeni, dei nomadi, degli zigrini e dei congolesi.

Utile e concreta, l'appendice riporta un'ipotetica scheda finalizzata alla codificazione dei dati e come supporto a un colloquio di incontro-accoglienza. La scheda si suddivide in tre parti: una prima, *anagrafica*, offre spazio al rilevamento di dati sulla *religione* e sul *gruppo familiare* di origine; una seconda, esplora la *richiesta di cura*, dando importanza, oltre agli aspetti relativi all'invio, all'anamnesi e alla diagnosi, anche le *aspettative* di chi si rivolge al servizio circa le modalità di cura, la struttura e gli operatori; infine, la terza parte è dedicata al *processo migratorio* e ai *vissuti emotivi* ad esso connessi (aspettative, desideri, nostalgie, ricordi, difficoltà, possibilità di integrazione, ricongiungimenti...).

Il libro indaga e stimola, in modo equilibrato, il pensiero e l'agire transculturale: risulta, per questo, un utile supporto a quanti si dedicano, anche per professione, ad un lavoro di mediazione, attenti al contesto familiare, multiculturale, valorizzando gli strumenti dell'incontro, del dialogo, della narrazione, nella complessa e diversificata relazione con l'altro.

LAURA BINDI

JACQUELINE ANDALL (a cura di), *Gender and Ethnicity in Contemporary Europe*. Oxford-New York, Berg, 2003. 238 p.

Che il genere sia una variabile fondamentale per analizzare le dinamiche dei flussi migratori contemporanei sembra ormai indi-

scutibile; che lo studio delle migrazioni possa apportare un contributo essenziale agli studi di genere non è invece così accertato. Questo libro a cura di Jacqueline Andall ha il grande merito di tracciare il filo comune che sottende queste due problematiche. Nell'introduzione, l'A. analizza gli studi delle migrazioni ed evidenzia che, se la tematica delle migrazioni e quella dell'appartenenza di genere sono trattate separatamente, si contribuisce alla costruzione dell'invisibilità e alla marginalizzazione delle donne migranti. Nel delineare il nesso circolare esistente fra le due questioni, Andall rimarca che la seconda fase del femminismo ha introdotto nelle analisi di genere nuovi ambiti di studio. Le analisi femministe, spesso autoriflessive, concernenti questioni quali il colonialismo, la razza, l'etnicità hanno influenzato lo studio delle migrazioni. Di ritorno, l'attenzione portata su donne appartenenti a culture differenti all'interno del mondo occidentale ha messo in evidenza le diversità esistenti fra le donne, rinnovando gli studi di genere.

I saggi presentati nel volume sviluppano questa riflessione attraverso l'esame di tre ambiti di ricerche. La prima parte del libro affronta la relazione esistente fra genere, etnicità e migrazione. Annie Phizacklea nell'articolo "*Gendered Actors in Migration*" sottolinea l'utilità di considerare i migranti attraverso una logica di genere applicata a tre piani di riflessione (la globalizzazione delle migrazioni, l'accelerazione del fenomeno e la differenziazione del fenomeno stesso), tenendo conto però che la partecipazione delle donne alle mobilità passate non è inedita. Jacqueline Andall in "*Hierarchy and Interdependence: The Emergence of a Service Caste in Europe*" evidenzia il modo ambiguo in cui sono considerati gli immigrati domestici. Il "ritorno" del lavoro domestico pagato in Europa ha un forte legame con la declinazione delle appartenenze di genere e produce nuove differenziazioni fra donne, in modo particolare fra immigrate e autoctone. Nell'articolo "*Migrant Women in Spain: Class, Gender and Ethnicity*" Carlota Solé e Sônia Parella sottolineano come l'etnicizzazione delle donne in situazione migratoria è legata anche al tipo di lavoro svolto e che spesso le politiche nazionali sostengono questa "discriminazione positiva".

La seconda parte del volume approfondisce le dinamiche esistenti fra appartenenze di genere, quelle etniche e la mobilitazione politica. Ravi K. Thiara in "*South Asian Women and Collective Action in Britain*" chiarisce l'influenza decisiva che ha avuto il "femminismo nero" sugli studi delle migrazioni. Le riflessioni delle femministe *black*, oltre a sostenere l'azione collettiva delle donne contro il razzismo, hanno messo in crisi le categorie interpretative derivate dall'affermazione dei principi universali ed eurocentrici. Questa tendenza è confermata anche in Francia. Cathie Lloyd in "*Women Migrants and Political Activism in France*" dimostra che le associazioni delle donne immigrate si sono mobilitate per cambiare e/o migliorare la loro posizione, ma anche quella di tutti gli immigrati, come è stato nel caso del movimento dei *sans-papiers*.

La terza parte del volume affronta il problema del genere e dell'etnicità in relazione all'islam. Ruba Salih nel saggio "*Shifting Meanings of Islam and Multiple Representations of Modernity: The Case of Muslim Women in Italy*" coglie i livelli di ibridità vissuti da un gruppo di giovani donne musulmane a Bologna. Queste "musulmane autentiche", nel rivolgersi ad un "islam puro", costruiscono la "loro" modernità. Lo studio del corano da parte delle donne contrasta con l'autorità maschile religiosa tradizionale e apre loro l'accesso ai luoghi pubblici. Joke van der Zwaard nell'articolo "*Nowadays Your Husband is Your Partner: Ethnicity and Emancipation as Self-Presentation in the Netherlands*" adotta uno sguardo incrociato fra immigrate e autoctone per studiare la posizione femminile in Olanda. La ricercatrice durante le sue inchieste non ha introdotto la variabile della migrazione e constata che per le donne intervistate è più pertinente la differenziazione fra la categoria femminile e quella maschile, indipendentemente dalle origini individuali. Umut Erel in "*Gendered and Racialized Experiences of Citizenship in the Life Stories of Women of Turkish Background in Germany*" dimostra invece che le donne turche in Germania sono state elaborate come il topico della diversità fra i tedeschi e gli "altri". Questa rappresentazione si regge su un'immagine stereotipa della donna turca, vista come oppressa da padri, mariti e fratelli, che nasconde le differenze interne e generazionali, oltre che il ruolo attivo che le immigrate ricoprono nella costruzione della cittadinanza tedesca.

Nella quarta parte del volume l'appartenenza di genere e l'etnicità sono declinate in relazione all'identità femminile. L'esempio della Russia analizzato da Anne White nell'articolo "*Mother Russia: Changing Attitudes to Ethnicity and National Identity in Russia's Regions*" chiarisce il rapporto elaborato fra etnicità, identità e costruzione del recente sentimento nazionale russo. Nel periodo postcomunista, l'affermazione del valore della "madre Russia" è servita ad inglobare ed oltrepassare la multietnicità della società russa comunista tradizionale. L'analisi di Raminder Kaur in "*Westenders: Whiteness, Women and Sexuality in Southall, UK*" pone il problema della relatività dei concetti di minoranza e di maggioranza in relazione all'appartenenza di genere. Nel quartiere londinese di Southall, dove le donne bianche costituiscono una minoranza, la relazione maschio/femmina è una dimensione indispensabile per capire il sistema locale. Il genere e/o la sessualità sono risolutivi quanto l'appartenenza razziale/etnica.

Nei vari saggi presentati in questo volume, l'ottica di genere evidenzia le differenze esistenti all'interno delle situazioni migratorie europee e, allo stesso tempo, delinea le similitudini vissute dalle immigrate, al di là dei confini nazionali. Nell'inglobare il peso differenziale di questa variabile bisogna però tenere conto che c'è stato un grande equivoco nell'associare il concetto di genere soltanto alla donna. Con la sua adozione si accetta, infatti, l'idea che la condizione femminile non può essere studiata in modo isolato o separato da quella

maschile. Nel nostro caso, ciò significa che un'attenta valutazione dei percorsi di mobilità delle donne racchiude la riconsiderazione anche del posto della mobilità maschile. La messa in relazione della tematica dell'appartenenza di genere con quella delle migrazioni non è determinata quindi solo dalla peculiarità femminile, ma dalla necessità di elaborare uno sguardo esplicativo comune al fine di studiare la trama dei significati socioculturali che tutti i soggetti (uomini e donne) elaborano all'interno delle configurazioni migratorie attuali.

ADELINA MIRANDA

TITO BOERI, BARRY MCCORMICK (a cura di), *Immigrazione e stato sociale in Europa. Un rapporto per la Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti*. Milano, Università Bocconi Editore, 2002. 201 p.

Riunendo i contributi di alcuni esperti europei del fenomeno migratorio che hanno partecipato a un lavoro di gruppo promosso dalla Fondazione Debenedetti, il volume si prefigge "l'obiettivo di offrire una discussione equilibrata e pragmatica dei problemi che accompagnano la migrazione internazionale" (p. viii). Si tratta di analisi di economisti che, dichiarandosi "notoriamente pragmatici" (p. vii), prendono le distanze dalle polemiche accese fra chi auspica "società multietniche e la totale liberalizzazione delle migrazioni" (p. viii) e chi invoca l'immigrazione zero per xenofobia e razzismo. Secondo gli autori, negli Stati Uniti il dibattito sarebbe più informato, mentre in Europa prevarrebbe l'ideologismo e la scarsa documentazione. Anche in America non mancano le difficoltà nell'implementazione della politica migratoria; tuttavia, rispetto all'Europa, le restrizioni sono più temperate e meglio applicate. In Europa l'immigrazione illegale sarebbe sottostimata, mentre negli States "si possono ottenere dati più affidabili dai controlli di frontiera" (p. ix). I flussi dell'immigrazione clandestina, in rapporto alla popolazione, sarebbero di circa il 25% maggiori in Europa rispetto agli Stati Uniti, mentre sarebbe esattamente l'inverso per quelli legali. Ne consegue che l'immigrazione illegale sembra superiore laddove maggiori sono le restrizioni. In altre parole, ci sarebbe una "sostituibilità fra immigrazione legale e illegale" (p. ix e cap. 3), nel senso che la seconda cresce perché occorre soddisfare la domanda di manodopera. Tale sostituibilità corrisponderebbe anche al vantaggio evidente che riguarda l'impiego della manodopera clandestina, mentre sono rari i controlli sul posto di lavoro. Gli autori osservano anche che gli europei sono molto meno disponibili alla mobilità geografica, di settore e d'impiego, mentre i cittadini dei paesi terzi sono molto più mobili. Tuttavia, gli immigrati ricevono trasferimenti dal welfare proporzionalmente maggiori rispetto agli autoctoni. Questi elementi inducono a pensare che l'immigrazione sia "una tassa sull'immobilità delle forza-lavoro europea" (p. xii e cap. 5). Si osserva anche che la

xenofobia è associata alle minor disponibilità a spostarsi. Il curatore del volume si spinge quindi ad affermare che "la forza-lavoro europea si oppone fortemente all'immigrazione poiché la percepisce come una tassa" (p. xiii). Le alternative possibili sarebbero quindi tre: 1) limitare l'accesso degli immigrati al welfare; 2) introdurre politiche selettive d'immigrazione; 3) delegare a istituzioni sovranazionali, più resistenti alle pressioni dell'opinione pubblica, la gestione delle politiche migratorie.

Senza nulla togliere ai meriti degli esperti che hanno contribuito a questo volume, mi limito a esporre qualche osservazione. Purtroppo, il volume appare un po' datato, al punto che alcune affermazioni risultano oggi contraddette dalle informazioni e dai dati più recenti. Per esempio, forse è vero che in Europa l'immigrazione clandestina è sottostimata (ma non di molto), ma non si può dire che negli Stati Uniti sia in proporzione meno importante e che sia meglio stimata grazie ai controlli di frontiera. Già anni fa, al convegno dell'Aja (*"Preventing and Combating the Employment of Foreigners in an Irregular Situation", 22-23 Aprile 1999*), i responsabili dell'INS avevano riconosciuto che i controlli non avevano per nulla frenato l'immigrazione clandestina. Adesso che Bush annuncia l'intenzione di realizzare la più grande sanatoria di tutti i tempi, le stime dei clandestini negli Stati Uniti oscillano fra gli otto e i quattordici milioni di persone (il doppio di quattro anni fa), cifre che in Europa sono del tutto improbabili.

Forse si potrebbe garantire meglio il pragmatismo, l'equilibrio analitico se non il rigore scientifico (le qualità che gli economisti evocano come loro proprie), se si evitasse una credenza in statistiche delle quali non ci si chiede come sono costruite.

Il volume propone alcune tesi assai convincenti, per esempio quella della sostituibilità fra immigrazione legale e illegale e quella che "l'immigrazione illegale è superiore laddove ci sono più restrizioni" (p. ix). Tuttavia, le analisi di questi aspetti non sembrano riuscire a scavare in profondità, per individuarne gli elementi costitutivi, i mondi reali in cui si producono e riproducono. Per esempio, l'impiego della manodopera clandestina tende a svilupparsi dove sono più accentuati i meccanismi della crescita liberista: attività che durano poco tempo e che si situano nell'universo delle economie sommerse (in cui cioè tutto è illecito anche l'apparente combinazione fra lecito e illegale – vedi contabilità, fatture e documenti contraffatti, ecc.). Allora perché non guardare che rapporto c'è fra tasso delle economie sommerse e impiego di clandestini e anche di lavoratori nazionali al nero? E che correlazione c'è fra il tasso di sommerso e lo sviluppo liberista? V'è poi da dire che il ricorso ai clandestini impone un'alta riproduzione d'immigrazione irregolare, perché necessita di un alto *turnover*, trattandosi di lavori spesso assai nocivi, pesanti, a rischio di incidenti, insomma di lavori che provocano un'alta usura della manodopera o l'*exit* per non-resistenza ai ritmi o per rivolta. L'impiego di clandestini ha una logica "*one shot*" (un solo colpo) e non

può soddisfare attività che invece hanno bisogno di una certa regolarità su tempi medi se non lunghi. È anche questo che forse spiega le recenti sanatorie che corrispondono anche alla necessità di ristabilire nuovi controlli e il disciplinamento sociale, oltre che a recuperare consensi elettorali.

Una delle tesi del volume che quantomeno lascia fortemente perplessi sostiene che "gli immigrati riceverebbero trasferimenti dal welfare proporzionalmente maggiori rispetto ai nazionali" (p. xii e cap. 3). Numerose ricerche mostrano, al contrario, che in Europa (e soprattutto in Italia) c'è un grave deficit d'integrazione sociale degli stessi immigrati regolari, deficit ancora maggiore di quello che colpisce anche una parte degli stessi nazionali a causa delle famose revisioni del welfare. È anche a questo che si deve la marginalizzazione e l'auto-marginalizzazione di tanti immigrati e il rischio del rifugio in appartenenze religiose contrarie allo sviluppo di una società coesa su basi democratiche e universalistiche. Le discriminazioni nell'accesso all'alloggio, ai diversi servizi pubblici, a impieghi regolari e dignitosi, sono documentate. Senza mettere in conto l'apporto dei clandestini all'economia europea come a quella americana, come è possibile che gli immigrati ricevano trasferimenti dal welfare proporzionalmente superiori ai nazionali? Che peso dare a tali contabilità?

Va poi riconosciuto agli economisti la capacità di produrre alcune tesi originali, quale quella dell'"immigrazione come tassa sull'immobilità delle forza-lavoro europea" da cui discenderebbe che "la forza-lavoro europea vi si oppone fortemente" (p. xii e cap. 5). Tuttavia anche su questo i dati più recenti sembrano smentire questa tesi, mostrando che anche gli europei (e in particolare gli italiani) si muovono. Sarebbe in proposito utile una più approfondita analisi della crescita della mobilità che s'è prodotta negli ultimi due decenni a livello provinciale, regionale e interregionale (basti pensare all'aumento straordinario del pendolarismo).

Le alternative possibili discusse dal volume sarebbero quindi tre: 1) limitare l'accesso degli immigrati al welfare; 2) introdurre politiche selettive d'immigrazione; 3) delegare a istituzioni sovranazionali, più resistenti alle pressioni dell'opinione pubblica, la gestione delle politiche migratorie (p. xiii e cap. 7). Com'è noto si tratta di tre aspetti già praticati che tuttavia sembrano destinati ad essere rivisti sia in Europa e in Italia (il bilancio serio della Bossi-Fini sarà eloquente), sia in America con un probabile semi-ritorno a politiche migratorie che in parte ricordano quelle passate, così come non è da escludere una frenata allo sviluppo liberista incontrollato.

Al di là delle perplessità sin qui evocate, è indubbio che il lavoro degli economisti merita attenzione, perché può effettivamente stimolare una riflessione più seria soprattutto se si sviluppa in una prospettiva critica pluridisciplinare.

TURI PALIDDA

COMUNE DI MILANO, *Migrazioni, mercato del lavoro e sviluppo economico: sessione del Convegno internazionale "Migrazioni, scenari per il XXI secolo", Milano, 23-24 novembre 2000*. Milano, Franco Angeli, 2002. 279 p.

Il volume, pubblicato a cura del Comune di Milano, raccoglie gli atti del convegno "Migrazioni, mercato del lavoro e sviluppo economico" (Milano, 23-24 novembre 2000), ultima sessione del più ampio progetto denominato *Convegno Internazionale Migrazioni. Scenari per il XXI secolo*; ideato nell'ambito delle celebrazioni giubilari del 2000, mirava ad un'analisi complessiva del fenomeno migratorio nei suoi molteplici aspetti: geopolitico, culturale, dell'integrazione, economico.

Il testo rispecchia, evidentemente, la varietà delle relazioni e degli interventi, che spaziano dalle previsioni di scenari demografici europei a medio termine all'esperienza diretta della magistratura nella repressione dell'illegalità, dal fabbisogno di manodopera straniera da parte delle imprese italiane agli esperimenti di microcredito avviati nei paesi industriali sul modello della banca Grameen indiana. Il filo conduttore della raccolta, coerentemente con l'impianto del Convegno, sta nella comune percezione dell'immigrazione come dimensione del quotidiano, della convivenza sociale nelle città, così come delle relazioni di lavoro, autonomo o subordinato. Rimangono alcuni punti deboli nell'organizzazione del testo, che sono, però, consuete in questo genere di pubblicazioni – ad esempio, alcuni interventi sono trascrizioni della comunicazione orale e non articoli scritti per l'edizione – e non intaccano comunque la significatività dell'insieme.

Sulla base della divisione del convegno in sessioni tematiche, il volume è strutturato in tre sezioni piuttosto autonome, ciascuna delle quali può essere considerata una buona introduzione alla questione trattata: le motivazioni socio-economiche che regolano il comportamento degli immigrati, il bilancio economico dell'immigrazione, l'accesso al credito da parte delle persone immigrate.

La prima sezione – *Motivazioni socio-economiche che regolano il comportamento degli immigrati* – è quella di maggiore spessore scientifico, ed ha soprattutto il pregio di inquadrare correttamente la questione in una prospettiva europea, sia dal punto di vista della programmazione politica che degli scenari demografici di riferimento. Il contributo di G. Gesano su "Obiettivi economici, progetti migratori e realtà lavorativa degli immigrati recenti" contiene una rassegna chiara ed esauriente delle principali teorie migratorie, con una particolare attenzione alla questione delle motivazioni e delle aspettative economiche come determinanti del percorso migratorio da un lato, dell'insediamento nel paese di destinazione dall'altro. Il contributo di S. Feld su "Movimenti migratori, popolazione attiva e trasformazione del mercato del lavoro nell'Unione Europea a medio termine", inoltre, presenta un'analisi estremamente attenta e puntuale della ristrutturazione in corso nell'organizzazione del lavoro, entro cui vanno ricollocate sia le trasformazioni demografiche – pro-

cessi di invecchiamento, maggiore o minore natalità, partecipazione delle donne al mercato del lavoro – sia le dinamiche di insediamento dei flussi migratori diretti verso l'Europa.

La seconda sezione – *Il bilancio economico dell'immigrazione: luci e ombre* – presenta quattro interventi che toccano aspetti estremamente differenti dell'integrazione economica della popolazione immigrata in Italia. Di grande interesse la comunicazione di C. Gagliardi, direttore dell'Ufficio studi di Unioncamere, che discute "La domanda di lavoro immigrato delle imprese: aspetti quantitativi e qualitativi"; i dati del *Sistema Excelsior* mettono in evidenza il consolidato fabbisogno di manodopera immigrata espresso direttamente dalle imprese alle proprie associazioni di categoria, elemento che dovrebbe stare alla base di qualsiasi ipotesi di gestione programmata dei flussi migratori. Interessante per gli spunti di riflessione che offre è anche la relazione di L. Scagliarini, Sostituto Procuratore presso il Tribunale di Milano, su "Circuiti criminali e canali finanziari", che esplora la tematica meno conosciuta della lotta giudiziaria alla criminalità e alle situazioni di sfruttamento legate all'immigrazione irregolare. La relazione di D. Colonna e L. Breveglieri, a partire da un *case study* circoscritto agli "Immigrati imprenditori asiatici e africani a Milano", introduce e discute alcuni concetti – fra cui la *ethnic opportunity structure*, le dinamiche di strutturazione di una *hourglass economy*, le varie tipologie di "imprenditorialità immigrata" invece che "etnica" – di grande utilità per lo studio dei processi di insediamento delle comunità immigrate. Chiude la sezione il contributo di G. Bolaffi su "L'immigrazione moderna fra domanda dell'economia e rifiuto della società", una riflessione sulla dimensione sociale dell'immigrazione e sulle sfide che essa pone al processo di costruzione dell'identità collettiva, specie in ambito europeo.

L'ultima sezione – *L'accesso al credito da parte degli immigrati e le rimesse economiche verso i paesi d'origine* – è forse la parte meno organica nell'insieme, nonostante l'indubbia rilevanza delle rimesse e del credito, identificati come i principali aspetti finanziari dell'immigrazione. La lunga disamina sull'esperienza della banca Grameen ("L'esperienza della Grameen: un esempio per l'Europa?", di A. Kamal) e sulla natura e l'entità del debito dei paesi poveri ("Il debito estero dei paesi poveri e la lotta alla povertà", di S. Beretta) non sembra sufficientemente raccordata con la questione dell'accesso a piccoli crediti per l'avvio di piccole e piccolissime imprese in Italia da parte di persone immigrate, discusse negli interventi di G.B. Pittaluga su "Il microcredito in Italia", di A. Antoniazzi su "Le esperienze di microcredito nelle città" e di M. Masini su "Un approccio imprenditoriale alla finanza di frontiera". Rimane sullo sfondo l'idea di un possibile collegamento fra valorizzazione delle rimesse, razionalizzazione dell'accesso al credito e prospettive di sviluppo nei paesi d'origine, che non è facile da cogliere per il lettore meno attento.

Il libro nel suo complesso costituisce un'ottima raccolta di analisi, notizie e informazioni, com'è normale per la sua natura di atti di

un convegno internazionale. È importante soprattutto lo sforzo di enucleare i principali aspetti economici dell'immigrazione in una prospettiva veramente di ampio respiro, senza fermarsi all'impatto della manodopera immigrata sul mercato del lavoro nazionale. Particolarmente interessante è anche l'attenzione costante al variegato scenario dell'imprenditorialità, che va dal fabbisogno di lavoro immigrato da parte delle imprese italiane alla domanda di credito da parte di aspiranti piccoli imprenditori immigrati, fino ad analizzare le dinamiche di insediamento di alcune comunità proprio attraverso i loro percorsi lavorativi e imprenditoriali.

Migrazioni, mercato del lavoro e sviluppo economico è una lettura consigliata soprattutto per avviare l'approfondimento di alcune questioni legate agli aspetti più spiccatamente economici dell'immigrazione; di grande pregio, in questo senso, sono anche le ricche bibliografie che accompagnano ogni intervento. Uscito nella collana "Politiche e servizi sociali", il volume si presta bene anche per gli operatori del settore, che possono confrontarsi, oltre che con le argomentazioni scientifiche, anche con analisi e riflessioni direttamente ispirate dalla ricerca empirica o dal lavoro sul campo.

SERENA VITALE

FERNANDO DEVOTO, *Historia de la inmigración en la Argentina*. Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 2003. 527 p.

Gli studiosi dei fenomeni migratori, come è ben noto, sono oggi sempre più attenti alle molteplici varianti della mobilità territoriale e alle sue differenti estensioni spazio-temporali. Nonostante la vasta produzione storiografica e sociologica sull'argomento, tuttavia, sono ancora molte le questioni da definire in merito, non solo sul piano concettuale, ma anche su quello terminologico. Stabilire le differenze tra entità astratte, come quella di mobilità o di migrazioni, oppure tra soggetti più concreti, come emigranti, stranieri, esuli, rifugiati, è oggi infatti di cruciale importanza per affrontare in modo semanticamente e teoricamente corretto un tema così discusso. Ed è appunto con alcuni di questi interrogativi di fondo che si apre la *Historia de la inmigración en la Argentina* di Fernando Devoto. Attento, come sempre, all'impostazione teorico-metodologica, oltre che all'inquadramento storico dei problemi affrontati, a tali quesiti lo studioso argentino fornisce delle risposte che rimandano all'intrinseca ambiguità della categoria di emigrante e alle trasformazioni che essa ha subito sia nel corso della vita degli stessi protagonisti, sia nelle immagini e nelle autoimmagini delle generazioni successive.

Scorrendo la lunga storia dell'immigrazione in Argentina non è facile offrire una definizione univoca di tale soggetto e questa appare assai differente, nella stessa percezione dei contemporanei, a seconda dei momenti e delle contingenze. Tra il XVIII e il XX secolo –

il periodo su cui si focalizza questa storia, pur senza escludere il primo periodo coloniale – giunsero in Argentina, in differenti ondate, molti stranieri. Nel corso del periodo coloniale risulta assai difficile distinguere gli immigrati che decisero di fissare una più stabile dimora nel paese all'interno della vasta compagine di funzionari e mercanti che alimentarono i primi arrivi. Quando poi, nella prima metà del XIX secolo, presero l'avvio ricche comunità commerciali di stranieri, fu proprio come tali che questi furono percepiti dalle *élites* locali, anziché come immigrati. E come 'esuli' furono positivamente denominati, negli stessi anni, i molti esiliati politici che raggiunsero l'Argentina fuggendo dalle reiterate persecuzioni antiliberali. In seguito, nella seconda metà dello stesso Ottocento, quando a questa emigrazione di *élite* si sostituì progressivamente quella di massa, la definizione di immigrato si concretizzò maggiormente e soprattutto si andò restringendo dalla più positiva valutazione dello 'straniero' come agente di civilizzazione alla meno generosa definizione di 'forza lavoro': una definizione questa, che in un noto libro argentino del 1899 fu poi stigmatizzata nell'immagine del "bue", l'animale-simbolo della bruta operosità.

La nozione di emigrante si modificò anche in sintonia con l'evoluzione della legislazione argentina. Di fatto, a partire dalla Costituzione del 1853, le normative statali puntarono a definire i diritti degli autoctoni rispetto a quelli degli stranieri rimandando, di volta in volta, rappresentazioni e definizioni assai diverse di questi ultimi. Fu però la legge sull'immigrazione e la colonizzazione del 1876 a dichiarare chi dovesse essere ritenuto come *inmigrante*: secondo questa normativa era da ritenersi tale chiunque arrivasse in "navi a vapore o a vela, per stabilirsi nel paese". Nel corso del XX secolo, in Argentina, come in tutti gli altri paesi che adottarono leggi restrittive in materia di emigrazione, cambiò ancora la percezione dell'emigrante e la sua stessa denominazione. Quando cominciarono a crescere i conflitti sociali interni al paese, quando si andò affermando un'identità nazionale argentina e quando, nei flussi dall'Europa, presero a prevalere nuovi esuli e rifugiati (ora assai diversi, sul piano sociale e politico-ideologico, da quelli ottocenteschi,) fu la nozione di straniero a sostituirsi a quella di immigrato, ma con un'accentuazione delle connotazioni negative rispetto al passato.

Il volume si divide in due parti. Nella prima vengono esaminati i fenomeni migratori dall'Europa alle Americhe in una prospettiva temporale di lungo periodo, in un ambito territoriale che oscilla dai grandi spazi continentali alla più ridotte scale nazionali, regionali e microanalitiche e con un'attenzione privilegiata a quei meccanismi interpersonali dell'aggregazione – le catene migratorie – sulle cui dinamiche Devoto ha contribuito già in passato a fare luce, dando anche avvio a una nutrita e prolifica scuola. Nella seconda parte vengono seguiti i percorsi dell'immigrazione in Argentina tenendo in maggiore considerazione l'evoluzione diacronica dei fenomeni esaminati. Questa sezione del libro contiene anche un capitolo dedi-

cato alla discussione dei problemi dell'integrazione, del confronto culturale e della dibattuta questione del *crisol de razas*. Lungo il plurisecolare percorso della sua analisi Devoto si muove con la finezza teorica, l'abilitá metodologica e la sensibilitá storica di sempre. Coniugando la macro con la microstoria, i processi diacronici con la continuitá e le permanenze, la dimensione nazionale con quella internazionale, regionale e locale e ricorrendo, come in molti altri suoi studi, alla comparazione di differenti esperienze migratorie, lo studioso argentino ricostruisce un articolato ed esauriente profilo storico. Dalla sua indagine affiorano infatti le costanti economiche e sociali dei movimenti migratori verso il grande paese sudamericano così come le grandi cesure epocali. Queste, in particolare, appaiono segnate dai grandi eventi bellici, sia da quelli che colpirono il paese già a partire dal XVIII secolo sia, soprattutto, dai due conflitti mondiali. E proprio questi utltimi furono i fenomeni che aprirono capitoli del tutto nuovi per la caratterizzazione economica e politica dei flussi, per le trasformazioni che investirono la stessa Argentina nonché per le forme che assunse allora l'integrazione di immigrati di differente provenienza nazionale nel corpo sociale del paese. I movimenti di massa degli europei verso l'Argentina, secondo quanto affiora da questa storia, si chiudono di fatto con il 1960. Dopo questa data saranno soprattutto gli asiatici e le popolazioni limitrofe a sostituire gli europei e a caratterizzare la nuova immigrazione di massa. Ed è proprio a quest'ultima che viene dedicata un'intera sezione del volume, in appendice, scritta da Roberto Benencia. In questa parte, *La inmigración limítrofe*, viene tratteggiata la dimensione quantitativa e qualitativa dei flussi migratori sviluppatisi in Argentina nella seconda metà del XX secolo e soprattutto dei più recenti.

L'*Historia de la inmigración en la Argentina* si può considerare un punto di approdo significativo nella copiosa produzione di Fernando Devoto. In essa confluiscono infatti tutti i temi ricorrenti delle sue riflessioni: dalla messa a punto delle grandi questioni storiografiche alla formalizzazione dei risultati delle ricerche ritenute più significative: dallo studio dei meccanismi delle reti sociali originarie al loro funzionamento nella vita quotidiana e collettiva del nuovo paese; dall'individuazione del ruolo svolto dalle *élites* nella formazione delle comunità di stranieri alla loro penetrazione nella vita economica, politica e sociale dell'Argentina; dalla trasformazione-formazione delle identità, alle loro percezioni, rappresentazioni e invenzioni sia tra i primi-arrivati e gli autoctoni, sia tra le nuove generazioni; dai processi dell'integrazione delle prime generazioni a quelli sperimentati dalle successive. La prospettiva che prevale in questo nuovo libro, tuttavia, è quella della formazione dell'Argentina e del contributo che ad essa hanno offerto le numerose popolazioni che l'hanno raggiunta a partire dal XVIII secolo.

Qual è stato questo contributo? E qual è la posizione che assume Devoto di fronte alle numerose e controverse questioni che su tale argomento vengono sollevate non solo nella folta produzione sto-

riografica e sociologica, ma anche in un'altrettanto copiosa produzione letteraria, fonti che lo studioso argentino maneggia con grande conoscenza? Le risposte fornite in proposito sono molto articolate e niente affatto univoche. Molto schematicamente esse si possono così riassumere: sul piano economico il peso prevalente è stato sicuramente quello offerto alla produzione nazionale dal lavoro migrante, in tutte le sue manifestazioni e soprattutto in quelle manuali e artigiane; su quello sociale la pluralità di etnie presenti sul territorio argentino ha favorito lo sviluppo di un democraticismo del tutto originale tanto rispetto ad altre esperienze nazionali sudamericane quanto a quelle europee; su quello culturale, infine, la presenza massiccia di immigrati ha impedito l'insorgere di qualsiasi nazionalismo a sfondo razziale, nonostante l'esistenza di vari pregiudizi e di numerose differenze sia tra nativi e stranieri, sia tra i primi arrivati e gli ultimi, sia tra gli esiti economici e sociali degli uni e degli altri.

Agli interrogativi di fondo che danno spunto al suo volume, insomma, Devoto fornisce una risposta sostanzialmente positiva, che lo induce a vedere nell'Argentina, – al di là delle formule retoriche e mitiche usate via via per connotare il processo di formazione del paese e della sua identità nazionale – il risultato di un produttivo e favorevole incontro-confronto tra le differenti componenti presenti sul suo territorio nazionale: «Los argentinos – per dirlo con le sue parole – esa cosa misteriosa en el decir de Borges nacieron y parece que perdurarán. Aunque seguramente se podría argumentar acerca de cuánto tiene de retórica, de formalismo, la "identidad" argentina. Empero, ello no es sólo un patrimonio de este pais (....) Hubo además de un tardio crisol, un temprano mito del "crisol". Dado que si las personas creen que algo es real, es real en sus consecuencias, el mito, a la ve enmascarador y nivelador, pudo tener un efecto benéfico» (p. 431).

PAOLA CORTI

EMILIO FRANZINA, MATTEO SANFILIPPO (a cura di), *Il fascismo e gli emigrati. La parabola dei fasci italiani all'estero (1920-1943)*. Bari-Roma, Laterza, 2003. 194 p.

Sulla penetrazione del fascismo tra gli italiani all'estero sono stati condotti sicuramente meno studi di quelli dedicati all'antifascismo, ai rapporti tra fascismo e antifascismo o alle relazioni tra fascismo e organizzazioni cattoliche. Risulta quindi particolarmente opportuna l'iniziativa di pubblicare un volume come questo, che attraverso ricerche su fonti e materiali in gran parte originali si pone l'obiettivo di offrire un quadro d'insieme della parabola dei fasci in differenti comunità italiane.

Preceduti dall'introduzione dei due curatori e da un ampio saggio, in cui Luca De Capariis analizza l'itinerario dell'Ufficio centrale di coordinamento dei fasci all'estero, i saggi raccolti nel volume sono affidati a noti studiosi dell'emigrazione italiana nei paesi presi in

esame. Oltre alle colonie in Africa, i paesi analizzati sono le più importanti realtà di arrivo in Europa e nel nuovo mondo: Francia, Belgio, Gran Bretagna, Austria, Germania, Canada, Stati Uniti, Argentina, Brasile e Australia.

Alcuni quesiti comuni, posti dai due curatori agli autori, hanno il merito di rendere più omogenei questi scritti che – al pari di altre analisi dedicate a differenti realtà d'esodo – non possono non rivelarsi comunque eterogenei, sia per la peculiarità di ciascuna situazione d'immigrazione, sia per la non univocità della documentazione utilizzata. Le risposte a questi interrogativi – l'origine e i fondatori dei fasci nel paese esaminato; l'esito dell'iniziativa; le reazioni della comunità italiana alla vigilia del secondo conflitto mondiale – concordano sostanzialmente su alcuni aspetti centrali che cerchiamo di riassumere brevemente.

I promotori dei fasci all'estero furono quasi ovunque quegli italiani emigrati dopo la grande guerra, che avevano vissuto in prima persona l'esperienza bellica; proprio per questo loro avvio, le istituzioni fasciste non furono viste di buon occhio – almeno agli inizi – dalle vecchie *élites* italiane, mentre godettero – sempre agli inizi – delle simpatie dei governi locali. Tale simpatia cessò in seguito, quando il regime fascista assunse i ben noti toni aggressivi in politica estera; le relazioni tra le comunità italiane e i fasci furono invece migliori quando questi organismi cominciarono ad avere il favore delle *élites* immigrate. Questo accadde dopo il fallimento della fascistizzazione delle comunità italiane ad opera dei coordinatori romani, in seguito alla decisione, nel 1927, di 'fascistizzare' il Ministero degli esteri eliminando il Commissariato generale dell'emigrazione, creando la Direzione generale degli italiani all'estero e subordinando i fasci alle autorità diplomatiche italiane. I fasci subirono infine un inevitabile declino con l'approssimarsi della guerra, quando furono ritenuti ben più pericolosi dalle autorità dei paesi ospiti, e per questo osteggiati, e quando, nel medesimo clima di diffusa insicurezza alimentata dal conflitto, furono via via disertati dagli stessi italiani.

Se, in estrema sintesi, la parabola che accomunò i fasci nelle varie sedi di immigrazione si può ricondurre al confronto-scontro tra l'Ufficio centrale di coordinamento dei fasci all'estero e le autorità diplomatiche, nonché al ruolo affidato al Ministero degli esteri, ben più articolate risultano le vicende di queste istituzioni nelle differenti sedi di immigrazione. Tali peculiarità affiorano bene dai vari contributi al volume, che per ciascuna sede puntano a ricostruire i rappporti tra i fasci, le autorità locali, le comunità italiane, tenendo tuttavia conto del ruolo svolto dalle direttive politiche di ciascun paese. Le dinamiche dei fasci furono infatti ben diverse nell'ambito dei paesi amici o nemici, e risultarono legate all'evoluzione dei rapporti dell'Italia con i singoli stati di immigrazione oltre che alla trasformazione interna alle colonie italiane, ai rapporti tra queste e la madrepatria, alla presenza più o meno egemone del fascismo e dell'antifascismo nelle varie sedi.

Seppure nella inevitabile eterogeneità dovuta non solo alla già richiamata discontinuità delle fonti e delle storie locali, ma anche al differente consolidamento che gli studi 'politici' sull'emigrazione hanno avuto in certe sedi, i contributi al volume arricchiscono notevolmente le nostre conoscenze sui fasci all'estero. Certamente, come sottolinenano gli stessi curatori, l'argomento merita ulteriori ricerche e approfondimenti soprattutto se, dopo una lunga stagione di studi sugli aspetti economico-sociali del fenomeno migratorio e dopo molte ricerche sull'emigrazione politica, si auspica di arrivare a una storia 'politica' dell'emigrazione italiana.

PAOLA CORTI

MARCO ZURRU (a cura di), *Chi viene e chi va. Immigrati in Sardegna*. Milano, Franco Angeli, 2002. 250 p.

L'Italia è ancora un Paese di emigrazione? Verrebbe da rispondere di no. Il dibattito pubblico, politico e, in larghissima parte, anche quello scientifico si misurano ormai quasi quotidianamente con la presenza degli immigrati stranieri nelle regioni italiane. Eppure alcune di queste continuano ad essere terre di emigrazione, per quanto ciò accada in maniera carsica e si esprima in modalità e dimensioni differenti rispetto al passato. Il testo in oggetto, come recita il titolo, fa riferimento anche all'emigrazione ma si occupa in particolare degli immigrati in Sardegna.

Marco Zurru, ricercatore di Sociologia Economica presso l'Università di Cagliari, prende le mosse dall'osservazione dei movimenti emigratori che riguardano – o hanno riguardato – tanto l'Italia quanto la Sardegna. Ciò che ha destato il nostro interesse non è tanto il riferimento alle dimensioni e caratteristiche dell'emigrazione italiana e degli effetti, non irrisori, prodotti (a seconda delle stime, si tratta di 60-70 milioni di oriundi e di 4 milioni di italiani con cittadinanza). Piuttosto, costituisce un invito a tenere ancora presente che il fenomeno emigratorio isolano è ancora in atto e, sebbene coinvolga una quota, pur modesta, di soggetti e di giovani, costituisce una perdita di risorse umane, visto che a partire sono principalmente persone qualificate, che lo scarso livello del mercato del lavoro sardo non riesce ad impiegare in maniera consona alle aspettative.

Più recente è invece il fenomeno dell'immigrazione straniera in Sardegna. I primi flussi verso hanno avuto inizio circa 15 anni fa e, secondo i dati del Ministero dell'Interno, alla fine del 2000 gli stranieri presenti erano circa 11 mila, largamente concentrati nelle province di Cagliari (6 mila) e di Sassari (4 mila), territori che dimostrano una forte capacità attrattiva.

L'utilizzazione delle fonti anagrafiche permette all'A. di prendere in esame altri due aspetti: la provenienza nazionale e la distri-

buzione per genere. Come già rimarcato dagli studi sull'immigrazione in Italia, una delle caratteristiche del modello nazionale è costituita dall'ampio ventaglio dei paesi di provenienza. Non fa eccezione la Sardegna, motivo per cui Zurru parla di *frammentazione dell'immigrazione*: gli immigrati residenti arrivano infatti da 130 nazioni, con le comunità marocchina, senegalese, ex jugoslava, polacca, albanese, cinese e filippina ai primi posti per consistenza numerica.

La lettura della composizione del flusso migratorio isolano sotto il profilo di genere presenta poi maggiore articolazione, con differenze sostanziali in base alle provenienze. In Sardegna, la componente femminile costituisce in media il 41% della popolazione straniera. Se consideriamo la provenienza femminile dai paesi a forte pressione migratoria, questa si riduce al 38,7%, mentre quella dai paesi sviluppati arriva al 56%. Sono i flussi provenienti dall'America Latina, dall'Asia e dall'Europa Orientale ad essere caratterizzati da elevate percentuali di donne (rispettivamente del 60%, del 46% e del 75%), mentre, all'opposto, i nord-africani, i subsahariani e i mediorientali hanno una popolazione a prevalenza maschile (le donne in questi gruppi sono il 25%, 15,4%, 23,9%).

A partire da una schematizzazione tripartita, che comprende il lavoro irregolare dipendente (inclusa l'occupazione di tipo occasionale e stagionale, quella semi-continuativa e quella stabile e continuativa), il lavoro irregolare indipendente (che comprende l'autoimpiego di rifugio e l'inserimento promozionale) e il lavoro coatto (in azienda e quello nella prostituzione), l'A. indaga l'inserimento degli immigrati nel mercato del lavoro regionale. «La prima tipologia sembra la meno presente nel contesto isolano e, invero, caratterizzare in modo più forte le realtà del Centro e del Nord Italia: qui la crescita dell'occupazione nell'industria rappresenta un nodo importante nell'evoluzione del fenomeno» (p. 75). Gli immigrati dipendenti da imprese sarde erano, infatti, alla fine del 1999, solamente 161. Di tutt'altra consistenza è il numero degli stranieri nel lavoro domestico, il principale settore occupazionale, in particolare per la componente femminile. Alla fine del 1998 erano 565 gli stranieri occupati in questo segmento del mercato del lavoro: 96 uomini e 469 donne.

La seconda tipologia si articola a sua volta in due forme di occupazione: il commercio ambulante e l'imprenditorialità etnica. Mentre quest'ultima è prevalentemente svolta dalla comunità cinese, come documenta anche il saggio di Barbara Onnis, il commercio ambulante costituisce tradizionalmente la parte più visibile del lavoro degli immigrati, principalmente di quelli provenienti dal Marocco e dal Senegal. Manca purtroppo un quadro sulla terza tipologia lavorativa, di indiscusso interesse, ma che l'A. omette.

Nel volume vengono trattate poi due importanti questioni, oggetto di un continuo e talvolta controverso dibattito: la criminalità e la religione degli immigrati. Poiché la posta in gioco è elevata, visto che tali aspetti rimandano a temi più ampi che attengono alla politica culturale, sociale, giudiziaria, su questi temi si sono sviluppati

numerosi filoni di ricerca per comprenderne l'impatto sulla società ospitante. Il primo argomento viene affrontato da Maura Marras, che indaga la relazione fra criminalità e immigrazione in Sardegna. Per l'A. il fenomeno della criminalità straniera nell'isola è circoscritto e ha dimensioni contenute rispetto ad altre regioni italiane. Dai dati veniamo a sapere che, a fine 1999, la popolazione carceraria presente nei 12 istituti ammontava a 1.573 persone, a fronte di una capienza complessiva di 1.600 posti. Nel periodo 1995-1999 si è registrata una complessiva diminuzione dei detenuti, da 2.367 a circa 1.500, mentre è rimasto immutato il numero di quelli immigrati (334).

Osservando le comunità immigrate maggiormente coinvolte e l'incidenza dei principali reati, troviamo che «1/5 dei denunciati proviene dai Paesi dell'Unione Europea; per quanto riguarda il resto dell'Europa, è cresciuto il peso di coloro che vengono dai Paesi dell'Est, in particolare dall'Albania, mentre in riferimento al continente africano appare in aumento il numero dei denunciati provenienti dagli stati del Golfo di Guinea, come il Senegal e la Nigeria» (p. 12). I reati contro il patrimonio, le violazioni delle leggi sugli stupefacenti e lo sfruttamento della prostituzione sono tra quelli in cui gli immigrati risultano maggiormente implicati.

Della religione degli immigrati tratta Patrizia Manduchi, la quale, dopo un'attenta ricostruzione del quadro generale dell'Islam in Italia, si interroga sulle prospettive e le problematiche aperte dalla presenza dei musulmani, numericamente poco rilevanti in Sardegna: alla fine del 2000 erano 5.547 (l'80% di sesso maschile), quasi la metà degli stranieri censiti nella regione. Le due comunità più numerose sono quelle dei marocchini e dei senegalesi, mentre appaiono largamente minoritarie quelle provenienti dal Medioriente, dall'Estremo Oriente, dai Paesi Balcanici e dall'Est Europa.

In conclusione, il volume contribuisce a comporre il quadro della presenza straniera in Italia, analizzando quelle differenze territoriali, che gli studi a carattere locale sempre più evidenziano; conferma, inoltre, anche a livello regionale, il passaggio epocale della società italiana, da terra di emigrazione a contesto di immigrazione, in fasi non esclusive, che vedono, come nel caso sardo, una compresenza dei due fenomeni di mobilità.

GABRIELE SOSPIRO

segnalazioni

MARIA ADRIANA BERNARDOTTI (a cura di), *Con la valigia accanto al letto. Immigrati e casa a Bologna*. Milano, Franco Angeli, 2000. 277 p.

Sono presentati in questo volume i risultati di una ricerca sulla condizione abitativa degli immigrati, vista come elemento caratterizzante il processo di integrazione, realizzata dall'Osservatorio Comunale delle Immigrazioni di Bologna, nel capoluogo ed in alcune aree della provincia negli anni 1997-1998. Due elementi in particolare sono evidenziati: da un lato il massiccio inserimento lavorativo di stranieri nei settori economici carenti di manodopera (manifattura, edilizia, agricoltura, servizi); dall'altro l'aumento dei ricongiungimenti, connessi al consolidarsi di posizioni lavorative. Ne consegue l'obsolescenza dell'ottica emergenziale destinata a uomini soli, mentre la presenza di nuclei familiari mette in luce la necessità di nuove politiche di accoglienza.

I risultati dell'inchiesta, presentati nella prima parte del libro, rilevano che almeno un terzo della popolazione immigrata versa in situazioni alleggiative precarie (strutture di accoglienza, ospitalità presso amici o parenti), mentre un immigrato su dieci si colloca nell'area del disagio abitativo e dell'esclusione. Le cause che sono alla base di questa situazione non riguardano solo le politiche abitative, ma anche i progetti migratori individuali e familiari degli immigrati. Ancor più in profondità, il passaggio da un alloggio ad una casa chiama in causa i molteplici significati dell'abitazione come spazio simbolico, rifugio di accoglienza materiale ed emotiva, luogo della vita domestica ed affettiva, ma anche spazio che delimita i contorni tra privato e pubblico. È evidente che questo spazio simbolico ha valenze diverse a seconda delle culture di provenienza: la seconda parte del libro è dedicata all'approfondimento, mediante una serie di "studi di caso" in cui vengono di volta in volta prese in considerazione le soluzioni abitative adottate dagli immigrati marocchini, dalle donne filippine, dai senegalesi e dagli albanesi. Lo studio, dal dato statistico, si allarga a considerazioni socio-antropologiche dell'abitazione, luogo che consente alla persona di ricostruire una rete di significati e di relazioni familiari, parentali, amicali, e facilitando il percorso verso l'integrazione (MG).

IAIN CHAMBERS, *Paesaggi migratori. Cultura e identità nell'epoca postcoloniale*. Roma, Meltemi, 2003. 159 p.

Il sottotitolo dà conto del taglio con cui l'Autore, esperto di Studi culturali e postcoloniali, affronta una materia non nuova: la presenza dell'*altro* non più lontano, ma improvvisamente vicino, l'incontro, non più episodico ma quotidiano, tra lingue, culture, storie, religioni diverse. Quello che l'autore cerca di mettere a fuoco è il punto di tangenza con culture "altre", che costringe le società Occidentali a ripensare i propri punti di riferimento, ad aprirsi a nuove prospettive, a trovare un nuovo "ethos".

In questo incontro con l'alterità anche il pensiero critico si trova costret-

to a nuove elaborazioni. Di fronte allo spaesamento, il razionalismo mostra il suo limite evidente: non potendo dominare quello che eccede e sfugge al ragionamento, lascia posto, nell'uomo occidentale, all'inquietudine e alla paura, rivelando così anche l'abitudine alla centralità del soggetto occidentale. La presenza di "altri" mette in questione ogni pretesa "scientificità" dal sapore conlusivo, anzi vi si inserisce un senso aperto, interdisciplinare.

L'attenzione dunque è posta sullo sradicamento, rispetto alle sicurezze acquisite, non come situazione conclusiva, ma come momento iniziale di un percorso nuovo. Si tratta, per dirla con Adorno, "di imparare a stare a casa senza sentirsi a casa, per recepire ciò che esiste oltre i nostri confini [...] In questo luogo, sospesa negli interstizi del divenire, ogni identità si trasforma da punto di arrivo in punto di partenza, lungo il percorso mondo dove ormai tutti cercano 'casa'" (p. 150). Di piacevole lettura (MG).

ENZO COLOMBO, *Le società multiculturali*. Roma, Carocci, 2002. 127 p.

MARIA OMODEO, *La scuola multiculturale*. Roma, Carocci, 2002. 125 p.

IVO COLOZZI, *Le nuove politiche sociali*. Roma, Carocci, 2002. 124 p.

Nella collana "Le Bussole", l'editore Carocci propone una serie di volumetti dedicati ad argomenti centrali nel dibattito pubblico, con il dichiarato intento di offrire ai lettori una lettura "chiara, essenziale, accurata per orientarsi nei principali temi della cultura contemporanea" (dalla presentazione). Pensati dunque come strumenti rivolti al vasto pubblico, possono essere considerati come utili guide, redatte da specialisti in materia, adatte per cogliere gli elementi principali e il quadro di riferimento degli argomenti trattati.

Enzo Colombo, curatore del volume dedicato alle società multiculturali, scandisce in sei rapidi capitoli una materia vasta e complessa, riuscendo a fornire un'idea chiara ed essenziale dei principali nuclei tematici. Delineando per sommi capi la crisi della modernità e l'emergere del tema della differenza, l'Autore rivolge l'attenzione alla polisemia del multiculturalismo, determinato sia dalle minoranze interne agli Stati-nazione sia dai flussi di immigrazione. Le sezioni successive sono dedicate agli aspetti più propriamente socio-antropologici, che richiamano il gioco delle identità nelle società postomoderne, per esaminarne poi gli intrecci e le tangenze rispetto ai principi di riferimento della democrazia, quali libertà, uguaglianza e solidarietà. L'aumentata presenza nelle scuole italiane di bambini e ragazzi provenienti da altri paesi ha aperto nuove domande, ma anche nuovi orizzonti al sistema nazionale dell'istruzione, posto di fronte ad un obiettivo per molti aspetti inedito: la necessità di garantire pari opportunità di successo a tutti e di valorizzare nel contempo le culture individuali e collettive.

Maria Omodeo, curatrice del libretto *La scuola multiculturale*, cerca di condensare in queste pagine alcune sfide poste dalla nuova situazione. Tra queste, il bilinguismo che richiede corsi di lingua madre; la pluralità all'interno delle classi che dovrebbero trasformarsi in veri e propri laboratori di rapporti interculturali. L'Autrice fornisce inoltre consigli su materiali e strategie pedagogico-didattiche finalizzate alla gestione della multiculturalità, nonché sulle figure di riferimento del mondo scolastico ed extra-scolastico. Data la complessità del tema, il testo, che appare

un po' meno compatto di quello precedente, non può che offrire cenni sui vari argomenti, come input per ulteriori approfondimenti e/o applicazioni pratiche.

Il volume dedicato a *Le nuove politiche sociali* è affidato a Ivo Colozzi. Dopo una ragionata definizione delle politiche sociali e del loro contenuto, il testo affronta la descrizione del cosiddetto "terzo settore", evidenziandone caratteristiche comuni e differenziazioni, per soffermarsi successivamente sul vitale principio di sussidiarietà e sulla programmazione sociale. Le pagine conclusive sono dedicate all'evoluzione delle politiche sociali in Italia e al rapporto con terzo settore. La scelta del tema è motivata dalle trasformazioni radicali in atto nelle società avanzate, determinate dalla globalizzazione, dall'invecchiamento della popolazione, dall'immigrazione di massa, che coinvolgono e mettono in crisi i sistemi pubblici di protezione sociale. Il libro mette in evidenza i punti di contatto del rapporto tra politiche sociali, terzo settore e reti informali, e sottolinea, difendendolo, il ruolo fondamentale del principio di sussidiarietà come elemento portante delle nuove politiche sociali (MG).

WASIM DAHAMASH, TOMMASO DI FRANCESCO, PINO BLASONE (a cura di), *La terra più amata. Voci della letteratura palestinese*. Roma, Manifestolibri, 2002. 215 p.

Le pagine di questo libro, una raccolta antologica delle opere più significative della poesia e della narrativa palestinese degli ultimi decenni, ripropongono la travagliata storia di un popolo senza terra, il cui dramma collettivo, nel valore artistico della prosa e dei versi, diviene emblema della condizione umana. Tutto il libro contiene in filigrana il tema dell'esilio e della patria, cui si intrecciano canti d'amore e di lotta, di nostalgia e di persecuzione. Ma al centro di tutte le opere troviamo il ricordo e l'amore per la terra amata, sentita come il riferimento imprescindibile alla propria identità.

La lettura di queste pagine rappresenta "una rara esperienza della mente", scrive Luce d'Eramo nell'Introduzione. Ed effettivamente è difficile sfuggire alla suggestione di questi versi e di questa prosa, testimonianza di un popolo che convive con l'esilio, la persecuzione e la morte, e ne parla con accenti epici e lirici insieme. Nell'animo di questi poeti palestinesi l'estraneità dell'esilio non è mai lamento, ma si fa desiderio di elevazione, diventa desiderio esistenziale, nella cui precarietà non si può non riconoscere la condizione comune a tutti gli uomini.

In tutto il libro si coglie un forte desiderio di vita, una necessità di futuro che relativizza il presente nella sua tragicità, come in questi versi di Tawfiq Zayyad "*Sulle macerie e sotto le macerie / sulle soglie divelte delle case / e sopra i pali della luce, / e sui rami di alberi infocati, / e nei vicoli arati dai carri, è veloce il passaggio delle cose*". La raccolta è completata da un'appendice con i profili degli autori e dei traduttori, con indicazioni bibliografiche ed una scheda sulla cultura palestinese (MG).

GIORGIO FILIBECK, *I diritti dell'uomo nell'insegnamento della Chiesa. Da Giovanni XXIII a Giovanni Paolo II*. Roma, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2001. 951 p.

Curato da G. Filibeck per il Pontificio Consiglio della Giustizia e della

Pace, il volume si presenta come una raccolta sistematica dei testi del Magistero conciliare e pontificio sui diritti dell'uomo, a partire dal 1958, data di inizio del pontificato di Giovanni XXIII, il primo papa che ha fatto riferimento alla Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti dell'Uomo, adottata dalle Nazioni Unite nel 1948. La raccolta, che non intende essere esaustiva, ha privilegiato la scelta dei documenti più significativi, "limitandosi agli aspetti che hanno maggiormente attirato l'attenzione e che permettono di avere una visione d'insieme abbastanza equilibrata" (Introduzione).

Una breve presentazione di ogni documento ed alcuni rimandi bibliografici, completati dall'argomentazione teologica che sta alla base dei vari interventi del Magistero, rendono possibile "*far parlare i testi*", creando un vero e proprio *corpus* che rende ragione dell'attenzione che il Magistero ha dedicato a questo tema, mediante un approccio specifico. Concepito per la consultazione, il volume è completato da diversi indici analitici molto accurati, che costituiscono un valido strumento ed aiuto per la ricerca (MG).

MELANIA G. MAZZUCCO, *Vita*. Milano, Rizzoli Editore, 2003. 398 p.

È libro costruito sull'esistenza e i fatti concreti, sulle vicende di persone che vivendo la quotidianità danno forma alla loro storia. Sembra un romanzo epico, che narra di un viaggio nel tempo, dove i personaggi sono ben definiti, perché sono realmente esistiti: è un racconto vero e questa verità è schiacciante e disarmante. Alla fine rimane la forte sensazione di un'eco che non può svanire, perché in questa storia non finisce è come se ci fossero le pagine di un giornale di ieri e di oggi. "Vita" racconta la storia di persone che non si sono volute arrendere, la disperazione che vivevano ogni giorno e che le ha spinte a reagire con un taglio netto alla quotidianità drammatica fatta di miseria, di morte e di abbandono. È una lotta che si intraprende contro la schiavitù: quella vissuta nella terra natia e in quella dove si sbarca.

La realtà dell'emigrazione è contrastante: carica di speranza e piena di illusioni. Il personaggio principale, Diamante, nel libro distrugge il mito dell'America dicendo che non esiste, almeno come mondo dove l'arricchimento è facile, onesto e senza sforzo; ciò che si conquista viene pagato, sudato, riscattato e lascia un segno indelebile. "Ricordati di ricordare": un ammonimento, un appello, ripetuto più volte nel libro.

Il romanzo prende forma attraverso gli occhi e la mente dei due ragazzini italiani che si imbarcano per l'America. Vivono questa partenza come un'avventura che sentono piena di promesse e colpi di scena. Lo sbarco a New York non è dei più accoglienti, ma i due non si arrendono: sono arrivati alla prima meta, pensano alle meraviglie che scopriranno. Trovato alloggio nella pensione tenuta dal padre di Vita, stentano a credere al degrado che li accoglie, ma neanche questo li distoglie dalla convinzione che sono sbarcati in un posto che promette soldi e felicità, da conquistare facilmente. Saranno coinvolti nella vita e nelle peripezie di tanti altri come loro, emigrati che cercano di arrangiarsi per sopravvivere.

Il racconto si snoda fra mille personaggi, mille tentativi, la storia è divertente, malinconica, dolorosa, fatta di tradimenti, abbandoni e sconfitte che non spengono la voglia di arrivare ad una meta, non cancellano la speranza, l'allegria e la sete di avven-

tura. Diamante, il protagonista, dopo innumerevoli tentativi si accorge che l'America sognata, descritta non esiste, a lui ha tolto tutto: salute, sogni e l'amore della sua "vita". L'America sperata e cercata per lui non c'è, ritorna in Italia perché crede nella libertà, nella sua capacità di poter costruire una vita diversa nonostante tutto. Tutti vanno in America per rincorrere il sogno di una vita diversa e perché, corre voce tra i molti avventurosi, che nella Costituzione americana un articolo assicura a tutti il diritto di essere felici (Luigia Tosoni).

MASSIMILIANO MELILLI, *Malati di confine. Diario di viaggio tra i migranti*. Roma, DeriveApprodi, 2002. 138 p.

L'Autore, giornalista e scrittore, raccoglie in questo volumetto "fatti di cronaca, grumi di realtà, storie di migrazioni, un giro di vite sospese: per dire di un mondo sempre in movimento, in bilico tra presente e futuro". Una ventina di racconti costituiscono nell'insieme un reportage che ha per oggetto l'aspetto tragico della migrazione, soprattutto di clandestini, esuli e profughi. L'intento dell'Autore è quello di reagire alle notizie flash dei giornali, rapide e superficiali, quasi sempre legate alla cronaca nera. Propone quindi un servizio più ampio e circostanziato, come un viaggio, per raccontare dal di dentro "ai cittadini comuni [...] fatti accaduti e realtà inesplorate". La prima e più consistente sezione è dedicata ad aspetti dell'immigrazione in Italia, seguono cinque capitoletti dedicati all'Europa, per finire con "Tre storie dal mondo".

Nonostante le buone intenzioni, a nostro parere il libro resta giornalistico, sia nella scelta degli argomenti sia nello stile locutorio e immediato, nella prosa paratattica e spezzata, con l'intento di creare un tono drammatico, ma, a nostro parere, il tutto non riesce troppo a discostarsi dal reportage di cronaca (MG).

PAOLA SACCHI, PIER PAOLO VIAZZO (a cura di), *Più di un Sud. Studi antropologici sull'immigrazione a Torino*. Milano, Franco Angeli, 2003. 192 p.

Non a caso Torino è scelta dai curatori come campo di un'indagine in chiave antropologica: Torino infatti è una città dove la recente immigrazione dal Sud del mondo è stata preceduta da un'imponente immigrazione dal sud italiano e quindi presenta caratteristiche particolarmente interessanti per riflessioni di carattere generale circa la presenza di immigrati e i loro comportamenti. Il libro infatti non si concentra solo sulla recentee immigrazione da altri paesi, ma considera anche le conseguenze della precedente migrazione interna. Esaminando, ad esempio, le strategie di costruzione del sentimento etnico padano, vengono colti i mutamenti del bersaglio del pregiudizio, passato dal meridionale all'extracomunitario negli ultimi venti anni.

L'ampia introduzione firmata dai curatori, fornisce le coordinate essenziali per inquadrare il "caso Torino" e discute i principali aspetti metodologici e teorici dell'antroplogia delle migrazioni.

A motivo di questa specificità, il volume può essere molto utile per uno studio serio ed approfondito di questioni importanti legati all'immigrazione. Si presta quindi come strumento utile a livello accademico, ma anche per la formazione e l'aggiornamento di operatori sociali (MG).

rassegna delle riviste

WEI WEI DA, *Gender relations in recent Chinese migration to Australia*, «Asian and Pacific Migration Journal», (12), 3, 2003, pp. 361-384.

L'autrice si propone di contribuire a colmare quella che ritiene essere una lacuna nello studio dei flussi migratori provenienti dalla Repubblica Popolare Cinese. In particolare, viene esaminato il caso della comunità residente a Sidney, città che raccoglie oltre la metà della popolazione cinese in Australia. Lo studio si è svolto tra il 1997 e il 1998, su un campione di individui (uomini e donne in proporzione quasi uguale) arrivati tra il 1980 e i primi anni novanta (quindi, residenti nel Paese da almeno un decennio). La metodologia applicata prevedeva domande aperte e interviste in profondità, così da tracciare la biografia, storia ed esperienza di ciascuno – anche questo, sottolinea l'autrice, è un elemento che attribuisce allo studio un valore aggiunto, visto che l'approccio narrativo non è così popolare tra i cinesi e c'è comunque molta diffidenza al riguardo.

Il saggio si snoda attraverso una prima parte generale che colloca il caso-studio all'interno del più ampio contesto dei flussi recenti Cina-Australia, per poi passare alle caratteristiche del campione in oggetto e infine elencare alcuni punti chiave che emergono dall'indagine. Tra questi, preponderante l'aspetto dell'analisi di genere; si rileva, ad esempio, che le strategie di integrazione delle donne risultano più flessibili ed efficaci, e che anche i ruoli all'interno del nucleo familiare sono più "variabili" di quanto prevedano le teorie tradizionali. L'approfondimento sulle dinamiche di genere e all'interno del nucleo familiare evidenzia la necessità di un approccio che tenga conto del contesto socio-culturale e di classe dei migranti, con riferimento sia al Paese d'origine sia a quello di destinazione.

VAL COLIC-PEISKER, FARIDA TILBURY, *"Active" and "passive" resettlement: the influence of support services and refugees' own resources on resettlement style*, «International Migration», (41), 5, 2003, pp. 61-91.

MORTON BEISER, LAURA SIMICH, NALINI PANDALANGAT, *Community in distress: mental health needs and help-seeking in the Tamil community in Toronto*, «International Migration», (41), 5, 2003, pp. 233-245.

Con i due articoli qui segnalati si intende sollevare l'attenzione sulla nuova proposta editoriale di *International Migration*, che prevede un nucleo di contributi su una certa tematica scelta ("cluster") e l'aggiunta di una sezione dedicata alla "ricerca emergente".

Il saggio di Peisker e Tilbury appartiene proprio al cluster proposto in questo numero, sul tema dell'integrazione di rifugiati e migranti – gli altri contributi in collezione raccolgono studi empirici su comunità etniche diverse (brasiliani, russi, bosniaci, etiopi, sudanesi, somali) in vari contesti di immigrazione (Canada, Stati Uniti, Israele, Australia). Il saggio riguarda le caratteristiche di insediamento di alcune recenti comunità di rifugiati a Perth. Vengono individuati "stili" di integrazione che presentano un approccio "attivo" (tra coloro che si pongono degli obiettivi e sfruttano le risorse disponibili) e strategie in "passivo" (situazioni di perdurante indigenza e perpetuarsi del ruolo di vittima). Questa categorizzazione è chiaramente un procedimento che astrae, partendo da dati empirici, dei "tipi ideali", e ha pertanto valore puramente illustrativo. Tuttavia, tale metodologia è utile perché aiuta ad inquadrare almeno per grandi linee l'esperienza concreta e densa di sfaccettature dell'inserimento degli immigrati nei contesti di accoglienza, così come risulta dalla dinamica di interazione fra servizi di supporto e assistenza, e mobilitazione di risorse personali. L'indagine porta a concludere e conferma – se ce ne fosse bisogno – che quanto più i servizi sono orientati all'*empowerment* (cioè, concepiti in modo da valorizzare l'attivazione e l'impiego di risorse personali) tanto più l'utente è in grado di emanciparsi ed evitare la cronicizzazione del ruolo di assistito.

Segnaliamo anche il contributo di Beiser, Simich e Pandalangat perché inaugura una nuova sezione della rivista, dal titolo *Emerging research*, che intende dare conto delle nuove linee di tendenza per quanto riguarda gli studi realizzati sui vari aspetti delle migrazioni internazionali. In particolare, questo spazio è pensato per dare visibilità a quei progetti di ricerca orientati a conoscere meglio le caratteristiche di categorie specifiche di migranti (vittime del traffico, donne, rifugiati), con il fine di influenzare lo sviluppo di politiche che abbiano un impatto "sensibile" ed efficace per garantire l'accoglienza e l'integrazione di tali soggetti. Il saggio dell'équipe di studiosi del dipartimento di psichiatria Università di Toronto rileva i bisogni di supporto psicologico presenti nella comunità di rifugiati Tamil e discute le implicazioni per l'implementazione di servizi ad hoc di promozione della salute pubblica in una società multiculturale quale il Canada.

BAUKJE PRINS, BORIS SLIJPER (eds.), *Special double issue: "Multicultural society under attack"*, «Journal of International Migration and Integration», (3), 3-4, Summer-Fall 2002, pp. 313-455.

Un dossier a tutto tondo, sul dibattito che riguarda accoglienza e integrazione in cinque paesi europei – Francia, Germania, Belgio, Paesi Bassi, Norvegia – più Canada e Australia. Si parte dalla considerazione che il multiculturalismo nelle sue varie forme appare oggi

"sotto attacco" in ognuno dei diversi contesti nazionali esaminati. E siccome – spiegano i curatori – il dibattito pubblico non già meramente discute la società multiculturale, bensì ha un'influenza reale e concreta sulla medesima, allora una ricerca sistematica comparativa trova la sua ragion d'essere. In tal senso, si tratta di una collezione di ricerca "militante", fondata sull'approccio socio-costruttivista e sull'analisi delle pratiche discorsive di tradizione foucauldiana: il linguaggio non solo descrive simbolicamente la realtà, ma la costituisce nella sua dimensione materiale.

Nel complesso, emergono ovunque 5 temi portanti attorno cui ruota il confronto nella sfera pubblica: lo "scontro di civiltà"; diversità etnica e identità nazionale; la collocazione socioeconomica degli immigrati; le politiche di accoglienza e asilo; il "dibattito sul dibattito", ossia quello che può e non può essere detto, e perché. Quest'ultimo punto offre spunti che rivelano la grande complessità della questione: il *politically correct*, per esempio, appare una strategia usata tanto dalla destra quanto dalla sinistra e – nelle parole degli autori – "in ciascun Paese, in ogni dibattito all'interno dei confini nazionali, troviamo molti esempi di posizioni anomale, abnormali: immigrati xenofobi, musulmani *politically INcorrect*, e perfino realisti progressisti". Con questa complessità ci si deve misurare, sembra, da Canberra a Ottawa passando per Parigi.

FRANCK SENSELME, *Destins de migrants et constitution du sujet*, «Migrations Société», XV, 90, novembre-décembre 2003, pp. 9-35.

Un saggio che si fa notare per il carattere, per così dire, "minimalista" – si tratta di uno zoom su una dimensione intima e singolare quale quella della costruzione dell'identità soggettiva. L'autore è un sociologo dell'Università di Rennes II, ma il suo approccio è certamente al confine con l'antropologia.

Non vi sono dati statistici, campionature e nessuna pretesa di generalizzazione: "solo" le storie di vita di 9 stranieri da tempo immigrati in Francia, provenienti da Paesi culturalmente non distanti (Regno Unito, Croazia, Spagna, Portogallo, Madagascar), e residenti nella regione bretone. Un target poco rappresentativo – basti pensare che solo il 3% della popolazione straniera in Francia vive in zone rurali. Sanselme lavora con l'intento di provare a tracciare una tipologia esplorativa della costruzione di soggettività come appare in una realtà forse periferica, meno "esotica" di quel che ci si aspetti, ma forse per questo ancor più interessante nel contesto assimilazionista francese. Il saggio individua tre dinamiche fondamentali nel comportamento di chi immigra (ed è al contempo, come viene giustamente sottolineato, un e-migrante): c'è chi sviluppa un tipo di soggettività "di opposizione", che si scontra con il sistema in modo quasi sempre inefficace, e finisce per auto-confinarsi in una dimensione di

chiusura nella sfera domestica-privata. All'inverso, c'è che si conforma il più possibile, soprattutto in una logica di riuscita economica, e qui il problema risulta essere una alienazione del soggetto rispetto alle persone della sua stessa comunità di origine, e la riduzione al puro "ruolo sociale". Infine, c'è il "doppio straniero", cioè colui che si pone "a metà strada" tra contesto di nascita e società ospitante.

Nessuna di queste dinamiche è definitiva e immutabile. Resta da vedere – suggerisce l'autore – come e fino a che punto la soggettività migrante trova espressione negli spazi di azione pubblica e sociale, ad esempio attraverso l'associazionismo.

OLIVIER CLOCHARD, ANTOINE DECOURCELLE, CHLOÉ INTRAND, *Zones d'attente et demande d'asile à la frontière: le reinforcement des contrôles migratoires*, «Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales», (19), 2, 2003, pp. 157-189.

Articolo pubblicato come "nota di attualità" in calce al secondo volume, anno 2003, della rivista – il cui corpus principale, che qui vale la pena almeno citare, è costituito dall'interessante dossier su "Iniziative degli immigrati e nuove forme di cosmopolitismo".

Scegliamo di segnalare specificamente il contributo su "Zone di trattenimento e domanda d'asilo alla frontiera: il rinforzo dei controlli migratori", sia per l'appropriatezza del tema, che è di grande attualità, sia per l'accuratezza con cui l'articolo è presentato – statistiche aggiornate, mappe, grafici e tabelle, bibliografia, allegato normativo. I tre autori esaminano i dati raccolti dall'associazione Anafè, che dal 1989 rappresenta i numerosi organismi a vario titolo impegnati nella tutela dei diritti degli stranieri che accedono al territorio (dai sindacati, a France Terre d'Asile, ad Amnesty International) e che ha accesso alla zona di trattenimento presso l'aeroporto internazionale Charles De Gaulle a Roissy. È, questo, un osservatorio privilegiato, dal momento che vi si registra la quasi totalità delle domande d'asilo presentate in frontiera (il 98% nel 2002).

Una prima parte dell'articolo si sofferma sull'evoluzione della normativa vigente e sulle procedure previste. Poi, gli autori passano in esame alcuni casi di domande d'asilo giudicate come "manifestamente infondate", a seguito delle quali viene notificato un provvedimento di rimpatrio immediato verso il Paese d'origine: il numero dei richiedenti non ammessi sul territorio era del 40% nel '95, 80% nel 2001, 97,6% nel 2003. Questi dati evidenziano (nel caso francese, come in altri contesti europei) che il diritto d'asilo viene di fatto sempre più condizionato dalle esigenze dettate dalla politica di contrasto all'immigrazione clandestina, e che si adottano prassi restrittive con l'obiettivo di lanciare "segnali forti" agli Stati di provenienza.

a cura di SABINA ELEONORI

LIBRI RICEVUTI*

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* Non è possibile dar conto delle molte opere che ci pervengono. Ne diamo intanto un annuncio sommario, che non comporta alcun giudizio, e ci riserviamo di tornarvi sopra secondo le possibilità e lo spazio disponibile.

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