Migration into Southern Europe: new trends and new patterns
edited by Russell King

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Introduction

This special issue of Studi Emigrazione presents a collection of nine papers on a variety of new immigration phenomena in Southern Europe. Some of the papers refer to individual countries, even cities; others are comparative. Many of the papers are by young scholars and derive from their recent or ongoing doctoral field research in the region. And several articles are by authors who are, or have been, connected to the Sussex Centre for Migration Research and the Sussex European Institute, both part of the University of Sussex, UK. The methodological approaches range from overviews and interpretations of statistics and policy to ethnographic enquiry at the local level.

Whilst not covering all aspects of the diverse migratory phenomenon in the region, the papers do collectively attempt to represent some of that diversity, both thematically and with respect to geographical coverage. After two overview papers (King and Ribas-Mateos; Baldwin-Edwards) which examine statistics, types and contexts of migration, and policy responses, the sequence of papers moves from Lisbon through Spain (Granada, Barcelona) to Italy and then Greece. Appropriately, given the strongly gendered nature of immigration into Southern Europe, two papers (Dietz and El-Shohoumi; Zontini) explicitly focus on the migration, family, work and intercultural experiences of women. And as the immigration into Southern Europe moves into its "mature" phase with children born and educated in the host society, so it is timely that one of the articles explicitly addresses the question of multicultural education (Grassilli). The urban geographical context receives specific attention in a detailed case-study on the spatial impact of immigrants in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (Fonseca). Moving to the Balkan end of Southern Europe, the final three papers examine three very different migratory episodes: the mass migration of the 1990s from Albania (King and Mai), the return of second-generation Greek-Americans to Greece (Christou), and the post-1990 resettlement of Pontian Greeks from the former Soviet Union (Keramida).
This collection of papers cannot possibly claim to be the last word on new migration trends in Southern Europe. The articles represent a sample of research and documentation on a region whose migratory patterns are continuously evolving and changing. Not every country is covered: the first thorough research on Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia remains to be done. But one thing is clear: the countries of Southern Europe continue to provide nowadays, as they did in the past, one of the most fertile terrains for the study of human migration in all its richness and diversity of forms.

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Towards a diversity of migratory types and contexts in Southern Europe

Introduction

The notion of Southern Europe as an ensemble of countries sharing a number of distinct characteristics is perhaps controversial but there is a growing recognition of a common “southern” or “Mediterranean” identity to Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal (Loughlin, 1994). These are the four countries which are the focus of this article, and which are covered by the papers that follow in this collection. They are, of course, the four southern EU states and, most importantly, they share a common migration experience, having transited from a past status as countries of mass emigration to a recent phase of large-scale immigration.

The purpose of this paper is to “set the scene”. We do this by dividing our analysis into three parts: a brief and broadly chronological account of the evolution of migratory flows out of, within, and into the region; a categorisation of the diversity of migratory and mobility types which are observable in the contemporary Southern European migration scene; and a more detailed and in-depth analysis of the contexts framing the recent yet now well-established status of the Southern European countries as a major world region of immigration. These contexts involve setting out an explanatory framework or model that sees immigration set within a triadic relationship with major social and economic processes, in particular a weak and familistic welfare state, and a dynamic and constantly evolving informal economy.

1 According to Loughlin, the boundaries of Southern Europe include Malta and Cyprus. Some might include the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, plus Albania and, more speculatively, Turkey; even more problematic is the categorisation of France as a Southern European or Mediterranean country. For more discussion on this see King et al. (2001).
We also introduce the eight papers which make up the rest of this special issue of the journal. Rather than summarising each paper (this is not necessary since each paper carries its own summary), our aim is to “touch base” with each paper by relating its detailed empirical content to the general and theoretical overview we offer in the present paper.

Migration history

It hardly needs stressing that Southern Europe, and the wider Mediterranean region, have had a long engagement with migration, due largely to a common history of poverty and overpopulation. As Leontidou (1990, p. 2) has eloquently put it, the people of the region “have long had their own ways of confronting poverty and exploitation, above all by migration: hence they travelled, escaped from the overcrowded countryside, invaded the cities, emigrated, returned, and through all this survived with dignity.” Although there are notable inter-country (and even inter-regional) differences, this migratory history divides into two major epochs of emigration set against a background of more or less continuous internal, rural–urban migration. First, we have an earlier period, from the 19th century to the mid-20th century, when most of the emigration was overseas and transoceanic, mainly to the Americas. Second, there is a more recent epoch, lasting from the 1950s to the 1970s, when an intense emigration took place to Northern Europe.

Within these two broad migratory eras, important variations can be noted between the four sending countries. Spanish emigration has a deeper colonial history and is oriented overwhelmingly, in its earlier phase, to South and Central America. Portuguese emigration, likewise, is shaped by its powerful colonial history, with Brazil and its African colonies as key destinations. Italians emigrated to both North and South America (especially to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela); Greeks almost exclusively to North America, up to the 1950s, that is.\(^2\)

\(^2\) There were migrations from Spain and Portugal to North America but they were relatively minor strands in the overall pattern. One interesting example is the migration from the Azores to New England and California in the second half of the 19th century (Williams and Fonseca, 1999); another is the migration of Basque shepherds.

\(^3\) Once again some significant, if less quantitatively important, flows can be noted. Both Greeks and Italians migrated in quite large numbers to Australia; and both Italy and Greece were involved in colonial/mercantile migrations to North and North-East Africa – to Libya, Ethiopia and Somalia (Italians), and to Egypt and Ethiopia (Greeks).
During the early postwar period some of these long-range migrations continued, but the key feature of Southern European emigration since the early 1950s was its European orientation. Portuguese and Spaniards migrated mainly to France, and Greeks mainly to West Germany. Italians had a wider range of European destinations — France, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom.  

This potted migration history and geography provides the backdrop to the rather extraordinary and unanticipated "migration turnaround" that occurred in the countries of Southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s (King et al., 1997). This turnaround was the statistical product of three distinct, though not entirely unconnected, migration variables: the rapid decline in emigration; the behaviour of return migrant flows; and — eventually the most important variable — the rapid and accelerating growth across the 1980s and 1990s of immigration from a remarkable diversity of new source countries.

Of the Southern European countries, Greece is the one in which the decline in emigration was fastest over the 1970s and early 1980s — and also the one where immigration (though much of it undocumented) grew fastest in the 1990s. With a population of about 10 million, Greece had an estimated 350,000 migrants elsewhere in Europe in 1987, 100,000 fewer than 15 years earlier. Greek migrants remain concentrated mainly in Germany (300,000 Greek residents), with other European countries playing a marginal role (Fakiolas and King, 1996). Not to be overlooked, however, are the substantial Greek, or Greek-origin, communities in the United States and Australia. Return migration has been taking place from virtually all places in the Greek diaspora, including the so-called “Pontian” Greeks from Asia Minor and the former Soviet Union. Two papers in the collection pick up on these processes of “return”: Christou on second-generation Greek-Americans, and Keramida on the Pontians. In both cases there are doubts and ambiguities over exactly how to label and theorise the “return” to Greece.

Emigration from Spain has been on a different level to that from Greece because in absolute (but not relative) terms it was on a larger scale, and because the tradition of Spanish migration has its roots a long way back in Spanish colonial history, as noted above. However, now too, the Spanish propensity to emigrate has sharply faded, and has been falling for the past 28 years. The sudden drop in outflow beginning in 1974 demonstrated the effect of the restrictive policies

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4 These generalisations too need brief embellishment. There has been some Spanish and Portuguese migration to Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, and Greek migration to Belgium and the Netherlands.
adopted in the various European host countries in the wake of the first oil crisis, whilst the growth and modernisation of the Spanish economy since the 1960s has reduced the need to emigrate. Curiously, however, the Spanish unemployment rate has remained significantly higher than elsewhere in Southern Europe. Yet this has not stimulated further emigration, nor has it prevented immigration from taking place. The reasons for this paradox will be explained later.

Italian migration trends have followed broadly the same patterns noted for Greece and Spain: a steady decline in emigration; a continuing flow of returning migrants, though at a lower level than during the 1970s; and a constant build-up of immigrants living, working and ultimately settling in the country. Italian emigration in the postwar decades peaked in the 1960s and was already declining well before the oil shock of the early-mid 1970s. Annual departure statistics tell the story: 329,000 Italian emigrants left in 1961, 200,000 in 1970, only 85,000 in 1983. After 1983 departures declined more slowly. Now the significance of Italian emigration is limited; many of those who leave do so for professional or business reasons. What remain, however, are significant and continuing internal migratory flows, mainly between the South, or Mezzogiorno, and the North-Centre (Bonifazi, 1999). The Italian case is also important because in many respects it has been the harbinger of trends later to be observed across the Southern European region. Moreover, most of the migratory trends and forms found in the other countries are represented to a greater or lesser extent in Italy. Italy displays, for instance, the greatest range and diversity of emigration destinations, and of immigrant origin countries. For these reasons we can regard it as the paradigmatic case of Southern Europe migration. Three papers in the sequence that follows deal with aspects of recent immigration to Italy: King and Mai examine the post-1990 Albanian influx in the context of myths and stereotypes, Grassilli looks at multicultural education in the context of the now-maturing second generation of immigrants’ children, and Zontini compares the social and work dynamics of Filipino and Moroccan women’s migration to Bologna and Barcelona.

Finally, Portugal is a country where emigration constitutes a profound structural element of its society and economy. Within Europe perhaps only Ireland has been so deeply affected by such a long tradition of emigration overseas. But Portugal’s emigration patterns (and immigration too) have been shaped more than anything else by its existence as a colonial metropole, as Fonseca points out in her paper.

Hence, as mentioned above, emigration has been to Brazil, Angola and Mozambique as well as to Europe. Today those who live abroad (4 million) can be compared to the 10 million who reside in Portugal; of the emigrants, nearly 1 million are in Europe.

We now move to some more general remarks on the recent phase of immigration into the Southern European region. The key underlying structural factor behind the migration reversal has been the region’s recent economic transformation, as Baldwin-Edwards emphasises in more detail in the next chapter. Before the 1970s, Southern Europe seemed to be stranded somewhere between the advanced industrial economies of North-West Europe and the less developed parts of the world. The region still suffered from the economic, social and political legacies of the past: modernisation stifled by the survival of what were seen as archaic social traditions; a heritage of fascism and dictatorship (less so in Italy, where fascism collapsed at the end of the war); and an economic structure based on small, inefficient farms and a non-existent or incomplete industrialisation. Starting first in Northern Italy in the 1960s, by the mid-1980s a profound economic transformation had taken place in all four countries, the political culmination of which was the accession of Greece (in 1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) to the European Community. Today, the Southern European region is clearly identified and understood under the rubric of European integration and its regional dynamics and growth axes. As against the classic “blue banana” of the Rhinelands and the Paris–London–Amsterdam triangle, since 1992 the EU has identified other, more southern growth zones. Geographers speak of a “southern sunbelt” or “Latin arc” whose linear core curves from Tuscany across southern France to the Spanish Levante (see Dunford and King, 2001). Apart from its geographical coherence, this development axis is defined by its coastal landscapes, regional dynamics, urban and business traditions, pleasant environment and lifestyles, Latin-based languages and Catholic culture. It is also a region which is demographically and socially distinct, with ageing populations, very low birth rates, and highly educated cohorts of working population. This picture is not the whole story, however. Greece stands somewhat apart: detached geographically and not sharing all of the features listed above. And there is marked heterogeneity within the Southern European region, with significant pockets of deprivation and retarded development, for instance in Epirus, the northern Aegean, Calabria, south-west Spain, the Alentejo and the Azores—all amongst the least-developed areas of the EU.

6 So-called because on satellite images the belt of dense settlement, transport axes and industries defined by this area showed up blue.
We shall analyse selected aspects of this economic and social transformation with a little more finesse in the final section of the paper. For now we just want to signal once again the fact that, despite the region’s economic heterogeneity, this advancement in prosperity provides the key to understanding the attractiveness of Southern Europe to immigrants during the 1980s and 1990s. The pioneer Southern European country for immigration was Italy where, already in the 1970s, communities of new immigrants came to be established – Tunisians, Moroccans, Filipinos, Somalis, Ethiopians/Eritreans and Cape Verdeans. More or less right from the beginning, these Italian “new immigrations” were characterised by a series of fundamental elements: the large number, and diversity, of the origin countries; the marked female domination of some of the flows (e.g. Cape Verdeans, Filipinos); the dynamic role of the informal economy; the uncontrolled and hence “illegal” nature of the inflows; and a high concentration of immigrants in the tertiary sector. These distinguishing features have applied to a greater or lesser extent to the subsequent evolution of the migration influxes, both in Italy and the other three countries. The above-noted characteristics are replicated most closely in Spain, less closely in Greece and Portugal. In these latter two countries there are some different characteristics: the domination of lusophone migrants into Portugal coming from Brazil and the “PALOP” (Portuguese-language former colonies in Africa); and the particular role of the Greek diaspora and of neighbouring Albania for Greece, especially after 1990.

The recent immigration into Southern Europe invites two historical comparisons. The first and most obvious one is with the labour migrations of the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, when the countries of Southern Europe themselves supplied a massive migrant labour force to their economically more advanced northern neighbours. This comparison offers a distinct contrast across just a few decades. The earlier migration of Southern Europeans (and Turks, North Africans etc.) constituted a major source of industrial labour linked to the economic regime of the time – Fordism. The migrations were regulated, nearly all migrants were “legal”, and family reunion eventually followed what was in its initial stages a male worker migration. Now the general socio-economic map of Southern Europe is quite different from the earlier historic model of North European Fordism. Southern Europe exemplifies a range of post-Fordist structures (tertiarisation, flexibilisation and informalisation of the labour market, affecting above all women and young people) which parallels the chronology of the migratory changes, and which will be further explored presently.

A second historical comparison, less often made, is with internal migration within Southern European countries. King et al. (1997) pro-
pose a “South European” elaboration of the Lewis dual-sector model which functionally relates the new foreign immigration to the exhaustion of the internal supply of predominantly rural-origin labour by the 1970s. This means, first, that the former receptors of internal migrations have become destinations for foreign immigrants who are needed to work in the tertiary and industrial sectors, especially in the big cities (Rome, Milan, Turin, Barcelona, Madrid, Athens, Lisbon etc.). Thus there is a partial reproduction of the powerful interregional currents of internal migration of the 1960s: from the Italian Mezzogiorno to the “Industrial Triangle” of Northern Italy; from southern Spain to Catalonia, Madrid and the Basque region; from rural Portugal to the Lisbon Metropolitan Area; and from rural Greece to the Athens conurbation (King, 2000, p. 5). Often the foreign migrants take over the same poor-quality housing originally settled by the internal migrants of the 1960s. Second, there is also a new migration of foreign immigrants to those agricultural areas which are short of local labour because of rural depopulation and the unwillingness of local people to engage in casual farm labour: the classic example being the district of El Ejido in southern Spain.

Diversity of migratory types

The discussion thus far has been based on the assumption that migratory inflows to Southern Europe are primarily of one type – migrants arriving from poor countries to do low-paid jobs. Whilst these migrants are indeed the majority type, there are several other types of incoming migrants, and other types of mobility, which need to be acknowledged, not least because they are exemplified in some of the papers that follow. What we do in the following paragraphs is to provide an intuitive listing of the rather rich multiplicity of migratory forms which have now replaced the previously dominant emigration flows.

Logically, the first type to identify is return migration. It is almost a truism of migration studies that every (voluntary) migration generates a certain amount of return migration. Certainly this has been the case with Southern Europe. In general, rates of return from the overseas “settler” migrations (to North and South America, Australia, South Africa etc.) have been lower than those from the postwar “guest-worker” migrations which involved shorter distances and a greater degree of temporariness or “rotation”, at least in the early years of this migratory system. Nevertheless returns have come from all destinations, and for a variety of reasons, including failure of the migratory project, nostalgia, economic change (redundancy in the host country,
or improved economic prospects at home), family and life-cycle factors (to find a marriage partner, to educate children in the “home” culture, to look after aged parents, retirement etc.). The paper by Christou explores some of the complex narratives of “home” and identity surrounding Greek-Americans’ return to Greece.

There was a major wave of return migration during the 1970s consequent upon the halt to labour migration imposed by the Northern European countries and the accompanying economic downturn. Whilst there were some successes, the literature of the time reveals that many returnees had difficulty reintegrating, both economically and socially, with the result that the developmental impact of these returnees, especially in rural areas, was rather minimal (see, for instance, King et al., 1986; Rhodes, 1978).

But there are other types of return, too. One involves a kind of “ancestral return” whereby the children or descendants of the original emigrants return to their ancestral home in order to “find their roots”. Again, Christou’s paper exemplifies this, taking the case of “returning” second-generation Greek-Americans. Another subtype of return concerns the repatriation/return of the Pontian Greeks who left their Pontian homeland (in Asia Minor) to migrate outward to the Soviet Union, before being given the opportunity to “return” (to Greece) after the demise of the USSR. Keramida’s paper addresses this case. Finally, Southern Europe contains one large-scale instance of forced return: the repatriation of Portuguese colonial settlers at the time of the independence of the colonies in 1974. Upwards of half a million retornados, many of whom had never set foot before in Portugal, were resettled during the mid-1970s, for the most part fairly successfully although not without some initial painful readjustment (Lewis and Williams, 1985).

We now move on to the dominant type in the discourse on new immigrants in Southern Europe – these are the labour migrants who have arrived from virtually all parts of the developing world and in increasing numbers over the past 25 years. To call them labour migrants is perhaps partly a misnomer since, unlike the Southern European labour migrants of the 1950s and 1960s, they have not, in most cases, been formally recruited to do specific jobs. Rather they are job-seeking migrants, arriving adventitiously and looking for almost any kind of job that will give them a better income than their poor economic state at home. As Baldwin-Edwards points out in the next article, these migrants have come from a wide range of source countries across the globe. Some of the most intense flows are from nearby Mediterranean Basin countries: Tunisians to Sicily, Moroccans to Spain and Italy, Albanians to Greece and Italy. In other cases the links are cultural and linguistic: Brazilians and PALOP migrants to Portugal, Latin Ameri-
cans to Spain, Somalis and Ethiopians to Italy. The Catholic religion provides a broader affective and structural link for many immigrant groups – for instance those from the Philippines, Cape Verde or Latin American countries. But there are also several cases where geographical, cultural, linguistic or religious proximities simply do not appear to operate – this is so with migrants coming from West Africa (Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria), South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) and, even further afield, China.

These migrant groups (and many more too numerous to mention) are further differentiated by their gender distribution, the jobs they do, their history of migration and their countries and regions of arrival and settlement. These cross-cutting categorisations make for a complicated mosaic of migrant settlement across the South European region. A few generalisations can be made (but there are always exceptions). Nationalities whose migrants are predominantly male tend to be from Muslim countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Bangladesh). However, particularly amongst the long-established Moroccan communities, family reunion is now well developed, and some Muslim women (chiefly from North Africa and Somalia) are migrating independently – see Zontini’s account of Moroccan women in Bologna and Barcelona in this issue. In fact, amongst Moroccan migration flows to Italy and Spain, independent female migration was established more or less right from the start – unlike the earlier experience of Moroccan emigration to France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The main female-dominated migration nationalities are the Filipinos and most Latin American groups (e.g. from Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic). These migrants tend to work overwhelmingly in the domestic service sector, some branching out into hospital and care work. These stereotypically female jobs are also being accessed by women from male-dominant nationalities (e.g. Moroccans) and those from sex-balanced communities (e.g. Albanians, Poles). The papers by Zontini (on Bologna and Barcelona) and by Dietz and El-Shohoumi (on Granada) provide some telling details about the harsh and difficult lives of female domestic worker migrants in Southern Europe, many of whom are exploited because of their “irregular” status and their presence in the “black” economy. Migrants’ reciprocal relationship with the informal sector of the economy will be analysed in the final section of the paper, where some further examples of migrant job specialisms will be given.

Before we leave this general category of “low-status” immigrant, it is important to correct one common misconception, namely that the majority of these migrants come from poor backgrounds and have low levels of formal education. Often, quite the reverse is the case. Many have college diplomas and university degrees, and many come from
family backgrounds which, by local standards, are quite well off. Their migration project may be a chance to improve the family fortunes, but may also be a journey of adventure and self-discovery. It is a telling fact that many of these migrants are more highly educated, multilingual and worldly-wise than the Southern Europeans who end up employing, and often abusing, them.\(^7\)

Also often overlooked are the considerable numbers of professional and business migrants from Northern Europe, North America, Japan etc. who have settled mainly in the big cities of Southern Europe where multinational corporations and international organisations have offices. These high-status national groups show up quite prominently in the registered migration statistics,\(^8\) yet are rarely commented on and have been subject to no in-depth investigation, to the best of our knowledge. As a first step towards a correction of this oversight, Pascual de Sans et al. (2000) have highlighted their importance in the overall migration scene in Barcelona, and Fonseca, later in this issue, devotes some attention to them (and to Brazilians, who are a middle-ranking professional group in Portugal) in the Lisbon context.

Working-age professionals are not the only high-status, highly educated migrants from Northern Europe living in the South. Since the 1970s, following on the heels of a boom in mass tourism, Southern Europe has become a haven for international retirement migration. This form of migration, which sees wealthy retirees settle along the Mediterranean coast of Spain, in the Algarve, in the Balearic and Canary Islands, and in favoured Italian regions such as Tuscany and Umbria, has been especially popular with the British, Germans, Dutch and Scandinavians (see for instance Williams et al., 1997; King et al., 2000). Younger, working-age North European settlers are also attracted to regions like the Costa del Sol, in order to open up businesses (bars, restaurants, estate agents etc.) oriented to tourists and retirees (Madden, 1999).

Also highly educated, obviously, are university students from Northern Europe, North America etc., who spend a year or so in universities in Southern Europe – to learn the language, absorb the culture and get university credits. These student migrants are a virtually unstudied group. Whether they can be called true “migrants” is a moot point, but they come in increasing numbers to the university towns of

\(^7\) For a vindication of this point see Zinn (1994).

\(^8\) For instance the Italian register of immigrants with sojourn permits for 31 December 2000 showed the following “developed country” migrants (absolute numbers and ranks in brackets): USA (47,000, 6th), Germany (37,000, 10th), France (26,000, 16th), UK (23,000, 17th). See Caritas di Roma (2001, p. 121).
especially Spain and Italy, or spend their "gap years" between school and university working as au pairs, bartenders etc. In fact, as Bianchi (2000) and Williams et al. (2000) demonstrate, there are a range of mobilities associated with leisure, travel, residential tourism, casual working holidays etc., which bring large numbers of people from outside the region into Southern Europe for periods of time which may vary between a few weeks and a lifetime.

**Contexts for interpreting immigration to Southern Europe**

In this final part of the paper we advance our thesis about the triangular relationship between large-scale migration and two key features of the receiving-country context: the strength and dynamism of the informal economy; and the weak nature of the welfare state, historically familistic but now in crisis given the continuing lack of state structures and the declining strength of the traditional family unit. Before we tackle each of these key dimensions, and in order to be clear about the specific nature of Southern European immigration as the "dependent variable", we summarise what we see as the defining characteristics of the South European "model" of immigration. These are:

- rather sudden and spontaneous evolution of inflows since the late 1970s, and hence the unpreparedness of the receiving countries for their new status as countries of immigration, leading in turn to extreme uncertainties and delays in implementing relevant policies;
- great diversity of source countries, especially as regards Spain and Italy, again posing challenges for policy-making on reception, integration, multiculturalism etc;
- marked gender asymmetry of many migrant nationalities, with upwards of 70, 80 or even 90 per cent of either males or females; with time, however, these gender imbalances tend to become less extreme;
- diversity of social and regional origins of migrants from many source countries – by this we mean that not only are there differences between source countries, but also within them (Moroccan migration, for instance, combines poorly-educated rural migrants with an increasing proportion of highly-educated urban young people);
- high degree of "irregularity" or "clandestinity" amongst many migrant flows, partly deriving from the restrictive legal frameworks of the receiving countries and EU "fortress" policies;

*9 Here we summarise and extend the discussions in King (1998, 2000) and King et al. (1997), focusing on the main type of migration, that from poor countries of the less and semi-developed world, including Eastern Europe.*
• social marginality of most immigrant groups coming from developing countries and Eastern Europe, due at least in part to lack of policies for integration and lack of appropriate social models for migration; highly negative stereotyping of certain groups (e.g. Moroccans in Spain, Albanians in Italy);

• concentration of migrants into precarious, low-paid, “undesirable” jobs; these jobs, however, having a remarkably wide variety of sectors, niches and activities (agriculture, fishing, industry, construction, tourism, domestic service, street-hawking, sex work etc.).

From these key characteristics we can define the essential nature of the Southern European model of immigration. It is based on a demand for cheap and flexible labour, above all in the informal labour market, where low wages are paid to workers who have little or no bargaining power because of their abundance, often “irregular” or undocumented position and lack of access to alternative sources of work, in either the destination or the home countries. Immigrant workers are highly concentrated in certain segments of the labour market, some of which have come to be monopolised by migrants of one specific nationality and/or gender. As Baldwin-Edwards shows in the next paper, migrants’ vulnerability and often undocumented status are key obstacles to their integration into host societies, whilst governments’ policy response has been fragmented, inconsistent and wholly insufficient.

The labour market dimension: tertiarisation, informality and segmentation

Foreign immigration into Southern Europe is clearly related to key structural economic changes, both globally and in their specific expression within the region, seen as a “late developer” in terms of European capitalist modernisation (Mingione, 1995). Macroscopically, the main economic changes are those affecting most parts of the advanced capitalist world in the late-capitalist or post-Fordist era: intensification of global competition; deregulation; de-industrialisation; tertiarisation. Within Southern Europe these macro-processes are refracted onto a specific economic canvas. This model can be defined by the following characteristics: obsolete social and economic structures including a strong survival of clientelistic values (patronage, favours, kickbacks etc.); a modernisation path from a rural economy to urban-based services (with rather limited industrial development in the meantime); a gender asymmetry in these rapid sectoral employment changes; and, perhaps most characteristic of all, the important role of a dynamic informal sector. This model is typical of “late-comer” economies where family enterprises, face-to-face personal relations and self-employment are
widespread and still manage, to some extent, to resist the pressures from capitalist concentration. More than elsewhere in Europe, in the Southern European countries the "unofficial" or "informal" economy (also called "black", "submerged", "hidden", "parallel" etc.) comprises a vast and complex arena of activities centred in micro-enterprises in the traditional agricultural, artisan and service industries, which vary greatly in their geographical distribution and regional specialisation, and in their degree of innovation and transformation.

Tertiarisation is the widespread general tendency. Indeed, within the EU as a whole, for the past two decades or more, all the net additional jobs are in services.\textsuperscript{10} Hence the proportion of employment in this sector grows continuously whilst numbers employed in agriculture and industry decline. The tertiarisation of the Southern European societies, along with other socio-economic transformations, is related to the overall process of global and regional economic restructuring. This leads generally towards more productive regimes (but not without some casualties, human costs and resistances); and reinforces processes like segmentation of the labour market and the further expansion of the informal sector.

But deindustrialisation has not been the only industrial dynamic in Southern Europe in recent decades. During the 1960s and 1970s industrial development in the four countries was based both on the principle of attracting domestic and multinational capital into the sector, and on state-aided promotion of what were then seen as key industries such as steel, shipbuilding, petrochemicals etc. Internal migration, not foreign immigration, provided most of the labour for these industries. Another important component of industrial development in the region, more dominant since the 1980s, is made up of indigenous small and medium firms (Garofoli, 1992). It is important, however, to distinguish between different types of such firms, such as artisan activities, independent firms, firms tied directly into wider circuits of capitalist production via subcontracting arrangements etc., because these differences have implications for the division of labour within and between firms, notably the balance of self-employment, family work and wage labour. Small firms of all types play a major role in the processes of economic restructuring towards more flexible production and labour organisation in Southern Europe, and these in turn have implications for the employment arrangements of the "new immigrants".

Labour market segmentation may likewise function as a means towards the flexibilisation of the labour process. In periods of slack labour markets for example, employers striving for the full potential

\textsuperscript{10} For graphs and figures on these sectoral employment trends for the four Southern European countries see King and Konjhodzic (1995, pp. 18-27).
benefit of slackness try to do away with the barrier around their internal labour markets to provide for as much interchangeability with the external market as possible: less protected, low-paid jobs in the "secondary" subsector of the labour market, often occupied by foreign migrants, play a major role in helping firms' strategies to achieving different kinds of flexibility. These efforts by capital can be characterised as a strategy of "exposure", i.e. removing as far as possible obstacles and barriers to the flexibility of labour in order to benefit as much as possible from labour surplus, including the surplus generated by immigration (Losifides and King, 1996).

Hence the existence of a demand for low-skilled jobs filled now by immigrants is to be understood in the context of the broad socio-economic transformation and labour-market restructuring of Southern Europe. But there is another important element: an enhanced level of education for most indigenous young people and an overbearing sense of family prestige lead to a rejection of manual work and to a sharply-defined conception of what are regarded as "acceptable" and "unacceptable" jobs. This dualism does much to explain the paradox between high rates of unemployment in some areas (especially in Spain and Southern Italy, and often disguised by extended participation in university study), and the high immigrant presence in the region. Both the nature of the work (physically tough, sometimes dangerous, insecure, unskilled, poorly paid etc.) and its rejected stigmatisation as "degraded" makes it extremely unlikely that it will be taken up by the slack of the indigenous unemployed. The presence of immigrants in these segments and niches of the labour market only serves to further enhance the undesirability of these kinds of work. Moreover the "degradation" is total since degraded jobs in the labour market find a correspondence in the degraded housing occupied by immigrants, both in urban and in rural areas.11

Finally, in this subsection, let us mention some examples of immigrant work niches, paying attention also to ethnic and gender dimensions. Immigrants are inserted in a wide variety of sectors but, as indicated above, nearly always in marginal and low-paid jobs which are often precarious, temporary and part-time, and involve working at anti-social hours and in undesirable locations.12 Such unpleasant and

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11 Both because of market pressures and of discrimination from landlords, estate agents etc., immigrants tend to be housed in the poorest-quality accommodation. In urban areas these range from inner-city slums to peripheral shanty-towns; in rural areas barns and other dilapidated buildings. Many immigrant workers sleep rough in the fields or in the city parks and wasteland.

12 Of course, in making these generalisations, we need to make it clear once again that this does not apply to the much smaller numbers of high-status skilled and professional migrants from North European countries, North America etc.
irregular work is especially concentrated in the agricultural sectors in intensive farming regions of Southern Europe, in the construction sector, local manufacturing and quarrying, and in services to individuals and families. All parties are to some extent, although with different power relations, complicit in the functioning of, and exploitation of immigrants in, the informal labour market: the employer saves on social security payments and, in some cases, on wages (paying lower wages to immigrants than would be paid to a native worker doing the same job); the employee too saves on social security contributions and income tax; and the authorities turn a blind eye.

In Greece we find Albanian men working in all parts of the country in agriculture, from the northern border regions (where some cross-border “commuting” from southern Albanian villages takes place) to Crete. Seasonal labour demand in Spanish and Italian agriculture, mainly for harvesting work, is satisfied by peripatetic foreign migrants, mainly from Morocco and West Africa, who move from place to place according to the timing of the crop harvest (tomatoes, olives, apples, citrus fruit etc.). Immigrant work in agriculture is less developed in Portugal where family mixed farming, reliant on female labour, survives more than in the other three countries. Construction, too, absorbs mainly male immigrant workers, of many nationalities – Albanians, Poles, North Africans, Cape Verdeans etc. Street-trading is a specialization of the Senegalese, though other nationalities, such as Moroccans and Bangladeshis, also participate. In Rome, for example, the Bangladeshis monopolize the trade of selling umbrellas in the street whenever it rains, and the practice of cleaning car windscreens at traffic lights.

Somewhat different circumstances surround the employment of most immigrant women in Southern Europe. Two of the papers in the collection, those by Dietz and El-Shohoumi and by Zontini, focus specifically on immigrant women. Although the situation is changing and diversifying, the dominant sector, by far, remains domestic service. The employment of foreign women in domestic service (cleaning, cooking, childcare, care of the elderly etc.) is closely related to the fast-increasing participation of Southern European women in the labour market, mainly in skilled employment. For upper- and middle-class professional women (and also to some extent for lower-middle-class families), domestic help by immigrant women is seen as a survival strategy in order to combat the negative effects of women’s “double burden” (work and homecare/child-rearing duties). The taking on of domestic helpers also constitutes a strategy or a “symbolic apparatus” for maintaining and enhancing social status as well as improving their quality of life and leisure opportunities. It also compensates for the wide gaps in the state provision of welfare services and childcare support – the topic of the next subsection.
The social welfare dimension: a weak and familistic welfare state

The third and final element in our triangular analysis of Southern European migration trends is the "Southern" model of the welfare state—weak and family-oriented (Ferrera, 1996; Petmesidou, 1996). Extending the much-cited Esping-Anderson typology (1990, 1996), we can identify four welfare regimes in Europe: social-democratic (Scandinavia), conservative (continental Europe), liberal/social-democratic (UK) and Catholic/familistic (Southern Europe). Common traits of the welfare states of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal are held to be the low coverage of the population; high differentiation of benefits; a great asymmetry of benefits alongside underdeveloped unemployment benefits; and inadequate universalistic national welfare systems. The core of the South European model is the individual: when she or he fails to be able to take care of herself/himself, the support resources will be found first through the nuclear family, then the extended family, and thirdly through the local community, which includes the Church, civil organisations and informal neighbourhood networks. The model tends to assume a "male breadwinner" role, a clientelistic and patron-age-laden structure of society, and an abundance of time on the part of helpers—family members, friends, charities etc.

This model has been eroded by important social and demographic changes, by the development of the labour market structures of late capitalism, and by the enhancement of more individual-based social and political rights, especially for women (though much remains to be achieved). Even without these more recent changes, the "rudimentary character" of the Southern European model remains overgeneralised, particularly with respect to the strength of the Leftist tradition in regions like North-Central Italy or Catalonia. In this submodel, welfare regimes are dependent upon workers' contributions; therefore the dual labour market system described above reproduces also a dual welfare system, leaving the new immigrants, belonging to the irregular or non-institutionalised sector of the labour market, bereft of important forms of welfare support.

But the recent changes have been fundamental. Especially in the more urbanised social contexts, the extended family has partly broken down, at least as a closely-knit, geographically contiguous welfare unit. Demographic structures have reshaped age and household structures and reordered social and familial relationships: the traditional

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13 It should be mentioned here that in Greece the Orthodox Church has never played as prominent a role in social assistance as the Catholic Church has in Spain, Portugal and, especially, Italy.
"Mediterranean" model of many children, cousins, relatives, often living close together in multi-generational households and neighbourhoods, has been replaced by small nuclear families with very small numbers of children (often none, in fact). Younger women, whose assigned role before was to bring up children and also care for the husband and perhaps some elderly relatives, now are mostly in paid employment, and tend to only have one child, if any. Elderly relatives are left more and more to fend for themselves.

Nevertheless, in Southern Europe, when compared to Northern Europe (except perhaps Ireland), family structures are still relatively strong, and this is coupled with a still rather weak professional development of women's employment and careers. This contrasts with Sweden and Denmark which have disintegrated families and much part-time and full-time female work, including proportionate numbers of women in the higher echelons of responsibility in the labour market. This in turn opens up a differentiation between two approaches to supporting families and mothers: the holistic approach (e.g. Norway) based on cash benefits so women can look after their children and stay at home; and the dualistic approach (e.g. Sweden) based on a free choice from the women's point of view - to be at home or to work outside the home, or to combine both. In Southern Europe these variations and choices scarcely exist, given the lack of state support, and this is one reason why migrant domestic workers are sought to facilitate choices (sometimes these are seen as necessities) about work, child-rearing, leisure etc.

According to Sainsbury (1994), family and welfare typologies based around the single underlying dimension of the strength (or otherwise) of the male breadwinner model in terms of the traditional division of labour between the sexes fails to reflect the full range of social entitlements. Mainstream typologies have often distinguished between three bases of entitlement: need, work performance and citizenship. In the traditional family model two other bases of entitlement are central: the principles of maintenance and care. Hence "gendering" welfare states requires that women's multiple entitlements are spelt out: as wives, mothers, workers and citizens (Sainsbury, 1994, pp. 69, 167).

One important contribution of Sainsbury's work for the purpose of our analysis is that it points out an important gap in mainstream research by examining the care and human service sectors, in contrast to traditional comparative analysis which concentrates on social insur-

14 We should over-stress this change in the sense that, in some social contexts, families and kin-linked households still live close to each other, e.g. in the same street or apartment block.
ance schemes and income maintenance policies, or on gender analysis of the state-market nexus without the family dimension. Indicators on social services provision (which generally reveal lack of provision in Southern European countries) are not only useful for analysing the gendering of the welfare state but can also be seen as the matrix linking immigration, the welfare state and the family. In a privatised conception of services, thinking in terms of the indigenous family's strategy for care, the double-income household could be fulfilling a reproductive role on the demand side. On the other hand, immigrant women (who are also involved in transnational family strategies, often including motherhood – see Zontini's paper in this issue) could be seen as playing an important role on the supply side. Accordingly, gendered family strategies and a sexual division of labour can be shown as the grounds for the ethnically gendered conception of care.

Conclusion

This paper has ranged widely in its objective of mapping the background to recent trends in Southern European migration. The historical overview stressed the long and rich history of emigration from the region, both overseas and within Europe. Then came the "turn-around". By the 1980s, earlier in Italy, the attainment of "European" standards of prosperity and economic modernisation, amongst other factors, had turned Southern Europe into a major global region of immigration from a remarkably wide geographical spread of source countries. Although some comparisons with past international (and internal) migrations can be made, there are many new features of this recent immigration to Southern Europe which enable us to frame and speak of a South European "model" of immigration, whose essential characteristics have been presented. However what continues to impress is the sheer diversity of types of external migration evident in recent years in Southern Europe: these were set out in the middle of the paper. In the final part of the paper we concentrated on elaborating two theoretical dimensions of poor-country emigration to Southern Europe: the economic dimension, with particular reference to the informal economy; and the social dimension, with particular reference to the welfare state and its failure to cater for many of the personal, household and care needs of the indigenous population, thereby creating openings for, but also increasingly a structural reliance on, mostly female domestic and care workers from poor countries.

Finally, we can point to some interesting links between the regional reality of Southern Europe as a border zone between the "bottom of Eu
Europe” and the “top of Africa” (and, beyond, the rest of the developing world), and the new global mobilities based on control, channelling, transience and circulation. Southern Europe functions as a closed/open border; a friction-plane within the spaces and networks of globalisation. The closing of the borders of “Schengen Europe” and the desire of people to move represent two contradictory faces of globalisation, played out across the Mediterranean Sea, which once again becomes, as it was in the more distant past, a shared migration space (Ribas-Mateos, 2001). But it is a marine space laced with tragedy, for countless lives are lost through drowning and shipwreck as migrants and traffickers risk all to reach their el dorado. The dynamics of this drama are particularly evident in those places where the sea-gap is very narrow – the Strait of Gibraltar, Tunisia-Sicily, the Otranto Channel between Albania and Southern Italy, or Sarande-Corfu. Cities, too, have a key spatial and functional role in the migratory geography of the Southern European borderlands: both those frontier cities which are “extroverted” towards South Europe (Tangiers, Tunis, Durrës, Istanbul etc.), and those Southern European cities which are places of arrival, mixing and migrant redistribution (Algeciras, Barcelona, Marseilles, Naples, Lecce etc.) where a freewheeling de facto multiculturalism evolves.

But the Mediterranean “Rio Grande” is not the only spatial frame for these new migrations. There are other historical and geographical contexts: earlier emigrations from the South European countries rebound with return migration or repatriation; whilst the attractions of the climate, landscape, culture and lifestyle bring a whole range of amenity-seeking migrants such as footloose entrepreneurs and the self-employed, travellers and retirement migrants. In this way we see in Southern Europe a splendid laboratory for the study of old and new forms of human migration.

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References


Summary

This introductory paper sets the background for the special issue of the journal on Southern Europe by offering an overview and selective theorisation of recent trends of immigration into the region. The paper is in three parts. The first sketches the historical evolution of migration from and to the region: emigration overseas, emigration to Europe, return migration, and immigration. The major causes of the migration “turnaround” from mass emigration to large-scale immigration are detailed, but also, in the second part of the paper, the great diversity of types and forms of migration recently and currently affecting the region. In part three of the article recent immigration is conceptualised in terms of two explanatory frameworks, linked in turn to the informal economy and the weak welfare state; whilst in the conclusion the significance of the Southern European region is stressed in terms both of the global map of migration and of new typologies of mobility.
Semi-reluctant hosts: Southern Europe’s ambivalent response to immigration

The human tragedy of migration has become a regular feature of those Southern European countries with accessible coastlines (Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus), inhospitable illegal border crossings (Italy and Greece) or even borders set with landmines (Greece/Turkey). The number of deaths by drowning, freezing and explosion can only be crudely guessed, but it is the dramatic arrival of shiploads of starving emigrants which most captures the public attention—frequently with a humane and compassionate popular response. Public policy, however, does not generally approach such matters in other than legalistic formulations; the typical initial state response has been to characterise the migrants as “illegal”, then later to concede that some might be candidates for political asylum. This status is rarely granted in Southern Europe, and in some respects is actually scarcely better than that of illegal immigrant (Black, 1992; Malheiro and Black, 1997).

In this paper, I hope to convey an impression of the massively complex, rapidly changing and frequently misunderstood nature of the international migration to Southern Europe; its relationship with the economy and society; and the role of the state in managing the phenomenon. I conclude with a short appraisal of policy, along with some personal thoughts on how progress might be made.

Migration to Southern Europe

Over the last two decades, immigration into Southern Europe has increased on a continuous basis, although with the major increases

1 An earlier version of this paper has appeared in the «Brown Journal of World Affairs», (8), 2, 2002, pp. 211-229, although with serious printing errors which have warranted republication in this updated and revised form.
into Italy and Greece caused by large-scale influxes of emigrants from the collapsing Albania in the early 1990s. A consistent pattern, which Southern European governments have been trying to amend only very recently, has been highly restricted access to the formal labour market. The resultant burgeoning of the informal sector and its population by immigrants has been met since 1985 by frequent legalisation programmes across Southern Europe, typically followed by lapses back into illegality along with more illegal workers and immigrants (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999). Most recently, policy developments in all countries except Portugal show a new racialisation of the politics of immigration in Southern Europe, with a clear focus on "illegals" as the unwanted and allegedly criminally oriented aliens.

The immigrants exhibit a remarkable diversity of nationalities, educational levels, professions, and immigration routes into Southern Europe. Furthermore, there is extreme doubt about the types of migration — whether they should be considered as temporary guestworkers, seasonal cross-border labour, semi-permanent immigrants, long-term immigrants, refugees, etc. One thing should be learned from the Northern European experience: that even intentionally temporary migrants frequently end up staying (Rogers, 1985). However, this should not preclude states from facilitating migrants’ return, most notably through provisions for minority language instruction for migrant children, and legal arrangements for co-ordination or exportability of acquired pension rights. Both of these issues are largely ignored in Southern Europe, thus providing structural encouragement of permanent immigration.

Owing to the great extent of illegal immigration and residence, official statistics give limited information about the resident immigrant population across Southern Europe — especially in Greece. Table 1 gives a rough picture, using the latest available official data along with estimates for illegal residents.

Typically, the immigrant-to-population ratio in EU countries is within the range 3–9% (Salt, 2000, p. 8), although this range includes only legally-present immigrants. Table 1 shows that within Southern Europe, only Greece has a remarkable proportion of immigrant stocks; however, in this case a reservation should be made about whether they are stocks or complex flow patterns. Across Southern Europe, the main nationalities, ranked according to approximate numerical importance, are thought to be as set out in Table 2.

With the notable exception of Portugal, which has historically important connections with Brazil and its former African colonies, the dominant nationalities are Moroccan in Italy and Spain, and Albanian in Greece and Italy. However, the very wide range of nationalities in all Southern European countries indicates the complexity and diversity of migration patterns into the region.

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Table 1 – Total population, estimated immigrant stocks and work permits, 2000 [200s]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total population (million)</th>
<th>With residence permit</th>
<th>Of which, EU nationals</th>
<th>Illegal estimates</th>
<th>Total non-EU immigrants (minimum estimate)</th>
<th>Non-EU immigrants as % total population</th>
<th>Non-EU legal workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>309±148*</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>350–500</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>230–290</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>200–400</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *granted temporary “Green Cards” in legalisation.

Table 2 – Principal third-country nationalities in Southern Europe, ranked

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Cape Verdean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Angolan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>Ecuadorian</td>
<td>Brazilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Tunisian</td>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>Bissau Guinean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>Yugoslav</td>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td>Mozambican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Algerian</td>
<td>Sao Tome Principe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Senegalese</td>
<td>Senegalese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgian</td>
<td>Senegalese</td>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Brazilian</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>Sri Lankan</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>Peruvian</td>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian</td>
<td>Brazilian</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: dominant nationalities in bold.
Source: author’s completion from national statistics and regularisation data.

Migration routes and modes of travel

There are three main routes of migration in the Mediterranean Basin. The first consists of South→North movements within the Basin, largely from Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Turkey, and arriving in the Northern Mediterranean countries of Greece, Italy, Spain and France.
The second can be loosely labelled South-East→North, e.g. from Iraq and more remote Asian areas (e.g. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan), and from Africa (e.g. Senegal, Nigeria, Congo and Somalia). Migrants using these routes either remain in the Southern European countries, or attempt to use them as transit countries to gain access to other parts of Europe (Icduygu and Unalan, 2001: 9-10). The third main movement is North-East→West, e.g. from Albania to Italy and Greece, and from Bulgaria, Romania and Poland (along with other USSR satellite states) to all of Southern Europe. This route exhibits more diversity in types of migration: some of it is shuttle migration, possible through geographical proximity; some appears to have started as temporary migration, but now looks to be more permanent; and much of the migration from the Baltic countries, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, consists of trafficked women and children forced into prostitution (Budapest Group, 1999; Emke-Poulou, 2001).

For the first two routes, travel by sea is the most common pattern, although increasingly complex stepwise movements have been noted for long-distance migration (Icduygu and Unalan, 2001). The arrival of "illegal immigrants", as they are typically called, is not actually so large in quantity – although increasing markedly over the last two years. One of the problems besetting serious analysis of all aspects of immigration into Southern Europe is the extraordinarily inadequate compilation of statistics, especially in Greece and Italy. However, the latest report by the Greek coastguard gives the number of immigrants intercepted during the first ten months of 2001 as 5,242.2 Until recently, the vast majority have been Iraqi Kurds; they are now Afghans and Iraqis, usually leaving from Turkey which they have reached by land. Italy estimates that over the two-year period 1999–2001, some 77,000 immigrants disembarked.3 Spain arrested some 3,500 immigrants arriving by boat in 1999, but this figure increased to nearly 15,000 for 2000; for 2001, the figure dropped to 4,500 for the first nine months, partly reflecting co-operation between Morocco and Spain, and also a cessation of such traffic immediately after the September 11th events.4 Three quarters of migrants arriving in Spanish waters are North African, mainly Moroccan with the remainder from Sub-Saharan Africa. Although these numbers are not small, and the Spanish and Greek figures are of actual arrests (which may be a small proportion of successful illegal immigration), they are nevertheless just a small fraction of total non-EU immigration into Southern Europe. Re-

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search in Spain in 2000, commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior, revealed that only 10% of immigrants had arrived illegally by sea, across the Strait of Gibraltar.5

Land border difficulties exist primarily for Greece and, to a lesser extent, Italy. The Greek–Albanian border is porous and it seems that most of the several hundred thousand Albanians in Greece have crossed it illegally. The Greek–Turkish border is passable, but filled with landmines which have not yet been removed in accordance with treaty obligations. The recently-created Greek Border Protection Corps has arrested some 45,000 illegal immigrants over a two-year period.6 Italy has released the figure of 14,000 caught at land borders over the two-year period 1999–2000,7 but there is no known estimate of the number who may have crossed successfully.

Asylum-seekers

Asylum-seeking into Southern Europe has never been a major issue, mainly because of the ease of illegal immigration, the historical difficulty of gaining asylum, and the minimal rewards for achieving such a status. The situation has improved slightly in recent years, but despite generally low application numbers – partly through active discouragement – the recognition rates are very low.

| Table 3 – Asylum applications, recognition rates and principal nationalities, 1990–99 |
|----------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Greece                           | 1,530       | 24,610        | 8.6%                        | 11.5%           | Iraq, Turkey, Albania, Iran   |
| Italy                            | 33,360      | 89,530        | 13.4%                       | 15.6%           | Albania, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Romania |
| Portugal                         | 310         | 5,590         | 4.9%                        | 12.3%           | Romania                       |
| Spain                            | 8,410       | 93,560        | 5.8%                        | 8.1%            | Romania, Poland, Algeria, Liberia |
| EU                               | 367,400     | 3,746,410     | 11.1%                       | 21.4%           | Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, Iraq |

Source: UNHCR (2000).

Table 3 shows asylum data for Southern Europe. As can be seen, all except Italy have had very small numbers of asylum claims; the Italian

figure is skewed by the 1991 arrival of Albanians en masse and a large increase in 1999. There is also extreme doubt surrounding the Italian statistics.\footnote{Migration News Sheet, Brussels, February 2001.} For all of Southern Europe, it can be seen that the recognition rates are well below those of Northern European countries, despite both the small number of applicants and the apparent strength of their claims, judging by country of origin – i.e. war zones and oppressive regimes.

**Trafficking and smuggling of migrants**

Organised crime has benefited massively from European restrictions on immigration, originally merely facilitating the illegal entry of immigrants as a short-term commercial arrangement (smuggling). The organisations providing this service are usually specialised in human smuggling, and not necessarily involved in other forms of organised crime (Budapest Group, 1999, p. 26), although Europol believes that drug smuggling is often linked. Research conducted in 1993 by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in Vienna, suggests that 15–30% of illegal immigration into Europe was arranged by smugglers, and that the profits for that year must have ranged from a minimum of US$ 100 million up to as much as US$ 1.2 billion, with world profits of the order of US$ 6 billion in this criminal sector (Savona, 1997: 5). The ICMPD estimate for 1999 was that 400,000–500,000 people were smuggled into Western Europe in that year (Widgren, 2000), more than double the figure they estimated for 1993.

Since the early 1990s, the criminal activities in this area have not only multiplied, but changed massively in both character and organisation. Thus the distinction between “smuggling” and “trafficking” has been made, by all professional analysts, including Interpol and Europol (Budapest Group, 1999). Trafficking involves a form of exploitation over an extended time period. The most horrendous form of this exploitation is the enforced prostitution of women and children, which has great commercial attraction for organised criminal groups. The profits are as high as drug smuggling, and until recently the penalties if caught were rather lower (Emke-Pouloupolou, 2001).

In Southern Europe, there are two main areas of concern. The first, the less worrying, is the use of smugglers for transit migration through Turkey: it was reported for 1995 that 45% of such migrants had used smugglers, although the proportion was 66% for Iraqis (IOM, 1995: Table 17). Some 20% of the sample in the same study were intending to
enter either Bulgaria or Greece illegally, with the aid of smugglers, and with either Greece or Italy as the final destination. There are also reports of professional smugglers being used for illegal migration from North Africa to Spain (Koslowski, 2000: 205), although there is little evidence that they are used so extensively. The second area of concern is the trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and children from Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, which appears to be extensively operating in Greece (Emke-Pouloupolou, 2001) and Italy (Campani, 1999). Furthermore, this sort of exploitation has been reported by Interpol as becoming “increasingly violent”, including beatings and rape (Budapest Group, 1999, p. 23).

Some observations on immigration patterns into Southern Europe

The evidence presented above shows that, through their geopolitical situation, Greece and, to a lesser extent, Italy are the recipients of three sorts of illegal immigration:

- spontaneous emigration from Albania and other nearby countries;
- organised smuggling from the east using the Turkish route;
- trafficking and sexual exploitation from Eastern Europe and Nigeria.

Spain, and to a lesser extent Italy, have the phenomenon of some illegal boat migration from North Africa. However, the majority of illegal immigrants in both Spain and Italy arrived legally. Recent research carried out by Eurostat on illegal immigrants in Spain and Italy, along with sending and transit countries, indicates that 15–36% overstayed their permit, whilst only 7–17% entered illegally. Apart from refusal to answer, the remainder – some 35–60% – claimed to have complied with the immigration rules. The exception seems to lie with Moroccans, who showed a greater tendency to travel without a visa or permit – roughly 42% of those sampled in Spain (Icduygu and Unalan, 2000: Table 4). Other recent research in Spain by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas in Madrid suggests that 67% of illegal immigrants entered with valid documents – mostly a tourist visa - and that over 75% did not rely on help from others, meaning that smuggling or trafficking of migrants has not been the major mechanism of migration into Spain.9

Thus, Greece stands out as unique in Southern Europe for its extent of illegal immigration. It is also unique in the proportion of immigrants to population (refer back to Table 1), and especially in the ratio

of non-EU to native population. The latter can perhaps be attributed mainly to geography; however, the extent of illegality, it has been argued, is the direct result of government policy (Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas, 1999; Baldwin-Edwards, 2001a).

**Immigrants’ location in economy and society**

**The economy**

Despite Southern Europe (with the exception of Portugal) having the highest unemployment rates in the EU – along with the lowest participation rates, especially of women and young people – there is not an important issue of job competition with immigrant populations (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). The dual labour market hypothesis of Piore (1979) is evidenced throughout the region: even with quite high immigrant stocks, as shown in Table 1, certain sectors are begging governments to increase legal labour immigration. In all four Southern EU countries, the economic sector most obviously in need of labour is agriculture. Over the last year, with a new immigration law in Spain, substantial fines were imposed on farmers for employment of illegal workers, but their requests for several hundred work permits were met by allocations of one per farm, leaving the choice of a destroyed harvest or employment of illegal workers. In June 2001 strawberry producers in Andalusia demanded, through their local mayors, that the state legalise about 3,000 undocumented workers.\(^{10}\) In January 2001, some 50% of the broccoli harvest in Spain was reported as having been sacrificed for lack of legal workers.\(^{11}\) Greek agriculture has had problems of agricultural labour shortages throughout the 1990s (Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild, 1999), along with Italy, which also has difficulty recruiting factory workers in the northern part of the country. Portugal is reported as needing, by the end of 2001, some 20,000 more workers in agriculture and construction, in addition to 100,000 legalised.\(^{12}\)

**Society**

The social reception of immigrants in all four countries is shaped by factors other than their economic role. Media coverage of immigration-related events has varied greatly, both across Southern Europe

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and also over time. Thus the most negative representations were occasioned in both Greece and Italy in 1991 with the mass influxes of Albanians; although the stereotyping of Albanians as criminal has abated, its long-term effects are still evident. Spain and Portugal show more tolerance of immigration than Italy and Greece; the latter two consistently appear as xenophobic societies according to the European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys. There is, however, great doubt about the cross-national comparability of these surveys and, consequently, the value of the results. Several major social issues regarding the social integration of immigrants stand out as paramount, and deserve some discussion. These are: undocumented status; the criminality of immigrants; local immigrant/population ratios; and access to healthcare services.

Undocumented status

This undocumented status is the greatest stumbling block to the integration of immigrants in Southern Europe. Despite frequent amnesty programmes and an increasing use of longer-term work permits, there remain substantial illegal immigrant populations across Southern Europe. Their size varies, with by far the largest illegal proportion in Greece. As has been acutely noted by Suarez-Navaz (1997) in her ethnographic study of immigrants in Andalusia, “the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ immigrants ... pervades daily life as well as institutional programs for immigrants’ integration”. She continues by noting the real-life ambiguity – the grey areas of semi-legality – such as legal immigrants who work illegally, or who have a work permit to work in a different sector. Many simply go in and out of legality, through their vulnerable and changing employment situation. The differentiation between legal and “illegal” is frequently used as a justification for discriminatory practices, although it also reflects the marginality of natives employed in the informal economy and without a stable social location. A “restricted notion of citizenship [exists] that indirectly requires potential citizens to have a high economic level. The group of immigrants that do not have the ideal level are condemned to join the ranks of the informal economy and to be subject to permanent persecution...” (Suarez-Navaz, 1997).

This account, focused on a region of Spain, seems applicable to almost any part of Mediterranean Europe. Research in Greece has suggested that increased personal contact with immigrants leads to more positive evaluations on the part of members of the host society, which can empirically undermine the social stereotyping of immigrants. At the same time, a genuine dislike – even fear – of the illegal status of im-
migrants has been noted (Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild, 1999). We should also be aware of a general public concern about single male immigrants, as opposed to families; this connects to the issue of whether the migration is temporary, seasonal, variable or permanent. Without generous family re-unification policy, male temporary migrants have little possibility of being joined by wives and children.

The alleged criminality of immigrants

Statistics are frequently cited by European governments as "proving" that there is a problem with the criminality of immigrants. Generally, immigrants have been increasing as a proportion of prison populations across Europe, most dramatically so in Greece. Table 4 gives the latest available data. It can be seen that across Europe there have been large increases of immigrants in the prison system over the last two decades. The largest proportion is in Greece, where the figure has now grown to around 50%. There has been no systematic research in Europe to explain these figures, although it is clear that many are imprisoned for breach of the immigration rules. A study of the Greek situation (Baldwin-Edwards, 2001b) has shown that there are highly discriminatory reasons why immigrants are imprisoned for crimes unrelated to immigration offences, including automatic pre-trial detention (where a native would not be detained), concentration on arrests of immigrants by the police, the assumption by judges of guilt in other crimes because of an immigrant's illegal status, inadequate legal representation, and even imprisonment beyond the actual sentence length through inability to deport.

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<td>Switzerland</td>
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Source: Council of Europe data, cited in Baldwin-Edwards (2001b, Table 1).
Although there is some evidence to suggest that immigrants have contributed disproportionately to certain specific petty crimes, such as document forgery and theft, generally the native population seems to be more involved with serious crime, such as murder. A notable exception to this statistical generalisation is the behaviour of foreign and indigenous mafias. Public perception of the crime phenomenon is shaped largely by media reporting and government publicity, both of which seemed to have improved across Southern Europe in recent years, but now have started to re-appear as Southern Europe's new "race card".

Local immigrant population density

The third social issue I want to say something about concerns the social geography of local immigrant/population ratios. The importance of localised high immigrant population densities is an increasingly accepted axis of analysis in immigration literature. Using various types of empirical data, its relevance for Greece has been shown as impacting upon relative wage levels of illegal immigrants, and also for public perceptions of immigrants (Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild, 1999). Of course, Greece has a particular vulnerability in Southern Europe, with its northern borders – especially that with Albania – and the large number of illegal immigrants in the border regions providing mainly agricultural labour in depopulated zones. More general theoretical positions emphasising the local dimension of the politics of immigration have been laid down by both Money (1997) and Karapin (1999). Their starting point is that the national geographic location of immigrants is uneven, with concentrations in certain local areas: for Money, the crux lies in local economic conditions to which local politicians respond; for Karapin, the mechanism is, rather, anti-immigrant social movements and the local political opportunity structure (Karapin, 1999: 427).

Across Southern Europe, important regional concentrations of immigrants have been noted. In Spain, some 50% of non-EU immigrants are thought to live in Catalonia (179,000) and Madrid (149,000), of whom 162,000 are Moroccan. The total non-EU immigrant population of Spain in 2000 was estimated (by combining residence permit data with application data for legalisation) at 516,000, plus another 418,000 EU nationals. In Italy, ISTAT data (ISTAT, 2000) show the highest concentrations of immigrants as being in central Italy (3.3% of total population in 1999), the north-west (2.8%) and north-east (2.6%). These are actually the most populous areas of Italy, reflecting the internal migration

of Italians for work as well as the immigrants’ distribution and relocation. In Greece, the distribution of immigrants is complex owing to the border with Albania, the available work in rural regions, as well as the more usual urban employment in Athens and Thessaloniki.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Immigrant/population ratio</th>
<th>High level of integration</th>
<th>Marginality</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rural context</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Stable, few problems</td>
<td>Transient but accepted</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Affects social structure</td>
<td>Potentially threatening</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban context</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Stable, few problems</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Changes city patterns</td>
<td>Can form minority ghettos</td>
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There is a serious lack of research on the impact of immigrants on local communities in Southern Europe. I hypothesise, on the basis of limited data, a fourfold typology of such interactions (see Table 5). According to my schema, although rural and urban settings accommodate small numbers of immigrants in different ways, there should be few problems. With larger numbers, there are different implications. A large concentration of well-integrated immigrants in a rural area can completely shift the demographic and social structure, repopulating schools which would otherwise have closed, for example; other possible effects are on the housing market, hospital services, and so on. A large number of marginalised immigrants in a rural context is likely to be threatening; they may even have recourse to petty crime for survival, thus increasing their marginalisation. In a city context, in both cases a small proportion of immigrants is likely to be unnoticed or of little consequence. With increasingly larger numbers, there will be an impact on urban structures – for example, by populating declining inner-city areas, which would impact on the housing market. In the case of weak social integration, there is the danger of ethnic ghettos emerging – which may not be acceptable to the host community. All of these socio-geographic effects have been observed across Southern Europe, although it is unclear without rigorous empirical evidence that they are valid as general propositions.

Access to healthcare services

Immigrants’ access to healthcare services, the fourth social issue to be briefly treated, varies greatly across the EU, and information ap-
ppears to be deliberately suppressed by national governments. Generally, it seems that state facilities are available to undocumented and uninsured immigrants — even if only for emergency treatment. Across Southern Europe, there continue to be contra legem practices — although these often vary substantially by local region (Ugalde, 1997; Zincone, 1999). In Italy, a 1995 decree law permits not only free emergency medical care for undocumented immigrants, but also for serious illnesses and some preventative prescriptions; the 1998 Immigration Law extended all state medical services to undocumented children (Zincone, 1999, p. 67). Thus, Italy since 1998 has given free access to healthcare services to both illegal and legal migrants, with specialised services for immigrants including interpreters and support counselling. In the matter of health research, 2.4% of the Italian Ministry of Health budget is devoted to projects covering migrants (Schinaia, 2000). In Greece, the new Immigration Law of 2001 stipulates that state hospital care is provided for undocumented immigrants only in emergency cases and until the condition is stable, and requires state employees to notify the police. There is no special provision for undocumented children.

Across Southern Europe, the voluntary sector plays a major role in healthcare for immigrants. Organisations such as Médecins sans Frontières, Médecins du Monde, and Caritas — along with many other less-well known or individual NGO clinics — constitute the only medical support that a majority of immigrants can receive.

Research on the health of immigrants in Southern Europe suggests that there are serious health problems in the following categories: communicable diseases, such as TB, hepatitis, AIDS, meningitis and diphtheria; non-communicable illnesses, including organic disorders (e.g. cardiovascular risk, diabetes, dental diseases); occupational illnesses, to which illegal migrants are particularly vulnerable; sexual abuse, noted in the extensive trafficking of women for prostitution; psychosocial illnesses, which illegal migrants seem vulnerable to; and finally, poverty and living conditions as themselves causes of illness (Carballo et al., 1998, p. 937; Gushulak and Macpherson, 2000).

Policy: the two faces of Janus

The response of most Southern European governments to immigration has been bifurcated. On the one hand, there has been a policy to close borders with increasing efficacy and varieties of techniques. On the other hand, governments have felt compelled to attempt some

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social integration of immigrants into the society, notwithstanding the
large numbers of undocumented migrants "on the ground". The major
exception to this double-faced approach has been Greece, which offers
virtually nothing in terms of social integration, with the state exhibiting
a consistently hostile approach to its large number of illegal and
semi-legal immigrants.

It is important, at this point, to recognise some essential differ-
ces in the migration problems facing the four Southern European
states. Portugal is stressed by relatively few problems, mostly relating
to its colonial past. Spain has, by virtue of its geographical position, the
difficulty of illegal immigration by Moroccans and others leaving
North African shores, along with its historical ties to some South
American states. Italy experiences illegal coastal immigration, fre-
quently using Turkey and Greece as transit countries, along with some
illegal border crossings. However, it is Greece which is the recipient of
mass illegal immigration, primarily through its border with Albania,
but also from Turkey as a transit country, and through the other Bal-
kan countries neighbouring Greece.

Turning to non-EU immigrant ratios, again it is Greece which has
the largest proportion, over 6%, with Portugal, Spain and Italy at just
over 2%, although Spain has a large number of EU nationals in addi-
tion. Although regional concentrations are also important in evalu-
ating the effects of these numbers, clearly the strain is likely to be great-
est on Greek policy-makers. Furthermore, of all these countries it is
Greece and Greek society which has had the highest ethnic and cul-
tural homogeneity – placing additional pressures on the state for pol-
icy solutions.

Let us examine in more detail the two antithetical policy responses
– controlling the borders, and integrating the immigrants.

Controlling the borders

Following the requirements of both the EU and Schengen, over the
last decade all four countries have adopted mechanisms for increased
border control. These include:

- Visa requirements for certain countries’ nationals
- More effective policing of land borders
- More coastguard patrols
- Expedited asylum applications
- Principle of “safe country of origin” of asylum-seekers
- Expulsion of undocumented immigrants
- Exchange of information within Schengen on undesirable aliens and
  asylum-seekers
In addition to these general principles, all four countries have passed new legislation on immigration. Much of this legislation is concerned with trying to legalise the position of large numbers of irregular immigrants, the great majority of whom were in fact once legally present on the territory (with the exception of immigrants in Greece). The many legalisation programmes carried out across Southern Europe over the last 15 years constitute a major study in their own right, and will not be dealt with here. The principal problem with them has always been that they awarded short-term residence/work permits, requiring the immigrants to renew them with continuous work records. More recently, Spain and Italy have been awarding longer-term permits, in an attempt to solve that problem.

The European Union has played a virtually non-existent role in international agreements for the return of illegal migrants, despite the Association Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia, and the stronger Customs Union with Turkey. It was determined in principle in 1995 that the European Union should have re-admission clauses inserted in all future agreements with third countries (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997, p. 502); this has been achieved so far only with the Ukraine, and is planned for Morocco, Pakistan, Russia and Sri Lanka (Cholewinski, 2000, p. 394). In fact, it has been left to individual states to negotiate bilateral treaty arrangements for return of illegal migrants, and in some cases for labour recruitment; there are also ad hoc regional groupings, attempting to secure the borders of southern and southeastern Europe.

Apart from the re-admission provisions negotiated with third states under the Schengen arrangements, the known bilateral agreements for re-admission are actually rather few. Greece has arrangements with Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Albania – although the extent of their utilisation is not known. Recently concluded agreements consist of a Spain–Nigeria agreement signed in June 2001; a Greece–Turkey agreement signed in November 2001; and discussions between Italy and Turkey on co-operation against human smuggling early in 2001. Spain has been pushing for some time for Morocco to include repatriation in a renegotiated agreement, but has not been successful.

Only two out of the four Southern European countries – Italy and Greece – carry out mass expulsions of illegal immigrants. Italy has made public information that over the period 1998–2000, some 193,000 illegal immigrants were “repatriated” and 149,000 were ex-

pelled.\textsuperscript{18} Greece has had a much longer history of the police "broom" searches and mass expulsions of all those not in possession of valid residence documents. During 1992–95, these expulsions averaged over 225,000 a year (Baldwin-Edwards, 1998) and for 2001 the figure is expected to remain high at 270,000.\textsuperscript{19} Spain has adopted a rather more inclusive approach to its illegal residents, and repatriates relatively small numbers – mainly Moroccans and a few Nigerians.

Labour recruitment agreements were signed in 2001 between Spain and Morocco, Ecuador and Colombia. Spain is planning further labour recruitment agreements with Poland and other East European countries, with the objective of matching specific nationalities with occupational skills. Greece has bilateral agreements with Albania and Bulgaria, but only a few thousand seasonal workers have ever been recruited (OECD, 2001, p. 76). Italy had, until recently, a more far-reaching system which allowed sponsored immigration rather than being confined to bilateral agreements.

\textit{Integrating immigrants}

With the massive extent of illegal immigration and/or residence, Southern European countries have had to tackle the problem of illegality before considering longer-term issues of integration. Increasingly, states have had to find pretexts to include as many as possible in the legalisations, otherwise their purpose would not be achieved. In Spain, a legalisation programme with the cut-off date of July 2000 approved only 60\% of the 227,000 applications. Protests and demonstrations in early 2001 led to another legalisation in 2001 with 323,000 applicants. Preliminary processing of the applications shows an approval rate of 94\%.\textsuperscript{20} Greece's second ever legalisation was also conducted in 2001, with 351,000 applications; some applications from the first legalisation in 1998 were still pending, and the total number of legal immigrants in Greece has been an unknown figure since 1997 (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). However, given that the total number of immigrants in the last few years has generally been estimated as being at least 800,000, the number of applications is very low. It can safely be assumed that Greece will continue with several hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants for many years to come, even if they are regularly arrested and expelled from the country. Portugal conducted a low-key continuous amnesty in 2001, which legalised some 90,000 workers.\textsuperscript{21} Italy has

\textsuperscript{18} Migration News Sheet, Brussels, April 2001.
\textsuperscript{19} Migration News Sheet, Brussels, November 2001.
\textsuperscript{20} Migration News Sheet, Brussels, September 2001; November 2001.
\textsuperscript{21} Migration News Sheet, Brussels, September 2001.
avoided using legalisations recently, in order to prevent the cycle of legalisation→new illegal immigration→new legalisation.

Spain and Italy have undertaken fairly extensive family reunification, with such measures constituting a large proportion of legal immigration and taking these countries into the mainstream of European immigration patterns. Greece discourages family immigration, and only in 2001 slightly relaxed its rules on the matter.

Permanent residence is granted in Spain and Italy after 5 years of legal residence, but requires 10 years in Greece and Portugal (Groenendijk and Guild, 2001); the average period required in the EU is about 5 years.

Increasingly, Spain, Italy and Portugal have been attempting to stabilise the position of immigrants by awarding longer-term residence permits, and also attempting to minimise the traditional requirement of continuous employment for their renewal. This policy, if continued, will lead to a replication of Northern European immigration countries’ experience of permanent alien residents or “denizens”, frequently with unemployment rates higher than the indigenous populations. This latter has already started to occur in Italy. Greece has no such problem, as the vast proportion of its immigrants are either illegal or in some grey area of semi-legality.

Since access to the welfare state is determined mostly by social insurance coverage in Southern Europe’s less-developed welfare systems, only those immigrants who are legally resident and insured are easily included. Italy, as was noted above, has been more inclusive in this regard. Greece, departing from a previous situation of tolerance, has tried to prevent use of state services by illegal immigrants. Thus, in all four countries, the voluntary sector remains crucial for both legal and illegal immigrants.

Policy failure

Probably the biggest policy failure across Southern Europe has been the inability of the state to adapt to changing global patterns, to accept migration as a reality of the late twentieth century, and to manage it in economic, social and political terms. By persisting with exclusionary patterns of immigration control – notably issuing very few work permits, setting absurd conditions for employers to recruit illegal labour, horrendous bureaucracy in the application process – Southern European governments have effectively closed off legal labour recruitment. At the same time, they have made only token efforts to control their borders. Thus the phenomenon of an expanding informal sector began, staffed principally by illegal immigrants who accepted the terms of their host country.
The informal employment of immigrants has done much for economic growth, and in particular has propped up entire ailing industries — but at a cost. That cost has been borne by the illegal immigrants themselves, who are socially excluded; and by the indigenous population, which feels somehow threatened by all this illegality. It has also set back the normal process of social integration of immigrants, although this is now proceeding at a reasonable pace in Spain and Italy, despite governments which are broadly anti-immigrant. Greece has yet to initiate any such process, given its failure to provide legal status to even a majority of its immigrant population.

Another consequence of over-restrictive immigration structures (the term “policy” hardly seems applicable) has been the involvement of organised crime. Originally starting with the involvement only of people-smuggling, it has now accelerated into a multi-billion dollar business, exploiting its victims, and forcing women and children into prostitution across Europe. The activities are also linked, in parallel form, with drug-trafficking, money-laundering, and other mafia-style activities. European governments are desperately trying to repair the damage which their own policies have actually caused.

What are the policy options that might effect some improvements? First, a recognition by all of Southern Europe that it actually needs more immigrant workers: in no Southern country is there an issue of too many immigrant workers for the economy, although possibly Greece has some sort of equilibrium of supply and demand. Thus, the legal employment of workers from both within and without the territory must be expedited, preferably without the usual bureaucratic horrors.

Secondly, a recognition of the sad fact that police hounding and searching for illegal migrants within the society sends a message of “unwanted” to the entire population: it is inconsistent with the social integration of immigrant communities, and likely to promote racist tendencies. Even illegal immigrants have human rights, and should be treated with dignity: this reflects as much upon the host society, as on immigrants’ presence within it. One step would be for all the countries to sign the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, as suggested by the European Commission. Also, Greece should reconsider its refusal to sign the two ILO Migration Conventions which protect legal and illegal migrant workers’ rights.

Thirdly, there has to be some consideration given to the structural factors surrounding the informal economy. It is not enough simply to harass employers of illegal labour: it may be necessary to change social insurance provisions, requirements by the state for the employer to provide ‘bonds’ etc., and avoidance of all the impediments to employment of foreign labour which encouraged employers to hire illegal la-
bour. There should also be special consideration given to small businesses, which might need extra workers, but not under the conditions currently on offer by the state.

Fourthly, a more constructive approach to dealing with refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan etc. would be desirable, rather than grudgingly accepting very small proportions of small numbers of asylum-seekers. Southern Europe is now part of the “First World”, and as such has obligations as well as benefits; moreover, refugees can be integrated into society, taught the language, trained in semi-skilled jobs that Southern Europeans refuse to do, and so on. These things require management and investment by the state, for the future of the society. It seems doubtful that any politicians have enough vision to promote such schemes, at least at this time.

Finally, and the most demanding, a plea for some planning and effective management of immigration and immigrants’ integration. By planning, I do not mean the sort of “command economy” approach which has tended to prevail in parts of Southern Europe. Rather, I am thinking of some research agendas, and recognition of likely problems, in order that possible measures be considered. We might mention here several things: healthcare and immigrants’ communicable diseases, minority language teaching for immigrant children, local housing markets and immigrant communities, the criminal justice system and immigrants... The list is almost endless. Yet, all these problems and more already exist: would it not be wise to address them?

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References


Summary

The complexity and diversity of immigration into Southern Europe are examined, within the limits of available data, along with the estimated illegal immigrant presence and participation in the formal economy. Illegal migration and illegal residence appear as norms, although obscured by multiple legalisation efforts by Southern European states. Three main routes of migration into the Mediterranean Basin are identified, with a recent increase in the use of smugglers and traffickers and very low asylum applications as well as recognition rates. Immigrant integration is posited as a dichotomy between economic role and social marginalisation – both largely determined by the illegal or semi-legal status of the immigrants. Three subtopics are briefly examined: the criminality of immigrants, immigrant population densities and access to healthcare services. Finally, a comparative overview of government policy responses is presented, concluding with identification of broad policy failures. Some policy priorities for the future are suggested.
Immigration and spatial change: the Lisbon experience

Introduction

Throughout history, migrations have been an engine of urban growth and one of the main agents responsible for change in the social and economic structures of cities. As places where people, goods, capital and information are brought together, cities have always been privileged “relation spaces” – of both cooperation and conflict – among firms, institutions, social groups and individuals.

As in the past, today’s immigrants and ethnic minorities tend to gather in the most important urban centres of each host country. The large metropolises and the national capitals are privileged spaces, bringing together different elements of the world and reinforcing the role of such key urban centres as structuring nuclei of the world economy. These cities are well-known within the world-wide context; they provide employment and social opportunities and make it easier for immigrants to establish regular contacts with their countries of origin. Moreover, after the arrival and settlement of the first migrant cohorts, network relationships attract new immigrants from the same geographic origins, thus reinforcing concentration in receiving urban areas.

Due to the increasing scale and complexity of international migration systems that has occurred in the last quarter of the twentieth century, major cities are increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-racial, which indicates an even greater differentiation in the near future (Sandercock, 1998). The efficient management of this economic, social and cultural diversity, which sometimes leads to conflicts – but also to innovation – is one of the major challenges to the social sustainability of cities.¹

¹ Social sustainability of a city is “the development (and/or growth) that is compatible with the harmonious evolution of civil society, fostering an environment conducive to the compatible cohabitation of culturally and socially diverse groups
Until the mid-1960s, the presence of immigrants in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, as in other major Southern European cities, was extremely limited because the rural exodus from within the country completely fulfilled the regional needs for labour. By the end of that decade, the cumulative effects of Portuguese emigration (mainly to France), the colonial war, and the urban and industrial expansion of the Lisbon region had generated some employment opportunities in construction and in unskilled services for the first wave of migrants coming from Cape Verde. However, the fast growth of labour immigration to Lisbon was mainly visible after the mid-1980s (Malheiros, 1996, 2000; Malheiros and Fonseca, 1999).

Taking this new position of Lisbon as a city of immigration, this paper focuses on the processes of social and spatial change associated with the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities. There are two kinds of opposing effects related to the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Lisbon. The first one corresponds to the establishment and development of poor immigrants and ethnic minorities in degraded and derelict neighbourhoods. The second, on the contrary, is visible in processes of urban revitalisation, directly or indirectly induced by immigrants.

The concentration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in poor neighbourhoods with multiple social and economic deprivation such as serious housing problems, lack of infrastructures, abundant derelict public spaces, high unemployment rates, drug dealing, juvenile crime, and a very negative social image, is mainly a result of these groups' economic inability to reach other segments of the housing market because of low income levels, informational barriers, restricted access to

while at the same time encouraging social integration, with improvements in the quality of life for all segments of the population” (Polèse and Stren, 2000, pp. 15-16).

In order to ensure the greatest possible accuracy in interpreting and handling the information contained in this paper, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of two basic concepts: immigrants and ethnic minorities. Immigrants correspond to foreign nationals living in Portugal. Ethnic minorities are defined as all people, independently of their nationality and place of birth, that share an ethnic background different from the one shared by the majority of the population. We use this definition because in Portugal, members of the non-dominant ethnic groups are a significant minority and mainly because in day-to-day practices, they suffer from discrimination due to their ethnic background.

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public housing), but it also results from self-segregation mechanisms supported by networks established between community members with the same social and cultural identity.

Despite these more negative issues related to urban change and immigrant settlement, there is also a growth in creativity in the economic, social and cultural domains. Four dimensions must be pointed out in which, directly or indirectly, immigrants have an important role in the social and spatial dynamics of cities (Malheiro and Fonseca, 1999):

- **Economic renewal or economic restructuring**, led by ethnic entrepreneurship, associated (or not) with ethnic territorial enclaves.
- **Urban renewal** due to immigrant-sponsored improvements in housing conditions, social and public space, and infrastructure. The presence of immigrants is also reflected in the incorporation of architectural elements typical of the sending regions (churches, internal organisation of homes, patios, windows, balconies, gardens and other decorative elements) into the urban landscape. The changes in urban space produced by international migration are also manifested in the mobile elements of the landscape: in dress, in language, as well as in signage, and in the image and symbolic value given to each neighbourhood or residential area.
- **Social renewal** corresponding to the establishment and spread of new values and social practices emerging from the interaction between different social and cultural groups that share the same territory. The concept of social renewal came into favour at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, in opposition to the emphasis on physical space given in territorial planning and urban policies. Social renewal focuses on interventions in social issues: improvements in governance, organisation and relationships rather than technology (Landry, 2000). Therefore, neighbourhoods become the main target of social renewal policies that combine such diverse elements as the improvement of housing conditions, creating more jobs, professional training and different social support services for children, young adults, older people, women and other groups with distinct needs.
- **Cultural renewal**: the idea of cultural renewal corresponds to the diffusion in the host society of different cultural and consumption practices brought and developed by immigrants. Examples of these cultural changes are found in different artistic expressions such as music, dance, handicrafts and the growth of ethnic restaurants. Moreover, cultural renewal is also reflected in the emergence of youth subcultures that combine elements of domestic and home-country ethnic backgrounds. Examples of this type of expression are the practices of graffiti, rap and hip-hop music and clothes that are a symbolic mixture of combined cultures.
The paper is organised as follows. After a brief overview of the evolution and main features of immigrants and ethnic minorities living in Lisbon, I will then try to analyse the interplay between immigrants and ethnic minorities and the socio-spatial reorganisation process that has been taking place in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon. Three case studies in areas with a high visibility of immigrants and ethnic minorities will be presented to illustrate the role of immigrants in the construction of new urban landscapes, in the spatial, economic, social and cultural domains. Finally, some reflections on the kinds of adaptation that cities, and particularly Lisbon, have to go through to integrate larger and more diversified immigrant communities will be made.

Recent immigration to the Lisbon Metropolitan Area: an overview

As already mentioned, until the mid-1970s immigration to the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon and to Portugal was extremely limited. From then on, several internal and international factors converged in order to change Portugal's migratory tradition. The establishment of a democratic regime in 1974, the African de-colonisation process, the internationalisation and modernisation effort of the Portuguese economy and the beginning of EU integration – all in a context of recession and economic restructuring in more developed capitalist countries – are some of the most important elements in the inversion of the Portuguese position in the international migration system. Emigration fell, and immigration, until then extremely limited, began a significant growth phase, mainly due to refugees from former Portuguese African colonies (Fonseca et al., 2002). Figure 1 shows the profile of increasing foreign residents in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (LMA) since 1975. Immigration of a more economic nature was intensified with the arrival of newcomers, coming from a wider range of areas of origin, many of whom entered the country illegally. Africa is the continent of origin of the majority of immigrants who now live in the Lisbon region (60.2% of the total at the end of 1999). Europeans and Americans (from North, Central and South America) are, after the Africans, the more numerous groups, being responsible for 21.2% and 13.5% respectively of foreign citizens living here.

It should be noted that the data in Figure 1 are for the districts (distritos) of Lisbon and Setúbal, which are not quite congruent with the designated municipalities of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. The statistics for 1994 include the special regularisation of 1992-93.
In a more detailed breakdown of documented foreign residents in Lisbon according to origin country (Figure 2), one can see that the largest immigrant communities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area on 31 December 1999 were still clearly made up of citizens from the former African colonies (57.7%), mainly from Cape Verde (31%), followed at a great distance by people from Angola (11.7%) and Guinea-Bissau (8.4%), and also from Brazil (8.2%). Among European Union citizens, the Spanish, British, Germans and French are the key groups. The Spanish are fifth in the hierarchy of immigrants with residence permits living in the LMA; the British are eighth, the Germans tenth and the French eleventh. Finally, as we can see in Figure 2, Americans, Saint-Tomese and Mozambicans also make some contribution, each of these nationalities accounting for a little more than 3% of the total.

Immigration to the LMA is predominantly labour migration. The social and employment structure of the working population shows that the largest group is made up of industrial, and particularly construction, workers, followed by highly-skilled professionals and technical staff. The larger segment is made up of low-skilled individuals who perform the hardest and worst-paid tasks of the secondary labour market, above all in the branches of construction, cleaning and domestic work. At the other extreme of the social and professional hierarchy, we have administrators, directors, board managers, and highly-skilled professionals from developed European countries, the USA and Brazil.
Broadly, the immigration of these latter groups is related to the deindustrialisation process taking place in rich Central and Northern European countries and associated industrial relocation to Mediterranean countries and, since the mid-1980s, the growing presence of transnational corporations in the service sector. More recently, there has also been an appreciable increase in Chinese restaurants, which reflects the expanding migratory flow from China. The success of Indian and Chinese immigrants in the trading sector is due to professional experience acquired before arriving in Portugal, and to the business opportunities generated by economic growth in Portugal as well as increased spending among Portuguese families during the last two decades (Fonseca, 2000).

The trends in African and Asian immigration to Portugal have followed a course that in many ways is similar to Portuguese emigration to France and Germany in the 1960s and early 1970s. This is long-term or definite immigration that hinges largely on information and personal contacts provided by relatives, friends and fellow-nationals. Asians, primarily of Indian origin, differ from the other groups in that there are a large number of people employed in trade. They have set up two kinds of ethnic commercial enclaves in Lisbon: furniture shops belonging to the Ishmaelite community; and wholesale bazaars specialising in goods coming from the Far East, controlled by Hindus and Mus-
lims (Malheiros, 1996). On the other hand, the immigration of highly-skilled professionals is, in most cases, short-term temporary migration and involves individuals, hired by transnational companies, who are looking for fast avenues for career advancement (Peixoto, 1999). Brazilian immigration reflects a more complex process. On the one hand, we have highly-skilled professionals seeking the opportunities that the development of foreign investment and business growth in Portugal provides. On the other, we see a growing number of semi-skilled and low-skilled workers, mainly in the trading sector, restaurants, hotels and other services, who have left Brazil because of that country’s serious economic and social instability.

Finally, at the end of the 1990s a large undocumented migratory wave coming from Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Russia and Bulgaria) began. On 31 December 1999, the stock of documented immigrants from Eastern European countries and from the former USSR was 2,383 people. However, the permits granted by the Foreigners and Borders Office, under the new 10 January 2001 law regulating the entry, stay and expulsion of non-EU citizens, confirmed the growth of immigration coming from this region. Between January and 30 November 2001, immigrants from Eastern European countries and the former USSR represented more than half of the total sojourn permits given during that short period.

Traditionally, major cities are preferred destinations for international migrations (OECD 1998; Sandercock, 1998; White, 1999). As we can see in Table 1, this trend is also evident in the Portuguese case, where the Lisbon Metropolitan Area is the main destination area for immigrants. The data show that 65% of all documented immigrants living in Portugal are located in the distritos of Lisbon and Setúbal. Outside this area, the major immigrant concentrations are found in the Algarve, in the Oporto Metropolitan Area and in the industrial areas of the North and Centre Littoral (Fonseca, 2000).

Further examination of the data in Table 1 shows that the relative concentration of immigrants in the Lisbon area is particularly high for the African and Asian immigrant groups – generally above 80% and reaching 91% for São Tomé and 96% for Pakistan. Much lower percentages, generally below 50%, are recorded by Europeans, North Americans and Brazilians who are therefore more widely distributed throughout the country, or concentrated in areas other than the LMA. Especially notable in this regard are the British and Germans who are over-represented in the southern Algarve region, an area of holiday settlement and retirement migration.

The change to a model of “illegal” immigration, structured by international networks of trafficking, as is the case with the recent migratory wave from Eastern European countries, points to a more dispersed distribution pattern because it is less dependent on the informal community networks set up by the older members of the immigrant communities settled in Lisbon (Baganha and Malheiro, 2000). Confirmation of this trend is possible due to information made available by official institutions, NGOs which support immigrants and also through recent news and reports broadcast in the media. Such reports describe life experiences of many Eastern European immigrants who live scattered all around the country, including in the rural Northern, Centre and Alentejo regions. However, one must point out that these communities tend to settle in urban areas where they can find more job opportunities in the economic sectors where the informal economy is
more dynamic, namely civil construction and public works. After a period of concentrating major investment in the construction of huge infrastructures in the Lisbon Region (the new bridge over the River Tagus, the expansion of the subway network, the railroad crossing on the 25th of April bridge, the renovation of the international exhibition area in 1998, etc.), by the end of the 1990s there was a transfer of major investments to the Northern and Central Littoral regions, especially to the Oporto Metropolitan Area. Many of these investments are made within the scope of Oporto European Capital of Culture (2001). Thus, it can be expected that traffickers of immigrant workers are also sending them to that region. The choice of Portugal as the organising country of the European football championships in 2004 ("Euro 2004") is also leading to the construction and adaptation of many sporting infrastructures in many Portuguese cities; this, too, will influence the geographical pattern of distribution of the new immigrants.

Ethnic minorities and residential segregation

The spatial arrangement of the residential neighbourhoods of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area shows a lower presence in the city centre and inner-city, and a much more scattered pattern throughout the urban area, when compared with American and North European cities. However, at a more detailed level of spatial analysis, a tendency towards clustering of immigrant communities according to their geographical origin and social and cultural characteristics is visible. Spatial self-segregation mechanisms are well-developed, both among European and North Americans, and also among African immigrants.

A comparison of the patterns of geographical distribution of European and African immigrants in 1981 and 1991 allows us to identify the differences between the two main immigrant groups and to assess the importance of the ethnic component in the process of social and spatial segregation in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. Figure 3 is a map of the administrative units (concelhos) used for subsequent maps.

As one can see in Figure 4, in 1981 Europeans were over-represented in the better-quality and more prestigious areas of Lisbon, along the Estoril railway line and mainly in Cascais, thereby confirming the relationship between the image associated with each residential area and the social status of its inhabitants. The Africans, besides having a more scattered distribution displaying thereby a lower spatial segregation level, show higher relative concentrations in the municipalities which are located in the immediate periphery of Lisbon. This occurs along the border between Lisbon and Amadora and Oeiras municipalities and in the municipality of Seixal (on the south bank).
These contrasts result not only from the social, economic and cultural differences between the two groups of communities, but also from the time and conditions in which the arrival and settlement took place in the Lisbon region. Although the immigration of African workers started at the beginning of the 1960s, when the first Cape Verdeans arrived, the intensification of this migratory flow only happened after the mid-1970s, after the April 1974 Revolution and the independence of the African colonial territories. The sudden arrival in Portugal of a huge contingent of people coming from the ex-colonies, in a context of deep recession and great political instability also in Portugal itself, created enormous pressure on the housing market and more difficulties
Fig. 4 – Relative weight of African and European foreigners in the municipalities of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, 1981

Value for the total LMA – 11.0 per thousand

Value for the total LMA – 5.1 per thousand

Fig. 6 – Relative weight of African and European foreigners in the municipalities of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, 1991

Value for the total LMA – 11.0 per thousand

Value for the total LMA – 4.2 per thousand

to integrate this African population who, in addition, suddenly lost their Portuguese nationality and were thereby excluded from the special support given by the state to Portuguese "refugees".

Therefore, many Africans were forced to find a solution for their accommodation problem in the parallel housing market, settling down in many shanty neighbourhoods or in illegal housing that could be found in vacant land in Lisbon's periphery and in the municipalities located in the first suburban ring. The least insolvent groups found accommodation in new public or private estates, in areas far from the city, both on the south and north sides of the Tagus river, where it was possible to find housing at lower costs.

The presence of European-origin communities in the Lisbon region, notably along the Estoril railway axis, happened much earlier (Cavaco, 1983). The settling down of the first groups of English and German nationals goes back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in a period when Estoril and Cascais were the summer resorts for the Portuguese crown. This vocation for tourism and leisure activities, serving the national and foreign elites, was reinforced by the building of the maritime, climatic and sports precinct at Estoril. It was planned at the beginning of the First Republic, but was developed only during the 1920s, because of the effects of the First World War. This area was also the first to benefit from an urbanisation plan (in the 1930s) that protected it from the environmental and urban degradation of the 1960s, when Lisbon's suburbanisation started to intensify. To these factors, we must add the tendency that transnational elites have to form closed cultures, reinforcing their spatial concentration, although their incomes allowed them to have an extremely wide choice of places and types of housing.

The comparison of the distribution of Africans and Europeans over the decade 1981–91 suggests an increase of segregation indexes based on ethnicity. Figure 5 replicates the format of Figure 4, this time using 1991 data. Among the Europeans, the main difference when compared to the 1981 geographical pattern is the increase in the relative representation of more distant municipalities, in prestigious areas, with good urban and environmental qualities. Examples are coastal areas in Mafra municipality on the north bank, and Sesimbra and Palmela in the Setúbal Peninsula – high-quality estates near the beaches of Arrábida Mountain. The Africans meantime reinforced their relative presence in less-valued suburban areas, far from central Lisbon, and both north and south of the river, where it is possible to find housing at lower prices. However, simultaneously to this dispersal of Africans throughout the urban territory, there was also a tendency towards the consolidation
and growth of older nuclei, reinforcing the ethnicity of some of these
neighbourhoods which in turn became unattractive for the domestic
population. The spatial pattern of derelict neighbourhoods (illegal
shack neighbourhoods or public housing areas) where, by the end of
1994, at least 500 people with an African background lived, clearly il-
lustrates this situation: see Figure 6. Despite the increasing periph-
eral location of these degraded ethnic neighbourhoods, we must point
to their concentration in Amadora and Oeiras municipalities, making
what is called Lisbon's Cape Verdean ring, and to the border area be-
tween Loures and Lisbon municipalities. In Setúbal Peninsula, the
huge settlement of Vale da Amoreira (in Moita municipality), where
one can find a large relative concentration of Angolans, has to be men-
tioned, as well as the Bela Vista neighbourhood in Setúbal munici-
pality and a series of nuclei of smaller size scattered throughout Almada
and Seixal municipalities. It is clear that the Angolan and the Mozam-
bican communities, which came late to the LMA, are over-represented
in the Setúbal Peninsula; this is due to an urbanisation process that oc-
curred later here than on the Tagus north bank.

Local authorities and the central government have been trying to
rehouse those living in shacks and in illegal neighbourhoods that do
not possess basic infrastructures and have a very derelict urban envi-
ronment. This effort is particularly visible with the launching of the
Special Rehousing Programme (*Programa Especial de Realojamento* or
*PER*) in 1993 and the Special Rehousing Programme for Families in
1996. Therefore, the population living in many of the neighbourhoods
represented in Figure 6 has already been or is about to be rehoused in
social housing.

It must be stressed that documented immigrants benefit from
these rehousing programmes in the same way and according to the
same criteria as Portuguese citizens. Thus, the rehousing programme
has helped to reduce the residential segregation levels of poor ethnic
minorities, because in the social housing neighbourhoods immigrants
with different ethnic backgrounds live together with the autochtho-
nous population.

In the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, *PER* covers 113,701 inhabit-
ants (33,640 families and 29,223 dwellings), representing 4.5% of peo-
ple living in the LMA in 1991 (Morais et al., 1997). As can be seen in
Figure 7, Lisbon and the municipalities of the first suburban ring on
the northern bank of the river Tagus (Amadora, Loures and Oeiras),
are those with the higher volumes of people to rehouse. In the Setúbal
Peninsula, the major needs in housing are found in Almada and in
Setúbal.
Although there are no detailed data by ethnic group, the distribution of registered people according to nationalities allows us to see that immigrants coming from PALOP (Portuguese-speaking African countries) are heavily over-represented in the population to be rehoused. They hold a share that is seven times higher than their weight in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon in 1991 (20.2 and 2.8% respectively). It is also important to stress that this figure would be even higher if the Portuguese citizens of African origin were taken into account, namely the Portuguese-born children of immigrants.
This over-representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in areas where urban problems are more acute leads to a frequent association between residential segregation of the least favoured groups with ethnic segregation mechanisms. However, as research developed by Malheiros (1998 and 2000) shows, the levels of residential segregation of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Lisbon and, more generally, in the major Southern European cities as a whole, are lower than those observed in Northern European metropolises and in American cities. Moreover, a greater suburbanisation of ethnic minority residen-
tial areas, in opposition to the concentration in city centres observable in Northern European cities, is also found.

These differences derive from economic and socio-cultural factors, and also from the specificity and timing of the urban development process in Lisbon. In the first group of factors the following can be stressed: more recent immigration and smaller relative weight of migrants in the total population; greater geographic, ethnic and social diversity of immigrants; high proportion of non-documented immigration; strong relationship between immigration and former colonial dependence links; specificity of the economic development model based on service employment and relative importance of the informal economy (King, 2000; King et al., 1997). In the second group two major reasons are identified: late emergence of a regular and formal practice of urban planning, resulting in a less rigid model of the internal organisation of cities, with consequent lower levels of social segregation in the residential areas; and development of derelict and often illegal housing, mainly in suburban areas, due to the exclusion from the formal housing market of those with low wages -- firstly the internal migrants coming from rural areas and then, after the 1980s, the external migrants and ethnic minorities (Leontidou, 1993; Malheiros, 1998, 2000; Salgueiro et al., 1997).

In Lisbon, although lower levels of residential socio-ethnic segregation are found and there are some neighbourhoods where immigrants, ethnic minorities from different geographic origins and the Portuguese population live side by side, the main situations of social marginalisation tend to be associated with ethnic marginalisation. Therefore, the urban and social degradation of many neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Lisbon frequently coincides with the presence of immigrants and is negatively reflected in the social stigmatising images built about these people, especially black Africans. As examples of this situation, we can mention several public demonstrations organised by people living in neighbourhoods close to areas where people from shacks and covered by PER are going to be rehoused, protesting against the location of the new rehousing neighbourhoods.

**Immigration and place:**
**urban problems and institutional answers**

Despite the immigration to Lisbon being a rather recent phenomenon and with still limited numerical importance compared to other European metropolises, the presence of immigrants and poor ethnic minorities is felt through the appearance of new elements visible in the urban landscape (particular features of dwellings, appropriation of
public spaces, development of ethnic trade and commerce, emergence of new cultural and ethnic practices, etc.). Urban problems resulting from the aggravation of social disparities and situations of increasing social exclusion, particularly among immigrants and poor ethnic minorities, are also visible through urban policies and new planning and land management practices. These aim at promoting the social integration of the least favoured groups and at improving the quality of the urban environment.

To better illustrate the interplay between immigration and the process of urban change, three case studies in areas with a high visibility of immigrants and ethnic minorities are presented. The first case study is Oturela-Portela, a neighbourhood located in Oeiras municipality, in the so-called Cape Verdean belt. The second one is Vale da Amoreia, a neighbourhood in the municipality of Moita in the Setúbal Peninsula. Both areas benefited from urban rejuvenation programmes financed by the EU, the first one from the URBAN Community Initiative, and the second one from the Urban Revitalisation Programme. The third case study is an example of an ethnic enclave located in the margins of the traditional city centre in Lisbon: Martim Moniz/Almierante Reis Avenue.

Oeiras: Vale de Algés, Oturela-Portela

The intervention zone of the URBAN EU initiative named “Vale de Algés” (Oturela-Portela) is located in the inner periphery of Lisbon, in the parish of Carnaxide, and has a total area of 261 hectares. With a population of 7,000 inhabitants, many of whom are poor ethnic minorities coming from Portuguese-speaking African countries, mainly Cape Verde, this area and its adjacent territories were the major concentration of population in Oeiras municipality already rehoused and to be rehoused under the aegis of the PER programme (85% of the total 12,175 inhabitants covered by this programme).6

The overall unemployment rate in the area is about 16% against a national average of 4.5%. The high level of urban degradation of this area, the poverty and the social and cultural marginality of its inhabitants, the increasing criminality and difficulties of relationship-build-

6 In September 2000, according to declarations by the mayor of Oeiras (Isaltino de Morais) made in the “Forum of Social Policies of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon”, there were only 320 families to be rehoused of the total 3156 families included in PER in this municipality. On the same occasion, Mayor Isaltino de Morais also stated that the rehousing process would be concluded by the end of June 2001 (Supplement of the newspaper Público, 12 October 2000). See also Baptista and Martinho (1997, p. 31).
ing among the different ethnic groups living in the intervention area, together with a very negative social image were mobilising factors for its inclusion in the URBAN EU programme.

A research study on the results of rehousing policies in derelict neighbourhoods located in the URBAN programme intervention area, carried out at the request of Oeiras local authorities by a group of social scientists between 1995 and 1999 (Marques et al., 1999), showed that the improvement of housing conditions enabled the following social changes:

- Enlargement and diversification of local social contacts and networks to areas outside the family and the neighbourhood, opening new bridges to establish relationships with other social groups. Through contacts established at school, the youngsters acquire expanded geographical and social fields of action.
- Assertion of ethnic differentiation and references to national and ethnic cultures of origin, in opposition to an undifferentiated physical space, planned by the local authorities, without the participation of the rehoused citizens. However, for those with higher levels of education, the opposite trend can be observed.
- Emergence of new needs and an increase in levels of dissatisfaction, especially as regards employment and income, the latter considered insufficient to cope with the increasing expenditures induced by the new type of housing and the wider consumption of goods and services associated with new norms of social differentiation.

All in all, as far as the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the new neighbourhoods is concerned, one may conclude that a selective assimilation process towards the dominant culture occurs. The most permeable practices for assimilation are associated with utilitarian issues that make incorporation easier in the hosting environment: employment, school, language etc. On the other hand, more particular elements such as music, dance or gastronomy tend to remain original or sometimes become hybridised.

Considering the nature of the problems detected in this area of Oeiras as well as the perceptions of the issues on the part of people living here and in the surrounding neighbourhoods, local authorities have chosen an intervention strategy embedded in the URBAN programme. This intervention was developed between 1995 and 1999 and tried to stimulate the establishment of partnerships between the municipality and other entities, both public and private, and to enhance the development of integrated actions in the social, economic and urban domains.

Three kinds of measures were defined: support for training, employment promotion and entrepreneurial initiatives by the ethnic mi-
norities; support for the social and cultural integration of residents; and urban and environmental reclamation. These approaches are visible in the following actions:

* environmental upgrading linked to new housing developments;
* projects to promote school success among youngsters attending the primary and secondary levels, and to diversify their personal and professional interests;
* setting up a reception centre for children living in difficult situations;
* establishment of facilities such as youth clubs, sports clubs, advice centres and a community centre;
* training and re-skilling supported by the European Social Fund;
* refurbishment of a derelict farmhouse as a small enterprise centre (Quinta do Sales);
* improvement of lighting and enhancement of public spaces (pedestrian areas, green areas and play areas).

Despite the budgetary limitations of the URBAN programme, the initiatives developed had an important role in mobilising the local residents to participate in EU projects. Among the measures executed, special relevance must be given to the following:

* Building an accommodation centre for children – “Casa do Parque” – inaugurated in October 1997 for abandoned children, for those who are victims of violence or come from drug-addicted and alcoholic families. This centre is managed by the Portuguese Association for the Rights of Minors and Family and counts on the support of a solidarity network based in local partners and institutions.
* Establishment in 1996 of a leisure area for children under 12 years where their interest in education is stimulated, their social skills are improved, and opportunities for deviant behaviour are prevented.
* Establishment of a Prevention and Security Post, managed by the local council. This unit aims to stimulate co-operation among residents, to provide supporting health and security services, and to give information and advice on solving daily problems. To achieve this, the Centre has a psychologist, a lawyer and a social assistant.

Simultaneously there has been an important effort developed by the municipality of Oeiras to invest in urban and environmental enhancement. In June 1998 an urban park with sports and leisure equipment was inaugurated in a derelict farm. The manor house was renovated and adapted to install a small business park in order to give economic strength to the region and to create new job opportunities. In addition there was an improvement in security, safeguarding and ex-
tending pedestrian areas and setting up more lighting in public spaces. A multi-sports building and a swimming pool were also built.

Moita: Vale da Amoreira

Vale da Amoreira parish is a residential suburban neighbourhood, resulting from a huge state-promoted rehousing development project characterised by a very negative image. In 1991 the neighbourhood had 13,522 inhabitants, most of whom were "refugees" from Portuguese former colonies in Africa, having left their countries after independence. The population is mainly composed of large families, with a high percentage of young people with little schooling and low skills. Public spaces, like residential buildings, show signs of dereliction, the unemployment rate is very high (in 1995, it was 40%; Baptista and Martinho, 1997, p. 13), and there is a serious lack of equipment and services.

In order to respond positively to these problems, the Moita local authorities set up a local intervention office in 1995 and established a social and urban re-qualification plan whose development was possible due to EU funding. Five essential goals were defined:

- to improve road and sewage networks and to enhance public areas;
- to promote local job opportunities with the establishment of an office and small business park hosting offices, warehouses, workshops and handicrafts; a new market to replace the street-market was also built;
- to support the modernisation of local economic activities and to stimulate entrepreneurial initiative and job opportunities;
- building social equipment (kindergarten and home for elderly people) and sports structures (playing fields);
- to stimulate people's participation in the economic, social and cultural dynamics of the neighbourhood.

The initiatives developed within the framework of the urban revitalisation programme facilitated the improvement of community structures and equipment, but the economic, social and cultural dynamism of this neighbourhood has progressed at a slower pace, and is proving a difficult goal to achieve. However, in this domain it is important to point out, because of their strategic and innovative features, the following initiatives:

- a local federation of neighbourhood organisations aiming to establish the necessary links between the population and the project promoters;
• an information centre for youth, with activities in the areas of employment, vocational training, school guidance, sports and leisure in the Setúbal district and special programmes for youngsters during their school holidays;

• the promotion of an “African Cultural Week”, a social event that is also an element of uniqueness and attraction in the context of the social cohesion of the whole municipality;

• an opportunities centre, aiming to support micro-enterprise activities in (and for) the neighbourhood (maintenance of green areas, building repairs and conservation, etc.).

*Development of an ethnic business enclave in the inner city of Lisbon: Martim Moniz*

The Martim Moniz area is located at the edge of Lisbon’s old town centre. Together with the axis composed by Palma Street/Almirante Reis Avenue it is a prolongation northwards of the so-called “Poor Downtown”. The present Martim Moniz Square was made possible by the demolitions made during the 1940s of buildings expropriated by the local authorities with the aim of renovating Lisbon’s derelict central area and to make car traffic easier. However, among the many projects and proposed interventions that have been presented during the last forty years for this area, only isolated elements have actually been built. These are a memory of the dominant trends in Portuguese urbanism between the 1940s and the 1980s: many plans but little in the way of realisation of those plans. This contributed to the urban and social degradation of this area and to the establishment of a strongly negative image.

In mid-1970s an ethnic commercial enclave began to form after the arrival in Lisbon of Indian-origin refugees coming from Mozambique due to the economic instability and civil war that followed the independence of this Portuguese former colony. The first Indian shop-owners established their business in this area of Lisbon and, as noted above, developed two kinds of business: furniture shops, and the selling of imported goods from the Far East such as toys and electronic goods (Malheiros, 1996).

By the end of the 1980s, when the Mouraria Shopping Centre was built on the eastern side of this square, it did not fulfil the goal of upgrading local commerce. It certainly was not a very attractive locational environment for Portuguese shop-owners, especially those with higher-quality outlets. Therefore, this shopping centre became an expansion area for Indian traders who were already installed in the surrounding streets and along the Avenida Almirante Reis axis.
During the 1990s, with the growth and diversification of the geographical origin of immigration to Portugal, this area, due to its centrality in Lisbon and its orientation to lower purchase-power markets, has rapidly become a reference area for poor immigrants and ethnic minorities. It has gradually converted itself into a multi-ethnic commercial enclave made up of Indian and African traders coming from the Portuguese former colonies, and (in the last few years) Chinese businesses. These are concentrated in the Martim Moniz Shopping Centre located opposite the Mouraria Shopping Centre.

For the majority of Lisbon's residents, Martim Moniz Square and its surrounding area have a negative social image due to the presence of many homeless people, its closeness to an area of prostitution and the numerous run-down buildings. However, the ethnic trade, firstly of Indian origin, and subsequently from a number of non-European countries, together with some improvements in accessibility and enhancement of public space, have been playing a key role in revitalising some commercial places, upgrading this neighbourhood and thus arresting the decay and dereliction process that began in the 1940s. Martim Moniz has become a symbolic space for demonstrating the multi-ethnic character of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area.

Concluding remarks

In this paper, using Lisbon as a case study, I have attempted to illustrate the relationship between immigration and urban change. Major economic restructuring occurred in the Lisbon region in the 1980s and 1990s. Changes in the social, professional and ethnic composition of the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, due to economic changes and the rise in immigration, together with large-scale urban construction in the Lisbon region, all exposed and in some cases exacerbated the economic and social disparities of the metropolitan area and introduced substantial shifts in urban policies.

In terms of the spatial pattern of immigrants, it is important to stress that in Lisbon, as in other metropolises where immigration is still a relatively recent phenomenon, there is a trend towards a greater suburbanisation and dispersion of immigrants of the same geographical origin than is the case in American and Northern European cities, where immigration is a more established phenomenon. This means that in Lisbon and other South European cities, ethnic communities are maintained more through social networks rather than through ethnic residential enclaves, as is again the case in the "traditional" cities of immigration.
However, a more detailed spatial analysis reveals that there is a tendency for immigrants and ethnic minorities to gather according to their geographical origin and social and cultural background. The spatial pattern of immigrants' residential areas reflects the dual structure of their social and professional composition: the Europeans and North Americans are over-represented in the more attractive and prestigious areas of Lisbon and Costa do Sol, whereas the Africans tend to group in certain peripheral quarters of clandestine and shanty dwellings.

Local authorities and the central government have been making a major effort to rehouse residents living in shanty-towns and other semi-derelict neighbourhoods. However, this massive rehousing process was not always successful. It improved housing conditions but did not reduce immigrants' social and economic segregation. Moreover, when people are moved to a distant place, it interferes with their territorial identity and severs the ties they had with their previous place of residence. In addition, the architecture of the new buildings makes it more difficult to maintain social networks and support ties among neighbours. The result is often dissatisfaction and sometimes rejection of the new residential area, a stigmatisation of these neighbourhoods by those living in the surrounding areas, and the establishment of a culture based on feelings of exclusion, poverty, low self-esteem and the internalisation of an identity of economic, social and ethnic marginality (Baganha et al., 2000). The answer to these problems demands new approaches and more integrated action in the social, economic and urban environment domains, with wide participation of residents, trying to stimulate the establishment of partnerships between the municipality and other entities, both public and private.

In the case of Lisbon, although the culture of top-down policy, basically oriented to rehousing people living in degraded neighbourhoods and focused on the improvement of buildings, still prevails, since the mid-1990s there has been, at least at the level of political discourse, a change in attitude towards giving attention to social issues (bringing down unemployment, enhancement of public areas, encouraging the social and cultural integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities) and promoting the active participation of residents. The concern of dealing with urban rehabilitation in a more integrated fashion is also present in the principles of the EU URBAN initiative, directed towards the rehabilitation of derelict neighbourhoods where there is often an over-representation of immigrants. The interventions made in Outurela-Portela and Vale da Amoreira are good examples of the adoption of these practices. On the other hand, the Martim Moniz case study demonstrates a more spontaneous capacity of economic and urban revitalisation, directly or indirectly induced by immigrants.
The three case studies presented in this paper confirm the increasing relevance of international migrations in processes of economic, social and cultural change in major cities; they stimulate some thoughts about the kind of adaptation that cities and particularly Lisbon have to go through to integrate larger and more diversified immigrant communities.

The first point of reflection is the direct and indirect innovative potential, both at the socio-cultural and economic levels, that immigrants and ethnic minorities bring to decaying and deprived neighbourhoods. A second element of positive reflection lies in the need for strategic co-operation: both horizontal (between agents with different specialisations that act at the same geographical scale) and vertical (between agents placed at different hierarchical levels). Such multi-level and broad co-operation appears to have good potential to prevent socio-urban degradation processes.

On the other hand, there are some negative issues that also deserve reflection. The first one deals again with co-operation, but this time refers to the low levels of participation on the part of private economic agents (e.g. enterprises, both with domestic and non-domestic backgrounds) in the regeneration plans. Furthermore, in the residential neighbourhoods, it is sometimes hard to reach the minimum participation levels among the ethnic minority population. Finally, public authorities are sometimes slow in recognising new realities and in providing adequate responses. This results in delays in the resolution of problems and sometimes the adoption of inadequate strategies that were planned for other contexts (Malheiros and Fonseca, 1999).

All in all, my analysis of the Lisbon case confirms that the management of the growing ethnic and social diversity of Southern European cities presents new challenges to citizenship and representation, and to forms of government and regulation which are typical of the nation state. In this framework, local authorities have an essential role to play, because they deal directly with people’s difficulties. A bottom-up approach, supported by the empowerment of civil society at the local level, is probably the key to avoid social exclusion mechanisms. Local authorities have to work with all the citizens, on an equal base, independently of their nationality or ethnic background; and citizens, for their part, should be able to voice their concerns over municipal life, so that policies can really be useful. This is more important than ever, not only because society is becoming socially more diversified, but also because its ethnic composition is more varied (Fonseca et al., 2002).

The transition from traditional government strategies to governance – a co-operative effort for spatially-based sustainable development undertaken by local authorities, civil society representatives and enterprises at the urban level (where migrants and ethnic minorities
are concentrated) – opens up space for a wider participation of different urban groups and also for the development of a collective creative capacity (Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000). In this sense, a mix of immigrant and ethnic groups in a favourable urban context may also contribute to find innovative solutions for the increasing complexity of the urban world (Landry, 2000).

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References


Summary

The fast growth of labour immigration to Lisbon, as in other major Southern European metropolises, was mainly visible after the mid-1980s. Considering the new position of Lisbon as a city of immigration, this paper focuses on the processes of social and spatial change associated with the presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities. After a brief overview of the evolution and main features of immigrants and ethnic minorities living in Lisbon, the paper focuses on the interplay between immigrants and ethnic minorities on the one hand, and the socio-spatial reorganisation process that has been taking place in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon on the other. Then, three case studies in areas with a high visibility of immigrants and ethnic minorities are presented to illustrate the role of immigrants in the construction of new urban landscapes, taking into consideration spatial, economic, social and cultural domains. Finally, some reflections on the kinds of adaptation that cities, and particularly Lisbon, have to go through to integrate larger and more diversified immigrant communities are presented.
“Door to door with our Muslim sisters”: intercultural and inter-religious conflicts in Granada, Spain

Introduction: migration and Islam in Spain

In the last fifteen years, Spain has experienced a remarkable increase in its immigrant population (Cornelius, 1994; Izquierdo, 1992). Maghrebin Muslims make up a significant percentage of Spain’s “new” immigrants. Parallel to that, and since the end of the Franco regime, a strong tendency for conversion to the Islamic religion has been observable in Andalusian cities like Granada and Cordoba. In the face of these two phenomena, anti-Islamic and anti-“Moorish” attitudes reflecting the combination of ethnic, religious and nationalist dimensions of discrimination now prevail amongst large sectors of the Spanish general public. These attitudes in fact are deeply-rooted and can be interpreted in one sense as nothing less than historically transmitted stigmatisations of “the other”. As Stallaert (1998) shows in detail, since 1492 and the process of the so-called reconquista, when the “Christian reconquest” of the Iberian peninsula from the different Muslim ruling dynasties was accomplished with the final fall of the city of Granada after its lengthy siege by the “Catholic kings”, the Spanish nation-state project has been founded on a mixture of ethnically-based “arabophobia” and religiously motivated “muslimophobia”.\(^1\) The construction and imposition of a common Spanish-Castilian hegemonic identity has always relied on measures of religious persecution – such as the institution of the Santa Inquisición, invented in Spain – as well as of “ethnic cleansing”, implemented since 1492 through “laws of blood purity” which constantly blur supposedly biological, ethnic and religious terminology.

\(^1\) In the English language the normal term is “islamophobia” (Runnymede Trust, 1997); however we prefer the term “muslimophobia” since it corresponds to the Spanish term.
Particularly affected by this newly emerging muslimophobia is the Muslim woman, whose social function, in the opinion of the majority society, is reduced to motherhood and obedience to her husband. For several centuries now not only Islam as such, but above all Muslim women, have been perceived, used and mis-interpreted as an opposite frontispiece of the West’s self-portrait as a modern, secularised and inclusive civilisation (Martín Muñoz, 1999). Independently of their age, profession, ethnic or social class background, their citizenship and their migrant or native status, Muslim women tend to be focused on as the stereotypical representatives of the West’s prototype of “otherness”. Reflecting the recent feminisation of Maghrebin migration (García Castaño, 2001; Ramírez Fernández, 1998), and contrary to the traditional pattern of female North Africans migrating from rural areas as dependents on their families/husbands, in recent years many Moroccan women from urban contexts have been migrating alone to Spain. Now it is especially the Muslim woman who is becoming more and more an important protagonist in the process of forming a Muslim community.

Methods, actors and local setting

This ethnographic study addresses the largely unknown daily life-world of these “different” female migrants living within a secularising, but still mainly Catholic southern Spanish society. Their life-worlds are profoundly shaped by different, but often overlapping and mutually reinforcing sources and forms of discrimination and exclusion. Gender-related, citizenship-based, ethno-national and religiously mo-

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2 One third of the approximately 140,000 Moroccans legally residing in Spain are women. Approximately 85% of the Moroccan women are from urban backgrounds in northern or central Morocco, whereas fewer women emigrate from the rural Rif region (García Castaño, 2001). The broader context and the general tendencies of changing migration patterns in the Mediterranean region are analysed by King (2000).

3 This study formed part of a transnational project on “Multilevel Discrimination against Muslim Women in Europe”, co-ordinated by Dr. Jochen Blaschke, financed by the Commission of the European Union (project no. VS/1999/0659) and carried out in different European cities between 1999 and 2000 by the Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozialforschung (Berlin, Germany), the Danish Centre for Migration and Ethnic Studies (Esbjerg, Denmark), Università degli Studi di Firenze (Florence, Italy), the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (Warwick, United Kingdom) and the Laboratorio de Estudios Interculturales (Granada, Spain); for its final report, see Blaschke et al. (2001), and the Spanish part see Dietz et al. (2001).
tivated discriminatory attitudes and forms of behaviour are simultaneously at work – both from the “outside”, non-Muslim majority society and from within Muslim minority communities. Accordingly, in the present research, emphasis is laid on the emic perspective of the actors themselves (Geertz, 1983). The (all-too-seldomly studied) awareness and self-definition of discriminatory attitudes and practices, as perceived by the Muslim women, constitute our principal focus of interest, whereas the legal, political and societal macro-level contexts will only be considered as a general framework in which the individual and collective experiences are to be situated and interpreted. Apart from the ethnographic interviews, participant observation and informal conversations and discussions carried out in the Muslim women’s neighbourhoods as well as inside their community associations have been used as a second source of data. The observational data, which reflected our own, outsider or etic perspective, have only been used to cross-check the emic data obtained through the interviews and through informal discussions. In the case of our main source of information, the Muslim women themselves, from the very beginning of the research we have been seeking interview partners who, taken together, would be as heterogeneously composed as possible. The variations followed the criteria of age, region of origin, nationality, ethnicity, civil status, residential/household pattern, educational background and training, current occupation, level of income and, finally, the way of relating to Islam. Combining and varying these criteria, 25 women were chosen. In the case of the 13 NGOs and immigrant associations studied, we have distinguished between organisations mainly run by Spaniards – volunteers as well as employees – and those formed mainly by immigrants, all of them volunteers. Additionally, we obtained access to seven public institutions that deal with women in different areas of social security, health care, education, employment promotion etc. These three different samples of actors we interviewed were chosen in such a way as to ensure a highly diversified picture of variations, experiences and policies, rather than strict statistical representativeness.

4 Slightly pre-structured, open and dense ethnographic interviews have been conducted with the following three main actors considered in this study: immigrant as well as convert Muslim women, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and immigrant associations dealing with them, and public institutions in charge of looking after them.

5 The team which carried out the data collection was made up of experienced ethnographic researchers, teachers and anthropologists who are pursuing postgraduate studies at the University of Granada and who have been participating in several previous migration-related projects of the Laboratorio de Estudios Interculturales; for methodological details, see Dietz et al. (2001).
Granada was the local setting of the research. In this Andalusian city of approximately 300,000 permanent inhabitants, a highly differentiated migrant population has arrived and settled during the last two decades. The main reasons for choosing this city are economic. Granada is the principal commercial city in eastern Andalusia, with market relations both with the northern province of Jaén, dominated by olive monoculture, and the eastern province of Almeria, which has been transformed over the last decade into one of Spain’s most vigorous agricultural export regions. Since the first non-European immigrants started to settle down in Granada in the second half of the 1980s, a complex economic pattern of urban construction work (dominated by Moroccans), urban informal trade (controlled by Senegalese) and seasonal migrations to the olive harvest in the north as well as to the tomato plantations in Almeria, has evolved (Dietz and Peña García, 1999). Further advantages of Granada derive from its character as a university city. On the one hand, the flat market responds to the 60,000 students’ demand for cheap rental property, from which the migrants also profit; on the other hand, the university has attracted highly skilled immigrants. Meanwhile the “orientalist” legacy (Said, 1978) of the city has turned it into a point of confluence for Muslim converts as well.

Islam between discourse and practice

Despite their often completely different political and ideological backgrounds, the representatives of public institutions as well as of NGOs agree in their rather stereotyped perception of Muslim women. All representatives mention the gap which supposedly exists not only between Islam and Christianity, but also between Islam and modernity. Even those who reject the simplifying opinions about the supposedly oppressive character of Islam in its “impact” on Muslim women, tend to stress the cultural difference between “backward” or “underdeveloped” Muslim regions of the world on the one hand, and the “modern” parts of the world on the other hand. Muslim women are viewed as—real or potential—victims of their own religion and its machista practices. Political authoritarianism and religiously legitimated oppression against women are “two sides of the same coin”, as one NGO activist stated.

This homogeneity of external definitions and views expressed by members of the non-Muslim majority society contrasts completely with the huge diversity of self-definitions and identity discourses offered by the Muslim women themselves. The religious identity expressed by Muslim women in the course of the interviews is strongly
shaped by their socialisation, which for most of them has taken place before emigrating to Spain. Those women who come from an Arab – mostly Moroccan – and from a more or less religious background, tend to perceive Islam as a “normal” part of their identity and self-definition (Geertz, 1968). Since adolescence, the religious prescriptions and rituals like praying and fasting, which were transmitted as part of a family’s and/or community’s cultural heritage, have been integrated into the women’s daily life routine. As a woman of Pakistani origin explained, for her Islam is just “a system of organisation” which helps to structure daily routines and to organise one’s own life according to certain guiding principles of morality and “respect” towards each other. Thus, most of the women associate their distinctively Muslim as opposed to Christian religion to a mere coincidence or “fate” of geography. Religion is not perceived as a matter of choice, but of inheritance. The close link which is supposed to unite Islam as a religious system, on the one hand, and the Muslim women’s particular cultural and even national backgrounds, on the other hand, is only questioned by two rather different types of interviewees: those women of Spanish nationality and Catholic religious and cultural origin who have converted to Islam in the course of their adolescence or early adulthood, and those women who have migrated from the north-eastern part of Morocco or from northern Algeria and who identify themselves in ethnic terms not as Arab, but as Amazigh.

Without any exception, the Spanish converts stress the particular gap dividing Islam and Christianity. The personal experience of religious conversion is always expressed in terms of “liberation” from tradition. The process of conversion is remembered as a profound and very personal identity crisis and as an “awakening” from past superficiality and merely pragmatic religiosity. Quite a lot of former Catholics converted to Islam in the transition period from the Franco dictatorship to democracy, a period during which Catholicism was perceived as an empty relic of pre-modern times. In their process of searching for new forms of belief, Islam becomes a tool for struggling not only against the superficiality of traditional Catholic rites practiced in their own families of origin, but also against the prevailing machismo. In the converts’ view, sexist and authoritarian attitudes towards women are part of Catholic religion, as customarily practiced in southern Spain. Islam, on the contrary, promotes “mutual respect between both sexes”.

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6 Allievi (2000) analyses the role generally played by converts in re-interpret- ing Islam.

7 The influence of Amazigh culture and identity on the northern Moroccan Rif region is described in detail by Hart and Raha Ahmed (1999).
Since, for the converts, Islam is not an integral part of family traditions, they claim that there are two different ways of practicing Islam: the "religion of the immigrants", on the one hand, where culture and religion are supposedly "mixed up", and "bare Islam", on the other hand, which should not be associated with any culture in particular. The regional diversity and ethnic distinctions that prevail inside Islam (Lippman, 1995) are thematised as well by the Amazigh, be they from Algeria, from Morocco or from the North African Spanish enclave of Melilla. They tend to concur with the converts in pointing out that a large amount of distinctive religious practices, beliefs and rules is not of Muslim, but of Arab or other ethnic origin. Otherwise the struggle for presenting Islam as a culturally "neutral" and contemporary "way of life" is only observable with young urban upper- and middle-class women, who in several cases now pursue university studies in Spain. All other Muslim women, who come from rural or lower-class urban contexts, tend to identify Islam with tradition.

Because of the obvious differences in the personal and cultural backgrounds, further differences can be observed in the way Islam is perceived and lived by the converts, on the one hand, and by immigrants, on the other. For the vast majority of Muslim migrant women, religious instruction is not remembered as a distinctive aspect of the process of socialisation. Their descriptions of religious life and its institutional setting still closely relate to the country of origin. While the women's home is mentioned as the main place and institution in charge of religious orientation, the mosque and the school are recalled as minor socialising agents. The mosque, as a public meeting-point and as a religious community institution, is frequently associated with male attributes. A woman from Nador in Morocco even feels uncomfortable praying in the mosque, as it is "more suitable for men". Apart from that, most of the women admit that their knowledge of the Holy Quran is rather selective and reflects very pragmatic attitudes. Spanish converts, on the other hand, often criticise this pragmatic attitude towards religious belief. They have experienced conversion as an initiation in the most classical sense of a rite de passage (Van Gennep, 1966), and therefore require the support of an initiated person or community in order to acquire basic notions not only of the Arabic language and Islamic theological literature, but especially of the Holy Quran.

Descriptions of and opinions about religious beliefs and practices provided by Muslim women through the interviews once again present a highly diversified scope of attitudes and experiences. With the exception of the converts, it is always the family of origin which shapes the particular rites and habitual practices (Rippin, 2001). Most women remember the role of the father as being crucial in the first years of par-
ticipation in religious life, while continuity of religious practice is associated more with the mother, and not any more with the father, who seems to have acted as an often absent, but always supervising authority (Geertz, 1968). In the overwhelming majority of families, religious obligations have always been practiced in a rather flexible way. After emigrating from Morocco, Algeria or other Muslim countries, what has been until then a more or less routine practice frequently becomes a serious problem or at least a challenge for one's sense of duty. Different strategies are developed in order to cope with these challenges. Some of the women try to compensate the lack of context and of cultural embeddedness by increasingly internalising their belief. A young woman from Nador in northern Morocco explained that since living in southern Spain she has got to know "that Islam is located in the heart, not in the family or neighbourhood". In many cases, however, the suddenly missing framework of the family and kinship networks and a deep feeling of personal isolation weaken the willpower for the daily practising of Islam. This – supposedly only temporary – loss of social support is deepened by the lack of an existing migrant community in many of the cities or villages of immigration. If anything the now-emerging "religious infrastructure" of mosques, community meeting points, shops which offer halal food as well as products from the region of origin, etc. that is observable in cities like Granada and Cordoba, strengthens even more the impression of losing the "naturalness" and embeddedness which formerly characterised religious belief. In contrast to the converts, who welcome the "changing face of their city" as a development towards its "oriental legacy", some of the migrants even feel somehow "instrumentalised" by orientalist tourism policies. The sense of the above-mentioned loss is also promoted by the surrounding social context. Members of the Spanish and Catholic majority society are frequently reported to show not just "mere" rejection, but complete ignorance and a lack of interest when interacting with Muslims. Accordingly, some women abandon certain customs like daily prayers, Ramadan or wearing the headscarf. Finally, several younger women have developed "double standards" in order to face the challenge of bridging the expectations of their own family and those of the majority society. This strategy, however, is not only a result of migrating to Spain; since adolescence many of the interviewees were found to systematically change codes of conduct when spending time outside their parents' direct sphere of influence.

This pragmatic and selective approach towards Islamic traditions and obligations (Lippman, 1995) is completely absent in the case of the converts. They perceive their religious duties not as something negotiable with and against the "forces of tradition" and/or the "surround-
ing social context”, but as the result of an individual choice. In the same way as the conversion itself is narrated in rather mystical terms, religious life is seen as a unique opportunity of encountering divinity in daily routine.

Another frequently discussed issue is the significance and necessity of wearing the headscarf. Despite the fact that in Spain there have been no major public conflicts around the issue of the headscarf – women are “even allowed to wear it when taking a passport photograph”, as one Moroccan interviewee gratefully acknowledged – nevertheless the veil is seen as an obstacle when searching for employment or trying to rent a flat. The institutions and NGOs see the “problem” of veiling as a major indicator of the host society’s “racism”. And yet, although tolerance towards the habit of veiling is always expressed, some institutional representatives say that Muslim women “should not exaggerate” and should not look “just as if they were in Morocco”, as this would make it difficult for their Catholic neighbours to “accept” them. A social worker dealing with Muslim women even claimed that some of them are covering their head as a means of “self-isolation”.

In order to avoid this kind of discrimination, some migrant women in certain situations strategically take the headscarf off, something that of course does not counter the underlying equation of headscarf, phenotypical distinction, muslimophobic attitudes, and the overt rejection of people of Moroccan origin. While the majority of women regard wearing the veil as an integral part of their identity (not only religious but also sexual), and therefore as an unquestioned part of their traditions, a minority of women, mainly of Amazigh origin, reject the headscarf, which they identify as “something imposed by the Arabs” and above all by “the machista attitude of Muslim husbands”. For them, the preservation of an archaic religious symbol that has nothing to do with higher or lower degree of religiosity, prevents Muslim women from liberating themselves. This interpretation, which is astonishingly similar to the Spanish mainstream public perception of Muslim women as victims, is sharply contradicted by other women, who emphasise the variability of veiling customs that are just as exposed to changes and fashions as any other “piece of clothing”. Several Muslim women, immigrants as well as converts, even claim the hijab serves as an erotic device, while Christian Spanish women are criticised as boringly “naked”.

However, in the migration context of a non-Muslim host society, some women understand the headscarf not as a question of custom or

8 For a sketch of this conflict as it has manifested itself in different European countries, see Verlot (1996); El Guindi (1999) presents the evolution and diversity of country-of-origin interpretations and uses of veiling.
fashion, but as a strictly religious symbol of identifying oneself vis-à-vis the Christian “other”. This attitude is shared by the Spanish converts, who, while being dressed modestly, cover their heads in order to be recognised as Muslims. This tendency of using the hijab as a religious distinction or even as an “ethnic marker” (Eriksen, 1993) in inter-religious contexts, however, is openly rejected by other Muslim women. In their view, it turns the issue of veiling into a superficial question of belonging to a religious minority without regard to the individual faith and attitude towards one’s own religion.

Despite these differences in perceiving and practising Islam, nearly all the women we interviewed highly appreciated their religion as a source of security and confidence in their current situation of suddenly belonging – due to migration or conversion – to a religious minority. As an Arab woman told us, her own religious conviction has actually increased in the migration context in the sense that she has started feeling much closer to the presence of God.

When asked about the relation between religion and gender and, particularly, about the Islamic norms and values directly referring to women, the interviewees do not agree at all. Generally it may be stated that most of the women acknowledge the necessity of distinctive gender roles. They accept the assignment of different social and economic, public as well as private, tasks according to gender differences as something “natural” or “practical”. Above all the converts comment on their impression of being liberated from the male omnipresence and the intersex competition which according to them characterises Christian societies. When comparing female roles, rights and duties, only very few of the interviewed women – all of them of Amazigh ethnic background – identify Islam as such as a source of sexual discrimination and<br>machismo. In contrast, in the eyes of the majority, it is not Islam in itself, but Muslim males, who are generally claimed to be the perpetrators of sexual discrimination. Accordingly, for them it is the social control which mainly through “mere gossip” succeeds in transforming the differentiation of roles into female submission. Thus, all converts as well as many Moroccan women insist on the necessity of distinguishing between Islam as a belief system, on the one hand, and its realisation in different cultural and geographic contexts, on the other.

A gendered life-cycle

For nearly all of the non-Spanish women, their whole childhood has been focused on the family, on close kinship relations and on the neighbourhood, which is recalled as ever-present, often supporting,
but at the same time surveying, the girls’ upbringing. The majority describe their first menstruation as the major event in their young lives. The taboo associated with the female period becomes a decisive part of a woman’s sexual identity in her behaviour towards and her interaction with male counterparts. For many women reaching puberty is remembered as a real turning point; since then the male members of the family, their father and/or elder brothers, start to intervene directly in their education. Another crucial factor in the process of socialisation is the question of access and continuity in the home country’s educational system which, according to the description of several women, had an impact on the personal awareness of gender-related issues and has promoted therefore the process of increasing consciousness in general and “liberation” from the family’s tutelage. In those cases where the parents enabled their daughters to attend higher schools, often far away from their family homes, schooling and migration mutually reinforced each other. Due to this interrelation between education and migration, a relatively high level of professional qualification – gained in the country of origin – characterises most of those female Muslim immigrants who entered Spain neither as students nor in the course of family regrouping. Only the migrant women from the poorest strata had never attended school, because they had to support their parents’ economic activities from an early age. The vast majority who did attend school were educated at state or public schools. In several families of urban middle and higher strata, the religious instruction provided in these schools was supplemented by a specific Quranic instruction. Due to the former Spanish “protectorate” (Salas Larrazabal, 1992), in northern parts of Morocco there exists a further type of school, namely Spanish-speaking or Spanish-Arabic bilingual schools maintained either by the Spanish government or by Catholic religious orders. Even though they do not provide any religious instruction for Muslim pupils, these schools seem to be highly attractive for the upward-striving middle classes, as they offer a combined Spanish-Moroccan baccalaureat, which often constitutes the first step for university studies in southern Spain. So, as can be seen, Islamic instruction did not play a major part in the education of many migrant women. Contrary to that, all converts, besides pointing out the “oppressive” nature of their traditional socialisation inside their Catholic families, criticise the overwhelmingly confessional orientation inside the schools they attended. After their process of conversion, most of these women are nowadays highly and overtly suspicious about the Spanish school system and fear the

9 For details on this see González Barea and Dietz (1999) and González Barea (2000).
strong influence of the non-Muslim surroundings as a potential risk for their children’s long-term adherence to Islam – a fear which is not shared by any of the immigrated Muslim women.

Apart from schooling and education, the question of marriage has an important impact on the life of all Muslim women. Since nowadays love and friendship are the motives most frequently stated to explain the choice of the partner, specific conflicts arise in the migration context. For many of the younger women who emigrated on their own and who had reached a fairly high educational level before deciding to migrate to Spain, a major problem consists not only in finding an adequate partner in the isolated situation which they are suffering in the migratory destination, but above all in resisting the indirect, but ongoing pressure and criticism by their parents, kin and neighbours back home as far as their “age limit” for marriage is concerned. Beyond that, serious problems are mentioned when marrying non-Muslim partners. Instead of achieving some kind of inter-religious exchange on the basis of Christian-Muslim beliefs and convergences, women who have passed through these experiences remember sensations and feelings of “ritual loneliness”, of just being “tolerated” by their partners. Sometimes an even greater problem for inter-religious marriages, however, is their lack of formal recognition in the Muslim country of origin. Therefore, a strategy of “double standards” between the host society and the context of origin is developed by some Muslim women in order to hide the inter-religious reality from their families back home. An Algerian woman who had been married to a Spanish Catholic said that her father never knew about her marital relation. Since the converts criticise and refuse the concept of love as “Western” and “romantic”, the issue of getting married for them seems to be less conflictual. According to their statements, the criteria for choosing a spouse, and a prerequisite therefore for a successful partnership, are “rational” and not “emotional” ones.

Struggling for community formation

Above all unmarried migrant women, and even many of those young Muslim women who study at a Spanish university and normally feel well integrated, suffer from loneliness, and especially isolation from their families. Their feelings of isolation also reflect the poor community relations which characterise their daily lives in southern Spain. To some extent, the problem can be countered by an emerging “transnational” and “trans-Mediterranean” kind of migration network, i.e. by frequent visits from and to the family in the region of ori-
gin. On the other hand, even married women who migrated in the context of a family reunion opportunity complain about difficulties in establishing more stable social and neighbourhood relations. This is due to their heavy dependence on their husband’s social and work relations or on their own employment in the shadow economy (more on this below). While the necessity of community building in the migrant situation is reflected in all of the interviews conducted, immigrant community life is still strongly fragmented and departmentalised according to the needs of the first immigrants, mainly unmarried male employees. The immigrant sections of the two major Spanish trade unions (Unión General de Trabajadores and Comisiones Obreras) that still dominate associational life (Watts, 2000), are only controlled by male representatives, and their union activities are accordingly focused on sectoral issues relevant above all to male employees. And the religious organisational life emerging through newly-established mosques and recently-created bodies like the Consejo Islámico de Granada at the local level or the Comunidad Musulmana de España at the national level (Moreras, 1999; Rosón Lorente, 2000), are also dominated by men. These organisational frameworks therefore cannot satisfy the requirements of migrant women, who most of all just seek possibilities of meeting each other, of knowing other Muslim women, of exchanging practical information and of holding informal encounters without the presence of men. The participation of Muslim women in certain activities carried out by migrant associations and/or by Spanish NGOs supporting them is actually very weak, either because they are not allowed to by their husbands or because they simply have no contact with or knowledge about these associations or NGOs. Otherwise the “assistentialist” connotations conferred on such institutions often produce feelings of being somehow “stigmatised” when turning towards them—an attitude that is promoted by the often-criticised “charity” approach explicitly used by several NGOs of Catholic background (Dietz, 2000). Similar attitudes are expressed concerning social services offered by the Spanish welfare state to its citizens. Apart from those women who have never even heard of the existence of such services, all female migrants deploy strategies of simply ignoring and/or explicitly avoiding them. According to one social worker’s opinion, this resistance stems from the “illegal” immigrants’ fear of being denounced and deported with the aid of the public institution.

10 The concept of “transnational migration networks” has been applied to the study of migrant women in Spain and their integration into “long-distance” kinship and household units by Gregorio (1998); González Barea (2000) extends the concept to Moroccan students living between the northern and southern Mediterranean shores.
Nevertheless, both sides, NGO representatives as well as many Muslim women, tend to agree that the Spanish-dominated association spaces for encounters, on the one hand, should be supplemented by the migrant women's own associations; and that, on the other hand, migrant women should be incorporated into the work process of these NGOs - as a first step in the attempt to overcome the "huge culture conflicts going on daily". According to the Muslim women, the most important topics these emerging associations are supposed to address are, first of all, legal and bureaucratic issues, such as "legalising" residence and work permits as well as the situation of divorced, abandoned women and single mothers, and secondly the issue of accessibility to literacy and language instruction, above all for older women.

While many women criticise the NGOs' frequent praxis of "diverting" them from one organisation or institution to another, the difficulties described by NGOs while interacting and cooperating with Muslim women's groups and associations are due to the lack of stability, continuity and accountability shown in their daily work. In the opinion of the director of the Albayzin neighbourhood's Community Social Services Centre, it is still the Muslim communities' organisational diversity which prevents them from having a stronger impact on local issues. Apart from internal divisions and sectarianism, the main distinction that still divides Muslims in Spain is that between migrants from Muslim societies of origin, on the one hand, and Muslim converts, on the other hand. Due to their different approaches to and perception of Islam noted above, most converts implicitly distance themselves from the Maghrebin immigrants. In fact, they are the only Muslim group that succeeded in building up strong and stable, although rather small communities. This difference seems to be related to the process of conversion itself, which takes place not only as a personal revelation, but in parallel as a "voyage" of initiation into the midst of a community of already-initiated fellow travellers. Besides, the strength of the convert communities is also a result of the necessity of compensating one's own experience of de-rooting from the complete set of family, kin and social relations which existed before conversion.

The only Muslim women who feel they completely form part of their local host society are those who hold Spanish citizenship: e.g. a woman who acquired dual Spanish–Moroccan citizenship after marrying a Spanish Muslim, and above all the Muslim migrant women from the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. However, even the latter describe a feeling of bewilderment when exposed to the "strange" and "exaggerated" southern Spanish Catholicism, with its cults of holy images, processions and other public rites.
Niches and segments of labour market integration

Concerning work activities, there is a basic distinction to be made between married and unmarried Muslim women (Ramírez Fernández, 1998; 1999). The majority of the unmarried ones work above all in domestic services and – to a lesser degree – in the tourism-related service sector, e.g. in the kitchens of bars and hotels. The interviewees describe dense informal networks which regulate and control the access, distribution and sub-contracting of domestic cleaning, child-care and related activities, carried out in mainly Spanish middle-class families. Many of these women complain about the lack of social security provisions, the exploitation they suffer by their employers, the lack of formal employment contracts and the instability and changing nature of the jobs they do. According to several NGOs and associations which try to advise and protect the affected migrant women, these shadow "niches" of the economy (including also prostitution) increasingly seem to grow together in an intertwined complex of informality, illegality and lack of protection; a trend which is reinforced by the fact that the official governmental "regulation campaigns" for "illegal" migrants do not cover these sectors.

Due to the informality of most of the jobs, hardly any of the Muslim women we interviewed had access to trade union advice or protection, or has ever obtained official unemployment payments offered by the central government's employment agency, the Instituto Nacional de Empleo (INEM). Because of the constant fear of losing the current, though informal job, many women enter a vicious circle. They accept bad working conditions, discriminatory treatment and exploitation\(^{11}\) not only out of financial necessity, but because they hope meantime to stabilise their status. Only those immigrants who can prove for a certain number of years – this amount varies in each of the "regularisation campaigns" – that they have been employed formally or informally, will get the opportunity of legalising their residence and working permits.

A new "Muslim employment" sector is currently emerging in the course of the "orientalist" fashion of the local tourism policies developed in cities such as Granada. Tourist entrepreneurs as well as converts, who are regaining control over the historically Muslim quarters and who are upgrading these formerly deprived neighbourhoods through "oriental" tea shops, ethnic food restaurants, handicraft stores etc., offer jobs mainly to Moroccan migrants and above all to Moroccan stu-

\(^{11}\) "Slave-like exploitation" is an apt description of the so-called internas, migrant women who are forced to live in the same private homes in which they are offering their domestic services, and whose very existence as employees is not even recognised by the social security institutions.
dents who work in shops and give Islamic instruction as well as Arabic language classes.

It is almost impossible for migrant women to find employment according to their prior qualification. On the one hand, academic titles and professional training acquired in the country of origin are generally not recognised in Spain; and on the other hand access on equal terms to the Spanish labour market is legally restricted. This is why almost all interviewees experience professional frustration after having migrated to southern Spain, something that always implies a parallel sensation of social class downgrading.

As for married migrant women, they tend to support their husbands’ often informal economic activities, working as street-vendors, shopkeepers or agricultural labourers. In most cases they lack their own working permit, which can only be acquired if in the course of the next “regularisation campaign” they can prove that they have been working and earning money on their own. Anyhow, Muslim women frequently state that they themselves give higher priority to child-raising than to employment outside their home. Therefore they focus their own work on activities that can be performed at home, like handicrafts, preparing food for restaurants or shops, or taking care of other families’ children.

If a woman lacks a working permit, she furthermore cannot be included in the employment search databases administered by INEM. This is the reason why a whole network of informal and semi-formal job opportunity files and databases has been created by Spanish NGOs supporting so-called “illegal” migrants (García-Cano Torrico, 2000). In addition, free-of-charge services with the aim of offering intermediation services concerning work possibilities are provided by the Oficina de Atención Integral al Inmigrante (OAIM), an office recently started by the city council of Granada. Besides employment promotion and qualification opportunities (such as language training) offered to Muslim women by NGOs and voluntary associations, migrant women’s associations have created informal child-care projects through which the women can leave their children with other women while participating in courses or other leisure activities.

Institutionalised muslimophobia? Muslim women in search of the Spanish state

When asked about their general impressions of the institutional network of public as well as non-governmental agencies supposedly in charge of addressing the needs of migrant and/or minority populations, nearly all women complain about the chaotic and bureaucratic
way in which these institutions function. As Spanish institutions seem neither understandable nor efficient in their service-provision functions, many women – even those who are rather well integrated in the host society and who have a good command of Spanish – avoid attending them. Only in extreme situations of emergency, such as certain diseases, a deadline for “regulating” migration-related documents or a threat of deportation, are they willing to ask for “help”. This attitude of resignation and avoidance is conditioned by experiences of generalised institutional discrimination and in a few cases even direct racist and sexist attacks by official bodies like police officers. Despite the fact that several women – mainly those who have never suffered from periods of “illegality” – deny any personal experience of being rejected or ill-treated by public institutions due to the mere fact of their nationality, especially the converts agree that all reported forms of official discrimination merely reflect the institutional perception of threat, according to which both conversion and immigration will end in a “new invasion of Granada”.

In the perception of institutions’ and NGOs’ representatives, the migrant population as such “is a problem”. They complain about “submissive” Muslim women always being accompanied by a male friend or by their restrictive husbands, which deprives them from expressing their own skills and possibilities of communicating and from establishing a personal and direct contact with the institutional counterpart – something that therefore only holds them back from overcoming their linguistic difficulties and communication barriers. As a consequence of this perception, which turns migration into an institutional problem per se, both public institutions and their NGO counterparts seem to have agreed on “splitting up” the already weak social services provision into a “generalist” and a “particularised, minority-oriented” branch. The non-problematic segments of the majority society would thus be covered by public institutions, whereas specific problems of migrants or other minority communities such as the Andalusian Roma population would be better solved when treated by particular, mostly non-governmental bodies (Dietz, 2000). As the president of Granada Acoge, the main local NGO admits, this division has a “negative impact on the quantity and quality of the services, since non-citizen migrants ... are passed over to private charities, which try to deliver the highest quantity of services while having the lowest financial resources”.

Another major problem for migrants constitutes the issue of the Spanish public health care system, from which Muslim women are officially excluded if they lack residence and working permits. In the case of those women who accompany their husbands or who join them through a family reunion measure, they will only have the benefit of health insurance if their respective husbands are employed in the for-
mal sector of the economy, which is often not the case. Foreign (e.g. Mor-
rocan) students obtain health care coverage only up to the age of 28, in
spite of the fact that many need more time to finish their university
studies, because they often first have to take language courses.

In order to solve this urgent problem, the main NGOs, in agree-
ment with the Andalusian Regional Ministry of Labour and Social Se-
curity, have recently become entitled to issue a special personal identi-
fication document for persons with “irregular coverage”. This tarjeta
sanitaria gives access to hospital facilities. However, this possibility is
restricted to “cases of extreme emergency” and is often still not recog-
nised by local doctors, according to the representative of the Spanish
Red Cross.

While some of those women who have a health insurance stress
above all the positive impact of information campaigns concerning pre-
ventive medicine, others complain about “permanently being sent
around in the building when asking about special doctors or units”,
and even about rude treatment by the hospital staff – an attitude that
once again seems to be related to the lack of language skills. Paradoxi-
cally, the same hospital staff who insist on their clients’ obligation to
bring their husbands with them as “translators”, criticise Muslim
women for “crowding the waiting rooms” with their children. In addi-
tion, hospital attendants emphasise Muslim women’s unwillingness to
adapt to the health system’s “official rules” and to the hospital’s tim-
etable. They attend medical services either too late and often show up
“in the middle of the night”, or they refuse to accept the differentiated
functions of the district doctors, the specialists residing in the hospital
and the chemists’ providing the prescribed medicine.

Another problematic aspect perceived by many Muslim women
when making use of the Spanish health institutions is the scarcity of fe-
male doctors, particularly in the units of gynaecology and obstetrics,
since being examined by male physicians is perceived to be highly un-
usual and shameful. Furthermore, the circumcision rite also seems to
create conflicts. According to a Spanish convert, some anesthetists re-
fuse to serve their Muslim clients in order to prepare them for circumci-
sion, arguing that they do not support any form of “child abuse”. This in-
terviewee interprets such a refusal as an act of religious discrimination.

Non-confessional schools as confessional battlegrounds

As the settling of whole families of migrants is a very recent phe-
nomenon in southern Spain, the domain of education and training is
only now becoming a major focus of attention for migration-related is-
sues. Many of the schools concerned with the challenge of receiving, in-
Integrating and educating the children of migrants lack any experience in the field of bilingual and/or intercultural education (see García Castaño et al., 1999). Only a very few schools, located in neighbourhoods with a relative clustering of migrant communities, include any activity supposedly targeted at migrant pupils. The real intercultural character of these activities is, however, highly dubious. For the headmaster of a primary school in the Albayzin quarter of Granada, for example, including pupils and parents of other religions when celebrating festivities such as Christmas is seen as a sufficient contribution to the “intercultural curriculum” of his school and to eradicating discrimination among children and grown-ups!

On the other hand, Muslim mothers – while admitting that neither multicultural education nor bilingual classes promoting the language and culture of origin of migrant pupils are implemented in the schools – still hold rather ambivalent opinions about the necessity of interculturalising the school activities. Several Moroccan women interviewed seemed rather satisfied with the de facto division between the completely different educational roles and tasks performed by the migrant family, on the one hand, and the public school, on the other. They insist on the usefulness of distinguishing between their own task of transmitting their mother tongue and their cultural and religious background, and the Spanish school’s task of offering access to the majority society’s most important linguistic and cultural tools. In contrast to that, serious school-related problems and conflicts are mentioned by Muslim convert mothers. Many of them reject the legal obligation of schooling all children until they reach the age of sixteen either in public or in recognised private – mostly Catholic – primary or secondary schools. They complain about overt discrimination against their children – above all against their daughters – by non-Muslim fellow pupils, who constantly mock them, stigmatising them as “Moors” and thereby provoking feelings of isolation and passive resistance. This discriminatory attitude seems to be deepened by the lack of intercultural knowledge and sensibility often shown by the schools’ personnel, who for example might completely ignore Muslim prescriptions in lunch catering services for the pupils or on festival occasions. Furthermore, convert mothers criticise the monolingual tradition which still strongly shapes the Spanish educational system; they also suspect the Spanish public schools to be implicitly but intrinsically confessional and potentially missionary in their orientation – something that is also recognisable by the simple fact that religious instruction is offered only for the Catholic confession.

As a reaction to these experiences of implicit partiality shown by a supposedly “neutral” public school system, three years ago a group of convert parents from Granada and its surroundings started to shift
from their usual criticism to more propositional action. They decided to
develop a “pilot project” through which, in one of the public primary
schools (the afore-mentioned Albayzín school), the curriculum would
be adapted in order to offer Islamic religious instruction and Arabic
language classes as an alternative for the Muslim pupils, who would be
“co-educated” with the non-Muslim pupils in all other subjects. Fur-
thermore, the Islamic dietary prescriptions would be respected in an
alternative lunch menu. After a very brief first exploratory phase, dur-
ing which a Spanish teacher, who also had converted to Islam, was in
charge of the Islamic instruction and the Arabic language classes, the
project was suddenly cancelled by the Andalusian Regional Ministry of
Education. The motives expressed above all by the Catholic residents
and parents for stopping the enterprise lay in the fear that this multi-
religious school would attract too many Muslim pupils from other
neighbourhoods, which would then run the risk of “ghettoisation”. This
attitude once again reflects not only the majority society’s, but even the
administration’s historical fear of “a return of the Moors”. The educa-
tional authorities, on the other hand, retrospectively interpret the can-
celled project as a partisan attempt of one single Muslim convert group
of gaining control of the public school in the neighbourhood. In the
Ministry’s view, as long as the Muslim communities settling in Andal-
lusia do not succeed in “speaking with one voice” and negotiating ac-
cess to public religious instruction through a single legitimate and rep-
resentative body, their projects will be denied any official support.

When the project was rejected, the solution chosen by the Muslim
convert mothers was rather drastic. By means of a concerted action, all
Muslim pupils suddenly disappeared from the state primary school in
Albayzín and entered a newly created, private Islamic school, which
lacked official recognition. After the parents had been threatened with
legal and police action to enforce their children’s right to education, the
local Community Social Services were chosen as intermediary in the
negotiations. The social worker in charge finally succeeded in convinc-
ing the parents to “hand back” their children to those schools where
they were originally registered before the pilot project started.

Multiculturalising the neighbourhood?

Next, discriminatory attitudes in the local and personal contexts of
their immediate neighbourhood are reported by many Muslim women.
Overt or subtle rejection is experienced when addressing the initial
challenge of renting a flat. According to the public institutions and
NGOs, the major factor preventing migrant families from renting a
well-equipped flat is the impossibility of paying simultaneously the
first month of rent and the deposit. Due to that factor and to the stereotypical opinion that Moroccan immigrants “don’t clean” and “leave flats in a mess”, real-estate owners feel very insecure when dealing with migrant people. In addition to the financial factor, the public institutions also perceive “cultural differences” as a source of “misunderstandings” between local owners and immigrant tenants. Moroccan students are said to “lack tolerance” towards Spanish fellow students, particularly regarding drinking, diet and sexual habits when sharing a flat with them. Another supposedly “cultural” factor is their refusal to accept the local urban habit of many older people who want to rent them a room in their flat, but who share the flat with their domestic animals.

From the point of view of all the Muslim women who were interviewed, these obstacles do not seem to be completely “culture”-based or economically motivated, but related to a generalised, historically-rooted muslimophobia. The fear of, and scepticism towards, their ethnic and religious “otherness” are also felt by Muslim women in the neighbourhood as the main sites of daily interaction with members of the majority society. Converts and immigrants alike feel permanently observed and scrutinised. They become bored and tired of “proving” to their neighbours through their day-to-day behaviour that they are “different” from the general prejudices existing about them. This permanent requirement of arguing and justifying one’s “difference” vis-à-vis the mainstream society – according to an Algerian woman – often leads into self-restricting leisure activities and social relations only with other Muslim women or families instead of striving for “integration” into the social networks of their non-Muslim Spanish neighbours. Meanwhile, in the perception of the majority society and its institutions, this phenomenon of self-isolation is seen as an undesirable enclosure and “self-ghettoisation”.

Between gender, religion and ethnicity: experiences of discrimination and racism

Following our methodological choice of privileging an emic perspective in analysing the issue of discrimination in its multiple expressions and functions, our approach moves far beyond an etic, external point of view of merely distinguishing between “real” and “perceived” phenomena of discrimination. This stance contrasts not only with other academic approaches (for instance Moller and Togeby, 1999), but also with the view of several majority-society institutions and organisations which tend to stress an alleged “over-sensitivity” as the reason for Muslim women feeling continuously discriminated against. Muslim women generally define “discrimination” as synonymous with “in-
equality", a conscious and often explicit ill-treatment of a certain minority group, based on arbitrarily making artificial distinctions where there should be none. In their view, discrimination, which fundamentally takes place on a personal and not on an institutional level, may range from mere joking and stereotyping in daily interaction, to legal distinctions between Spaniards and aliens, and finally to overtly racist threats or attacks. For several interviewees it is not sufficient to explain the discriminatory experiences they are currently suffering by reference to the host society’s simple ignorance and lack of knowledge about the immigrants’ region or culture of origin. Especially the converts stress the negative impact of the Spanish mass media in producing a generally bad and often completely false picture of the Muslim-Arab world, full of religious, phenotypical, culture- as well as gender-related stereotypes which inevitably guide the perceptions and interactions of the local majority society.12 Many women said how fed up and insulted they feel when always having to counter allusions to “machista Muslim men” and “submissive Muslim women”, to the “hideousness” of Arab men and the “lascivious and eroticism of Arab belly-dancers”, and answer explicit questions about the supposed customs of “Arab revenge and blood-feuds”, or even about the strangely cultivated rumour according to which “the Arabs” are trying to reconquer the “Spanish shores” by sending their pregnant women illegally to the peninsula offering them money for giving birth to “so many moritos”. The converts, however, who do perceive institutional and structural forms of discrimination, describe these attitudes and questions not as a mere expression of stereotypes, but as a new form of reproducing structurally-rooted historical phobias. Since to the converts’ mind a monocultural and mono-religious core persists inside the supposedly secular and “neutral” Spanish public institutions, conversion to Islam is treated as an act of “disloyalty” and “national betrayal”.13

This permanent confusion between national, ethnic and religious dimensions of identification throughout the Spanish majority society’s stigmatised and essentialised view of “the other” is perceived by many interviewees as the main obstacle to establishing and maintaining a genuine intercultural dialogue. In order to systematise the often overlapping and intertwined areas and sources of discriminatory attitudes and practices, in the following a double distinction will be made, on the one hand, between exogenous versus endogenous forms of discrimina-

12 Said (1997) illustrates the extent to which Western mass media contribute to the maintenance and promotion of stereotyped and biased perceptions of Islam.

13 For an example of a literary treatment given in the democratic transition period to the topos of “national betrayal” through religious conversion to Islam, see Goytisolo (1985).
tion (i.e. between discriminatory attitudes whose principal source is situated outside or inside the Muslim women’s own community); and, on the other hand, between ethno-religiously motivated versus gender-based discrimination.

On the level of exogenous forms of ethno-religious discrimination, our data show at least five dimensions of distinction, inequality and supposed superiority, which are combined and thematised in the following stereotypes against Muslim women:

- the religious and/or “civilizational” division (Huntington, 1996) between Muslims and Christians/Catholics, i.e. between “Orient” and “Occident”;
- the ethnic distinction between “Arabs” and “Castilians”, which reflects historical connotations of “them” and “us” (Stallaert, 1998);
- the racialised perception of a supposed phenotypical bipolarity between “non-whites” – either “semites” or “blacks” – and “whites” (Hall, 1996);
- the national and citizenship-based distinction between “aliens” or “non-Spaniards” and “Spaniards” or “nationals”, already codified in the Spanish Constitution (Agrela, 2001);
- the dividing line drawn by public opinion between “immigrant” minority communities, who are supposed to be problematic per se, and the “sedentary” host majority society, which is in charge of solving these migration-related problems (Dietz, 2000).

The blurring of distinctions between the religious and the ethnocultural dimensions of being a “Muslim-Arab-Maghrebin” woman are also suffered by interviewees inside their newly-emerging communities, where endogenous forces may also use Islam as an ethnic marker vis-à-vis the host society. As a result, incipient minority communities are increasingly “ethnicised” from within as well as from the outside (Rosón Lorente, 2000). In the case of the Muslim women, this frequently means that particular cultural and geographically limited features, customs and traditions – be they of Arab, Amazigh or other ethnic origin – are transmitted and acquired as if they formed part of Islam as such (Jawad, 1998). According to a Pakistani woman, who refuses the simplistic identification of one particular cultural horizon with the supposedly global legacy of Islam, “religion is an easy argument and simply a way of controlling women”.

Exogenous forms of gender-based discrimination have been documented several times in the course of our study and are mainly based on stereotypes about Muslim-cum-Arab men and women, which are shaped by a profound dividing line between the sexes. Whereas Muslim-Arab men are stigmatised as potentially violent, criminal and vindictive, Muslim-Arab women are supposed to be inherently am-
biguous. Behind the “mask” of the headscarf, lasciviousness and potential promiscuity are suspected from the sexist perspective of the Spanish male.

Nevertheless, several Muslim women do define certain rules and practices, seen as “female” by the male fellow-members of their own migrant community, as endogenous forms of gender-based discrimination. The younger Moroccan interviewees criticise the unequal treatment, inferior educational opportunities and lack of personal freedom they suffered during their adolescence, compared to their brothers. Those women who acknowledge the existence of discriminatory practices – either in their region of origin or inside their current minority community in the diaspora situation – in general agree that it is not Islam as such which is discriminatory, but the particular application of Islamic traditions and gender-biased interpretation of the Holy Quran by male Muslims which constitutes the source of the problem (Jawad, 1998). A similar view is often taken by converts, whose tendency to completely dissociate Islam from Muslim countries has already been analysed above as a constitutive part of the converts’ religious identity project. Finally, convert as well as migrant women concur in identifying male interests as forces which have always (and also in several other different religions and cultures) ended up “manipulating” and re-interpretating an original distinction of gender-differentiated roles, which per se are not supposed to have been discriminatory, but which in the course of time have become de facto sources of gender-related discrimination. Accordingly, “the problem of women in Islam is not a religious but a social issue – i.e. religion being used by a patriarchal society” (Martín Muñoz, 1999, p. 13).

Societal responses and institutional perspectives

Finally, these experiences of discriminatory practices are contrasted, on the one hand, with official public definitions of and attitudes towards discrimination, and, on the other hand, with the awareness of ethno-religious discrimination and gender-based exclusion as shown by the NGOs and public institutions. Following Article 14 in the section on “Rights and Liberties” of the Spanish Constitution, which limits legal equality to all those who hold Spanish citizenship,14 and Article 16, where “the ideological, religious and cult-related freedom of

14 This article is a major point of departure for debates on the question of citizenship and migration. In juridical practice, however, it is interpreted in inclusive terms as comprising Spanish citizens as well as foreigners, insofar as the corresponding Spanish legislation on foreigners, refugees and immigration does not contradict this inclusive definition (Borrás Rodríguez et al., 1995).
the individuals and communities” is guaranteed, there is neither a particular officialised definition of discrimination and anti-discrimination currently existing in Spain, nor are there distinctive agencies or institutions dedicated to the implementation of anti-discrimination measures. The debate on the necessity of introducing clearly defined anti-discrimination issues in Spanish legislation itself, as has already been accomplished in other EU member states (Fathi, 1998; Schulte, 1995), is only just beginning. Often, this debate is still contained in three different, somewhat isolated domains, whose cross-cutting, overlapping and mutually reinforcing consequences are hardly perceived by the institutional actors:

- As far as legislation to ensure equal opportunities for women is concerned, the currently existing Spanish judicial framework as well as its respective enforcement tools have already incorporated the international standards (UNESCO Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer, 1995).
- Racism is discussed mainly in relation to gitano-payó (gypsy versus non-gypsy) ethnic conflicts and to the periodic violent attacks against the Spanish Roma communities (Calvo Buezas, 1989; San Román, 1996).
- The only context in which discrimination against migrant populations has been explicitly addressed so far is the labour market and unequal treatment of immigrants in the workplace (Colectivo IOE, 1996; 1996); in this case, the international pressure and lobbying activities developed by national trade unions, but channelled through the multilateral institutional framework of the International Labour Office, has proven to be decisive (ILO, 2000).

Similarly to the International Labour Office precedent, the recent approval of a directive issued by the Commission of the European Union and aimed at harmonising the very heterogeneous national legislations of the member states on equal treatment on the basis of race and ethnic origin will force Spanish legislation to develop its own legal framework on racism, xenophobia, and ethnic, racial and religiously motivated discrimination.

15 Nevertheless, in the same article public institutions are obliged to “consider the religious beliefs of the Spanish society”, and in this context Catholicism is explicitly mentioned.
16 A purely consultative organ which is mainly dedicated to anti-discrimination policies in the broad sense is the Ombudsman Office of the Defensor del Pueblo named by the National Parliament, whose main task consists of supervising the state institution’s treatment of the citizens’ fundamental rights and periodically informing parliament about abuses of these rights.
17 Directive 2000/53/EC.
The differentiated and interrelated perception of exogenous and endogenous discriminatory experiences, practices and attitudes, which in the view of Muslim women mutually reinforce each other, is not shared at all by the organisations and institutions. Depending on their governmental or non-governmental nature as well as on their Muslim or non-Muslim protagonists, each of these institutional actors tends to perceive only one aspect, source or dimension of the multi-level phenomenon of discrimination against Muslim women. The representative of the Moroccan immigrant department of the Spanish Unión General de Trabajadores even argues that men, not women, are the most discriminated sector of the migrant population, since they have more difficulty in finding employment than women. In his view, which is also shared by most of the male-dominated immigrant associations, discrimination first and foremost is only being inflicted exogenously on Muslims and/or migrants by the host society, and, secondly, this external form of discrimination is racist, not sexist in nature. Contrary to this perspective, the Spanish public institutions dealing with migrant and/or Muslim communities tend to emphasise only the internal and supposedly “culture-specific” gender-based discrimination of Muslim women. In this official view, discrimination does not produce social exclusion, but, on the contrary, it is social enclosure and self-ghettoisation which generate external rejection. While racist attitudes towards the long-established Spanish Roma communities (and not towards the small minority of Muslim migrants) are acknowledged by the host society, representatives of public institutions generally deny any important presence of racist or muslimophobic attitudes inside their organisations. Paradoxically, the same interviewees cling to the same above-mentioned stereotypes about the submissive, passive Muslim woman, “permanently producing children”, a view that per se is discriminatory and combines muslimophobic and arabophobic elements.

The perspective of Spanish NGOs which deal directly with migrant populations is more nuanced. Contrary to the public institutions, all NGOs admit that exogenous discrimination against migrant and/or Muslim women does exist and on a rather large scale. The source of this discrimination is perceived to be mainly legal and political. Migrant Muslim women are exposed to legal discrimination because they are deprived of basic citizenship rights, like voting and the benefit of social services. Thus, migration and citizenship, not gender or religion, are the sources of Spanish discrimination against Muslim women. The second most important and distinctive source of discrimination, however, is seen as internally motivated. Reflecting the state institutional perspective, NGOs identify the unequal treatment of women both in Muslim countries and in Islam as such as a major source of gender-based discrimination.
Conclusion

Through the comparison of the experiences expressed by the Muslim women themselves on the one hand, and by their Spanish institutional counterparts on the other, the complexity of the Muslim woman’s particular life-world as part of an emerging minority community inside a non-Muslim environment has become evident. For the Spanish case, this complexity results from a “double dichotomy” to which not only the Muslim women and their male partners but also the Spanish society and its institutional framework are exposed: firstly, the dichotomy of “oriental” religiosity versus “Western” secularism; secondly, the dichotomy of Christian-Castilian versus Muslim-Arab ethno-religious categories.

As the institutional representatives frequently state, the “return of Islam” to the Iberian peninsula challenges the process of secularisation which the Spanish state and society are currently undergoing. In this perspective, a fundamental contradiction seems to reside in the relation between an all-encompassing, comprehensive world-view (formerly Catholicism, nowadays Islam) on the one hand, and Western meta-religious laicism (Waardenburg, 2000), on the other. This perspective, however, is constantly challenged by an ancient rivalry which has been fundamental to the historical emergence and shaping of Spanish national identity (Stallaert 1998), but which still persists today inside the Spanish majority society and culture: the supposed antagonism between Islam, perceived as “Arab” or “Moorish”, and Christianity (in general) and Catholicism (in particular), identified with the predominantly Castilian ethnicity. The resulting ethnic, intercultural and/or inter-religious conflicts analysed above have a negative impact particularly on Muslim women. These conflicts shape their life-worlds precisely at the moment when the first generation of Muslim women is starting to establish their own communities and to struggle for their own spaces and networks inside the non-Muslim host context. As reflected in the women’s experiences of both exogenous and endogenous forms of discrimination, ethnicised perceptions of religious and cultural otherness, and gender-based tendencies of female exclusion and victimisation, mutually reinforce each other and end up restricting the development of flourishing intercultural life-worlds in the midst of the multicultural legacy of Andalusia – or, to give it its symbolic Arab name, Al-Andalus.

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Summary

In the last fifteen years, Spain has experienced a remarkable increase in its immigrant population among which Maghrebin Muslims make up a significant percentage. Parallel to that a strong tendency to conversion to the Islamic religion has been observable in Andalusian cities like Granada and Cordoba since the end of the Franco regime. In the face of these two phenomena, anti-Islamic and anti-“Moorish” attitudes, which reflect different dimensions of discrimination, prevail in large sectors of the Spanish general public. These attitudes in fact are deeply-rooted and nothing else than historically transmitted stigmatisations of “the other”. Especially afflicted by this newly emerging “muslimophobia” is the Muslim woman, whose social role, in the opinion of the majority society, is reduced to motherhood and obedience to her husband, but who is becoming more and more an important protagonist in the process of forming a Muslim community. This ethnographic study addresses the largely unknown daily life-world of these Muslim female migrants living inside the secularising, but still mainly Catholic southern Spanish society. The paper analyses both the more general, often overlapping and mutually reinforcing sources and forms of citizenship-based, ethno-national and religiously motivated discrimination, and more specifically gender-related forms of exclusion. Such discrimination and exclusion comes both from the non-Muslim majority society and from within Muslim minority communities. Finally, these experiences of discriminatory practices are contrasted with official public definitions of and attitudes towards discrimination as well as with the awareness of ethno-religious discrimination and gender-based exclusion shown by non-governmental organisations and public institutions.
Towards a comparative study of female migrants in Southern Europe: Filipino and Moroccan women in Bologna and Barcelona

Introduction

Although women still appear to be marginal in much mainstream migration research, there are now several studies of migration that pay attention to issues of gender. A characteristic of these studies, however, is that they tend to echo conventional (male) research in the selection of topics and in the definition of their relevance. Thus, economic aspects of migration are dominant also in feminist migration research where the great majority of studies deal, for instance, with women’s role and function in the labour market. In the case of Southern Europe this translates into a particular attention paid to the role of women in two niche sectors: domestic service and prostitution. Other aspects linked to the migration experience remain unexamined, notably those related to “the family” and women’s role and position in it. As Zlotnik (1995) has noted:

the literature dealing with international migration and the family is meagre; and the literature stressing family issues in relation to the particular situation of migrant women is even less abundant. It is both ironic and very telling that, although women have traditionally been considered as “family migrants”, that aspect of their migration experience has generally been disregarded.


The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the need for a gender-sensitive approach to migration that does not compartmentalise women's productive and reproductive work and, rather than "adding women in", operates a "shift" in focus so as to include aspects which have so far been neglected. Using examples from fieldwork in Bologna and Barcelona, I want to show that looking at women's position within wider units - such as families and kinship or quasi-kinship groups - is vital in order to be able to grasp more fully the gendered nature of contemporary migration and to understand the specificity of female migration. This focus on family relations is important not only in itself but also to shed light on other aspects traditionally studied by migration scholars such as female labour market incorporation and potential settlement, as well as illuminating new ones such as transnationalism.

Southern Europe is a crucial location for analysing the feminisation of migration, a phenomenon that several authors have defined as one of the most salient of the contemporary era of migration (e.g. Castles and Miller, 1998). What is interesting about Italy and Spain, and to a lesser extent Greece and Portugal, is that women are entering these countries in increasing numbers both as autonomous migrants to take up jobs in sectors of local labour shortage and as family migrants reuniting with male immigrant workers. This reflects the gendered (and racialised) nature of Southern European labour markets where female and male immigrant workers from poor countries are recruited to carry out very different tasks: women are mainly employed in domestic service and sex work, and men in industry, construction and agriculture. By analysing the experiences of women belonging to these two different types of immigrant flows - male-dominated and female-dominated - one can address some key questions for the study of female migration. How do family and kinship relations affect the migration of different groups of women? How do different groups of women balance productive and reproductive roles? What roles do women of different origin play in transnational families?

The paper is based on ethnographic research that I conducted with Filipino and Moroccan women residing in the two cities of Bologna and Barcelona. The Filipino women, in both cities, belong to a predominantly female migrant group, whereas the Moroccan women form the minority share of male-dominant groups, again in both cities. The fieldwork took place for about six months in each location during 1999–2000 (Bologna) and 2000–2001 (Barcelona). The research involved a combination of qualitative methods including: participant observation carried out in sites of immigrant congregation (such as associations, public services, trade unions, Churches, parties and celebrations); semi-structured interviewing with 76 women (20 with Filipinas and 18
with Moroccans in each of the two locations); in-depth interviewing and life-history accounts with a smaller sample of women and with some men belonging to the two groups studied.³

Filipino and Moroccan women in Bologna and Barcelona

In Bologna at the end of 1999 there were 14,439 foreign residents representing 3.8% of the total population of the city. Of these foreign residents 47% were women. The two largest groups in Bologna were Moroccans (1,929 residents) and Filipinos (1,748). Within these two national groups women numbered respectively 690 (35.7% of their group) and 1036 (59.2%). In Barcelona in January 2001 there were 74,019 foreign residents, 4.9% of the total population of the city. Of these, fractionally over 50% are women. The two largest groups are the Ecuadorians (8,204 residents) and the Moroccans (7,165), with Filipinos (3,176) occupying seventh place. Moroccan women number 2,837 (39.5% of their group) and Filipinas 1,826 (57.4% of their group).⁴

What emerges from the above data is the following: first, the incidence of the immigrant population is slightly greater in Barcelona than in Bologna; second, the feminisation of immigration is greater for Barcelona where female migrants already (just) outnumber male migrants; third, both groups present similar female/male ratios in the two locations; and fourth, in spite of the fact that they belong to a male-dominated group there is large presence of Moroccan women in Barcelona where they are in fact the largest female group. It should, however, be noted that the above data refer only to documented migrants; the undocumented are not included, so the real numbers of migrants are likely to be somewhat higher.

In order to introduce the profiles of the women who are migrating to Southern European cities Table 1 provides some comparative information about family structure and demographic characteristics of the 76 women who are at the core of my study.⁵

Although the ages of the interviewees ranged from 18 to 60 and I tried to incorporate a variety of ages of respondents in all four samples,

³ This fieldwork forms part of my DPhil thesis about to be submitted to the University of Sussex, and funded by an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) postgraduate studentship. An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the International Geographical Union's Conference on "Human Mobility in a Borderless World" held in Loreto Aprutino, Italy, 20-22 April 2001.

⁴ Data on Bologna are from Osservatorio Comunale delle Immigrazioni (1999); those on Barcelona are from Ajuntament de Barcelona (2001).

⁵ My samples are strictly speaking non-representative, interviewees being identified mainly with snowball techniques.
Table 1 - Filipinos and Moroccans interviewees in Bologna and Barcelona: basic characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Filipinas</th>
<th>Moroccans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bologna</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age of interviewees (years)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal migrants prior to emigrating (no.)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of siblings (average)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of time in Bologna/Barcelona (years)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of years of education (average)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household head in place of origin (no.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status at time of migration:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/widowed/separated</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of children at migration (ever-married only)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of children now (ever-married only)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

some clear differences emerge from a comparison of average ages for the four groups: Filipinas are on the whole older than the Moroccans, and the average age for Barcelona is older than the migrants in Bologna.

With regard to the geographical origin of Filipinos migrating to Italy and Spain, some of my key informants reported that they migrate from all regions of the Philippines. As far as my respondents are concerned, their origin was more variegated in the case of Bologna and more uniform in the case of Barcelona, where they all come from the island of Luzon. A majority of Filipino respondents in both cities had a rural origin: 80% of the women interviewed in Bologna and 50% of those interviewed in Barcelona came from farming backgrounds. However, the majority of interviewees had left the countryside and undergone rural–urban migration: 17 Filipinas in Bologna and 11 in Barcelona had made a rural–urban migration to study and/or work prior to international migration. Usually they went to live with relatives who were already resident in the city in the Philippines or they were able to reside at the work place (in the case of factory and hospital workers, for instance). In some cases they had formed their own family with men they had met and married in the city.

The majority of Filipinas in Bologna and Barcelona came from large families with an average of more than six siblings. Another characteristic of the migrants is that they often come from female-headed households because of the death or desertion of the father/husband. As regards their civil status upon international migration, 15 women were single and five were married when they migrated to Bologna. Of
the latter, three migrated together with their husbands and two went ahead alone. Of the migrants to Barcelona, 12 were single, six were married, one was a widow and one separated. As for the socio-economic situation of the families of the Filipino migrants, it seemed more variegated in the case of Bologna and generally lower for those going to Barcelona. However, in both case-studies the economic situation of the respondents and their families tended to be precarious and international migration was seen as a means of improving it.

The geographical origin of Moroccan women differs in the two cities studied. In Barcelona they tend to come mainly from the Rif Mountains in the northern part of Morocco, reflecting the Spanish colonial legacy in this region, although a number of respondents came from Casablanca. The geographical origins of the respondents in Bologna were more varied, with a majority coming from Casablanca and an inland provincial town called Khouribga (the latter probably as result of chain migration). Contrary to their Filipino counterparts, Moroccan women had not, by and large, been involved in rural-urban migration, although some had experienced internal mobility mainly as a result of marriage.

Like the Filipinas, the Moroccan women in my study tend to come from large families, especially those in Barcelona. In Bologna some women came from smaller families and these were normally either migrant families or female-headed families. A remarkable number of women come from female-headed households (nine out of 18 in the case of Barcelona). As for the civil status of Moroccan women, upon migration to Bologna nine were single (five of whom had a relative already living in Italy and migrated to reunite with them); five were married (four married men who were already working in Italy); and four were divorced. In Barcelona six were single, five were married (two of whom left their husbands behind upon migration) and seven were divorced. The socio-economic background of my respondents seems more diverse in the case of Bologna where I met both women from very deprived backgrounds and women from wealthy families, whereas in Barcelona they tended to come mainly from the urban working classes.

To sum up these initial background characteristics of my samples, the main difference I identified between these two national groups of female migrants is the more homogeneous character of the Filipinas compared to the heterogeneity (in terms of class, education, origin, etc.) of the Moroccans. This is why it is easier to talk about specific

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6 I must stress again that my samples cannot be regarded as anything more than intuitively representative. My essentially qualitative methodology did not permit me to work from a rigorous sampling frame; nor would this have been possible in any case, given the lack of detailed statistics on the characteristics of immigrant groups in the two cities.
characteristics of Filipino migrants than it is to generalise about Moroccans. With regard to Filipinas such characteristics include a rural origin but urban residency prior to international migration, a poor background but a strong family aspiration to upward social mobility, a high number of siblings, and high educational levels (usually at university level). Such common traits emerge also from analyses undertaken with Filipinas migrating to other parts of the globe such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Canada. Another difference between the two groups relates to civil status, although this element has less importance that I had originally anticipated. Filipino female migrants are commonly portrayed as single women and as surplus labour not involved in reproductive work who can be better deployed elsewhere. By contrast, Moroccans are thought of as dependant wives who become international migrants only as result of marriage. However, a considerable proportion of the Filipinas I met were married, whereas the majority of Moroccan women I interviewed were either single or divorced. Taking ever-married respondents only, both groups in both cities had family responsibilities towards their children, who numbered between one and three on average. The fall in number of children between the ever-married at migration and the ever-married now (noticeable for Filipinas) results from new marriages contracted by Filipinas whilst abroad. A characteristic shared by migrants of both groups is that of being a female head of a household or coming from a female-headed household. This confirms what Moore (1988) and Chant and McIlwaine (1995) have noted for female rural–urban migration in the Third World generally.

Why do they migrate?

This section will explore if the reasons for migrating are different or similar for women belonging to the two national groups and what is the relationship between these reasons and household, family and kinship relations.

Filipinas

Economic imperatives are almost always at the root of the migration of Filipino married women with children. The decision may be taken at the household level after consideration that it can be easier for women to find jobs in feminised sectors of the labour markets in South-

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ern Europe where there are quotas for categories of immigrants such as domestic workers. Husbands may migrate subsequently or they may remain in the Philippines and retain their job. In virtually all the interviews conducted with married migrants in both Bologna and Barcelona, the main reason provided for their migration was the desire or the need to pay for their children’s education. Women are the ones giving up qualified jobs in order to undertake manual jobs in Europe for the well-being and future of their children. Gender roles clearly play a part here since it is the mother who is the one who has to “sacrifice” for the family, and her job in the Philippines is invariably considered more disposable than that of her husband (even if she is a professional). But married women can also use their responsibility towards the family to their own advantage, for example to get away from unhappy relationships without incurring in the social stigma that a separation would entail in the Philippines.

Single women too may migrate out of economic necessity but in their case such an obligation does not tend to originate within the household. These women often migrate to support members of their natal family who do not necessarily live with them and who do not count on such support. Older siblings feel responsible for their parents (particularly if they in turn had made sacrifices for supporting their child’s studies) and younger siblings, and often sacrifice their own interests to improve the family situation. In these cases migration is not a household strategy but can be rather framed within wider kinship relations and obligations.

Once they have undertaken international migration these women are often the ones putting pressure on other family members to become migrants in order to share the burden of remittances. They do so playing on the same kinship duties that motivated their move. What is interesting is that they almost invariably favour the migration of female members of the family before that of male members. Some respondents commented that their sisters will accept and adapt more easily to the kind of jobs that are available in Italy and Spain than their male kin. Such a pattern shows, on the one hand, how women can contribute to gender-selective processes of migration; and on the other hand it points to the control that women are exercising over current migration flows. The opportunities opened up by these “early” female migrants and the consolidation of these channels of migration from the Philippines offer women escape routes in a variety of situations, something that we can also find in Moroccan female migration, as we shall see presently. The economic motor lies at the heart of Filipino migration but this interacts with a number of other reasons. Filipino women exercise their agency by on the one hand complying with their gender-ascribed roles of dutiful daughters and sisters, and on the other hand by
using such roles as an “excuse” to undertake international migration. Such migration may “mask” more personal goals such as the desire to leave unsatisfactory living and working conditions, the desire to enjoy more freedom and independence, the desire to pursue personal objectives, the wish to remain single, and so on.

Moroccans

Moroccan married women tend to migrate to reunite with their husbands – the typical “family migration” described in the literature. However, what this literature does not explore is how this form of migration may mask more personal goals on the part of the women, of whom many – particularly the youngest ones – see and live their migration as a hard-won achievement usually gained in spite of family opposition (usually that of the husband) and state regulations that make it almost impossible to meet ever-more-stringent requirements for family reunification (Kofman, 1999). Their reasons for migrating go beyond the mere desire to be with their husbands; they often want to earn a wage, see the “West”, and/or run away from their allotted place in the extended family and from restrictive social control. The known availability of “female” jobs in Southern Europe is used by the most adventurous women to subvert gender roles and start migrating ahead of their husbands. This is, however, still more the exception than the rule and women who have done it feel very proud of it (even if they have to bear increased tensions with their partners who do not seem very supportive of their choices).

For single Moroccan women their migration is often a family project since in many cases they move to reunite with the head of their family who initiated the migration (normally the father, but if parents were divorced, the mother). If the woman does not belong to a “transnational family” the most important factor to understand her likelihood to migrate is the socio-economic position of her family of origin. Women coming from wealthy and progressive families migrate in order to study or look for a job in order to better themselves, and generally they have few responsibilities other than for themselves. If they come from poor working-class families their migration actually resembles that of Filipinas in that they are migrating to occupy the openings of low-skilled feminised jobs in Southern Europe that would allow them to support their families back home. However, this dichotomy is somewhat too rigid in the case of Barcelona because there I met women from working-class backgrounds who chose to migrate when single not to fulfill responsibilities towards their natal families but to secure an economic independence for themselves as an alternative both to marriage and to dependence on their natal family, a possibility rarely enjoyed by
women in a country like Morocco. As already pointed out, divorcees seem to be present in large numbers both in the migration to Bologna and to Barcelona, proving their vulnerable position (both in ideological and economic terms) within Morocco.

Inter-group comparison

Gendered roles and positions within households, families and kinship groups affect the migration of women of both groups to both cities. But the ways in which Moroccan and Filipino women can and do articulate their agency differ. Contrary to common assumptions that portray them as passive victims, Moroccan women often see and undertake migration with a clear emancipatory goal. Their aims are studying, being able to work, enjoying more freedom, eluding social control, starting a new life and so on. In order to render such goals socially acceptable, if they are married they frame them within a family project, and if they are single they justify their migration as a temporary measure to accumulate capital for things such helping their family of origin or for their own dowry. Class and education are important factors shaping the likelihood and the form of their migration. For Filipinas migration tends to be more in line with their roles as dutiful daughters, sisters and mothers who have to “sacrifice” for the family good by working abroad. Yet, they too, even if more subtly, exercise their agency and try to fulfil personal objectives. They tend to opt for conflict-free ways of bettering their position within families and kinship groups that allow them to gain more control and independence over their lives, while still maintaining the expectations inherent in their migrant roles.

Table 2 – Reasons for migrating: key inter-group differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Filipinas</th>
<th>Moroccans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Single         | • Work to support members of their family of origin  
                 • Pressure from migrant relatives in order to share the burden of remittances  
                 • Desire to enjoy more freedom and independence  
                 • Desire to remain single | • Reunite with family  
                 • Study  
                 • Work – middle-class women for themselves; working-class women to support family members  
                 • Desire to remain single |
| Married        | • Work to support their children (especially to get them through the education system)  
                 • Get away from an unhappy marriage | • Reunite with husband  
                 • Desire to work  
                 • Desire to see the “West”  
                 • Get away from the extended family |
| Divorced       | • Work to support themselves and their children | • Work to support themselves and their children  
                 • Start a new life |
Table 2 summarises the key inter-group differences regarding the reasons behind female migration. Subsequently I provide four stories (one for each subgroup of women) that exemplify some of the issues discussed above and produce a more concrete impression of the profile of the women migrating to Southern Europe and their reasons for doing so. The names are fictitious.

Gloria: a Filipina in Bologna

Gloria is 39 and comes from a village in the Philippines, coincidentally called Barcelona, where she lived with her parents and six brothers and sisters. Her parents were farmers and cultivated a small plot of land. When she finished school Gloria went to Manila to continue her studies and eventually she enrolled at the university in the Faculty of Economics. In order to support herself, pay for the fees and remit money home she worked full-time in a pharmaceutical factory first and in one producing bottles later. During this time she lived in the compounds adjacent to the workplace that large factories provide for young female workers coming from the countryside like her. Her eldest sister and one of her cousins were already working in Bologna and offered her the possibility of joining them. Gloria decided to accept their offer and made all the preparations for her departure secretly, without consulting her parents. After only one year of university she decided to leave her course, attracted by the possibility of a job in Europe. When they found out her plans, Gloria’s parents were against her decision to leave, but in the end they accepted it, mollified by the fact that she would be near her sister and her cousin. Their objections were mitigated also by their awareness that having another daughter abroad would mean an improvement of the family economic situation.

Gloria arrived in Italy in 1983 with a tourist visa, flying to Paris and then entering Italy by train. She regularised her position five years later in 1988. As soon as she arrived she started working in order to pay back the money that her sister had spent for her trip. Her sister had already arranged a live-in domestic job for her in which she stayed until 1987. Gloria is totally happy about her decision to go to Italy since she feels much more free in Bologna than she was in Manila. In her view Filipino parents control their children too much even when they are grown up. For instance she laments the fact that when she was still in the Philippines, and even though she was living independently in Manila, her parents were interfering with her private life, forbidding her to see her boyfriend whom they did not like. In Bologna all of a sudden, far away from parental control, she felt that she could do what she wanted.
In 1985 she met her future husband, an Egyptian cook whom she married two years later and with whom she has two children. Yet, despite of the fact that she left the Philippines in search of independence and self-fulfillment, Gloria has maintained a strong tie with her family of origin. Although she has now created her own family she is still supporting financially her family of origin. She sends remittances every month to her parents and she is covering all the education costs of one of her nephews.

Nabila: a Moroccan in Bologna

Nabila is 35 and is single. She has eight brothers and sisters and comes from a provincial town in Morocco where her father had been the director of a school. All her brothers and sisters, except the eldest one who married young, studied. Two of her brothers did their university studies abroad, one in Tunisia where he now works as a veterinary surgeon and the other in Belgium where he now lives. Nabila went to study in Casablanca where she got a degree in Arab literature. After completing her studies she stayed in Casablanca where she did several jobs which included two years of voluntary service in a tribunal, a job as a secretary in a legal firm, shop assistant and many more. But she was unable to pass the public exam which would have enabled her to find a more qualified and above all stable job. She therefore decided to go abroad in search of better opportunities.

Her preferred option was France where she had spent time as a student but now without a student card and only sporadic employment she did not stand any chance to enter that country legally. A friend who was working at the Italian consulate in Casablanca offered her the possibility of going to Italy. She accepted and he arranged a job as live-in maid for a family near Bari where she arrived in December 1994. She stayed there for a year (the length of her contract) and then moved to Rome where she worked as a domestic until 1998. At this point, tired of domestic service and attracted by the possibility of finding at least a factory job, she decided to go to Bologna. When I met her two years later she had still not managed to fulfill her plans and was working in a hospital as a cleaner. She is quite dissatisfied with how things have turned out for her and sometimes she feels worried about her future, not having a good and reliable job nor her own family in Italy. In case of emergency she knows that she can count on her brothers (her parents are now dead), but she feels that they have done enough for her in the past and now she should start to be independent. When she has enough money she sends some to one of her sisters in Morocco who has recently divorced. She is also thinking of convincing her to join her in Italy so
that they could both work and help each other. In the meantime she has not given up on the idea of finding a better kind of job (for example, as a translator in a legal firm) as well as a suitable husband (a Muslim who shares her liberal views on the family and on spousal relations).

Maricel: a Filipina in Barcelona

Maricel is 50, a widow with five children. She is from Batangas and her parents were farmers and petty-traders there. She is the youngest of 13 children. All of her brothers and sisters graduated and several of them are now working abroad—"they have good jobs". Three of her sisters and one brother are working in Saudi Arabia respectively as nurses and as an architect; two brothers are working on international ships, one as a captain and another as a chef. She resents not having a degree and a good job like them.

Maricel gave up her job as a police officer in Manila when she got married. In ten years she had five children. Her husband had a job as a bus driver but he was an alcoholic and did not help her in any way.

He was working on a bus but he wasn't giving us any money because he was spending everything on alcohol, with his friends. He wasn't giving me or my children anything. I was alone. I was alone fixing my children. He wasn't giving them clothes nor anything else. I was alone, alone... He was living with me but when he was going to drive the bus then was eating at his mother's and then he was coming to my house all drunk and there wasn't any money, none at all. But I'm strong and everyday I prayed to God and in the end he gave me all the benefits.

Maricel was suffering a lot but she felt that she had to put up with her situation.

I was suffering but what I was going to do? I was married and marriage is very sacred in the Philippines. I was suffering but I didn't know what to do ... until I decided to come here.

Maricel saw in emigration both an escape route from her very unhappy marriage and a viable option for providing for her children. It was 1986 when she tried to leave for the first time but reaching Southern Europe did not prove at all easy. She tried three times to emigrate until she finally succeeded in 1987. It was her mother who helped her raise the money to leave and who looked after her five children. Her first attempt collapsed because the agency she used turned out to be fake. The second time she paid another agency which gave her false documents but she was apprehended by the police at Barcelona airport and sent back to the Philippines. After having twice lost her mother's money and under a lot of pressure from her family of origin, she turned
again to the same agency begging them to give her a second chance. She had to pay more money but this time she managed to enter the country. Maricel's problems did not finish there. After having finally reached her destination she realised that she was an illegal immigrant who could potentially be discovered by the police and be deported any time. She lived three years fearing to be deported before finishing to pay back her considerable debts.

**Buchra: a Moroccan in Barcelona**

Buchra is 28, divorced with a five-year-old son. She is from Tétouan where she studied until the baccalaureate. She is the eldest of three daughters and her father was a factory worker. She got married in 1994 to a carpenter with whom she had a son. Soon after he was born problems started to arise because her husband was seeing other women and was often leaving Buchra without money. She decided to leave him and go back to her family. In 1997 she obtained the divorce and the custody of the child. After the divorce she started seeing another man who had promised to marry her but then left her when she became pregnant.

For Buchra the only way out of this situation was to try to reach Spain in order to have an abortion:

With my pregnancy – because in my country you can't be pregnant without the paper, without being married – I decided to come here... to have an abortion, not even my mother knows that I had an abortion, it's something that I can't reveal...

Here below is how she describes her departure and her arrival in Barcelona, where within a few days she got her abortion:

One day in May 1999 I decided to come here to Spain, I took my son, took out a few things and, since I have a passport from Ceuta, I could enter Ceuta without a visa... [my parents] didn't realise anything because I always used to take my son and go for a walk or to see my aunt, so I took a bit of money that my mother gave me... yes, my mother knew that I was going away from Morocco. But she was scared to death that they were going to capture me there, because I'm not legal... I feared that they would send me to prison and then they take away my son from me and give him back to his father and I go to prison... Well, without thinking about anything I got on the boat with my son. I was scared to death. Then when the boat started to leave the port I started to calm down a bit. When I got off the boat in Spain I started to feel a bit lost – where do I have to go? With whom do I have to speak? What will I do? How will I reach Barcelona? At that point I met a woman who told me that she was also going to Barcelona... I came up and I arrived at 3.15 in the afternoon. I called my neighbour and they sent me their son to collect me from the station... On the 31st of May I
went to the Health and Family Centre (Centro de Salud y Familia) with my friend and I asked them to help me and they sent me to a clinic. My friend had to pay only 8,000 PTAs and Salud y Familia paid the rest. So on the 9th of June I had the abortion. Then I felt a bit bad, imagine how I felt. At that point I started to look for a job but there aren't any jobs without papers, without papers they can't give you any jobs. I went to the social worker and I told her that I wanted to do a course or something to be able to find a job.

After she solved her main problem (the unwanted pregnancy), Buchra's main concern became that of finding a job. In order to improve her chances — apart from enrolling in a course — she appealed against the decision that denied her the documents. Unsuccessful at first, she eventually assembled the necessary documentation to apply for regularisation. With the help of her neighbours she has already managed to find a small flat for her and her son. A few months after the first interview she got her residency permit and a job in a restaurant.

New immigrant families

As these stories show, family, kinship and gender relations at origin influence the migration of women. At the same time the migration experience impacts and shapes such relations introducing important changes. What follows is a synthesis of some of the transformations that the Filipino and Moroccan families I have studied are undergoing as result of migration.

Filipinas

One consequence of migration on Filipino family formation is that in some cases Filipinas are marrying out of their group and they do so both with Italian/Spanish nationals and also with other foreigners, including Muslims. The choice of their partners seemed to be entirely their own since they either married in the immigration context — far away from family influence — or they married boyfriends they had met during the first leg of their migration trajectory, from the villages to the large Filipino cities. Only two women of the total of my interviewees in the two locations were currently living away from their husbands. This demonstrates a general tendency towards family reunion, at least among those couples who do not break up for good. In both Bologna and Barcelona there were women who chose to remain single, something almost inadmissible in the Philippines. Two women (one in

Family continuity is important in Philippine society and high value is placed accordingly on both marriage and children. This is particularly the case for women:
Bologna and one in Barcelona) had children outside wedlock. The number of children per woman was higher for those who had formed their families in the Philippines and lower for those who formed them in Southern Europe (Table 1). Among the two locations it was higher for Filipinas in Barcelona. The majority of Filipinas tended to live separately from their children for a number of years but then to reunite with them when the latter complete their education. At the time of interview the number of women separated from their children was relatively low, although the majority of them had had this experience in the past.

In the immigration context we can note a decline of the nuclear household – the typical household structure in the Philippines (Chant and McIlwaine, 1997) – since only ten of the 40 Filipinas I interviewed lived with their spouse or their spouse and children. The local labour market and housing situation contribute to make this family structure economically unviable. Added to this there is the migrants’ desire to save as much as possible in order to carry out projects in the country of origin, which renders the nuclear household a more expensive form of living than other solutions. However, if the relevance of the nuclear family declines in emigration, this is not the case for the kinship group which maintains its centrality. In spite of the heterogeneous housing arrangements of my interviewees, the majority of households continued to be based preferably on kinship relations of various kinds. An element of change is that of friendship-based households which are uncommon in the Philippines but are present in significant numbers both in Bologna and Barcelona. Although the birth rate is decreasing in the Philippines (it went from 6.8 children per woman in 1965 to 3.7 in 1990), it seems to be even lower among my interviewees in Southern Europe, particularly among those who formed their families after migration. This is not necessarily a choice but is at times a forced decision influenced by the migrant’s situation in the context of arrival (type of job, lack of housing, family responsibilities back home etc.).

Another characteristic of immigrant families – both Filipino and Moroccan – is their transnational character since, apart from the regular contacts existing between sending and receiving countries, they have family members residing in several other countries, with whom relations are kept. There is no major difference in the distribution of family members of the Filipinas residing in Bologna and Barcelona (the majority of them having family members in three to five countries), apart from the fact that whereas in Italy some women had family in more than one Italian region, Filipino families in Spain tend to be more concentrated. What emerges clearly, even from a small sample

“the possibility that a woman might voluntarily choose to perpetuate her single state rarely enters the Filipino mind” (Chant and McIlwaine, 1995).
like mine, is the dispersed nature of the Filipino transnational family. Family members migrate to different destinations around the world according to opportunities to maximise the possibilities of success, and minimise the risks. The various groups do seem to keep in contact with one another and these networks may be used to underpin further migrations or simply as safety-nets in times of difficulty. Mina’s brothers-in-law, for example, migrated to Saudi Arabia to support their children in school, but when one of them found himself temporarily out of work Mina intervened and sent money to her nephew from Barcelona. Another example is that of Irma’s brother who migrated to Japan where he found a job in a factory, but was unable to regularise his position. Not having any future as an illegal immigrant in Japan, he decided to use his sister’s network and he was expected to arrive in Barcelona very soon.

Moroccans

As a consequence of migration some Moroccan women – like their Filipino counterparts – marry out of their group but they tend to marry within their religion. The only woman in my sample who married a Spaniard did so after he converted to Islam. Regarding the choice of their partners, many women in my sample had arranged marriages but, unlike some South Asians in Britain (cf. Summerfield, 1993), they tended to consider this practice oppressive. New “imported spouses” often were “chosen” by their future husbands but the former usually had the final say on the marriage. Fatima, for instance, had received three propositions all from emigrants (one living in Belgium, one in Germany and one in Italy). She eventually chose the man who worked in Italy because she felt he was the most suitable for her. The Belgian one was a non-practising Muslim “with long hair who played in a rock and roll band”, whereas the German suitor was a traditionalist Muslim. In Fatima’s view, whereas the former was not religious enough and she feared that he would not have been able to understand her, the latter was too religious and she knew that he would have forbidden her to work or simply to go out alone. She opted for the one nearer to her personality and customs: “a practising Muslim with open views”. In order to be sure about her choice and before committing to a formal engagement Fatima spent two years with him “to get to know him better”.

As was noted for Filipinas, among the Moroccan sample too there was the case of a woman who chose to remain single. Having a full-time job and a rented flat, she felt free of not getting into an unwanted marriage. The same conclusion was reached by some of my divorced interviewees who refused marriage propositions and preferred not to form
new families. When Moroccan families are separated due to migration, women are normally the ones left behind but there are also Moroccan women who are becoming the initiators of migration, as their Filipino counterparts are, thanks to the growing presence of “female” jobs in Italy and Spain. As for the number of children, Moroccan women I interviewed tend to have fewer than their Filipino counterparts and they rarely have more than two. They tend to live together with their children although it is not uncommon for them to leave them for periods of varying length in the care of their families of origin.

Although slightly less transnational than the typical Filipino migrant family, Moroccan families are quite dispersed and the majority of my respondents had family in three countries — normally Morocco, Italy/Spain and France. The main difference between Moroccan women living in the two locations is that the Moroccan women of Bologna have family members more dispersed amongst the Italian regions than Moroccan women in Barcelona — an aspect identified also for Filipinas. Both the Filipino and Moroccan family distribution reflects the geography of their group’s migration, confirming the validity of those analyses centering on the existence of migration “fields”. For Filipinos the countries of emigration are, in order of “prestige”, firstly the United States, Canada and Australia, followed next by Southern European countries (mainly Italy, Spain and Greece) and to a lesser extent other European countries such as Germany, France, UK and Switzerland, and then the Arab Gulf states and finally Hong Kong and Singapore. Moroccan migration is less “global” and has mainly a European character. Countries that were the destinations of the older waves of Moroccan migration are France, Belgium and Holland, whereas new migration flows are directed primarily to Italy and Spain.

The patriarchal extended family model — typical in Morocco (Lacoste-Dujardin, 2000) — does not seem to reproduce itself in the context of migration since in both my samples I did not encounter any extended family of this type. The only three-generational family of my sample diverged sharply from what is supposedly the norm in Morocco since it included a married couple and the mother and brother of the wife rather than the parents and siblings of the husband as it should be if following patrilineal rules. The most widespread family form among my Moroccan interviewees was the nuclear household (14 out of 36 cases), followed by a variety of combinations. Another element of change introduced in the immigration context is the emergence of some households based on friendship rather than kinship (particularly in Barcelona), where there may be male members who are not the household head but rather “guests”. The fertility rate of Moroccan women residing in the two cities studied is quite low. A possible explanation for this
could be that these women find it extremely difficult to bring up children due to a number of factors such as their new labour function, the changing structure of their households (with fewer female members at hand) and the lack of support and facilities for childcare in the context of arrival. Changing attitudes towards children among women of the younger generations should also not be disregarded.

Women’s roles and positions within their families

This section deals with the changes in roles and responsibilities within families brought about by the migration experience. Although feminists have long tended to equate the family with the site of female oppression, in the migration context that I have studied the family appeared as an institution characterised by ambivalence, a site that is at times beneficiary towards and at other times detrimental to women, or indeed both at the same time. Such conclusions echo those reached by other authors working on both ethnic minorities and poor urban families who have noted how the family can carry out important functions such as that of mediator or barrier in racist and hostile environments. My study confirms that migration can undermine and weaken family relations as much as it can strengthen them, and can contribute to the fact that some families become more united in the face of what are perceived as difficult conditions. In a context such as Southern Europe, where policies towards vulnerable categories are patchy and ineffective, the family (at origin, destination as well as in other locations) represents an important safety-net and a resource which is vital in a number of spheres (e.g. for favouring immigration itself, for accessing accommodation, for finding jobs, for providing childcare, etc.). Below I consider women’s roles and positions first in different types of families based on marriage and subsequently in mono-parental ones (see also Zontini, 2001). The last section introduces an issue that is crucial for the majority of immigrant women I interviewed: the upbringing of and the relationship with their children.

Marriage

One obvious consequence of migration on couples is that it often involves them living apart. Such separation means that the “traditional” marriage based on co-residency loses salience for many migrants, introducing new forms of conjugal unions that bring with them new

* See, for example, Andall (2000b); Brah (1996); Foner (1997).
problems for the partners. Some of these impacts are shared by both Filipino and Moroccan migrant women, with others differentiated between the two groups. First, I will make some remarks about the Filipino context, and then turn to the Moroccan.

For Filipinos such separations are normally the result of women’s departure to take up jobs abroad and are widely accepted within Filipino society since they are seen as carried out for the family’s benefit. Such arrangements may be beneficial to women, particularly for those who are tired of unsatisfactory marriage life and look for a legitimated way out of an oppressive situation (Moore, 1988; Tacoli, 1999). However, women’s and men’s behaviour in these types of marriages is not expected to be the same. On the one hand men are “excused” for being promiscuous in the absence of their wives, and many Filipinas live in fear that their husbands will form new families in their absence, as has happened in many cases. On the other hand women are expected to be chaste and totally devoted to their distant partner and family. Their respectability and moral virtues are controlled by the Filipino community in the destination and “gossip” seemed a very important tool conditioning the life of my informants both in Bologna and in Barcelona.¹⁰

After a period of separation there is in many cases the process of reunion. This is an event that many of the Filipino interviewees longed for but which is not free of difficulties and strains for the couples involved. One problem that emerged from my interviews is the fact that “reunited” husbands can find it difficult to be economically dependent on their wives. Edna reported how this resulted in endless quarrels and disputes between her and her husband who was becoming “nervous” of staying at home all day with no job. Another issue is that men who had professional jobs in the Philippines find it more difficult than their wives to accept and engage in the types of jobs that Filipinos are offered both in Italy and Spain. When Filipino men are present they seem to work less than Filipino women but this does not seem to bother their wives who take up the role of main breadwinners. When that is the case Filipino men often do get more involved than usual in domestic tasks particularly in relation to childcare. Migration thus results on the one hand in a continuity for Filipinas with their role as those who are responsible for their families, and on the other hand they undergo a shift towards becoming the main breadwinners who are exempted from a part of domestic duties. Furthermore their earning capacities strengthen their position within the kinship group giving them new prestige.

¹⁰ Chang and McAllister Groves (2000) noted the same phenomenon for Filipinas in Hong Kong.
Another consequence of migration, also noted earlier, is that Filipinas are getting involved in mixed relationships both with nationals of the country of immigration and with other foreigners. Filipinas seemed quite satisfied with their relationships with Italian, Spanish and Arab men, at least according to the evidence I was able to gather. Their main problem in these types of relationships is that they sharply decreased the likelihood of an eventual return to the Philippines, a dream that almost all of my Filipino interviewees shared. Also some women felt that having an Italian/Spanish partner was impeding them from making further migrations and therefore was condemning them to a life of domestic work. The most problematic relationships seemed to be those between Filipinas and sub-Saharan African men. One of my interviewees attributed the failure of her relationship to cultural incompatibility between her and her partner particularly in relation to family formation. Filipinas wanted stable relationships leading to marriage whereas their partners (some of whom already had wives in their countries of origin) wanted more open relationships. However, again I should stress the small-scale nature of my data on this point.

Turning now to the second of the survey groups, the Moroccan family has often been looked at as the symbol of the problematic presence of Muslims in Europe and women’s position in it as been presented as the example of Muslim inferiority and backwardness vis-à-vis the supposedly more progressive and modern Western “civilisation”. The Muslim family has been seen as static, resistant to change and inexorably linked to tradition. As some authors (Brah, 1996; Husain and O’Brien, 2000; Lacoste-Dujardin, 2000) have pointed out, and as my study shows, that is not the case. Moroccan families are continuously “attempting to negotiate the boundaries of religion and tradition in non-Islamic sociocultural contexts” (Husain and O’Brien, 2000, p. 2).

According to Husain and O’Brien (2000, p. 9), “only a limited number of small-scale studies have been carried out to investigate the effects of migration, settlement, social exclusion and economic disadvantage on spousal relationships and gender dynamics within Muslim communities”. What has emerged from my study on this aspect is first of all the importance of generation. I noted important differences between older women who grew up in the Moroccan countryside, young Moroccan urban women, and young women who spent a considerable part of their life in the country of destination.1 Other important elements to bear in mind are class and education, since some women of higher socio-economic status have fewer pressures to adhere to what is supposedly the ideal model of the Moroccan family.

1 See Brah (1996) for similar considerations on different generations of Muslim Asian women in Britain.
As with the Filipinas, migration results in the fact that many Morroccan married couples have to live apart for a number of years. In the case of Moroccans it is normally women who are left behind in the home country while their husbands consolidate their position in the receiving context. This proved to be an extremely difficult period for the majority of my interviewees because they were totally dependent on and controlled by their in-laws with whom they were living. Unlike when their husbands were present, they did not have anyone mediating between their wishes and the often oppressive impositions of their mothers-in-law. Furthermore the absence of their husbands made them potentially “loose” in the eye of their families and thus social control on them increased. However, as we have seen, couples may live apart also as a result of women’s migration and this is another potentially difficult arrangement since Morroccan men do not see this inversion of roles positively. Mbarka commented how her fiancé did not talk to her for a year and almost cancelled the wedding when she decided to accept a job in Spain. Quarrels were frequent but Mbarka nevertheless felt extremely proud of what she did and despite the difficulties she sees her experience as worthwhile.

Reunion after a long period of separation is a delicate phase also for Moroccan couples. If those arriving and reuniting are the wives, sometimes problems may arise because they have “exaggerated” expectations of life in Southern Europe. Many complain about the unsatisfactory housing arrangements that their husbands were able to provide—either because it is too isolated (outside Bologna) or because of its poor quality (in Barcelona). They also expected their husbands to have better and less precarious jobs and generally they hoped for a more comfortable life where they would have improved their situation rather than being forced to take up jobs that in some cases are worse than the ones that they were doing in their own country. If those reuniting are the husbands, they may resent the freedom and independence of their wives and they may want to reinstate their male authority and control over family affairs. It has been noted in the literature as well as in my own research that migration may result in the weakening of the power of the Moroccan husband as breadwinner. One consequence of this can be his clinging more to the tradition where the male role is clearly defined and valued, rather than favouring the emancipation of the women in the context of the family (Husain and O’Brien, 2000; Lacoste-Dujardin, 2000). On the other hand, it can also lead to a new distribution of productive work between the spouses.

Moroccan families formed in the immigration context present fewer problems, since the partners seem to share a number of values and expectations. For instance, both partners accept the fact that
women should work outside the home and they agree on the primacy of the nuclear family and on the desire to control the interference of the wider kinship group. However, even in these families where women work, "the division of labour outside the family hardly affects the division of household tasks" (Pels, 2000, p. 85), something that my interviewees (especially the youngest and most educated ones) feel to be onerous and ultimately unjust. Because of the double work burden they had to do at home and at work, some of my interviewees decided to go back to the traditional role of the Moroccan woman as mother and wife, a role that brought them respect and which they saw as more rewarding than that of unskilled or semi-skilled worker in the devalued and precarious jobs that they can access in Southern Europe.

**Female-headed households**

Although not necessarily a consequence of migration, female mono-parental families are a reality of immigration for both Filipino and Moroccan women. In their study of Filipino women, Chant and McIlwaine (1995, p. 282) suggest that women-headed households can be advantageous structures for women, since such arrangements may be "more likely to ensure that they will derive greater personal gains from their work, whether pragmatically or ideologically". This is not so certain judging from my own field data. Such household structures do seem beneficial for some of my interviewees in the long run, but this seems to apply mainly to women without children or with grown-up children, whereas for women living alone with young children the benefits that they may derive from greater independence and control over their lives have to be set against the hardship of their daily routine characterised by long shifts both inside and outside the home. This is why for women in this situation married life is still seen generally as a preferable option.\(^{12}\)

**Children**

For both Moroccan and Filipino women, it has often proved difficult and challenging to bring up children in the immigration context, due to a number of interrelated factors. First of all, female immigrants in Southern Europe are working much more than they would have done in their countries of origin, and their schedule leaves them little

\(^{12}\) For more insights into the difficulties of immigrant women-headed families in Italy see Andall (2000b), and for a detailed biographical case-study of one Filipino woman in Bologna see Zontini (2002).
time for childcare. Second, they now have very little help at hand. Filipinas, even though they often live with a number of relatives, can hardly count on them since all their household’s members work as much as they can because they too support family members elsewhere. Moroccan women likewise cannot benefit from the same support of kin they would enjoy in Morocco since they now tend to live in nuclear households and their contact with relatives who live in the vicinity is generally decreasing in importance.

Many Filipinas thus decide to have their children raised in the Philippines while they act as breadwinners abroad. Many of my Moroccan respondents also sent their children to the home country or left them there while they migrated to Italy and Spain. The difference lies in the fact that the period in which Moroccan women stay separated from their children is much shorter than the separations endured by Filipinas. Moroccan women tend to send their children away when they are very young, usually to cover the period prior to nursery school, and generally take them back when they are still very small – around two years old. Filipinas can stay away from their offspring for periods of 10–15 or even 20 years, forcing them into new forms of distant parenthood. How to be a good distant parent is an issue that has started to be debated within the Filipino community since it is felt that it brings new problems. Some have noted than giving children money instead of direct affection and parental guidance may result in these children becoming spoiled and not taking advantage of the possibilities that their parents are giving them through their work abroad, particularly in the field of education.

The issue that most affected many of the Filipino mothers I interviewed is that of the relationship with their children. The majority of Filipino children have a great respect for their parents’ choices and recognise all the efforts they did for the sake of the family. However, their connection to their parents has weakened as result of separation and their affection has often turned to other members of their families – e.g. grandmothers – with whom they have been in closer contact in the Philippines. The lack of connection between parents and children has given rise to difficulties in some reunions with teenage children taking place in Southern Europe. Some of these youngsters have proved “difficult”, refusing the authority of their parents whom they considered almost strangers to them.

These kinds of problem do not seem to affect Moroccan women to the same extent since they tend to maintain a closer relationship with their children. Such relationships are eased also by the geographical proximity of Morocco and Southern Europe which makes visits more possible and thus more frequent. The issues of education and of par-
ent–child relations do however concern Moroccan and Filipino women equally. For Moroccan women their main concern is about the education and relationship with their daughters (rather than sons who are supposedly able to look after themselves and are exposed to fewer risks). Many Moroccan mothers expressed their fear about bringing up children in a society where (according to them) young people are “too free” and therefore exposed to many dangers. Because of this, parents may resort to controlling their children (especially their daughters) more strictly than they would have done in Morocco. Daughters suffer from the restrictions that their parents impose on them and struggle to improve their position within the family. These young women are generally not challenging their parents head-on and they do try to show understanding for the difficulties encountered by their parents. They tend to opt for a strategy of small steps that will lead them to more autonomy and independence. One of their tools is education and the other is work. Through school achievement and by working hard, they are on the one hand pleasing their parents who feel that their own migration had positive results on their children, and on the other hand they are getting access to spaces outside their parents’ control where they can fulfil their aspirations.

Conclusions

This analysis of Filipino and Moroccan female migrants in two important Southern European cities has pointed out the heterogeneity of backgrounds and motivations that lie behind women’s migrations. Having said that, there seems to be one element uniting the reasons for migrating given by these women: their gender-specificity. That is to say, their being related to women’s (gendered) roles and positions within their families and societies of origin. Among the reasons for this I identified the following. First, the absence from the household of a male figure (dead or disappeared). In fact, a high proportion of my respondents—both Moroccan and Filipino—seemed to come from female-headed households. The reason for this can be twofold: greater independence or greater pressure and necessity on the part of these women to earn higher wages. Second, the need of a well-paid job in order to help financially other members of their families (more so for Filipino women but also found for poor working-class Moroccan women). Third, the desire to escape from oppressive familial situations was often masked

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with the "excuse" of good job opportunities abroad (Phizacklea, 1998; Tacoli, 1999). Finally, women migrate for family reunion (Kofman, 1999; Zlotnik, 1995) and within this category Moroccan women often migrate as a result of marriage with co-nationals already resident in the country of immigration. Family migration - often the reason commonly associated with female migration - does not preclude other reasons, which may include economic ones and even the desire to escape from oppressive situations at home.

The local context of arrival clearly conditions some of the choices and possibilities open to migrant women. What has emerged from my analysis is the striking similarity of the two city contexts considered. The presence of gendered and racialised labour markets, the very limited availability of housing for socio-economically vulnerable categories of persons and the insufficient provision of public childcare are distinguishing traits of both Bologna and Barcelona, indeed of Southern Europe more generally. The main differences encountered in the study were thus not so much between locations, but between the two groups of women who arrive from different backgrounds, with different expectations and goals, and who deploy different strategies to adapt to the conditions they encounter in the two cities.

As regards women’s role and position within so-called transnational families, what has again emerged is the diversity of experiences, which is partly the result of a variety of factors such as the socio-economic position of the migrants and their education levels (Ribas-Mateos, 2000); and the stage in the life-course and also the stage in the developmental formation of particular households (Kofman, 1999). As far as Filipinas are concerned, we have seen that migration has brought changes in family formation patterns. For instance, they are marrying later than their parents, having fewer children, sometimes they are living together with their partners and some are joining with non-Filipino partners. Filipinas especially are involved in creating and maintaining transnational families in which members move to different countries according to different possibilities offered to their members at different stages of both their productive and reproductive life-courses. Workers stay in Italy and Spain where wages for domestic service seem to be among the best world-wide, whereas retired people, students and babies commute between Italy and the Philippines. These transnational arrangements, although they have benefits in maximising resources and possibilities, have also more difficult consequences for some of the individuals who have to endure long-term separation from their loved ones.

As far as Moroccan women are concerned, they often see the Southern European context (considered European and therefore advanced)
as one that is potentially favourable to them and where they can improve their status by working, by having legal protection, and by distancing themselves from the extended family and their role assigned within it. But their aspirations are often frustrated by the reality they find in Bologna and Barcelona, characterised by racism, stereotyping and lack of rights. Like their Filipino counterparts, Moroccan women are having fewer children than the average in their country, partly as a choice reflecting changed attitudes to family formation, and partly due to the difficulty of raising children in Italy and Spain.

By virtue of their “multiple presence” (Ribas-Mateos, 2000), both Moroccan and Filipino women are key actors for the maintenance of transnational networks. They manage to be present and contribute to different families and different markets. Their continued involvement with their countries of origin is achieved in a number of ways, such as by sending remittances and presents, helping relatives to initiate the migratory adventure, keeping contacts and communication, contributing with their work to invest in the country of origin, and so on. But also the women who stay in the home country play crucial roles in maintaining these networks: they look after children and elderly relatives who stayed behind, they take care of migrants’ houses and properties, and they host migrants when they go home for their holidays. From this analysis has emerged how families – and more specifically women’s roles and responsibilities within them – as well as kinship ties and networks play a key role in favouring, constraining or simply shaping female migration. This surely justifies a gender-sensitive approach to migration that does not compartmentalise women’s productive and reproductive work but rather seeks to understand women’s migration in a more holistic way.

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Summary

This paper compares the experiences of Moroccan and Filipino women migrating to two Southern European cities, Bologna and Barcelona. Most of the literature dealing with female migration to Southern Europe focuses on women’s role and function in the local racialised and gendered labour markets. This paper argues against compartmentalising immigrant women’s productive and reproductive work and calls for gender-sensitive approaches to migration that seek to understand women’s migration in a more holistic way. The paper shows, on the one hand, how family, kinship and gender relations in the country of origin influence the migration of both Moroccan and Filipino women; on the other hand, it documents the different ways in which these relations change and get renegotiated through the migration process and in receiving countries. The empirical base of the research consists of 76 in-depth interviews, evenly divided between the cities and the two migrant nationalities, enabling multiple comparative perspectives to emerge. Use is also made of selected individual biographical accounts.
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Atzinganoi, mint tea and hip hop: (multi)cultural education in Bologna

Introduction

In the last few years Italy has discovered itself as a multi-ethnic country with an increasingly ageing native population and an influx of young new residents. Its past as a country of emigration has had to be weighed against its present condition as a country of immigration. Issues such as racism - which were dismissed as not pertaining to Italy while criticism was not spared for other countries - have now come to the fore, in a society that has difficulty in coming to terms with the fact of being part of a global world. Whilst the wealth and prestige from Italy's export of goods and style have always been welcomed, the confrontation with poor people living next door has now created a sense of insecurity. The presence of a new underclass, which cannot (or choose not to) conform to the standard appearance of Italian society, has visibly revealed the existence in Italy of a gap between rich and poor and heightened the anxiety of many citizens who feel displaced in their own country. A rise in poverty matched by a perceived upsurge in criminality has been a powerful ingredient for politicians ready to exploit the immigration issue for their own advancement. The media are central in igniting the debate on the changing face of Italian society.

Italy's transformation from a "mono-cultural" to a multi-cultural society has been felt in all sectors. My own professional experience of the cultural sector - from clubs initially to cinema institutions later - led to the formulation of questions about the production, representation and the setting of (multi)culture which were to frame the longer research project (my doctoral thesis; Grassilli 2001a) from which this paper is drawn. ¹ How was the change that I have seen in my "returns",

¹ The thesis involved a comparison of "performances of multiculturalism" in Bologna and Barcelona. Findings for Barcelona were published in Grassili (2001b) and some of my other Bologna fieldwork in Grassilli (2002). The thesis was sup-
reflected in the production of culture? When I was working for clubs—as a publicist or bartender during my years as an undergraduate student in Bologna—black DJs and dancers were received with maybe exaggerated enthusiasm; yet bouncers at the door still favoured the entrance of those who wore the right gear. The most significant experience for me was to work on a film festival on Arab cinema in 1997 in a city that was just starting to come to terms with the sound of the Arab language on the bus. This job brought me for the first time in close contact with the immigrant associations which were then active in Bologna.

In a sense, Italy has always been “multicultural”—there are hundreds of dialects in a country that has been exposed to all kinds of invasions and foreign domination. The way that one looks is still a very important factor for inclusion. But the presence of the “new residents” is certainly shaping a diverse society. Now, the “ethnic” is often privileged in the choice of consumption of culture. Italy seems to have discovered that there is not only Italian or Western culture while simultaneously it still resists the new competition in values and beliefs. Sometimes I feel that the craving for African batiks, Moroccan cuisine and world music clashes with the indifference (or hostility) towards the lives of people living in these countries or who are newly arrived from these countries to Italy. Migration is a “hot” topic in Italy, key reportage being the tragedy of people drowning in the sea at the hands of unscrupulous human traffickers and the rise in criminality and prostitution associated with immigration. Yet there seems to me to be a contrast between the solidarity expressed by NGOs and policy-makers for immigration and the real efforts for structurally changing the conditions for welcoming new citizens. Much funding is oriented towards multicultural projects but political debate remains fixed on the control of the borders and the number of successful deportations. Now, since the election of a right-wing government in Italy in May 2001, this debate has become more harshly pitched against Italy’s immigrant population.

This research has thus developed out of my reflections on a changed “home”. What does “multiculturalism” mean in the Italian context? How is it manifested in cultural productions ranging from arts festivals to the primary school classroom? How are “difference” and “diversity” represented? Are the new residents active in countering the many stereotypes that are projected on them? Can they intervene in the debate for a multicultural Italy? If so, how?

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In this paper I focus on three “educational” events in which I was a participant observer: a musical event to celebrate the graduation of the first Roma university student in Bologna, and some cultural mediation activities in two schools in the city. Before describing and interpreting these events in more detail I will first introduce the setting of the research, the city of Bologna, outlining my views of its evolving multicultural character and of some aspects of the city’s cultural policies towards immigrants.

**Bologna – a fragmented multi-ethnic city**

I see Bologna as a city fragmented by current global trends of immigration and European transnational identification on one side, and local nostalgia for *Bolognese* traditions and for safety and security, on the other side. The city is thus a space of contestation – a *diaspora space* (Brah, 1996) or a *third space* (Bhabha, 1994) – where multiple discourses form Bologna’s inevitably plural identity.

A popular saying in Bologna describes the city as “la grassa (the fat), la rossa (the red) e la dotta” (the knowledgeable). As capital of Emilia-Romagna, a wealthy mixed-economy region of small and medium enterprises, Bologna is one of the richest cities in Italy. Therefore we can say that Bologna is “fat” because of its wealth alongside its many restaurants serving traditional Italian cuisine. The oldest university in Europe and the elegance of the city’s urban landscape have contributed to create the image of *Bologna dei salotti*, that is, a Bologna where ladies and gentlemen gather in tea rooms and coffee shops to discuss matters of life. The exclusivity of certain closed circles and families of the very provincial and conservative *Bologna Bene* is a contrast to the alternative and creative atmosphere of the university student community and to the famous “Red Bologna”. For 50 years until 1999, Bologna was ruled uninterruptedly by Communist (latterly post-Communist) administrations. With a strong tradition of resistance during World War II, well-established co-operatives and active left-wing organisations, Bologna was the “model city” within Italy’s Red Belt. The city became the showpiece of left-wing local government, with successful and ambitious social-welfare programmes. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) considered the city a “free commune” inspired by the medieval history of Bologna, and pointed to its efficiency and honesty in comparison to the chaos and corruption of other parts of Italy (Ginsborg, 1990, p. 203). But the decline of the “model city” over the last decade was apparent in the local elections of June 1999 when a centre-right coalition broke the long-running stronghold of leftist administrations.
A very large student community made Bologna a focus of the student movement of the 1960s and 1970s, revealing another fragmented “city within the city”. In the late 1970s, young people in Italy started organising collectives, they squatted buildings and became protagonists of new forms of urban conflict. According to Lumley (1990, p. 302, 309) “civil disobedience was at the heart of the youth protest” and “squattting was an important form of action for the movement”. Squats were not restricted to housing but also took over space for political and cultural centres. One of the outcomes of this underground experience was the creation of free, self-managed spaces as counter-cultural centres. Centri Sociali (social centres) started to emerge in Italian cities (with Bologna at the forefront) in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of initiatives by New Left activists who maintained their commitment after the defeat of the 1970s movements. However, in Bologna these institutions were initially strongly repressed by the Left administrations especially because the Centri Sociali had occupied and squatted empty public or private spaces. The city’s last Left administration (1995-99), with Roberto Grandi, a renowned scholar of media and cultural studies, responsible for culture, finally recognised the importance of Centri Sociali as expressions of the “social” Left and of the underground culture and creativity of the city.

Immigration in Bologna

Another important social element in the city arrived with immigration from developing countries. In the 1980s and 1990s the presence of foreigners who choose Bologna as their residence for reasons other than university study has grown considerably. According to official figures there were some 28,000 foreign residents in the province of Bologna in December 1999, over 2.3 % of the provincial population. In the city itself there were 14,439 foreign residents, 3.5 % of the population. The main national groups were those from Morocco (1,929), the Philippines (1,748), China (1,155), former Yugoslavia (844), Albania (685), Tunisia (598), Bangladesh (576), Sri Lanka (552) and Pakistan (519).}

2 The tradition of squatting resurfaced again in the context of immigration when a group of evicted immigrants occupied Bologna’s cathedral in December 1998. This event crystallised the severe housing crisis for immigrants in Bologna (Bernardotti and Mottura, 1999) and recalled similar church occupations of the sans-papiers in France (see Rosello, 1998). The Bologna occupation received an extra boost by the involvement of the satirical media puppet Gabibbo. I have provided a full account and interpretation of this event in a separate paper (Grassilli, 2002).

1 These figures are for 31 December 1999 and are for legally-resident foreigners only. They are taken from the Statistics Office of the Bologna City Council – and are also available on the Bologna City website: www.comune.bologna.it
The Centri Sociali have been particularly active in organising protests against the Centri di Internamento or temporary detention centres where undocumented immigrants are detained to facilitate their expulsion once the illegality of their presence is verified. Detention centres were at the centre of local debate during my fieldwork. On one side these were seen as a positive initiative by those who called for greater security – as a means for controlling illegal residents who escaped expulsion after being caught in illegal activities (for which, however, they were not being charged). On the other side, the centres are seen as “prisons” depriving the detained of their basic human rights.

It is impossible not to detect feelings of profound distress among the citizens of Bologna over the conditions in which migrants are living and, even more so, a growing feeling of insecurity about rising criminality. While the media have generally associated immigration and criminality, such a link is also often reproduced in the everyday discourse of the people. I found that the discourses were particularly critical of the lack of laws to stop illegal immigration, facilitate effective expulsion and achieve curbs on criminality. My impression was that there was a lot of ignorance surrounding the conditions of immigrants and a serious lack of positive information. This however cannot justify the constancy of anti-immigrant discourses, especially those coming from certain groups such as Bologna Bene, retailers and the elderly. All lament the growing insecurity and sense of displacement in a city like Bologna, no longer the “safe place” it was once thought to be. Mostly in these everyday accounts no distinction is made between the minorities of immigrants who are involved in criminal activities and the majority who are in Italy to work.

A dissociation emerges also between the experience of emigration of Italians and the contemporary immigration – “Italians emigrated to work ... they come here to be criminals...” Finally, in Bologna as in the rest of Italy, there seems to be a scale of preferences in associating ethnicity with criminality – with Arabs and Albanians seen as the most “misbehaved” (“malandrini”) and Chinese the least (“They take care of their own things...”). And there are the “zingari”: they are the most vilified group, and many times I witnessed verbal and even physical abuse of gypsies.

Immigration in Bologna has severely undermined the popularity of the city administration. This was already tested by the general decline of communist values and dissatisfaction with their management of certain key issues (for example traffic, housing and security). The inability of the city to properly administer the “emergency” of immigration and quell the growing sense of insecurity among its citizens have easily been exploited as political issues by the media and in the last ad-
ministrative elections. Però (1997 and 1999) has chronicled much of the disillusionment in Bologna over the mainstream Left’s handling of the immigration issue during the 1980s and 1990s, and exposed some of the hypocrisy separating official policy statements and the “reality” of the treatment of immigrants by various administrative organs “on the ground”. Immigration has acted in Bologna as a magnifier for debates over the administration of the city, which were particularly animated in the period leading up to the municipal elections of June 1999. The identity crisis of the city of Bologna, which has “surprisingly” grown from a provincial student town to a cosmopolitan metropolis, resulted in a backlash from some of its citizens that culminated in the re-invention of La Tua Bologna – the title of the centre-right coalition that obtained a majority of 51% of the votes in the June 1999 elections (Monteventi and Ghedini, 1999).

Let us now briefly examine the city’s response to immigration. Bologna initially serviced immigration through the Municipality Department for Social Services (Assessorato ai Servizi Sociali), providing information and managing emergency accommodation units. The administration of Bologna opted in 1994 for the creation of ISI (Institution for Migration Services); ISI remained active until 1999 as an autonomous administrative unit within the general structure of the Department of Social Services. In 1999 – as a result of the political change in the administration noted above – the independent administration was suspended and ISI was reintegrated within the department as “Servizi Immigrazione”.

Servizi Immigrazione – or before that, ISI – is responsible for all the actions relating to the presence of immigrant citizens from non-EU countries in the metropolitan area of Bologna. In the new structure, services for refugees and nomads (gypsies) are also included, which were previously dealt with by another office within Social Services. Servizi Immigrazione provides a range of legal and social information and a help-desk for advice on housing, work and political asylum. It also collects data and elaborates statistics on immigration in Bologna, constantly updating the City Council official website La Città Multietnica. A permanent function of the office is the management of the “shelter centres” (Centri di Prima Accoglienza) and other temporary accommodation for immigrants. Finally, in collaboration with other institutions and NGOs in the area, Servizio Immigrazione offers cultural mediation in schools and health – although this activity has declined strongly since the 1999 change in the administration.

To facilitate the dialogue with and among the new communities present in the area, Bologna City Council has supported the formation of cultural associations which are supposedly representative of the vari-
ous ethnicities and nationalities of immigrants. To fulfill this aim the Metropolitan Forum of Immigrant Associations has also been created. The Forum included in 1999 more than 40 immigrants' associations reflecting more than 20 nationalities. Its objectives were to promote the participation of the immigrants as political actors towards their integration within the host society, and to recognise the rights of foreign citizens. The Forum was to act as an interlocutor for the local administration on all issues concerning immigration. However, the Forum is questionable in terms of the adequacy of its representation of the immigrant population living in the metropolitan area of Bologna. In fact, the associations which belong to it are not representative of the whole population and the leaders who represent the associations in the Forum are not always democratically elected by the communities they claim to represent. There has been some tension within the Forum and sometimes I detected from my informants some disillusion over the efficacy of the institution for effective advancement of migrant integration and political work. The idea that the Forum has been co-opted by political forces within the city (for instance the trade union CGIL) and therefore has become disempowered and non-autonomous has been expressed to me by a few informants, who themselves no longer trusted the institution.4

With respect to the operation of cultural policy involving immigrants in Bologna, I did not encounter specific guidelines for respecting or promoting ethno-cultural diversity. Lacking a systematic approach towards recognising the socio-demographic and cultural realities which are the result of immigration, there seems to be in Bologna no particular funding geared towards “diversity” or a cultural policy which specifically encourages participation from the city’s new residents.

In interviews I had with cultural officers at the Assessorato alla Cultura in December 1998 it was explained to me that “funding is allocated for cultural projects according to their quality and not for their ethnicity... We do not think that we should give preference to foreigners just because they are foreigners...”. Nevertheless I was told of the many inter-ethnic initiatives which have received funding; such cultural projects were often seen as worthy of support also because they have emerged rather organically from certain multi-ethnic neighbourhoods in the city. I was shown budget lists of associations and projects which had received funding: the Chinese Association; students from Cameroon; a Centre for Far Eastern Arts; a Nigerian Association; an East African Association; and so on. However, the financial contributions were very modest, usually only up to 1 million lire, and exceptionally up to a maximum of 5 million (about 500 or 2.600 Euro respectively).

4 For further information on the Immigrants' Forum, and a critical evaluation of its practice, see Però (2002).
Roberto Grandi (personal interview, February 2000) stressed the importance of the university in Bologna for cultural production: “Cultural production exists and is substantially made by the university students who pass through the city and by other residents who have as a model the university students...”. The presence of the well-known DAMS (Department of Arts, Music and Performance) in Bologna creates strong opportunities for interaction between the different elements of the city – university, Centri Sociali, immigrant associations, etc. For instance, the World Music Festival Suoni nel Mondo – organised every year by CIMES (Interdepartmental Centre for Music and Performance associated with DAMS) – provides a stage for some of the best musical productions from different parts of the world. The event manages to achieve quite a strong participation from foreign residents as audience. The DAMS theatre, Soffitta, frequently hosts multi-ethnic theatre productions – for instance the Ravenna-based Teatro delle Albe, an African–Romagnola theatre company. The City Council intervenes in support of cultural production in the city by subsidising the regular activity of CIMES and of similar institutions which are particularly attentive to a wide conception of culture.

It does need to be pointed out that sometimes there is a discrepancy between the supply of cultural events and the participation of the audience in terms of the country of origin. For instance there have been productions from companies from the former Yugoslavia but new residents living in Bologna from the former Yugoslavia (who constitute one of the largest groups, numerically, in the city) do not attend the productions as audience. In the words of Grandi: “It is clear that the former Yugoslavians who live here in the majority of cases have never gone to see these productions... The productions are made in the sense of what is culturally alive there ... but this does not mean that the people who live here are necessarily expressions of all that...”. At the same time, Grandi underlined the importance of supporting “everyday culture”. According to him, “The people who are here are normal people... they express an everyday culture... It is important that this everyday culture has space... for instance, that the parents at the nursery start doing things... to introduce their elements of celebration there...”.

This particular orientation has been expressed throughout the administration with initial support for various initiatives – such as the development of libraries of different languages (e.g. Arabic, Chinese), the cultural activities of ISI – when it was fully operational – and educational–leisure events in the schools, through CD/Lei (Centro Documentazione/Laboratorio Educazione Interculturale). It is to these more explicitly educational representations and celebrations of multiculturalism that I now turn.
Atzinganoi: “gypsy” sounds in the heart of cultural power

Atzinganoi\(^5\) (11 December 1998) was organised by TRANSBO on the occasion of the graduation\(^6\) in Literature and Philosophy from the University of Bologna of the first Roma student: Santino Spinelli. According to its director, Michelangelo Ferrari, TRANSBO is an NGO interested in the “creation of non-material products – that is culture”. The organisation is interested especially in youth culture and thus works with music, fashion and art, tapping into the vast potential of creativity which reaches Bologna through its students. Atzinganoi was “a symbolic event to bring the most excluded and marginalised into the symbolic space of the power of culture” (Ferrari, interview, December 1998). The event included the screening of a documentary on Roma music made by Spinelli, and a round-table discussion on the ethno-musicology of Roma involving a Professor of DAMS, Santino Spinelli and a radio and music producer. In the evening, musical performances followed: the Diamant Brin, musicians originally from Kosovo and now resident in Bologna; a group of Italian musicians who play a fusion of Roma and Serdic music originating in Andalusia, India and Eastern Europe; the Sinti music group of Santino Spinelli; and a well-known folk group from Calabria (Il Parto delle Nuvole Pesanti) who play traditional Southern Italian music. There was also a photographic exhibition by Roma artists: the photos depicted life in the nomad camps as well as the protests of Italian neighbours against their presence. It should be pointed out here that Spinelli was already a well-known figure for his music and for his activism for the Roma people.

Before the concerts, quite a lot of work was put into preparing the stage and I used this opportunity to visit the artists’ changing room and meet Spinelli. There I also met an Italian woman dancer of gypsy music. Her dancing would later accompany the first Italian band. Dressed in flamenco-style red and black, she embodied the romantic imagery of the gypsy woman as visually reproduced in the famous film by Tony Gatlif, Gadjo Djilo.

\(^5\) Atzinganoi, the Byzantine term for gypsies, is reflected in several other languages: the German “Zigeuner”, the French “Tziganes”, the Italian “Zingari” and the Hungarian “Czinganyok”.

\(^6\) In Italy the graduation ceremony is an open discussion of the final thesis by the candidate in front of a Commission of Lecturers and Professors both internal and external to the University Department. After the discussion the candidate and the public are invited to leave the room for a few minutes for the Commission to decide the final mark. The candidate is then asked to enter again, informed of the grade and congratulated on graduation. The event is accompanied by the enthusiastic participation of family and friends, with clapping, flowers and photographs taken.
The event was organised in the most prestigious university building — the ex-Church of Santa Lucia, now the Alma Mater. This is where all the official ceremonies — such as the awarding of Laurea ad Honorem degrees — are hosted. The location of the event was specifically chosen to symbolically associate gypsy music with the most prestigious site of culture in Bologna and thus give visibility to cultural actors who are usually undervalued and consigned to a marginal position. Speaking to me “on site”, Michelangelo Ferrari said:

We are in Santa Lucia, in the official temple of culture of the world... Bologna is... an ancient city of culture... the city of academics... there is a great cultural tradition that is reflected by the splendour of this Alma Mater... Culture is the product of this city... it is its wealth... but there is not only “this” Culture... there is also a youth culture that usually does not pass through these places... that somehow is clandestine.

Thus the “gypsy” music here was representative of a broader “clandestine culture”. Ferrari continued:

(the clandestine culture) is that which survives in a limited and marginal cultural space between a Centro Sociale and a badly arranged graphic studio... but especially that which is not protected... I mean, which does not enter in the public circuit... that as a consequence is not nourished...

“Atzinganoi” and the graduation of Santino Spinelli should, therefore, be seen as more than a simple celebration of the Roma cultural tradition and its contemporary “translated” musical expressions; they were a subtle denouncing of the existence of officially overlooked producers of culture. In the words of Michelangelo Ferrari again, it was especially a critique of the lack of support and space for artists who cannot fully express their potential:

I think that the bohemian myth of the poor artist who sleeps among his canvases is over... I think that to produce culture today, dignity is required... adequate resources, a computer, a space, connection to the internet... There is no real attention from the top, from high institutions... to this underground culture... there is no link... they are somehow parallel worlds...

Atzinganoi was thus a subversive breach of a closure towards alternative artistic and cultural expression from high cultural institutions. Although this was not a squat, the cultural practice is similar in its intent to reclaim inclusion in usually exclusive spaces.

Tonight... we have made a breakthrough... the fact of having targeted, even with all the difficulties that comes with it... (for instance
we have to stop the music early) ... of having chosen this space that is
... the temple of Culture ... you know, this is the Alma Mater of the
University of Bologna ... the Alma Mater of the oldest university of the
world ... a very powerful symbol ... well, we have basically introduced
here a person who represents the lower, the most infamous ... the most
distant from (so-called high) “Culture” (Michelangelo Ferrari, inter-
view, December 1998).

The interest of TRANSBO in the “Roma as Other” originates from
two motives: because “Santino is a friend” and because “cultura zingara”
(gypsy culture) is marginal. The focus is therefore on “diversity ... that is
towards what is excluded because it is different ... not excluded because
it is over, dead ... but excluded because it has no strength for being
there...” (Ferrari). Atzinganoi aimed thus at symbolically bringing the
excluded right into the central alcove of power, exploiting a unique op-
portunity to express and exhibit a “clandestine” culture.

At the same time it was also an opportunity to de-exoticise “the
Other” – that is, not only to present the “good savage” but also to “free
him and make him escape from his exclusively gypsy role” (Ferrari).
The intention was in fact that of addressing stereotypes and attitudes
on the Gypsy question while playing with the exoticism produced by
Santino’s graduation – an exoticism that attracted great media inter-
est. This media interest produces its own dilemmas which Ferrari
muses over in the following interview extract:

Sometimes I ask myself if it is better to have the first attitude – of
rejection of the bad, “go away or I kill you” – or the second one – that of
going to the zoo to gaze at the exotic, the animal ... the circus phenome-
non... When Santino graduated there was a veritable assault of jour-
nalists and of the TV ... it was an incredible thing that I’ve never seen
before... But the journalists were there to take pictures of the fetish, of
the “Other” ... the fact that these “gypsies” were dancing in such a
place ... their clothes, different from those of the other students ... the
contrast ... lots of media ... Rai, Fininvest ... all interested, greedy for
this strangeness ... of this particularity that represented the event ...
Santino was the circus phenomenon ... So, you are the circus freak to
be put on stage ... I make you dance and the Westerners come to see
how strange you are but also how nice you are... No ... our discourse
with this event and others in the future – not necessarily related to the
Roma question – is to have a possible “third way” ... where there is no
war or curiosity ... but where notions of identity are challenged ...
where I change, you change ... where identity is transformed in the in-
teraction with the differences of the many “Others”.

For his part, Santino Spinelli welcomed the opportunity of “Atzingan
oi” for communication and identification: “Ours is a millenary tra-
dition that is practically unknown to the wider public ... the music is a
great vernacular for presenting our reality and cultural history ... this also means us deepening our cultural identity and thus being proud of it.” He also stressed the importance of positive representation:

it can help in going beyond the usual negative stereotypes ... that are so many on the cultura singara ... towards gypsies there are many deep-rooted and extreme prejudices... We want to demystify these ... to reveal their inconsistency... The gypsy discourse still remains strongly connected to the dimension of public security ... of the most negative social aspects ... we would like to present to the majority society the wealth of our ethnicity in its various aspects... (Santino Spinelli, interview, December 1998).

The event was an opportunity for Santino Spinelli to stress his multiple identities as Roma and Italian which he described to me as: “... two fierce beasts ... that could have devoured me ... I have succeeded in taming them and now I live with these two cultures in harmony ... I am as proud to be Italian as I am to be Roma ... and European ...” So, he is confident, “... there is hope that this will happen in the world and that divisions will be overcome, within the respect for difference.” Throughout the concert he shared this vision, encouraging the audience to participate by singing in the Roma language. Trying to tame the “two beasts” of Italian and Roma identity, he declared himself a “citizen of Bologna” and gave thanks for the opportunity offered by the music and by this event “to celebrate the Roma people and by being here together, to demonstrate that there can be unity”.

Spinelli dedicated the beautiful celebration and his newly-achieved degree to the Roma children: “to the ones who are making sacrifices to study and to those who unfortunately have to interrupt their studies”. He explained, “I lived this experience ... of being the first of the Roma at university ... with great emotion and pride ... but also sadness ... because (his uniqueness) reflects how difficult is for Roma people... to start a university career ...”. He hoped his example could show a possible third way between assimilation and marginalisation: “... that of positive social integration, remaining true to oneself...”.

During the evening concerts I happened to sit in the first row and hence was in a good position to observe what was going on. I was thus able to witness the presence of a special guest. The Rector of the University, Fabio Roversi Monaco, joined the audience. He came along to listen to some music and to greet Santino Spinelli. The meeting between the Rector, the main symbol of “powerful” culture (referred to in Italian university parlance as “Il Magnifico”) and Santino, symbol of a “marginalised” culture, was very friendly, and I listened to their conversation exchanges about different types of music.
Later I asked Michelangelo Ferrari whether it was difficult to get permission to host this event in Santa Lucia. His view was that it was easy to have access to the space, because it is comfortable for the institutions to sell solidarity... It was not difficult... it is difficult to do something when the others do not gain anything... but on something like this both the University and the City Council... make a good impression... it shows them in a positive light... so they immediately supported us... the University gave us the space for free... the City Council gave us about 5 million lire to pay for the sound system...

Summing up, the event still somewhat exoticised the "cultura zingara" whilst "authenticity" was not necessarily maintained since the dancer was Italian and Southern Italian music had considerable space in the evening concerts. The exoticism surrounding Santino Spinelli’s graduation was here used to attract and then channel attention towards positive aspects of the Roma tradition and to reclaim a right of expression.

The Alma Mater was transformed – even if just for a day – into a space where artists such as Spinelli and Diamant Brin were able to express their identity through Roma musical traditions. It was also a hybrid space where the sounds and dances of Eastern Europe fused with those of Southern Italy. Finally it was an event that challenged notions of “Culture” and – through re-affirmation of citizenship – “Bolognesità”.

In terms of participation, the event was organised by TRANSBO with the full involvement of Santino Spinelli and of the Centro Culturale Zingaro at all levels of organisation. The very aim of the event – and of TRANSBO as an organisation – was in fact that of challenging forms of exclusion from the production of culture. The later involvement of TRANSBO in training Roma teenagers to access the internet and master new media – within the framework of Bologna 2000 – was a serious continuation of TRANSBO’s commitment to providing the Roma people with the tools for self-participation in the cultural sector. The audience was composed of DAMS students but also Roma families with a lively participation of children – usually absent from cultural life in the city except as flower-sellers in the night bars. This, I believe, was an example of how the event was felt by the community and thus opened up for participation.

The above event did not, however, materially help in changing the dramatically poor living conditions of the Roma people whose settlements in Bologna (as in other Italian cities) are constantly a matter of dispute between hostile neighbours and the City Council. Not too long after the events, two small children died in a fire in their van in a Roma
camp, the same camp that suffered killings a few years earlier after violent attacks by the "Uno Bianca" gang. The death of the children – which was avoidable had the electricity system been within normal security standards – opened a debate in the city whereby responsibility was passed around without really progressing in lessening the divide between the "hostile Italian neighbours" and the "marginal gypsies".

Thus, even if Atzinganoi was certainly a bridge for cultural communication, there is still quite a gap between the inclusive celebration of a romanticised "Latcho Drom" gypsy community and the discrimination and material exclusion that the stereotyped gypsies experience everyday from the non-gypsy "Gadjo world".

Cultural mediation in school: mint tea and hip-hop

The next two examples I will present are linked to the activity of CD/Lei for the organisation of a new "multi-ethnic" school in Bologna. CD/Lei Centre is the result of co-operation between the Department of Education of the University of Bologna, the Provincial Education Office (Proveditorato agli Studi), the city council, the provincial government and the trade unions. The Centre directs its efforts towards teachers, educators, students and foreign families by disseminating knowledge and experimenting in the field of intercultural education. CD/Lei organises seminars, training courses, public initiatives and pedagogic counselling and has set up a database of bibliographic references, catalogues of audiovisuals and other teaching material with reference to the various associations and groups which are active in this field.

Walter Vitali, Mayor of Bologna 1995–99, expressed to me (personal interview, January 1999) his enthusiasm for the progress that Bologna had made in introducing "multiculturalism" in schools. Especially significant in his view were the cases of families living in the city centre, who were asking to register their children in schools located in the periphery in order to take advantage of the opportunity of learning in a multicultural environment. In his view this was important be-

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7 The "Uno Bianca" gang spread terror in Bologna in the early 1990s, ruthlessly killing ordinary people during robberies at gas stations or banks and simple acts of violence – such as those towards the gypsy community. The gang was eventually broken up and its members – some of whom belonged to the police forces – arrested.

8 During my fieldwork CD/Lei was involved in several projects: "Apriti Sesamo", a touring multicultural library; "Progetto Diecic" which is developing intercultural education co-operation between 20 European cities through student exchange, international workshops and the creation of multimedia training packages; and "Stanza dei Genitori", a training courses for foreign parents in six schools of Bologna. CD/Lei also offers support for literacy courses to new foreign students and organises training for cultural mediators.
cause it stressed the importance given by parents to the new educational environment and presented multi-ethnic classes as resources for learning.

While in Bologna I participated in two interesting school initiatives to address the issue of multiculturalism. On 12 December 1998, a day was dedicated to Morocco at the "Besta" middle school. On 18 May 2000 there was an outdoor concert in the "Rosa Luxemburg" secondary school. These two events are described below as examples of the kinds of cultural activity that schools in Bologna have started to organise in the last few years.

**Scuole Besta**

The event at Scuole Besta - a model school for the future of Bologna and its visible multi-ethnicity - was led by Med, a Moroccan cultural mediator then working for ISI (before moving to CD/Lei following the political change in the local administration). The day started by Med introducing Morocco through the images of a video. The audience was composed of about 70 children aged between 11 and 13. Of these about a third were of foreign origin (especially from China and Morocco). He then talked to the children about Morocco, interacting with them and the teachers. At the end of the event there was a little party for the children with Moroccan sweets and mint tea. I questioned him on the importance of food and drinks for inter-cultural education. He believes that parties are good opportunities for people to get closer to the culture of the children with whom they now share school time. The limitation comes when exoticism is all there is, and there is no further effort to use the event for education and communication.

The children smiled at the sight of the Fez tanneries and were surprised to see snow-capped mountains in Morocco. Through the video and the discussion, the imaginary of Morocco - desert dunes and the Mediterranean Sea - was stretched to include the Atlas Mountains and the Berber people. Among the audience there were some parents, the teachers and the team of CD/Lei - among whom was the Director Miriam Traversi and a video operator who recorded the event.

At the back of the schoolroom some Moroccan women were preparing a buffet with traditional Moroccan food - crepes with warm jam, rolls with sesame seeds, bread, and, of course, mint tea. The women were Leila, a 19 year old Moroccan woman who had arrived in Bologna a few months ago - but already speaking good Italian - and her aunt.

* The school system in Italy comprises: primary school (for students between 6 and 10); middle school (for students between 11 and 13); and secondary school (for students between 14 and 18).
They started preparing two days earlier for all to be ready for the day. Leila is now in Italy as a University student. She also works at night in a restaurant. Her aunt was wearing the veil, while Leila was dressed casually. While we chatted later, she said that if I would visit her at home, “we can do some Moroccan culture” and then we could talk. Leila showed me how to serve the tea in the proper way and handed me a notebook that she had filled with Moroccan recipes.

During the video, Med invited two pupils – a boy and a girl both from Morocco – to introduce their story. The boy had arrived in Bologna one and a half years ago and since his arrival had been at the school. The girl had only arrived two months ago at the “Besta” but had lived in Italy for two years. At Med’s invitation, the children addressed questions to them. “Do you like more your homeland or our homeland?” The girl answered: “My homeland ...” Med intervened reclaiming his citizenship of Bologna: “... but living and working in a country, this becomes your country. I am already a citizen of Bologna ...” The discussion continued with questions on Ramadan. Med then invited Leila to tell her story, what had brought her to Bologna and what she expected from her new life. The event ended with the sharing of the Moroccan snacks and of mint tea, to the sound of Moroccan music.

The day was a welcome opportunity to discuss issues of belonging and citizenship, where the pupils could challenge notions of “my” and “your” homeland. I felt that the active participation of Med was very significant for the success of the cultural mediation since he himself is a positive example of integration who feels he belongs to the city where he now lives and works. This was also an opportunity to welcome and celebrate the new pupils arriving from different countries and offer an opportunity for their classmates to voice their curiosity.

It could be argued that the representation of Morocco was simplified or that, by singling out the new children, their difference was accentuated. The day was however meant to be an introduction to Morocco, the study of which was to be continued within the classes and the children became useful translators of a still-distant imaginary. Their “difference” I believe was here valorised as a carrier of knowledge that was shared.

The snacks and the drinks added folklore to the day. But the goods were just a token of the cultural diversity that pupils, parents and teachers experience everyday in the school. Rather than an “exotic feast”, the food was here a demonstration of other ways of doing things, besides the Italian way. Leila and her aunt were proud of what they offered to the school and they spent their energies in sharing information on the treats they had prepared, encouraging the guests to explore their traditions. Through the event and – symbolically the buffet – there was the affirmation of a different identity, which was important to recognise
and valorise for a positive multi-ethnic Italian society. While “culture” was simplified, Med, Leila and her aunt were not performing essentialised culture, but expressing and sharing symbolically their traditions in a formative way. The mint tea was not commodified as an “Oriental” drink but offered as a symbolic door to a changing Italy.

Despite the overall success of the day, there were some moments of tension. Two of the teachers expressed to me their disappointment that the Chinese pupils were so silent. This raises the questions as to whether the Chinese students were “left out” of a day devoted to the study of Morocco, or whether their marginalisation and silence were indicative of deeper issues of exclusion. Some other remarks made by teachers made me realise that perhaps quite a lot of work still remains to be done with them before a real openness to diversity within schools is achieved. These few examples strongly legitimise the efforts of CD/Lei and its Director, Miriam Traversi, to give support to the teachers – who perhaps feel displaced by the school’s new demographic composition. In an interview (January 1999) Traversi expressed her concern about the insufficient resources and the slowness in applying modifications in the national curriculum. Through her team at CD/Lei, however, lots gets done in terms of raising awareness on the issue among the teachers.

This event was organised by the school but also with the active participation of the parents in the discussion preceding the event. There was therefore an opportunity before the event for parents to meet with Med and discuss issues of multiculturalism and education, and for the teachers to expand their knowledge on Morocco and Islam. In one of the preparatory meetings Med had a discussion with a teacher over the information on Islam collected in a handbook to be distributed to the children. He opposed the teacher’s selection as the information was limited to the theme of Islamic fundamentalism. Whilst fundamentalism can be an extreme expression of any beliefs – not just Islam – the material proposed would have offered a distorted perception of Islam at an introductory level. The handbook in its final version contained information on the religious aspects of Islam, including the ways in which the Qur’an is interpreted in everyday life. Without the participation of Med as a cultural mediator, the representation could have been quite different and thus might have achieved different results in terms of communication.

**Rosa Luxemburg**

The concert at Rosa Luxembourg – a technical secondary school specialising in languages and office work – was organised by a teacher – Francesca Milani – with the assistance of the students and the collabo-
ration of Jesus, a Senegalese poet and musician, and Malick Ba, a cultural mediator and producer of the hip hop group VDM (Voce dei Muti).

The stage was set in the gardens of the school in front of a small hill where students and teachers gathered to watch the performance. The day was officially introduced by Jesus who, wearing a traditional dress, thanked the school and the participants for this opportunity for sharing. Then the group VDM started rapping the piece "Porte Chiuse". VDM are - to my knowledge - the first multi-ethnic group in Italy, composed of young recent residents of Senegalese, Ivory Coast and Moroccan origins. The youngest was 18 at the time of the concert. The name of the group - Voce dei Muti - is a critique of the very limited possibilities that immigrants have to voice their opinion. As the producer explained, since the "Mutes" cannot speak they shout their anger through rap.

"Porte Chiuse", their first piece recorded on a demo CD, starts with the sound of a telephone ringing in a real-estate office.

"This is Mustapha ... I call about the ad I have seen about the flat ..."

"Are you extracomunitario?"

"I am a foreigner ..."

"I am sorry, the landlord does not want extracomunitari ..."

The rhythm picks up and through a mix of Arab, French and Italian the three "extracomunitari" express their frustration at how differently they are treated here as opposed to how foreigners are treated in their country: "The foreigner is on a throne in my country ...".

After a few more pieces performed by VDM, the stage passed to an Argentinian rock guitarist and then back to Jesus who, freed from his traditional dress of flowing robes, played reggae and initiated a jamming section which ultimately included all the musicians, Med as drummer and Malick as rapper. The music was contagious and after a short while the students were dancing in front of the stage. Quite special were four girls - very good friends - who very intensively and freely danced inspiring all other students to follow them. The four girls - who could easily have been scripted as the next (multicultural) "Spice Girls" - were super-trendy and great dancers. Originally they were from the Dominican Republic, Morocco and Tunisia. Med and Malick told me they had known them since they were small children, and that they represent the new generation with its origin in earlier family re-unification. Eventually Malick auditioned them, checking their potential as support singers of the VDM.

Behind the stage, close to the school building, there was a long buffet of snacks and drinks - both Italian and Moroccan-style. Coca-Cola was drunk while tasting baclava. The atmosphere was very happy and in-
clusive, with Alexandra, from Santo Domingo, dancing with her school friend in a wheelchair, teachers joining in at the end to Bob Marley sounds and graffiti in progress on one side of the courtyard. There was a contrast between the moderate Italian students and the "Multicultural Spice". The group – perhaps from the strength of their friendship – led the dances and contributed as much as the musicians to the "performance". Two veiled students attended the concert as part of the audience and were representative of yet another dimension of Bolognesità.

The performance was a mixed representation of global musical and fashion trends, translated in the context of Bologna. The "Italian" hip-hop of VDM and Jesus' reggae "performed multiculturalism" away from exoticism and traditions but close to the young students – both of Italian and foreign descent. The event ended with souvenir photographs and thanks on the part of the headmaster who towards the end started a dancing train with the students. Jesus then performed some poetry in a critical self-presentation of "I" as your new neighbour.

Conclusion

Summing up, what overall picture emerges from these "performances of multiculturalism" in the educational context of Bologna's schools and university? How do they contribute to the construction of a multicultural Bologna in terms of representation of diversity?

On the whole, I found that ethnicity (except local Bolognese ethnicity) is not widely celebrated in Bologna, as it is in many other European cities.¹⁰ There are lots of stereotypes and still quite a lot of ignorance about the "new neighbours". Instead of a positive appreciation of immigration as part of a changing Bolognese/Italian society, the prevailing reaction is still one of "immigration as emergency" and a negative public image which very much associates immigration with criminality, degradation and prostitution. In all this, the voice of the immigrant is rarely heard.

Hence the importance of working with young people of migrant or community ethnic origin, for they, clearly, are the future of "multi-ethnic Bologna". The three events which I have described in this article are but isolated incidents – moments of social networking, solidarity and fun – which should be much more widespread in the city, and elsewhere in Italy.

Certainly there is a necessity in Bologna of investing more effort and space in public events which would make the immigrants more ac-

¹⁰ For instance, in Barcelona, which was the comparative frame for my research in Bologna (see Grassilli, 2001b).
tive protagonists in the classroom and "in the square". In this way Bolognesi would become more directly aware of migrants' ethnic backgrounds and their unique and valuable cultural contributions. Unfortunately such an orientation is now largely absent from the city's public administration. Even during Bologna's celebrations as a "city of culture" in 2000, there was no real attempt to define the city's identity as one of multiculturalism. What are left are more or less isolated and spontaneous expressions of the city's evolving de facto multi-ethnicity. In Piazza Maggiore, for instance, there are the Peruvian musicians who sing their particular brand of global music in the corner, competing with the local musical character, Beppe Maniglia,\textsuperscript{11} whilst on Sundays and in the evenings the human landscape of the square is modified by gatherings of Filipinos, Bangladeshis and Somalis who form in their national groupings to chat, together with (but separated from) groups of elderly locals.

In this way, too, we can distinguish between the migrants as "ordinary" as well as "extraordinary". At the Besta school the presence of Moroccan students was an everyday experience. The event was precisely to celebrate such ordinary situations. The choice of African music for the end-of-year concert and of the rap of VDM was also a recognition of the "normal" influence of such music on young teenagers and a promotion of the local "new musicians". At Alzingano, instead, the presence of cultura clandestina in the heart of cultural power – the University Alma Mater – wanted to stress the "extraordinariness" of this presence, as the journalists did when they laid siege to Santino Spinelli's graduation.

Yet the "everyday" remains the dominant setting for immigrant/local interaction. The constant contacts with a Pakistani colleague at the workplace or a Chinese classmate at school are the everyday encounters that can slowly change perceptions and challenge previously-held notions about the "Other". It is through such general, everyday social interaction that society changes, new words enter the language, and new flavours enrich local cuisine. Thus many "performances of multiculturalism" document changes which are happening in society anyway. For instance, the school events were based on a reality that sees children from more than 40 different countries attending the schools of Bologna every day. It is this reality that school teachers and national curriculum developers are constantly forced to confront. The events in the schools helped all students, parents and teachers to absorb the change. In a way, a day on Morocco was a symbolic statement that the

\textsuperscript{11} A street performer who plays guitar music from a Harley Davidson arranged as a sound-system.
classroom is now changed and that a “merenda” (the school mid-morning snack) might be a Moroccan sweet rather than a slice of pizza.

On the other hand, there is the danger that the symbolic value of “different” foods remains just that: symbolic. Ethnic restaurants have mushroomed in Bologna in the last few years. Now a person living in Bologna can eat: Palestinian, Chinese (more than 40 restaurants), African, Argentinian, Cuban, Greek, Indian, Mexican, Thai, Persian, Moroccan and Japanese food. Ten years ago the only ethnic cuisine present in Bologna was Chinese, arriving with the first immigrants in the 1920s. The presence alone of restaurants, without an “event” that would reinforce this, challenges the identification of Bologna with just Bolognese cuisine. However this latter element of identification – Cucina Bolognese – was reaffirmed during the Bologna 2000 celebrations, where the “Cultura del Cibo” event only included participation of the best restaurants in the city that offer the traditional cuisine of the region.

The school is one of the sectors that has had to accept earlier than maybe others the changes in the ways in which “culture” is conceived. Teachers were suddenly confronted with the presence of children coming from many different countries and speaking little Italian; instead they spoke languages only recently considered in Italy, such as Arabic, Chinese, Bengali, Urdu, etc. Apart from needing to provide assistance for reaching equal literacy standards, teachers have had to rethink their ways of teaching; history books are having to be reviewed to adapt to the new students and geography suddenly becomes a reality inside the classroom. Relations with the parents had to include new considerations with respect to religious practices, class, gender, etc. In Italy, schools have been “de-Eurocentricised” by the presence of the “new students”, who will grow in numbers due to the very low Italian fertility rate and a generally much higher birth rate from within immigrant communities and mixed families.

Hope, then, is in the next generation represented by the academic success of more than just one Roma student, by the “Multicultural Spice” and by an open mentality (on all sides) which allows the voices of both the young Moroccan rapper and of students who wish to wear the veil to be listened to and understood.

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Summary

Drawing from a larger project which compared “performances of multiculturalism” in Bologna and Barcelona, this paper concentrates on examples of (multi)cultural education in Bologna. After first setting the scene by a brief examination of the debates surrounding the “immigration issue” in Italy today, the focus of attention then narrows to the city of Bologna. Data on immigration to Bologna are presented, followed by a brief discussion of the cultural politics of immigration in the city. The empirical heart of the paper is an analysis of three specific events which were observed and interpreted, each one reflecting a different aspect of the role of multicultural, inter-ethnic dialogue within an educational setting. First, a party and concert to celebrate the graduation of the first Roma student at the University of Bologna allowed the normally marginalised culture of the Roma to reclaim the most prestigious educational-cultural space in the city: the University Alma Mater theatre of Santa Lucia. Second, a “Moroccan day” at a primary school was observed, an event facilitated by a cultural mediator and other helpers. Third, the Rosa Luxemburg secondary school became a stage for reclaiming a musical space, facilitated by local migrant-origin musicians, including the rap group Voce dei Muti giving “voice” to the frustrations of the immigrant condition in Italy. In general the immigrant voice is rarely heard in Italy, almost never appearing in the infinite reportage on the so-called “emergency” of immigration. These multicultural educational events concentrating on young people give hope for the future.
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Special Issue:

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Of myths and mirrors: interpretations of Albanian migration to Italy

Introduction

March 1991 saw post-Cold War Europe’s nightmare immigration scenario: a flotilla of assorted craft, crammed with some 26,000 desperate migrants fleeing political and economic chaos in Albania, bearing down on the coast of Italy. Five months later, in the heat of August, the same thing happened again, and a further 20,000 arrived by rusty boat and flimsy dinghy. A third exodus of Albanian “boat people” occurred in March 1997, consequent upon renewed political and economic chaos that hinged on the collapse of a set of huge pyramid investment schemes which bankrupted more than half the Albanian population. Over the same period an even more massive, but less internationally publicised, migration of Albanians took place to Greece across the sparsely inhabited mountain border and via Corfu, which lies close to the Albanian shore. By the end of the decade, official destination-country records enumerated 142,066 Albanians in Italy who were holders of “permits to stay” on 31 December 2000, and 241,561 Albanians in Greece who had filed applications for “green card” regularisation during 1998–99, plus another 80,000 ethnic-Greek Albanians who were waiting to receive the homogeni card as members of the Greek diaspora. To these must be added an unknown, but probably quite large, number of Albanians who are living and working in these two countries clandestinely, as well as smaller, but probably rapidly growing, numbers of Albanians elsewhere in Europe and in North America. According to recent data from the Albanian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, out of a total Albanian population of 3.8 million, 800,000 are living abroad – 500,000 in Greece, 200,000 in Italy, 50,000 in other European countries, and 50,000 elsewhere, mainly in North America (Barjaba, 2000). In other words, more than one in five of the current Al-
banian population now lives abroad, a stark contrast to the period before 1990, when emigration was fiercely proscribed. Undoubtedly, emigration from Albania has been the major example of East–West mass migration following the removal of the Iron Curtain which was, in reality, as much a migration barrier as an ideological divide (King, 1998).

Standard geographic and economic migration theory would “explain” the Albanian migration in terms of spatial proximity – Greece shares a land border with Albania and the easily-crossed Otranto Strait separates Albania from Italy – and of stark contrasts in economic opportunity, above all with respect to income levels. These two factors have certainly been important. But to fully understand Albanian migration to Italy and Greece, and the experiences of exclusion and stigmatisation that Albanians have been subjected to in these two countries, one needs to examine firstly the histories of the relationships between Italy and Greece on the one hand, and Albania on the other; and secondly the specific political events taking place in the respective countries at the time of the main migration waves in 1991 and 1997.

This paper will focus on the Albanian migration to Italy.\footnote{This article can be considered as a background paper to our research project on “Albanians in Italy and Greece: a study in migration dynamics and social exclusion” financed by the Leverhulme Trust, 2001–03. Our partners in the project, Gabriella Lazaridis and Maria Koumandraki of the University of Dundee, are responsible for analysing Albanian migration to Greece. This paper draws on our combined experiences of studying and documenting Albanian migration, both in Albania and in Italy, over the past two years, before and into the preparatory phase of the above-mentioned project. Detailed field research, including interviews with more than 100 Albanian migrants in three cities in Italy (Lecce, Modena, Rome), is currently under way and further papers from this fieldwork will follow in due course. Earlier versions of the present paper were presented by Nicola Mai to the conference “Strangers and Citizens: Challenges for European Governance, Identity, Citizenship”, University of Dundee, 17–19 March 2001, and by Russell King to the International Geographical Union’s session on “Global Change and Human Mobility” at the Annual Conference of the Association of American Geographers, Los Angeles, 19–23 March 2002.} We leave to others to analyse the geopolitical dynamics of the Albanian migration to Greece. Our presentation consists of three main parts, each divided into subsections. First, we outline the chronology of the Albanian migration to Italy and the geographical distribution of the migrants within Italy, based on available official statistics. The second and third parts of the paper reflect our belief that the history of the Albanian migration to Italy is deeply embedded in both of the social, cultural and political environments that are at the two poles of the migratory flow. Hence the need to set our study of Albanian migration into the wider geopolitical context of Italy, Albania and Italo-Albanian relations. In
the second section of the paper we look at the Albanian setting: migra-
tion-related events and dynamics will be contextualised within the rela-
tion between the evolving social, economic and political situation in
Albania and wider geopolitical considerations. Then, in the final main
part of the paper, the timing and significance of the Albanian migra-
tion to Italy will be examined with reference to the profound political
and moral crisis being experienced by the latter country in the wake of
the break-up of the “First Republic” and Italy’s subsequent need to de-
fine itself as a fully modern and efficient “European” country.

Our analysis will expose a series of myths about Albanian migration
to Italy and Italo-Albanian relations: myths held by Albanians about It-
aly, and by Italians about Albania and Albanians. It will be shown that
the Italian cultural construction of Albanians (including migrants) ex-
emplifies the politics and discourses of “othering”. Behind this, however,
lies the fear of remembering Italy’s own heritage of poverty and back-
wardness; for the Albanian migrants, somatically very similar to Itali-
ans, hold up a mirror to Italy’s own rejected (Southern) past.

It needs to be stressed that Albanians have come to strongly influ-
ence and indeed almost to define the Italian experience of immigration
over the past decade. It is true that well before 1991 Italy had come to be
classified as a country of immigration, after its century-long experience
of emigration. Already by 1990, Italy had nearly 800,000 officially docu-
mented immigrants including, at that stage, only 2,000 Albanians but
large and significant presences from Morocco (78,000), Tunisia (41,000),
the Philippines (35,000), Yugoslavia (30,000), Senegal (25,000) and Egypt
(20,000). However, the Albanian influxes of 1991, and subsequently,
rapidly came to dominate the Italian political and media discourses
about immigration during the 1990s.

In fact the term Albanese has quickly come to possess a very partic-
ular resonance whenever it is used – it signifies a combination of the
“desperate, poor, uncouth immigrant” on the one hand, and on the
other the even more negative stereotype of the “untrustworthy”, the
“criminal”, the “prostitute and pimp”. Almost never is it acknowledged
that the majority of Albanians in Italy are hard-working, law-abiding
migrant workers; that many are highly educated; and that many, espe-
cially those with families and children, are enjoying a more-or-less suc-
cessful integration with their Italian neighbours.

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2 These data are for 31 December 1990 and are from Caritas di Roma (1992:
41). The figures do not include undocumented migrants, whose numbers were al-
ready thought to be considerable at that time.
Albanian migration to Italy: chronology and pattern of settlement

Viewed against a background of political turmoil, economic collapse, and the eruption of personal and collective frustration on the part of the long-isolated and long-suffering population, the mass flight of Albanians during the early 1990s was not surprising, even if the Italian and the world’s press gazed in amazement at what was going on. And still today, more than ten years later, images of rusty ships overflowing with Albanian refugees bearing down on the ports of Italy’s southern Adriatic coast, remain an iconic portrayal of the East-West migrations of post-communism (King, 1998). In reality, the flight to Italy of Albanian “boat people” was not the whole story: there was an equally large-scale, but much less well-documented, early migration to Greece. But the link to Italy was a logical, if complex one. For Albanians, Italy represented the rich near-West, just a short boat-ride away. Colonial links had been obviously repressed and expurgated by communism, but nevertheless remained dormant in the collective memory. Perhaps most powerful of all had been the half-secret cultural impact of Italian television on Albanian life throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Many Albanians had been, literally, tuned in to Italy as a “promised land” of their imagination because of their passion (illegal under the Albanian communist regime but widely practised) of watching Italian television for several hours per day (Mai, 2001a). This had not only given the otherwise-isolated Albanians a detailed (if partial) insight into Italian lifestyles and wealth, it had also taught them familiarity with the Italian language – so that Italians were amazed that the Albanians who landed on the quaysides as refugees from 45 years of communist isolation actually spoke Italian! 3

The 1991 exodus

The “first wave” of the Albanian flotilla migrants took the Italian authorities completely by surprise: within a few days in March 1991, 26,000 Albanians landed on the coast of Apulia, having crossed the 70km Straits of Otranto in boats and craft of every type. The situation rapidly assumed emergency character: the Albanians were massed on

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3 There was also an interesting historical precedent: the flight across the Adriatic in the late fifteenth century of around 100,000 Albanian Catholics escaping the spread of the Ottoman Empire. The villages in which these Albanian refugees settled – located mainly in the hill-regions of southern Italy and Sicily – still conserve their Albanian traditions and dialects today, and some preserve their Albanian origins in their names (Fiana degli Albanesi, Spezzano Albanese etc.).
open quaysides without shelter, food or sanitary facilities. After some
days of official dithering they were allocated to nearby military and
tourist accommodation; given the chaos in Albania at that time, repa-
atriation was, for humanitarian reasons, impossible. Accordingly, the
“first wave” were accepted as refugees, a budget was allocated for their
settlement, and they were redistributed in small groups in different
parts of Italy. In this way the Italian government acted to “control” the
situation, relieving pressure on the coastal towns (Bari, Brindisi, O-
tranto) and the region (Apulia) of arrival, and fragmenting the disrup-
tive potential of the migrants themselves (dell’Agnese, 1996). The ar-
gument was also advanced by the Italian authorities that a policy of
dispersal also gave the Albanians the best chance of finding work and
integrating in local labour markets. According to the Italian Ministry
of the Interior, at the end of their four-month temporary residence per-
mits (by which time, in order to stay, the Albanians should have found
jobs), there were 21,800 still in Italy. Of these 6,000 had found stable
employment, mainly in farming and small industries and workshops,
2,000 were in the process of being allocated jobs, 2,000 were undergo-
ing training of various kinds, 2,000 were school pupils and 1,000–2,000
were recorded as having returned to Albania. No records exist for the
remainder: either they had returned or had become clandestine immi-
grants (Barjaba et al., 1992; Pittau and Reggio, 1992).

Whilst the first wave of arrivals were still being settled, newarriv-
als disturbed the situation in June 1991. Given the establishment,
meanwhile, of democratic government in Albania, the Italian response
was now to treat these as “illegal” economic migrants and, with the
support of the Albanian government which was also acting to prevent
mass departures from its ports, they were refused entry. Italian patrol
boats intercepted Albanian craft and turned them back, supplying ex-
tra food, fuel and medical assistance where necessary.

A new crisis arose in August 1991 with the arrival of the “second
wave”. The Albanian authorities were unable to prevent the massing
of 30,000 desperate people at the ports of Durres and Vlorë and the
subsequent departure of several overloaded ships with 20,000 persons
on board. Despite some warnings from the Albanian government
(which, however, failed to quantify the scale of the exodus), once again
the Italian authorities were caught unawares. The patrol boats were
powerless to stop the flotilla from docking at Bari, above all the Vlora,
a large merchant ship laden with an estimated 11,000 people who had
been at sea for more than two days in insufferable conditions. Once
again, chaos greeted the Albanians who, in blistering heat, were first
corralled on the quays for two days and then packed into a sports sta-
dium. Like the first wave, the event received blanket media coverage.
Widespread condemnation issued from both the Italian and the international press at the Italian authorities' inhuman treatment of the Albanians; but few European governments voiced their disagreement with the Italian government's decision to repatriate. In fact, behind the harsh treatment of the would-be immigrants and the devious method of their repatriation there lay not only the approval of the Albanian government but also the EU's evolving "fortress Europe" policy of firmly closing the doors to such mass incursions of "extracomunitari". Most of the Albanians were sent back by sea, but a final residual group who refused to go were instead repatriated by air, duped into thinking they were being flown to another destination in Italy.

What factors lay behind the volte face of the Italian government in the five months between the first and the second waves? Certainly the interlinked phenomena of the media and public opinion played a key role. Public reaction to the first wave was generally positive: the Albanians were given an heroic label and greeted as "fellow Europeans oppressed by Communist tyranny" (Millar, 1992, p. 36), and as "Adriatic brethren" (Zinn, 1996). In hundreds of hours of television coverage and hundreds of pages of newspaper reportage, the Albanians were "consumed" by the Italian public, their exoticism patronised by the media, which wrote off 50 years of Stalinist history and homogenised the refugees as "noble savages"—passive, helpless, lost Europeans. In between the two waves a new, more sinister image emerged. Once again, this was manufactured by the media following the lead given by right-wing political ideology and building on pictures of the desperate Albanians cooped up in reception centres. The stereotype was clear—Albanians were incapable of organising themselves, they were work-shy, prone to thieving and violence—and surveys showed such views had become widespread amongst the Italian population (Barjaba et al., 1992, pp. 529–530, 534). A powerful reconstitution of the Albanians as "others" had taken place (Zinn, 1996). We return to analyse this media portrayal of Albanian immigration towards the end of the paper.

A second important factor was the increasingly close political relationship between the two governments. To have accepted the second-wave arrivals as political refugees would have implied Italian denial of the legitimacy of the newly-elected Albanian government. To have accepted them as economic refugees would have flouted EU migration policy. The Italian government felt the need to send a clear message to future aspiring immigrants, and not only those launching themselves across the Otranto Straits. In this, too, Italy was the mouthpiece of EU policy-makers for whom the Albanian boat people were the potential beginning of a "European immigration nightmare" (Brochmann, 1993, p. 100).
Third, there is some evidence that the objective character of the two waves differed and that the second was at least partly stimulated by Albanian agents provocateurs. Thus, whereas the first wave was a genuine spontaneous flight of refugees escaping the political and economic chaos of the terminal collapse of a decades-old totalitarian regime, the second wave could have been created as a tactic to destabilise the new regime, possibly by conservative elements within it, and to destroy the international credibility of nascent Albanian democracy. Concrete evidence for this view emerged when it was discovered that the second wave contained many arms-bearing members of Albania’s Sigurimi (special police) as well as others fleeing possible retribution from the new regime (dell’Agnese, 1996, p. 76). Another variant of the conspiracy theory was that the second wave was tacitly supported by the Albanian government in order to secure economic aid from Italy (Pittau and Reggio, 1992, p. 234).

Italian aid and logistical help to Albania had already started in 1990, and this was intensified in 1991 with the launch of Operation Pelican, consisting of food aid, medical and other supplies, repair of school buildings and training of Albanian police. In order to ensure a proper allocation of this aid, a contingent of 1,000 Italian soldiers was despatched along with hundreds of trucks and helicopters (dell’Agnese, 1996). Italy also acted as the voice of Albanian interests with the European Community and the World Bank. Operation Pelican enabled Albanians to survive the winter of 1991–92 without starvation, and its mandate was renewed in March 1992 in order to administer EC aid for the rest of the year. By 1993 the economic situation had stabilised and no further mass sea departures occurred until the exodus of March 1997. Nevertheless, even during the mid-1990s, inflation, devaluation of real incomes, unemployment and social unrest continued to propel Albanians abroad, both to Italy and, in larger numbers, to Greece.

The 1997 exodus

A new crisis struck in the early months of 1997 when an elaborate system of private pyramid investment schemes collapsed. More than half of all Albanians had invested in these informal schemes, and the World Bank estimated the value of Albanians’ lost savings to be $1.2 billion, equivalent to half the country’s GDP for 1996 (Olsen, 2000, p. 24). It is interesting to note that the Berisha government, in power since 1992, did nothing to discourage these obviously unsound financial ventures, probably because many government officials had major stakes in the pyramid firms and were reaping huge profits. Much of the capital invested in the financial pyramids had been savings accrued by Albanian
migrants working abroad. Therefore a large proportion of Albania's emigrants and returnees were virtually bankrupted. As Perlmutter (1998) chronicles, the subsequent political protests led to a breakdown of law and order, arms stores were looted, prisoners fled jail and rebel gangs seized control over much of the southern part of the country, particularly the important town of Vlorë, which quickly became the jumping-off point for clandestine shipments of Albanian (and other) migrants to Southern Italy. The Albanian government responded to – but did not solve – the deepening crisis by a series of repressive measures which included closing down the free press and further violence against the opposition, some members of which went into exile.

A major accompaniment of the disorder surrounding the savings pyramid collapse was a renewed refugee and migration crisis. In six days in the early spring of 1997, more than 10,000 Albanians crossed the Adriatic Sea to land in Apulia in a replay of events of almost exactly six years earlier. After accepting the initial migrants as refugees, the Italian reception became once again more restrained, and the conviction took root that “these migrants were coming for economic motives as part of a venture run by criminal elements” (Perlmutter, 1998, p. 203). Along similar lines, Pastore (1998, p. 4) makes a distinction between two phases of the March 1997 emigration. During the initial phase, in the first part of the month, the emigrants were mostly middle-class families from Vlorë and the surrounding areas who organised the trip by themselves in order to escape violence. During the second phase, in the second half of the month, the migratory flow changed in several respects: Durrës became the main departure point and the social composition involved mainly single individuals coming from rural areas, whilst criminal organisations were able to establish control over the movement, turning an emergency situation into a highly profitable business. Heavy patrolling by Italian military craft, including surveillance in Albanian territorial waters (agreed upon by the Albanian government), brought this particular exodus to an end by the last days of March, although tension became high once again at the end of March when an Italian military ship collided with an Albanian boat, leading to the drowning of a large number of Albanians.

The eventual dimensions of the 1997 exodus to Italy were as follows (Pastore, 1998, p. 13, n. 21). Between early March and mid-summer, when the worst of the crisis was over, 16,800 Albanians entered Italy. Just over 1,000 turned out to be already in possession of a valid permit to stay in Italy from a previous visit. Therefore the scale of the 1997 exodus proved to be somewhat smaller than both of the two waves in 1991. Nevertheless the “drama” of the event was continually emphasised in the Italian media and the clear impression was given that Al-
banian economic migrants and criminal gangs were heightening their "invasion" of Italy.

By the end of the summer of 1997, sufficient order had been restored for the main state institutions to function again; nevertheless security remained a problem in many parts of the country, with the army and the police force unable to guarantee the rule of law (Olsen, 2000, p. 25). Italy led an international humanitarian mission of 6,000 soldiers (Operation Alba) charged with the task of delivering aid to the poverty-stricken and newly-impoverished Albanian people, and during 1998 there was a gradual return to normality, helped at a moral and democratic level by the drafting and approval of a new constitution. However, during 1999, the arrival of more than half a million Kosovo Albanian refugees added to the instability in the northern part of the country. As distraught and traumatised refugees spilled across the border, another humanitarian aid effort was mounted to help Albania deal with the crisis. Whilst the presence of NATO troops and large contingents of aid workers helped to maintain order and ease the burden of the refugee movements on Albania's poorest and most isolated region, continued instability in Kosovo did little to ease the problems of organised crime and migrant trafficking in Albania (Olsen, 2000, pp. 71, 73). The relatively peaceful and democratic character of the June 2001 elections in Albania enables cautious hopes to be raised for Albania's political, and therefore economic, future.

Stepping back for a moment to 1997, we finally wish to raise (following Pastore, 1998) two important features of the 1997 exodus and its wider relationship to the ongoing dynamic of Albanian migration. The first is that, unlike earlier phases of Albanian migration, this episode was mainly directed to Italy and not to Greece. Pastore is not able to explain why this differentiation in destination occurred at this stage: he cautiously suggests the relevance of geographical factors (important flows from northern and central Albania being more likely to go to Italy rather than to Greece), and also the possibility of better treatment of clandestine migrants in Italy.

The second interesting – and potentially contentious – aspect analysed by Pastore is the relationship between conflict and migration in Albania. Whilst on the one hand mass migration emerged as an obvious consequence of the political conflict and economic chaos in Albania (both in 1991 and 1997), it is also true that there is a second, less obvious, relationship, namely that mass migration has acted in some ways to worsen the level of conflict in Albania. According to Pastore (1998, p. 5), Albanian migration has played a destabilising role in the following three ways.

First, there is the role of emigrant remittances in financing the pyramid schemes discussed earlier. Pastore stops short of suggesting that
remittances were directly responsible for the pyramid collapse, but he points to the fact that the massive liquidity generated by emigrant earnings could not find a regular outlet in the restricted legal investment opportunities offered by the fledgling Albanian economy and banking system, encouraging the investment of a large portion of these earnings in irregular financial circuits which proved ultimately unsustainable. We shall say more about these pyramid schemes later on.

Second, international migration from Albania to Italy (more so than to Greece, according to Pastore) has become an important source of revenue for criminal organisations. Once again, this is not to imply a direct causality between migration and crime. But it has to be recognised, according to Pastore, that a strong migratory pressure, fuelled by the push factors from Albania that we have already spelled out above, creates a situation that is easily exploited by criminal organisations which respond to the demand by developing trafficking activities. The power and audacity of these smuggling rings create their own conflicts and destabilising influences, both in Albania and in some regions of Italy.

Third, destabilisation, or rather debilitation, can occur at a deeper level, due to the large scale of the migratory outflow from a small country. The selectivity of this massive human haemorrhage – young, educated people being considerably over-represented – affects both the demographic and the human resource balance of the country, leading to a structural destabilisation, including substantial rural depopulation in certain regions of the country.

Enumeration and distribution of Albanian migrants in Italy

With the above chronological account in mind, a more precise quantification of the number of Albanians legally present in Italy can be gained by scrutinising the “permit to stay” data for each year since 1990. These important and useful data, sourced from the Ministry of the Interior and published by the Caritas di Roma in its annual Dossier Statistico (for the latest edition see Caritas di Roma, 2001) give a statistical account of the growth and regional distribution of the Albanians (and other migrant groups) in Italy. It needs to be stressed that the criterion of measurement is possession of a permesso di soggiorno, and that there are several ways in which the permit data do not match the number of Albanians actually physically present in Italy. Above all, many Albanians are thought to be in Italy without a permit. Others stay on after their permits have expired. Yet others, holders of a permit to reside in Italy, may have returned to Albania or migrated on to another country. Although the scale of “illegal” or unregistered presence in Italy is nowhere near as high as it is in Greece, most informed estimates would in-
crease the official total of immigrants (of all nationalities) in Italy by about 20–25%; there are conflicting views as to whether Albanians have a higher proportion of undocumented than this overall figure.

Table 1 sets out the evolution of the Albanian presence in Italy on the basis of "permit to stay" data for the decade 1990–2000. The data largely speak for themselves, but a few points can be stressed. First is the obvious build-up of the community from 1991, when its membership of 26,000 largely derived from the first main exodus, to 2000 when it totalled 142,000. Growth was slow during the first half of the 1990s, but then increased after 1996, partly as a reflection of the 1997 exodus but also related to the pattern of regularisations. On this last point, it is important to recognise that the actual presence of Albanians as recorded in the statistical series does not only correspond to the dynamics of the inflow but also to the rhythm of *ex post* regularisation of already-present migrants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (31 Dec)</th>
<th>No. of Albanians</th>
<th>Rank of community</th>
<th>% total immigrants</th>
<th>Total immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,034</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>781,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>26,381</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>859,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>28,828</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>925,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>30,847</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>987,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>31,926</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>922,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>34,706</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>991,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>63,976</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1,095,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>83,607</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1,240,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>91,537</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1,250,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>115,755</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1,251,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>142,066</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1,338,153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The percentage and rank data tell a similar story. Between 1991 and 1995 Albanians represented just over 3% of all officially-recorded immigrants, but then this percentage increased steadily to around 7% in the late 1990s, reaching 10.2% at the end of 2000. And whilst the Albanian presence was well down the rank list of immigrant communities during the early 1990s, by 1996 it had jumped to the second largest community, after the Moroccan one, a position it has retained ever since. However the gap between the Moroccan and Albanian communi-
ties has progressively narrowed in recent years. In 1998 the respective figures were 145,843 and 91,537; in 2000 they were 159,599 and 142,066. During 2000 alone, the officially enumerated Albanian population in Italy grew by 22.7%, compared to a much more modest growth of 8.9% for the Moroccans.

Let us now explore in more detail the question of the unregistered Albanian migrants in Italy. The view of the Caritas équipe is that, at an aggregate level (i.e. for all immigrant nationalities), the number of officially recorded migrants in Italy should be increased by 21.5% in order to arrive at an "effective quantitative estimate" of the size of the immigrant presence in Italy (Caritas di Roma, 2001, p. 129). Application of this factor increases the 31 December 2000 total of Albanians from 142,000 to 172,500, but Caritas acknowledges that its round-up factor reflects "criteria of prudence" and some believe the Albanian percentage of undocumented immigrants to be higher than for other groups (our own evidence, based on extensive interview surveys with Albanians, currently in progress, tends to the opposite view). Journalists, meanwhile, tend to focus on trying to estimate, and then gross up (which is both statistically and politically dangerous), the number of immigrants landed or intercepted on Italian beaches or off Italian coasts, notably the Adriatic coast of Apulia facing Albania. Silj (2001) uses a variety of local police and coastguard records from this part of Italy to arrive at an estimate of an extra 100,000 Albanians in Italy in addition to those officially enumerated by the permit database. His broad aggregate estimate for Albanians in Italy is 250,000. This must be regarded as highly dubious, for several reasons. The flow across the Otranto Straits contains not only Albanians but also many other migrant nationalities who use the "Albanian route" and Albanian smugglers. Many Albanians who are smuggled into Italy move quickly on to other European countries such as Germany, Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom where there are now sizeable Albanian groups. Finally, since and especially during the Kosovan crisis, many thousands of Kosovo Albanians became part of the refugee and migrant flow transiting Albania to Italy and beyond: quite how these Kosovan Albanians figure in the statistics is unclear. So, to sum up, certainly there are more than 150,000 Albanians in Italy, but Silj's estimate of 250,000 may be excessive.

Table 2 explores the regional perspective of Albanian migration to Italy. Utilising the most recent regionally disaggregated permit data, which are for 31 December 2000, the table records the numbers of Albanians in each of Italy's 20 regions, the percentage of the regional total of immigrants made of Albanians, and the rank of Albanians in the list of migrant nationalities in each region. In order to make an evolutionary
comparison, the same variables are presented for 1995; the final column on the right-hand side of the table measures the proportionate change for each region in numbers of Albanians from 1995 to 2000.

Table 2 - Regional distribution of Albanians in Italy, 1995 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>% total immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Val d'Aosta</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piedmont</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombardy</td>
<td>5,268</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liguria</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trentino A-A</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veneto</td>
<td>2,506</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friuli-VG</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-R.</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>2,469</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbria</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marche</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latium</td>
<td>3,712</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abruzzo</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molise</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campania</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basilicata</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apulia</td>
<td>4,767</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>34,230</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Several interesting features emerge from the regional analysis. Let us focus mainly on the 2000 data. First, Albanians are present in significant numbers in all Italian regions; only in Val d'Aosta, Molise, and Sardinia do they number less than 1,000. The first and second of these are very small regions anyway (in fact Albanians are the biggest migrant group in Molise); whereas Sardinia is far from Albania and so few Albanians bother to go there. The most revealing data are those in
the rank and percentage columns. Two groups of regions stand out as being of particular importance for Albanian settlement. First, there are five regions in south-east Italy, facing Albania, where Albanians account for between 22 and 39% of total regional immigrant populations. These regions are Marche, Abruzzo, Molise, Apulia and Basilicata. Second, there is a group of two central Italian regions – Umbria and Tuscany – where Albanians make up around 16% of the regional immigrant totals. In all of these seven regions just named – which actually form a contiguous block of regions running across the centre of Italy and then down the Adriatic coast – Albanians are the first-ranked group.

Albanians are also present in large numbers in all the main industrial regions of northern Italy (Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna) with around 10,000–20,000 in each region (hence large in absolute rather than proportionate terms) and around 7–12% of these regions’ migrant populations. Albanians are somewhat less important in a relative sense in the regions of Latium, Campania and Sicily where the big cities of Rome, Naples and Palermo attract many other migrant nationalities as well as Albanians.

Finally, if we compare the 2000 data with those for 1995, apart from noticing that there is a more than fourfold increase in the numbers of Albanians nationwide, there is some evidence of a proportionately greater increase in those northern and central Italian regions which are regarded as economically more prosperous and dynamic (Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, Marche, Tuscany and Umbria).

How can we interpret these Albanian migrant regional dynamics within the broader context of immigration and immigrant distributions in Italy? Using data for the finer spatial mesh of Italy’s 95 provinces, Bonifazi (1998, pp. 168–169) has compared the relative spatial concentration/dispersal of the 28 major migrant groups in Italy. He shows that Albanians are far and away the most dispersed group: in other words their regional distribution more closely matches the geographical distribution of the Italian population than any other migrant nationality.4

Next question: how to explain the Albanian regional distribution in Italy? The following hypotheses can be suggested.

First, we can be pretty sure that the original policy of dispersing Albanian arrivals in 1991 has set the tone for subsequent arrivals who, it can be assumed, will have to some extent followed kinship and community links to where existing contacts are located. This is not to sug-

4 At the other end of the scale, examples of extreme concentration include Bangladeshis (62% of whom are found in just one province, Rome), Filipinos (45% in Rome), Egyptians (44% in Milan) and Mauritians (44% in Catania province in Sicily).
gest that the original redistribution from the landings on the Apulian coast has remained immutable; indeed Albanians have probably been as mobile (if not more so) as many other migrant groups in Italy who move around the country in response to labour market opportunities, kinship ties and other factors. But the original scattered planned distribution has had some long-term influence.

The second hypothesised reason for this enduring dispersed pattern is that Albanians do not appear to have a strong community or national identity, and hence have not been encouraged by such an identity to regroup in fewer places, such as big cities. Indeed the Albanian presence in Italy is not one which clusters disproportionately in big cities, as most other migrant groups in this country do. In fact quite the reverse, so that Albanians are unusual in that they are present in significant numbers in small towns and rural villages – unlike most other migrants. Hence although they are not entirely lacking in community structures and in-group associative life, they are a peculiarly atomised group, even suspicious of each other.

Finally, with regard to the level of regional concentration of Albanians that does exist, there seems to be a double influence at work. The first is the obvious one of geographical proximity of southern Adriatic regions to Albania, especially the region of Apulia, which functions almost as an umbilical cord to Albania (Caritas di Roma, 2001, p. 416). The second is a less-easy-to-demonstrate one of links to those Italian regions which are economically dynamic with a variety of employment and residential options (farming, industry, services, tourism etc.).

The Albanian political, economic and cultural background

Our aim in this section of the paper is to outline the main events in Albania related to the initiation and further development of the migratory flows. In doing this we will challenge the current hegemonic polarisation of interpretations between those who see migration as a primarily economic phenomenon and those who underline only its political nature. We will emphasise the combined economic and political character (and ambivalence) of the Albanian migratory experience; and we will do this via a culturalist perspective, explaining the Albanian migration “crisis” in the light of the political nature assumed by material culture in the fast-changing environment of Albania’s transition from communism to post-communism.

Clearly, then, the nature of the “Albanian crisis” must be related to the country’s history of isolation and autarky under the 45 years of communist rule of Enver Hoxha (who died in 1985) and his successor
Ramiz Alia. Alia won the first free elections in 1991 but was then forced to resign and the Democratic Party under Sali Berisha took over in the Spring 1992 elections. These events provide the backdrop to the 1991 mass exodus to Italy and Greece. The country was in a state of chaos after the events of 1990 when liberalisation and privatisation of a previously state-run system led to a breakdown in the country’s economic and social life. However, this was only part of the story, for it needs to be stressed that the Albanian collapse was also a moral and an ethical one. Under Hoxha’s totalitarianism, the regime’s myth that Albania was close to paradise on earth was reinforced by a complete closure from the outside world: emigration was impossible, the frontier was militarised by thousands of concrete bunkers, and Albanians were prevented from accessing any other source of information about the outside world apart from propaganda stories about the pre-communist “bad old days” and about the moral decay of the West. The only meaningful exception to this rule of absolute control, the only “window to the West”, was the illegal watching of Italian television which it was possible to access with a clandestinely-made decoder affixed to Albanian TV sets. What Albanians were able to see was a capitalist world of wealth, pleasure and eroticism which provided just about the strongest contrast imaginable to their own monochrome world where private life, entertainment and individual freedom were severely limited and where work and production were heroïsised and pleasure and frivolity stigmatised. The centrality of consumption to the political opposition to communism during the closing years of the regime helps us to understand the migration behaviour of Albanians as soon as the freedom to leave the country was granted. They launched themselves, literally, at the country just across the sea whence came the images of wealth and pleasure, and whose language they understood after watching so many TV programmes over the years.

The events of 1990 and after

The immediate historical context that best enables the Albanian migration flow to be understood in its full political, social and economic relevance is the situation following the death of Enver Hoxha in April 1985. The period between the dictator’s death and the final overthrowing of what is simply known in Albania as “the regime”, was characterised first by a gradual erosion and then by the collapse of the communist state and all of its apparatuses and policies. The exit from the collectivist, authoritarian political system was rather slow in Albania because of the resistance of the political elite in Tirana to understanding and responding to the growing popular demands for cultural and polit-
ical pluralism. Genuine attempts at reform in this direction came far too late, by which time popular dissatisfaction and frustration with the conditions of poverty and oppression produced by the regime undermined the very possibility of its existence in any reformed way.

In this respect Ramiz Alia, the man who succeeded Enver Hoxha as First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labour, represented full continuity with the all-encompassing Marxist-Leninist ideology that had sustained the Albanian state for over 45 years. Alia tried — unsuccessfully — to steer a path between two incompatible positions: on the one hand, he insisted on the continuation of his predecessor’s hard-line politics; on the other hand, he sought to implement cosmetic changes aimed at preserving the system. In 1985 Ramiz Alia inherited a country completely isolated from the outside world, and whose economy suffered from problems endemic to centrally planned economies: low productivity, permanent shortages of basic foodstuffs, an ailing infrastructure, and huge subsidies. Moreover the deepening economic crisis and people’s weariness over the regime’s intrusive prescriptions and abuses were increasingly distancings a growing sector of the population from the political elite; social malaise had become widespread, and significant segments of the population seemed determined to reject the established values of the regime (Biberaj, 1990, p. 42). If the intelligentsia could not stand any more the regime’s extremely restrictive and ideologically pervasive control on cultural production, young people in particular appeared to be “alienated and disillusioned with the system and its ideology, and, to the consternation of party ideologues, highly susceptible to Western lifestyles, art, literature, music and fashion” (Biberaj, 1990, p. 43).

Although after Enver Hoxha’s death in 1985 some measures were taken to create a less centralised system of planning (wage policy and monetary incentives, self-financing, local planning etc.), these attempts to reform the economic system were in essence conceived as a means of fending off the need for substantial change (Sjöberg, 1991, p. 122). In reality such measures were of a minor technocratic nature and “the same problems of food supplies, low industrial and agricultural productivity, crippling shortages of spare parts and other technical problems continued to afflict the economy throughout this period” (Vickers, 1997, pp. 13–14).

In other respects, some of Alia’s domestic policies represented a more significant departure from Hoxha’s approach. During the first five years of his rule (1985–90), foreign travel was made slightly less impossible, trade relations with most East European and secular Islamic countries were improved, and some long-term prisoners were released as the result of two amnesties (Biberaj, 1990, p. 45; Vickers,
1997, p. 15). As with the economic reforms, these changes were meant to strengthen rather than to challenge the regime and although repression was not as indiscriminate and pervasive as it had been previously, the heavy hand of the regime did not diminish significantly; it merely became more subtle. Above all, the measures introduced by Alia’s rule were not meeting the country’s growing dissatisfaction with a political regime and its wider social and cultural order. On the contrary “every minor reform whetted the popular appetite for more fundamental structural changes” (Vickers, 1997, p. 25).

The direction taken by the process of undermining the one-party state was to be highly significant, as a cultural and political alternative to communism emerged from the very beginning in relation to the issue of access to foreign culture. The reforms introduced by Alia did not confront “what was seen by most Albanians, particularly the young, as a fundamental oppression: their inability to travel or work abroad, or to own passports” (Vickers, 1997, p. 25). It is not by chance that the very first openly dissident act against the Albanian one-party state was in relation to access to the Italian embassy. In February 1990 a family of six people climbed into the garden of the Italian embassy in Tirana and stayed there for several weeks. As the Italian authorities refused to hand them over to the Albanian police, suddenly the Albanian state appeared vulnerable and Western embassies “became the focus of attention among Tirana’s dissatisfied young” (Vickers, 1997, p. 26). Under the pressure of a tangible and growing popular disbelief in the regime’s actual willingness to introduce effective and radical reforms, in May of the same year Albanians were granted the right to travel abroad and to have passports. Notwithstanding this, in July about 4,500 people occupied the main Western embassy buildings, while “hundreds of people began to trek from all over the country towards the Adriatic port of Durrës, where would-be refugees seized a ship and (unsuccessfully) attempted to sail it to Italy” (Vickers, 1997, pp. 26–27).

The economic situation became more critical as winter began in the later months of 1990. Because of the dismemberment and destruction of state properties and of the structural deficiencies of the centralised production system there were dramatic food and power shortages, and attacks on party and state buildings became more and more frequent. By this time the opposition movement had broadened its bases and now included most of the young intelligentsia and increasing numbers of older professional people (Vickers, 1997, p. 34). The popular protest that culminated in the student movements of late 1990 forced Alia to go further with the reform process. An “emergency committee” was formed, made up of prestigious intellectuals, with the aim of strengthening the leader’s position against both the increasing power of street
demonstrations and the mounting opposition from within the party (Martelli, 1998, p. 148). Among these intellectuals was Sali Berisha, a well-known cardiologist until then considered to be one of the most reliable members of the PLA (Albanian Labour Party), and later to become the first Albanian non-communist president.

By the beginning of December 1990 all of the main industrial complexes of the country were on strike, workers were occupying the squares and streets of the main cities and even in the countryside (traditionally a stronghold of communist conservatism in Albania) there were spontaneous demonstrations against the regime. In the face of demands by students of Tirana University, Berisha was sent by the emergency committee as mediator. The first opposition party in the history of post-communist Albania thus emerged as the result of an attempt at mediation between the one-party state and the student movement: when political pluralism was officially acknowledged in Albania on 12 December 1990, Sali Berisha became a leader of the students. The party, whose first name was the “Party of the Youth and Intellectuals”, was later to become the Democratic Party and a major actor in the future political development of the country.

The emergence of a political opposition therefore was manipulated from within the one-party political system in order to control and discipline the disruptive potential of street demonstration. This is rich in significance for the further development of political pluralism in Albania and has to be seen as a consistent perpetuation of the behavioural tradition of Albanian politics, where decisions have been typically taken by a restricted political elite and the entire political life conditioned by programmes based on ambiguity and manipulation. According to Martelli “the entire process of transformation of the student movement into a party and in general the emergence of an opposition in Albania must be seen as a reform taking place within the Communist Party, and as a piloted scission leading to the creation of two segments of the same elite, of two forces competing for the same aim, in order to avoid a mass revolutionary escalation” (Martelli, 1998, p. 161).

In the first months of 1991, the economic situation was becoming ever more desperate: the Albanian GNP for 1990 was half that of 1965, exports collapsed to 15% of those of the previous year, while prices rose by at least 300% (Martelli, 1998, p. 162). As a consequence of the dramatic economic crises, food shortages, people’s disillusion with the regime’s capability to master the situation, and the collapse of border controls, the first migratory waves started to Greece and to Italy. Whilst the cross-border percolation of Albanians to Greece was undoubtedly the largest flow, political and media attention were more closely focused on the flight to Italy, which involved a sea crossing. On
9 February, as more than 10,000 people gathered at the port of Durrës in order to migrate to Italy, a fierce battle between the police and demonstrators followed and the latter were prevented by force from leaving the country. Meanwhile the students’ protests in Tirana were stepping up as 700 students and lecturers went on hunger strike, demanding an end to compulsory military training and to the study of Marxism-Leninism and calling for Enver Hoxha’s name to be removed from the university (Vickers, 1997, p. 47). On 20 February 1991, a crowd of more than 100,000 students and workers overturned the statue of Hoxha in Tirana’s central square. Alia declared presidential rule, but conceded almost all of the students’ demands. Finally, on 7 March 1991, thousands of desperate people converged on the ports of Durrës, Shengjin and Vlorë, where they seized ships and sailed across the Adriatic to Brindisi. On the Italian side, as we have already noted above, “the government did little, and sympathy quickly ran out as the refugees rioted in their squalid enclosures and many fled into the countryside. Running battles broke out between police and Albanians as the system at the reception centres collapsed, and it was decided to deport all the refugees back to Albania” (Vickers, 1997, p. 51). However, under considerable UNHCR pressure, after two weeks Rome announced that all Albanians who had arrived in this first mass exodus would be exempt from the strict application of Italy’s new immigration law, and the majority of Albanians who had reached Italy at this time were allowed to stay (Hall, 1994, p. 189).

The first pluralist elections in the history of post-war Albania were held in March 1991 and saw a clear victory for the PLA (later to be renamed and reformed into the Socialist Party of Albania). Whereas the opposition Democratic Party (DP) won all of the urban constituencies, the more conservative rural population voted predominantly for the PLA. Although these elections were considered free and fair by most foreign observers, the DP complained of its lack of media representation and of the psychological pressure to vote for the PLA (Vickers, 1997, p. 59). On 2 April four people were killed by police attempting to repress a large anti-government protest in Shkodra, alleging that elections had been held under the pressure of intimidation. This fuelled the growing antagonism between the government and the opposition. Between April

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5 According to the Italian law 39/1990 that was in force at the time of the first two Albanian exoduses (Legge Marielli), “foreign nationals who have entered illegally, who do not request a regular permit within a set period of time, or whose regular permit has expired and has not been renewed, are all subject to deportation. Whenever immediate deportation is not possible, these foreigners are obliged to enter ‘temporary residence centres’, where they are supposed to stay no longer than 30 days, giving authorities a chance to identify them and contact their country of origin”.

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1991 and the new elections held in March 1992, won by a large margin by the Democratic Party, the country saw many harsh confrontations between the two political factions, which involved the formation and subsequent collapse of four different coalition governments.

Between March and the end of July 1991, as a consequence of major strikes and of the wider context of volatile political instability, Albania was once again on the verge of economic collapse and this was at the root of another migratory crisis. In the first week of August 1991 a further 10,000 people attempted to migrate to Italy, where the authorities ordered a forcible repatriation, as noted earlier. The European Union responded to the crisis by doubling emergency aid. In response to an appeal by the Albanian government, in September 1991 the G-24 responded by providing more than $150 million in emergency aid and a large squad of Italian soldiers was sent to Albania to help with the aid distribution. This was the start of Operation Pelican which, initially intended for a few months, kept the Italian troops engaged in delivering humanitarian aid into Albania until December 1993.

*From the Democratic Party to the collapse of the pyramids*

While the process of dissolution of the Italian political system was in its early phases, in Albania, with the victory of the DP at the elections held on 20 March 1992, Sali Berisha became the country’s first non-communist president since 1945, thus ending almost five decades of communist rule. The passage of power from the post-communists to the DP can be summarised in terms of a substantial continuity of the one-party personalistic and authoritarian political culture perfected by Hoxha: as in communist times, the demonisation of the political opponent was highly instrumental in legitimising an increasingly despotic and authoritarian rule (Martelli, 1998, p. 166).

Although between March 1992 and the end of 1993 Albania enjoyed a period of relative political stability, critics claimed that this “was being achieved at the cost of an increasingly autocratic presidential rule, including attempts to muzzle the media, which although now free were not necessarily independent” (Hall, 1994, p. 183). According to Miranda Vickers, within the Democratic Party there arose “an ever-widening gap between most of the founders of the party on one side and President Berisha and his personal circle on the other” (Vickers, 1997, p. 227). From the very first months the judiciary was subjected to thorough purges and most key positions within the state cultural, economic and social apparatuses were assigned to figures loyal to the regime. These years were shaken by ever-increasing strikes and demonstrations organised by the many disaffected groups throughout the country; “the
general mood in the streets was that the country was now verging on yet another dictatorship since Berisha had established what amounted to exclusive presidential rule” (Vickers, 1997, pp. 238, 240).

On the question of economic reform, Berisha’s government, with the full backing of all the main Western states and of international financial organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, promised “shock therapy”, with a quick transition to capitalism, full privatisation of all industries and state-owned assets, and strong central monetary control (Vickers, 1997, p. 245). The hyper-liberal privatisation policies of Berisha’s government delivered a final blow to the country’s economy. As most collective state enterprises were subject to privatisation, residual industrial and agricultural production was disrupted and assets dismembered. Prices were freed and trade was liberalised at the expense of the disadvantaged classes, who had to endure widespread unemployment, rocketing inflation and a further retreat into poverty and insecurity. And yet “to foreign states ... it did not appear that way ... On the contrary, Albania was considered in many ways to be quite successful” (Vickers, 1997, p. 241). In fact, until as late as 1996 the Albanian economic performance of the 1990s was presented by the World Bank and the IMF as a virtuous example in order to advocate the viability of “shock therapy” as a possible route to the market economy in post-communist contexts. Because of the fact that from 1989 to 1991 Albania’s industrial output had declined by 65% and its GDP by 41%, it was relatively easy for the DP government to produce positive results (Chussodovski, 2000).

But the West’s support for Berisha during these years (1992 to early 1997) had further ramifications which eventually impacted, via the notorious pyramid schemes, upon the next act in the drama of Albanian migration. Under the pressure of all major Western foreign powers (which also generously sponsored Berisha’s political campaign across the 1990s), ruthless neo-liberal policies were applied onto a very shaky cultural and economic ground. This was marked by the collapse, not only of social and economic collectivism, but also of an entire moral and ethical order; yet this was accompanied by the endurance of a centralising, personalistic and authoritarian political culture, now free from any public ethos, which had withered away by having been associated with the enforced collectivism of the Hoxha era. As the country was opened up after nearly 50 years of closure in authoritarian collectivism, this being done in a situation of complete institutional, economic and political disarray, Albania immediately became an ideal place for the laundering of “dirty money” from major Italian- and Balkan-organised crime networks. Because of its strategic geographic position and condition of vulnerability, the country became an operative
base for the trafficking of drugs, people, and especially weapons across the Balkans and into Europe. The weapons and oil trade in particular became very lucrative as a result of the embargo imposed on Serbia and Montenegro in the 1990s. These traffics were either tolerated or directly run by companies affiliated to the Democratic Party (Chusso-dovski, 2000, p. 299). The irresponsible deregulation of the banking system introduced under intensive World Bank and IMF scrutiny allowed the establishment of thousands of financial and investment societies, which could be set up in the absence of any form of supervision by any public or private statutory body. These societies mushroomed in the vacuum of a proper legal framework protecting their subscribers from the consequences of mishandling and fraud, and were at the centre of wide money-laundering operations. Because of their involvement in illegal activities these societies could afford to pay disproportionate monthly interest rates, which in turn were instrumental in order to attract fresh capital for the money-laundering. Albania had, in effect, a “paper economy” (Zarrilli, 1999, pp. 112–115). In 1997 this network of private pyramid-selling financial schemes, unofficially endorsed by the state, collapsed and bankrupted at least half of Albanian families, many of whom had invested hard-earned migrant remittances in the schemes. For a time, Albania found itself on the verge of civil war and, as local and national criminal organisations stepped in as the country’s power-brokers, another migratory exodus to Italy ensued, as noted earlier.

The fact that from mid-April 1997, as a response to the Albanian political and refugee crisis of the same year, Italy led, with the endorsement of the UN, Operation Alba, a 6,000-strong military humanitarian mission charged with the task of delivering aid to the Albanian people, must also be read in the light of these internal and international dynamics. Moreover, the recent history of the expansion of Italy’s political and economic ambitions into Albania has not been limited to military-humanitarian missions. Italy is the most influential foreign country in Albania: the major foreign investor and the largest bilateral donor (UNDP, 1998, p. 27). At the dawn of the pyramid crisis, Italian entrepreneurs operating in Albania numbered around 500. Their investments – around $200 million between 1992 and 1996 – amounted to 68% of overall foreign private investments in Albania. Italian firms were employing nearly 60,000 Albanian people. Moreover on the Albanian foreign trade scenario Italy is the main actor as far as both imports and exports are concerned (Morozzo della Rocca, 1997, p. 100).

So, it is against this bleak political and economic backdrop that the political and moral connotation of the Italian government’s change of attitude in repatriating the refugees who fled Albania after August
1991 should be measured. For most Albanians illegal entry into Italy was not about accessing the consumerist utopia of capitalist leisure and pleasure made available by Italian television. Rather, crossing the Adriatic Sea has been the only way to survive in the face of an unforeseeable and ever-deepening political and economic crisis in which Western countries themselves played a major role, by sustaining neo-liberal policies that were ultimately responsible for the further deterioration of the situation.

The mythical role of Italian television and the myth of Italy as the “promised land”

If the “pull factor” of Italian television is too simplistically stated as a mechanism drawing Albanian migrants to Italy, we do need to reflect a while on the significance of Italian media in stimulating dissatisfaction, especially of young people, with the “Albanian way of life”, both in the years leading up to and immediately after the post-communist transition.\(^6\)

The first published accounts of the key causes of the Albanian migration to Italy were characterised by the widespread assumption about the role of Italian television in having attracted Albanians, who were described as “encouraged by hopes of success, pushed from necessity and by the imaginary world provided by television” (Perrone, 1996, p. 34). Because of the geographical proximity between the two countries, Italian television could be seen since the 1970s in Albania. It was one of the very few sources of information about the outside world to escape the complete control of the Hoxha regime. This mythical construction of Albanians as deceived and duped by the wonders of Italian television was articulated in a series of accounts about Albanian immigrants expecting all Italian cats to eat from silver trays, or expecting to find money on every Italian street corner, or all Italian women to be like female TV presenters, full of audacious curves and glitter.

It seems to us that the role of the Italian media in the process of construction of the migratory project of Albanians has been a double one. On the one hand, by having provided alternative models and examples of personhood, subjectivity and social relationships, Italian media stimulated social change and became deeply implicated in the gradual emergence of a new political positionality of Albanian youth within the Albanian social, cultural and economic scene. This positionality developed in

\(^6\) Given that one of the authors has already written on this topic, we outline our argument here in summary form, but we also develop new points of analysis from those already published in Mai (2001a).
relation to the disembedding of young Albanians from their previous roles and models, and into a new migration-oriented identity.\footnote{In this respect it is important to stress how the position of youth within Albanian communism was paradoxical: it was both particularly pampered and denied agency because it was considered, more than other social groups, the very essence of the communist project. Its position within society was one of silenced centrality under the gaze and scrutiny of the paternalist state. The narratives and images of consumption, leisure and pleasure provided by Italian television captured the attention and interests of young Albanians, who could be seen as having been (and still are) trying to move away from a paternalist and authoritarian political and cultural environment.}

On the other hand, the representation of Italian society given by Italian television, by referring predominantly to dynamics of consumption, has emphasised practices and discourses of social inclusion, linked to the access to Western consumer goods, while at the same time underlining the existence of a system of rules restricting the entitlement to rights, regulating the use of force and the access to resources within capitalist societies. Thus, the nature of these television-inspired expectations embedded the Albanian migratory project within a cultural construction of capitalism in utopian and inclusionary terms. This is a very relevant factor when trying to analyse the experience of social exclusion of Albanian migrants in Italy.

Another aspect that seems to be missing in the Albanian understanding of capitalist modernity is an awareness of the central role within capitalist societies of production – which is, of course, the real factor at the heart of the economic and material superiority of the West and of its cultural hegemony worldwide. It is at first sight paradoxical that, in a country ruled for over 45 years by the Albanian Party of Labour which exalted the value of productive work above all else, capitalism and democracy have been understood in terms of a situation in which wealth, entertainment and pleasure were easily attainable and guaranteed, without any or with only little work involved. This ironic interpretation is enhanced by the obvious dramatic economic consequences of the progressive decline and collapse of Albania’s productive structures over the last 10–15 years. But there is an explanation, which is that in this media-dominated consumerist cultural construction of Italy one can easily trace the projection into the West of a communist utopia of a world free of material hardship and of the burdens of inequality, discrimination and exploitation – the historical promise Enver Hoxha failed to keep.

From these brief remarks about the role of Italian media in Albania, we can see that the visual and narrative material provided by Italian television had a function which went far beyond being a migratory
magnet from the other side of the Adriatic Sea. Rather, it had deep economic, political and psychological implications. Firstly, it provided a mirror which highlighted the obvious deficiencies and voids in Albanian culture and material well-being. Second, it was the fulcrum around which a private dimension of leisure and desire was constructed as a political alternative to totalitarianism – but a political movement which was reactively disengaged and non-moralised, so that the wish to migrate to the “utopian state” was the main way of achieving the desired consequences. And third, cultural products coming from Western capitalist democracies carried with them strategic information about different understandings of the self, different regimes of subjectification and socialisation in relation to which the desire to migrate might emerge. What Italian television came to provide was an alternative source of information about very different realities, different lives, and for Albanians different ways of being. Thus, with reference to migratory flows from post-communist countries like Albania, a rigid distinction between the two contrasting concepts of the “political refugee” and of the “economic migrant” is untenable as it does not acknowledge the political nature of different material environments.

The Italian context: the politics of “othering”

In the third and final part of the paper we switch the focus of our analysis back to Italy. In doing this, we preserve two elements of continuity and comparison with the Albanian material discussed in the second part of the article. The first is a chronological parallelism and interlocking between political and migratory events in Albania and those in Italy. The second is a continued concern with the media dimension, this time the Italian media’s cultural construction of Albanians. It is important to remember that the Italian media’s attitude towards Albanian migrants changed very rapidly within the six months after their first arrival in March 1991. While the first Albanians arriving in Italy in March 1991 were greeted by local and national media as “deserving” political refugees, by the end of August these same people were described (and indeed treated by Italian institutions) as illegal “economic migrants”. Those who remained had to endure a media coverage that in large measure contributed to, indeed was responsible for, the pervasive stigmatisation and criminalisation of Albanian migrants, which has persisted and in fact worsened over the past ten years. Here it is very important to realise how the Albanian migration coincided not only with political chaos in Albania, but also in Italy with the collapse of a political system which had for more than four decades
been consistent with a wider national cultural, social and moral order. This had been characterised by a highly inefficient and centralised state, governed by a coalition of political parties kept together by a strategic opposition to the threat of the advance of communism in the country, and by widespread corruption practices. The political scandals of the early 1990s, that brought those illegitimate practices to light, left Italians deeply demoralised and engendered deep feelings of resentment against the Italian political system and state institutions. These feelings, as we will see in the next subsection of the article, played a key role in the process of redefinition of a new Italian identity in relation to its internal and external “others”.

Our main argument is that Albanian migration to Italy has been extremely significant within the process of re-elaboration of a new Italian national identity. This is a consequence of:

- Albania’s association with Italy’s (fascist and colonial) past;
- the condition of deep institutional and moral crisis that Italy was in at the time of the first two migratory waves in 1991;
- the echoing of current Albanian migration with respect to Italy’s own experiences of internal and international migration since the country’s unification;
- the re-emergence of dynamics of social antagonism that had been repressed in the process of construction of the Italian unified state and culture, and the re-projection of some of these repressed dynamics onto the socially-disadvantaged Albanian immigrants.

**Albanian immigration and the crisis of Italian national identity**

The political elections of April 1992 are considered the turning-point in Italy’s transition from the First to the Second Republic (Bufacchi and Burgess, 1998, p. 15). Others go further: “it would not be an exaggeration to describe the events which took place in Italy between 1992 and 1994 as a political earthquake” (Gundle and Parker, 1996, p. 1). However, even a brief analysis of the Italian crisis of the 1990s should really take 1989 as a starting-point. This is because “the end of the Cold War in Europe undermined the anti-communist cleavage around which much of the (Italian) political system had been organised, and caused various irregularities and forms of gross maladministration to be exposed to empirical scrutiny and political sanction on the part of an electorate that had long seemed impervious to them” (Gundle and Parker, 1996, p. 2). As a result of an extensive series of investigations into political, administrative and financial corruption carried out by a group of magistrates in Milan (later to be known as the mani pulite – “clean hands” – operation), a political coalition domi-
nated by the Christian Democrats which had been governing Italy without interruption since 1945, "was brought down by grave allegations of extensive corruption and connivance with organised crime, burgeoning demands for reform and the near bankruptcy of the state" (Gundle and Parker, 1996, p. 1). The timing of the unravelling of events is extraordinarily significant here. The first sign of the Italian people's dissatisfaction with the established parties came as early as June 1991, between the first two Albanian migratory waves, when the majority of Italians voted in favour of the abolition of the electoral multi-preference system, which had been a key instrument of political manipulation and corruption. It is not the aim of this article to analyse the deep political and cultural significance of the Italian passage to the so-called Second Republic during the 1990s. But it is very important to underline the meaningful interlocking of contemporaneous events on the two shores of the Adriatic Sea in order for the political and cultural significance of the switch in the representation of Albanian migration to be fully grasped. In fact the second 1991 Albanian exodus came at a period of profound change for Italy itself. The major catalysts of the Italian crisis

are situated in an arc of time that runs from the summer of 1991 to the summer of 1992. Early warnings came with the referendum of June 1991 and the national panic over Maastricht; the crisis took off in earnest with the arrest of Mario Chiesa in February 1992, and the League's victory at the national elections of April. That summer the killings of Falcone and Borsellino marked the dramatic entry of the South into the crisis; in September 1992 the lira was devalued and Italy abandoned the EMS. From then on, the country reeled under an endless stream of judicial investigations, arrests, suicides, and the demise of political parties. For a number of months its history acquired an extraordinary fluidity (Ginsborg, 1996, p. 36).

Moreover, in those same years the re-articulation of an Italian identity was deeply influenced by the economic conditions posed by the process of integration of Italy into the European Union. In particular, Italy's ability to cope with both the Maastricht Treaty's financial parameters and with the implementation of the Schengen accords became a site of political struggle between Italy and other EU member states. During the 1990s the Italian national debt had been allowed to rise until it reached 10.5% of GDP in 1992; as a consequence "Italy's economic performance was viewed with growing concern at an international level" (Ginsborg, 1996, p. 21). Hence, in the early 1990s Italy was increasingly concerned with its European image and became "dependent on the views of the major European powers for a judgement that, although it had technical criteria (was) in many ways a political judgement". Desiring admission into a European "club" that seemed as

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though it might reject them, the Italians saw a responsible foreign policy, including effective control over immigration, as a necessity (Perlmutter, 1998, pp. 215–216).

Another aspect of “responsible foreign policy” was Italy’s front-line engagement with the delivery and military-style management of humanitarian aid to Albania during the various crises of the 1990s – notably the already-mentioned “Pelican” and “Alba” missions of 1991 and 1997 respectively – which evoked Italy’s paternalistic invasion and colonisation of Albania during the war years. These international military-humanitarian operations led by Italy in Albania in the 1990s (and in Somalia, another former Italian colony, together with Italian participation in other Balkan operations) can be seen as part of a new “efficient” role played by Italy on the world stage. They are part of Italy’s attempt to achieve an EU-credible image and identity as a modern, rational nation-state capable of solving the problems of “others”, and to distance itself from the past image of corruption and inefficiency. But, as Cotesta (1999, p. 469) shows, the rationality, efficiency and moral solidarity of the Italian humanitarian effort can only be fully projected if done so against the irrationality, disorder and moral degradation of others – whether they are Albanians in Albania or Albanians in Italy. Moreover, it is also in relation to this mythical construction of Albania as a place outside of the modern capitalist world and lacking any worthwhile culture of its own, that the explanations noted earlier arose about the supposed role of television in having attracted Albanians to the wonders of Italian capitalism and about their misunderstanding of capitalism as a consumeristic world of luxury, pleasure and universal entitlement (Mai, 2001a). By returning to the theme of media we now wish to analyse more specifically the Italian media’s cultural construction of the Albanian immigration, and to draw out the wider social implications of this representation.

Albanophobia as a self-revealing prophecy

Although the presence of foreigners in Italy is much less significant when compared to other more established European immigration

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8 The image of corruption and inefficiency referred not only to the internal political heritage of the long years of Christian Democrat-dominated rule during the “First Republic”, but also to Italy’s image within the politics of the EU. Perlmutter (1998) argues that, although Italy was one of the founding members of the European Community and was traditionally in favour of the project of European integration, within the political institutions of the EU it has been neither an effective leader nor a loyal follower, having developed a reputation for refusing to obey legislation passed in Brussels, and for not spending the EU funds allocated for the development of its more impoverished areas.
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands or France, the fairly recent arrival in Italy of migrants, predominantly from developing countries, has been at the centre of media attention. Naturally the precise tone of the narratives depends on the type of media (visual, written etc.) and on the political flavour of the newspapers or TV channels involved; nevertheless much of the coverage has usually been framed in terms of a threat to Italian cultural identity, moral integrity and security. Within the wider context of the Italian media representation of migrants, Albanians are the group that has been the most intensely stereotyped, stigmatised and criminalised. They have been readily associated with criminality and moral degeneration, and in particular with drug smuggling and sexual exploitation. In fact crimes committed, even if supposedly, by Albanian migrants have been given particular prominence by both local and national Italian media from the very first episodes of the Albanian migration.

The first reflections on the Italian media's "reception" of the 1991 immigrations appeared in 1992. First, Pittau and Reggio (1992) looked at the two phases of the 1991 Albanian migration through the articles in the Italian press. This was not a proper press discourse analysis as such, rather a simple contrast between the relative "openness" expressed towards the arrivals in March and the "closure" pitched at the arrivals in August. Palomba and Righi (1992) made a more systematic analysis of the Italian press coverage on the two 1991 migration episodes (427 articles analysed), and related this to a national public opinion survey (n = 1,800) of attitudes towards Albanian migration. They too found a switch in the press discourse between the March coverage, characterised by headlines and stories about the unpreparedness of the Italian authorities and the necessity of normalising the situation and integrating the refugees, and the August coverage, dominated much more by stories of violence and helplessness on the part of the Albanians, and articles urging repatriation. This changed press discourse was held responsible by Palomba and Righi for the results of the national survey carried out in late 1991 which showed predominantly negative attitudes towards Albanians. Indeed only 12% in this survey were favourably disposed to the arrival of the Albanians and their integration into Italy; favourable attitudes were found to be correlated with higher education and younger age groups.

In a later and somewhat more in-depth analysis Zinn (1996) returns to the double exodus of 1991 and again contrasts the changed media and political context of the two migratory episodes; she then extends considerably the analysis by theorising the process of the con...

\[\textit{On this see Campani (2001).}\]
struction — and consumption — of the “Albanian Other” in Italy, pointing to the reflective mirror of Albanians as reminding Italians of their own troubled past of poverty and emigration, and of their own “internal Albania” in the Italian Mezzogiorno. Hence the Italian bourgeois-democratic utopian ideal, projected to Albania before (and after) the fall of communism by Italian television, rebounds back to Italy with the arrival of Albanians to remind Italy of its own less-than-utopian aspects.

The “consumption” of Albanian migrants was exemplified in a particularly powerful and symbolic way by the incorporation of the now-iconic photograph of the Albanian landings from a desperately overcrowded ship into the 1992 “United Colors of Benetton” advertising campaign. The theme of the advertisement reflected the typical (and some would say) cynical Benetton message: “human tragedy, Italian style — wear your social consciousness”. It was also “emblematic of how the so-called Albanian crisis of 1991 was somatized by the Italian people” (Zinn, 1996, p. 241).10

After the migratory crisis of 1997, the portrayal of Albanian refugees by Italian media was the focus of more criticism. The whole press representation of immigrants, and above all Albanians, was called into question by Italian analysts of the press, who blamed Italian media for playing an extremely active part in the elaboration and circulation of narratives of criminalisation and stigmatisation, which in turn fostered marginalisation and social exclusion.11 It is important to underline how these narratives and discursive practices can be seen as self-revealing prophecies as they actually prevent Albanian and other immigrants from accessing legal sources of income, thus relegating them to their actual condition of illegality and vulnerability.

10 This Benetton advertising poster is portrayed in Vebbiu and Devele (1996, p. 144), and another picture appears on the front cover of Myron Weiner’s provocative book *The Global Migration Crisis* (1995), and most recently of all in the dossier on migration in a recent issue of *The Courier* (issue 187, July–August 2001, pp. 28–29).

11 Particularly important in this regard is the research coordinated by Cotesta (1999) in a special issue of *Studi Emigrazione* on “Mass media, ethnic conflict and migration”. Although this research did not concentrate specifically on Albanian immigrants, this group figured prominently in the results. For instance, in the quantitative analysis of the frequency with which certain key words appeared in the sample of Italian newspapers over the period 1991–97, the ten most commonly cited words were: Albanians (n = 1,515), immigrants (1,467), arrest (1,135), police (1,071), clandestine (771), *extra-comunitari* (735), drugs (679), refugees (670), Moroccans (606) and repatriation (512) (Stoppiello, 1999). Another key part of the critique of the media’s handling of immigration issues is that most of the articles dealing with immigrants do so in relation to conflictual events involving crime and violence; only a minority deal with non-conflictual situations and with themes relating to solidarity or integration. Cotesta’s research demonstrates conclusively how immigrants, and especially Albanians, have been (and still are) constructed as a “dangerous class” in Italy.
Other research documented in a more rigorous way the statistical association between Albanian immigrants and crime in Italy — and also looked at important issues behind and beyond the statistics. Jamieson and Silj (1998) carried out some interesting research on the relation between the actual deviancy ratio, as far as petty criminality is concerned, among Albanian immigrants in Italy and the association between Albanian immigration flows and Albanian and Italian organised crime. Although the study underlined how “Albanian criminal organisations have undoubtedly gained a solid foot in Italy and are likely to want to expand their activities”, it also shows how this could only happen through cooperation with local and already-existing Italian criminal organisations. As far as the involvement of Albanians in micro-criminality is concerned, the research underlines how for them, as for other immigrant groups, illegal status contributes significantly to the likelihood of committing crimes, since most of them are carried out in order to achieve the minimum economic preconditions to survive and fulfil basic needs. Whilst it is true that the majority of Albanian immigrants in Italy undoubtedly wish to live and work legally, the difficulties in obtaining a visa or residence permit make this extremely difficult. This situation is not likely to change unless formal procedures become less bureaucratic and unless the general public and potential employers become less biased against Albanian labour. In this context, the high percentage of illegal immigrants (83% in 1997) among the total number of non-Italian criminals suggests that immigrant criminality may be at least as much, if not more, a function of being clandestine than of being an immigrant per se (Jamieson and Silj, 1998).

These dynamics of stigmatisation and criminalisation of Albanians are still hegemonic within both Italian media and society. According to an unpublished survey carried out in March 2000 by the Trieste-based marketing and research company SWG on 800 people over 18 years of age, 52% of those interviewed thought that the increase of criminality was closely related to the increasing presence of immigrants, and 34% thought Albanians to be the group most prone to violence, a much higher percentage than any other named ethnic group. In general migrants from developing countries were seen as “dangerous” because of their poverty (33% of respondents), because they are not willing to work (25%) or because of their “natural inclina-

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12 So that often Albanians are automatically held responsible for committing crimes they did not in fact commit. An excellent example of this “guilt by association” was played out in February 2001 in Novi Ligure, a small town in Piedmont. The murder of a mother and her 12-year-old son in their house was immediately attributed to “Albanian thieves”; only later did it emerge that the murderer was a family member (see Desiderio, 2001).
tion for violence" (23%). Finally 47% of the interviewees thought that setting a limit to the number of immigrants from developing countries entitled to enter Italy would lead to a decrease in criminality.

Summing up, the Italian media’s representation of the presence and migration of Albanians into Italy has been articulated through four main sets of narratives: discourses of moral depravity; discourses of the demonisation of atheism or essentialisation of religious difference; discourses of backwardness, exoticism and isolation; and discourses of deception and incompetence as regards Albanians’ understanding of capitalism and democracy (Mai, 2002). Each of these merits a few words of explanation.

First, Albania is frequently portrayed as a land characterised by chaos and lack of moral boundaries. This type of discourse is mainly articulated in relation to the fact that some Albanian immigrants have been associated with the trafficking of drugs and of women for sexual exploitation. The media has made much of the fact that some trafficking of young women into prostitution has taken place from within the same (extended) family, emphasising such “tales of moral depravity” as beyond any bounds of believable behaviour.13

Second, the fact that Albania, from 1967 until the collapse of the communist state, was the only officially declared atheist state in the world, enables the Italian media to impose another vision of Albanians as lacking any “moral sense”. Hence, atheism is demonised. But there has also been another religious discourse: the transformation of all Albanians into Muslims, an essentialisation which ignores the fact that many Albanians are of Roman Catholic and Orthodox background (Vehbiu and Devoile, 1996, p. 81). Here, one must not forget that the first migrations of Albanians to Italy happened at the time of the Gulf War, a period when Islam was viewed by the global Western press in all sorts of negative ways.

Third, discourses of backwardness, isolation and exoticism have been paramount in Italian views of Albania (Morozzo della Rocca, 1997, pp. 115–124). In accounts by Italian writers and journalists both before and after the collapse of the communist state we are treated to mythical, stereotypical descriptions of a country that “was both indecipherable and exotic, like another planet... an Albania that belonged to Europe only geographically... a country that is near and far, closed in its solitude, proud in its poverty...” (Vehbiu and Devoile, 1996, p. 29).

Fourthly, the narratives of deception and incompetence in relation to Albania’s consumption of Italian media have been discussed above.

13 For a more nuanced interpretation of this undeniably regrettable practice in terms of reinvention of older Albanian patriarchal practices see Mai (2001b) and Schwandner-Sievers (2001).
and shown to be particularly strategic for Italy's articulation of its own EU-compatible self-identity in terms of efficiency and capitalist competence. More speculatively, we might suggest that the "discourses of deception" reflect a combination of two wider dynamics: the projection onto Albanian migrants of Italians' disillusionment with their own "Americanised" televsional utopia; and the denial of Italy's responsibility for having supported a process of neo-liberal political and economic reform in Albania which, if anything, is responsible for, and not a simple reaction to, Albania's political, economic and social instability.

Finally, there is another respect in which Italian media have been implicated in the Albanian migration to Italy: this refers to their role in being mirrors for Albanians about themselves and sources of information about Albania in times of political turmoil (Devoe, 1998, p. 122). During communist times the Albanian media came to be distrusted as a consequence of their total subservience to the regime. Italian media, because of their inherent independence from the Albanian state, therefore achieved a status of objectivity. This was true especially in the first post-communist years and at times of political crisis. Albanians watched the turmoil triggered by the collapse of the pyramid schemes in 1997 as it unfolded on Italian television. This was also because Albanian national television was not functioning regularly as a consequence of the state of emergency in which the country was at the time. However, the Italian media, like other Western media, dwelt only on the most spectacular and exotic events of the 1997 crisis: the dominant images were of children shooting off machine-guns, destruction of properties, seizure of boats and mass exoduses. Italy portrayed Albania in a state of total collapse and civil war, without any law and order. Thus in its "inability in providing analytical readings" of a country in the throes of political confrontation (Devoe, 1998, p. 131), the Italian media can be seen as having both anticipated and produced events, and therefore as playing an active role in the way the crisis was shaped. Here again, it is interesting to observe how discourses of exoticisation, like those of criminalisation and marginalisation, can be seen as functioning as self-fulfilling prophecies. In framing a very delicate and complex situation of social and political antagonism in terms purely of chaos and anarchy, Italian media can be seen as having actively contributed to the degeneration and acceleration of events along the very direction they had framed those events with.

Concluding thoughts

This article has interpreted Albanian migration to Italy within the wider context of political events in the two countries, especially during
the early 1990s when, in both countries, a 45-years-old political dynasty came to an end—the demise of the communist regime in Albania, and the collapse of the Christian Democratic “First Republic” in Italy. We have punctuated our analysis by explicit reference to a series of myths and mirrors which surround and reflect the various views and perceptions of Italy and Italians, and Albania and Albanians, about each other and about the migratory process itself.

On the Albanian side, we have argued that the emigration to Italy (and to Greece) can be better understood not as a simple response to geographical proximity or economic inequality, but as a product of a long process of political, social, economic and cultural change, namely the post-communist transformation, which has both encouraged, and in turn been fostered by, migratory dynamics. Our focus on the media has allowed us to develop several new insights into the interpretation of Albanian migration to Italy, including the identification and discussion of a number of myths. Rather than seeing Albanians as mechanically drawn to Italy by the magnet of the televisual portrayal of a flashy and wealthy lifestyle, our contention has been that the daily presence of Italian television in the everyday lives of most Albanians during the later years of communism came to be a fundamental source of information (including misinformation) for the construction of a political alternative to an eventually despised regime. Furthermore, behind the readiness with which the myth of the Albanians as tragically fascinated by Italian television was elaborated and circulated, one should read a dynamic of displacement onto Albanians of Italians’ disillusionment with their own deceptive Italian utopia of universal pleasure and entitlement.

On the Italian side, we have argued that the preconditions for the mythical construction of Albania and the Albanians as “others” are to be traced both in the collapse of the Italian postwar national political and moral order (contemporaneous with communism’s collapse in Albania), and in the pressures posed by the process of EU integration. Confronted by the necessity to produce an EU-compatible articulation of “Italianness”, Italy re-imagined itself by rejecting and projecting its ascribed backwardness (Agnew, 1997) onto new others, but in continuity with the central experience of removal of the role of internal and external colonialism in the process of historical construction of an Italian national identity. In this way, Albanians were selected as the negative stigma against which to differentiate a positive, democratic, efficient and civilised Italian identity because they are most closely similar to Italy’s historically suppressed internal others, namely the Italian southerner and the experience of Italian fascism and colonialism. Despite their phenotypical similarity to Italians, despite the fact that
they come from a nearby country of broadly similar Mediterranean culture, and despite their widespread geographical distribution and scattering within Italy, Albanians have been accorded a stigmatised status which no other ethnic group can match for its negative connotations, with the possible exception of the Roma. Hence the othering of Albanians is tinged with a strong homophobia (Martelli, 1998, p. 211), in the sense of “fear of the same”.

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Summary

Emigration from Albania since 1990 has been the most dramatic instance of post-Cold War East–West migration. Now, more than one in five Albanians lives abroad, mainly in Italy and Greece, and the first part of the paper presents statistical documentation on the evolution of the Albanian migration to Italy, including migrants’ regional distribution within the country. Eschewing simplistic mono-causal geographic, political or economic explanations of the Albanian mass migration, the remainder of the paper essays a more rounded analysis by setting the exodus to Italy within the nexus of political, economic, social and cultural events that were happening in each of the countries, and whose timing and interconnections are crucial in understanding the dynamics of this migration and its reception and interpretation. We focus particularly on the role of the Italian media in constructing a series of myths—about Italy (projected as the “promised land” by Italian television to Albania both before and after the demise of the communist regime), about Albania (constructed as a backward, exotic, chaotic country), and about Albanian immigrants (represented as “undesirables”, deviants and potential criminals). Above all, we analyse how Albania and Albanian immigrants in Italy have evolved as a pervasive “myth of the other”, against which Italy’s own self-identity as a modern, efficient European nation has been reconstructed. However, in a final ironic twist, it is also the case that Albanian immigrants are seen as present-day mirrors to Italy’s own developmental and migratory past.
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Book Reviews - Review of Reviews - International Newsletter on Migration - Books Received
Greek-American return migration: constructions of identity and reconstructions of place

Introduction

In a world of uncertainty and constant fluctuation, as demonstrated repeatedly by current events, we can no longer rely on the absolutism of geographic positioning or of national identity. Concepts like "identity" and "place" have been challenged and intrinsically affected by a multitude of global forces. Yet the echo of Stuart Hall's claim that "Migration is a one way trip, there is no 'home' to go back to" (1987, p. 44), brings us in the midst of a heuristic dilemma associated with such notions as "belonging" or "home" and the imaginary or real boundaries of place in the case of return migration, the theme of this paper.

The long-lasting effect of migration on receiving countries is clearly reflected in the vast amount of literature on issues of immigration, assimilation, multiculturalism and related issues of concern to the receiving country. But, as King states: "Return migration is the great unwritten chapter in the history of migration" (2000, p. 7). Although King's 1986 book Return Migration and Regional Economic Problems still remains the only one that provides a global overview of the theme of return migration, there seems to be a resurgence of empirical literature surfacing in the last couple of years. Unfortunately, there is virtually no recent literature on Greek-American return migration, as emphasised by Kondis (1997). The only work on Greek-American return migration is Saloutos’ (1956) They Remember America: The Story of the Repatriated Greek-Americans, which deals with the return experience of first-generation migrants. On a wider front Richard Clogg bemoans the lack of attention paid to the study of the Greek diaspora. In his words, "Xeniteia, sojourning in foreign parts, the diaspora experience, call it what you will, has been so central to the history of the Greek people in modern times that it merits much greater attention than we historians have so far chosen to give it" (1999, p. 17).
This paper builds on aspects of current migration and identity theories which shed light on our understanding of notions of culture and place. My empirical focus is the shaping of migrant behaviour in the context of the return migration of Greek-Americans to Greece. An important consideration in my analysis is the multiple interactions between place of origin and place of destination, network ties and global forces. The paper aims at understanding how these elements influence and shape return migrant behaviour and in particular to enlighten our understanding of return migration as a process that encompasses the combined notions of “place” and “identity” as the outcome of a continuous search for “home” and what this means. The paper is concerned not only to present aspects of the story of Greek-American migration but also to investigate the migrant sense of “self” and how this self-identification unfolds and manifests itself in different places and contexts. The paper is organised into several parts. In the next I address questions of methodology; this is followed by a brief overview of the historical process of Greek migration and settlement in the United States. Then, using extracts from the narrated experiences of a small sample of returned Greek-Americans, the paper turns to current issues of Greek-American return migration and the conceptualisation of identity and place.

Epistemology and method

The purpose of this paper is to present some preliminary evidence about the experience of Greek-American return migration. My objective is to examine not only the experience of return per se but primarily the meanings attached to this experience. Through this I hope to develop a clearer understanding of the concepts of identity and place and how these internalisations are articulated in praxis. One of the challenges of this research is to reveal the extent to which the returnees' actions are reflective of conscious manifestations of individuals' identity, their self-sense and their positionality of place, real and imagined. I take inspiration from Fielding's argument that “Migration tends to ex-

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1 This paper was written during my stay as a Marie Curie Fellow at the Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex. I am indebted to my supervisor at the University of Sussex, Professor Russell King, for his guidance and support during my stay. Acknowledgement is also due to all the postgraduate students on the Migration Studies Programme at Sussex for their interest and for their stimulating questions during presentations of my research. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. D. Mentzeniotis for his enduring support of my work and his generosity and invaluable help in locating research material. Finally, I am deeply grateful to the interviewees who shared their life stories with me. Any errors or shortcomings remain my sole responsibility.
pose one's personality. It expresses one's loYalties and reveals one's values and attachments (often previously hidden). It is a statement of an individual's world-view, and is, therefore, an extremely cultural event" (1992, p. 201). Within this framework, migration and return migration are both viewed as expressions of the cultural imaging of place, where the migrants' and returnees' evolving lives produce constructions and reconstructions of the extended social world, both in the home and the host country. Individual migrants are recognised as socially embedded, active, intentional agents who influence as much as they are influenced by the social context in which they are located. This perspective follows Halfacree and Boyle's (1993) conceptualisation of migration, which emphasises its situatedness within everyday life, and leads to a biographical approach. This approach seeks to unfold the meaning of migration and the migrant's identity and sense of place by exploring the migrant's life course. Findlay and Li go a step further in their methodological contribution and introduce the "auto" biographical approach; here the researcher attempts to raise practical consciousness to the discursive realm in order to investigate how the growth of migration intentions over time are related to the self-defined changing cultural contexts of the migrants' everyday life (1997, p. 35). A similar approach was adopted in this study by encouraging returnees to engage in a process of self-reflection and to attempt to relate their actions, feelings and thoughts to the wider socio-cultural context of their changing place and positionality.

The epistemological foundation of this paper and my analysis of empirical data are based on a social constructivist (or constructionist) perspective with a phenomenological approach. Earlier representative works of this tradition include Berger and Luckmann's influential book The Social Construction of Reality (1967). Kenneth Gergen gives a more recent definition of the position:

Drawing importantly from emerging developments most prominently in the history of science, the sociology of knowledge, ethnomethodology, rhetorical studies of science, symbolic anthropology, feminist theory and post-structuralist literary theory, social constructionism is not so much a foundational theory of knowledge as an anti-foundational dialogue. Primary emphases of this dialogue are based on: the social-discursive matrix from which knowledge claims emerge and from which their justification is derived; the values/ideology implicit within knowledge posits; the modes of informal and institutional life sustained and replenished by ontological and epistemological commitments; and the distribution of power and privilege favoured by disciplinary beliefs. Much attention is also given to the creation and transformation of cultural constructions: the adjustment of competing belief/value systems; and the generation of new modes of pedagogy, scholarly expression and disciplinary relations (1995, p. 20).
My empirical material aims at demonstrating that identity and place are social constructions, "the product of specific historical and geographical forces, rather than biologically given ideas whose meaning is dictated by nature" (Jackson and Penrose, 1993, p. 1). Hence, the spatial constitution of social life, as it relates to return migration, is articulated and shaped by the returnees themselves, and the epitome of this is the very process of their identity construction.

It was essential to the design of the study that the participants met certain criteria. The study was designed to include only those return migrants who were second-generation Greek-Americans, specifically those born in the United States to Greek immigrant parents. The participants had to have had a minimum return stay of at least six months. The six-month period was decided after ongoing discussions with people involved directly or indirectly with return migration and the perception of "initial adjustment". After speaking with officials from Greek-American organisations and social clubs, it was ascertained that six months is the minimum required time for the "actual return" to start taking place. Finally, it was also critical that all participants in the study expressed their willingness not only to dedicate their time but also to engage in self-reflection and to disclose personal data about their return experience. In my initial contacts with the participants we discussed my research, their participation, and I reassured them of maintaining the confidentiality of their identities and the privacy of other communications conducted in the future. Some of the participants expressed enthusiasm and interest about my work and my own personal background, which I openly shared with them. This I had anticipated, and the information disclosed was the minimum, to avoid creating any type of distance or power relation between us, but enough to build trust. The participants did not feel that they were being exploited for research purposes, but felt useful to the study. This type of openness may have some risks, but it undoubtedly has many strengths: the participants felt a sense of security in knowing that although a researcher, I was really "one of them"; and they appreciated all the efforts I made to provide an atmosphere of trust and colleagueship which enabled them to engage in deep self-reflection, and to share feelings, behaviours and attitudes which are not always quantifiable and are missed in structured interview research.

This paper is based on the material analysed for seven participants who were among the first to operationalise their commitment to the study out of the initial 20 selected who expressed interest. As each of the stories progressed, I sought further clarification of my understandings since none of the initial verbal encounters were taped to avoid hindering the flowing process of natural conversation. All participants
then agreed to write about their experiences without having their stories interrupted or distracted by conversation. This was the second phase of the empirical material. The third phase was a final meeting some months later to balance my role as researcher, listener and conversationalist by going over my preliminary interpretations of their stories to verify that none of the information was misrepresented or misinterpreted from their viewpoint. The themes discussed were arranged in rough chronological fashion in the following way:

- before emigration: reasons to migrate, family background information;
- migration experience (USA): family, friends, school, social life;
- return experience (Greece): processes of return and settlement, life in Greece, place-identity.

Interviews and narratives were conducted in the participants' native languages, which were both English and Greek since all exhibited bilingual native fluency. Conversations would flow without any pre-determined choice of language. The participants were asked to select the particular language that made them feel more relaxed so they could describe their feelings, thoughts and experiences without translating. None exhibited a particular preference in language so all conversations tended to be mixed. In order to protect the anonymity of the participants all names used in the paper are pseudonyms. Although this article is based on fieldwork conducted in Athens, Greece, over a four-month period of time during the summer of 2001, ongoing contacts, written correspondence and participant observation, which began in 1994, continue to this day.

Kinship/friendship/colleagueship relations have facilitated the building of participant networks with Greek-Americans in Greece and the United States. The vast majority of conversations were not formally scheduled encounters; they took place in the context of everyday social interactions and became part of my ongoing participation in the intimate space of their personal and family lives. Natural conversations became the extension of life history and oral history interviews. While I recognise that this small group of subjects is not representative of all Greek-American return migrants, nonetheless there is a lot to reflect on from their experiences shared herein.

My motivations and research concerns extend beyond an initial inquiry into the realms of my own national consciousness and belonging.

2 Further fieldwork will be undertaken in 2002, both to broaden the initial sample and to diversify the analysis with techniques such as diaries, tape and video recording.
Born and raised in the United States, daughter of Greek immigrants, having lived and received education in both the United States and Greece, haunted by Socrates’ words “The unexamined life is not worth living for”, I can identify with Karakasidou’s (1997, p. xix) claim: “Perhaps in my search for what made my parents, different as they were, both Greek, I was also looking subconsciously for the basis of my own Greek identity”.

To the extent that it has been possible, I have followed ethnographic practice based on distancing oneself from native cultural assumptions and instead immersing oneself in critical introspection, in-depth reflection and active participation in the social phenomena I have aimed at analysing. My research originated and continues to this day to be a social encounter that extends beyond as well as within the research project, insofar as I can now “listen beyond” what was said and explore the issues with greater critical awareness and insight. So, my choice of methodology has proven uniquely useful in unveiling the meanings and processes encoded in the very act of return migration.

Having considered methodological difficulties, much of the remainder of the paper will embody an analytical structure conveyed by three distinct narratives: what I term “ideology of home”, “ideology of return” and “ideology of self”, which respectively are reflective of the notions of place, culture and identity. First, however, we need to briefly review the history of Greek migration to the United States.

Migration and settlement of Greeks in the United States: a brief historical interpretation

The Greeks were among the last of the Europeans to have immigrated to the United States. Numerically significant Greek immigration did not begin until the 1890s. The peak of Greek immigration was reached in the period prior to and immediately after World War I: according to data from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), more than 350,000 Greeks immigrated during 1900–1920 (Moskos, 1999, p. 156). More came after World War II but in smaller numbers. In 1976, the INS estimated that 640,000 ethnic Greeks had come to the United States between 1820 and 1975. This fig-

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3 There is a wide discussion in many disciplines about the researcher’s involvement in the empirical work conducted. Questions related to objectivity and subjectivity on the part of the researcher have been addressed by many scholars in the areas of sociology, anthropology, philosophy and theory of science. For the most part it is widely accepted to allow the voice of the researcher to be incorporated in the scientific process of fieldwork (see e.g. Abu-Lughod, 1993; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1996).
ure is contested by many experts who hold it to be too small. The Greeks who came to the United States in the main era of immigration during the early decades of the 20th century were in their predominance male and were the only fairly large European group of which more than half returned, reflecting the relative lack of family migration at that stage.

The bulk of Greek migrants moved because of the economic opportunities America offered. Those who lived in the Greek-speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire migrated for both economic reasons and because they wished to escape the political and religious persecution of the Turks. In general, a combination of environmental and social circumstances led Greeks to their departure for the ‘dreamland’. Poor soil conditions, repeated crop failures, difficulties in making a living, floods, earthquakes, oppressive taxation, and frequent changes in the government forced many to look to the United States as the land of opportunity.

Most immigrants came from the rural areas of Greece where family values were (and still are) of immense importance, and the need to earn a living and accept the responsibilities of an adult at an early age was a common phenomenon. Despite their young age, migrants departed with the plan to struggle, work hard, save and provide for their parents, sisters and brothers in Greece, and eventually for themselves. Optimism, determination, self-discipline and an adventurous spirit, along with the hope and expectation of returning home, provided the fuel to sustain the plan and to alleviate the otherwise often unbearably difficult times of early immigration.

By and large, the Greeks settled and established themselves in the states east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio. Despite coming from a rural background, they showed a remarkable preference for living in urban areas. According to Saloutos, “in the city (the Greek migrant) expected to find a job with less difficulty, receive wages at the end of the day or week, be in the company of his countrymen, and enjoy the social life that would be denied to him if he lived in an isolated rural area” (Saloutos, 1964, p. 3). The pursuit of urban occupations can also be explained by the fact that agriculture provided little attraction for Greeks who associated it with misery and hardship in their native land. The earliest Greek immigrants gratefully accepted whatever jobs they could get in both heavy and light industry. Occupational opportunities were found in railroad construction, textile mills, meatpacking companies and mining. Others worked as bootblacks, waiters, vendors

4 For more historical and statistical details see, among others, Moskos, 1999; Saloutos, 1964; Scourby, 1984.
and clerks in stores that catered to ethnic needs. Daniels meanwhile mentions that “relatively large numbers of Greeks became small businessmen and, for reasons that are not at all clear, large numbers of these opened restaurants. These were not restaurants that featured Greek cuisine but were generally modest places that featured inexpensive general food” (1990, p. 203). The business represented a firm step on the ladder of entrepreneurial success for those who were initially in menial jobs.

Close family bonds and the provisions of mutual assistance are strong cultural explanations which illustrate to a large extent the upward mobility aspirations of the Greeks in the United States. Their perseverance and determination to succeed led them to accumulate some capital, which in turn enabled them to demonstrate their business skills. This inherent tendency of personal sacrifice for social gain reflects a serious concern with the establishment of identity. The vehicle of success becomes the major component of identity formation, and America becomes the instrumental geographical context where this ongoing process takes place.

Current issues of Greek-American return migration: conceptualising identity and place

Identification appears to be one of the least well understood yet discursively explosive concepts of recent years. It has been subjected to a searching critique conducted within a variety of disciplinary areas. The notion of a unified, integral identity is one which exposes us to a series of conceptual difficulties. The concept of identity explored here is not an essentialist, but a positional one. That is to say, the concept of Greek (or Greek-American) ethnic identity does not signal a fixed and stable core across time, unfolding from beginning to end through all the stages of historical time and space without change. As Hall points out, “identities are never unified and, in late modern times, are increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization and are constantly in the process of change and transformation” (Hall and duGay, 1996, p. 4).

Identities emerge within the dynamic context of exclusion and difference. They are constructed in response to “otherness”, in that the process of “becoming” rather than “being” is articulated through the use of the historical, cultural and symbolic resources: not merely “who we are” and “where we came from”, but even further than that to “what
we might become” and “how we might represent ourselves”. Stuart Hall in his enlightening introduction to *Questions of Cultural Identity* (Hall and duGay, 1996) offers a wide-ranging exploration of this issue and asserts that: “Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked, identities are constructed through, not outside, difference”. This entails the radically disturbing realisation that it is only in reference to what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside, that the positive meaning of any term (and thus its identity) can be constructed (Butler, 1993; Derrida, 1981; Laclau, 1990). Hall continues: “Throughout their careers, identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’ abjected. Every identity has at its ‘margin’, an excess, something more. The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure, every identity naming as its necessary ... that which it ‘lacks’” (Hall and duGay, 1996, p. 5).

Returning to the notion of difference, a critical point about ethnic identity is that the relationship between “you” and the “other” becomes the embodiment of the “ethnic self”. Only when there is an “other” can you know who “you” are. Hall emphasises that “there is no identity that is without the dialogic relationship to the other. The other is not outside, but also inside the self, the identity. So identity is a process, identity is a split. Identity is not a fixed point but an ambivalent point. Identity is also the relationship of the other to oneself” (Hall and duGay, 1996, p. 5).

The environment of difference has compelled Greeks to re-evaluate and stress their ethnic identity. Greeks in America safeguarded their status by unification under the protective context of an ethnic group; a function grounded in their common language, religion and culture. This identification process encompasses the adjustment to the cultural elements of their larger surroundings while retaining their “Greekness”. This particular sense of solidarity along with the process of sharing a common culture strengthens ethnic identity. This feeling in turn grows and fills the vacuum of residing away from the homeland. Greek immigrants undoubtedly faced adverse conditions upon their arrival in the United States which in turn facilitated the formation of institutional as well as cultural agents that helped to promote and safeguard their ethnic identity. As Greeks began to assert their ethnic identity they simultaneously integrated into American society. Through this process, a new identity was formed, one that was neither entirely Greek nor entirely American, but an amalgamation of both, as subsequent generations have re-evaluated and reformulated their articulation of ethnic identity.
When we allude to Greek ethnicity, Scourby maintains, “it is something that can only be understood within very specific contexts of social, economic, political and psychological variables”. Although she is at pains to point out that the Greek American community is not a homogenous one, Scourby questions: is there under the umbrella term “Greek-American”, a common thread, one that pulls together the fracturing effect of generation, education, and class? “Is there an inexplicable bond among those who define themselves variously as Greek, Greek-American, American Greek, or Greek Orthodox?” (1994, p. 125).

From the perspective of cross-cultural psychology, identity is formally defined as: “that part of the totality of one’s self-construal made up of those dimensions that express the continuity between one’s construal of past ancestry and one’s future aspirations in relation to ethnicity” (Weinreich, 1999, p. 137). This definition emphasises the continuity between current expressions of ethnicity, past conceptions of one’s ancestry and future aspirations for one’s progeny. In terms of “Greekness” ethnic identity can be measured by the degree to which individuals internalise the values, symbols and traditions of Greek heritage and to what extent they are practically expressed by the group members. A very interesting study by Constantinou (1989) aims to define the dominant themes of Greek-American ethnicity and to examine the inter-generational difference in this phenomenon. The study first identified three dominant themes, Lingua, Cultura, and Politika. Although each of these three themes is composed of several attributes, the Greek language, socio-cultural activities, and politics respectively, form their core. Furthermore, a certain interdependence exists between specific attributes of Greek-American ethnicity. The pervasive role of language and the Orthodox Church account for this overlap (Constantinou, 1989, p. 115). Quantitative analysis, using Multivariate Analysis of Variance, revealed a sharp inter-generational decline in the use of Greek, a less pronounced decrease in the interest in politics, and little variability in participation in socio-cultural activities (Constantinou, 1989, p. 99).

Identity under construction: building-blocks and barriers

Even a brief review of the historical development of social stratification, economic and family patterns in Greece reveals some surprising contradictions. Herzfeld, a scholar who has transcended the level of experience and has truly “lived Greece”, identifies a series of startling contrasts: “the ruins and hints of the Classical past mix with the bustle of modern urban life, the warm hospitality with a sometimes overt suspicion of foreigners, the paraphernalia of a functioning national bureau-
cracy with the omnipresent evidence of patronage and favor trading" (Herzfeld, 1986). Herzfeld’s general thesis on Greek national identity and its relationship to the building of modern Greece is particularly relevant to this theme, as is the critical discussion of Greek national identity as a “stubborn stereotype” argued by Tsoukalas (1996).

The social construction of identity rejects any premodern conceptions of identity as a natural, stable, unchanging structure; and explicitly reiterates individual and collective identities as intentional or unintentional consequences of social interaction. The social construction of boundaries produces collective identities. There is a twofold way these ethnic boundaries function: as a demarcation line between “us” and “them” inside and outside the familiar and the different; and also as an enclosure line which forms a basis of trust and solidarity, and a forum of communal expression which can transform strangers into members of the group. For instance, religious conversion and language or cultural acquisition in cases of intermarriage between different ethnic groups can be viewed as a means of consolidating a basis of legitimate acceptance to the group.

The process of the construction of the migrant self in the case of the Greek-American experience may literally happen in open, versatile social space but symbolically it also involves the locality of closed national space. The Greek-Americans as social agents either in or out of the receiving country tend to resist the disciplining process of fixed identities and both actively and passively legitimise their ethnic and social personhood. This of course does not imply a lack of coherence in their own and others’ perception of “who” they are. Fragile and confused as they seem on the surface, essentially actions, relations and social positioning interpret identity. As we attempt to give meaning to such vague conceptualisations of “being” and “becoming” we come to realise that both choice and praxis are reflective of identity itself. Greeks convert the migratory experience into symbolic discourse of a multifaceted struggle (on moral, ethnic/national, and social-political levels) which has turned into success, and the embodiment of the Greek spirit can be measured in terms of financial and family capital. By and large, the Greek migrants who return to Greece are those who have accomplished a great deal during their absence and yet have given up little or most likely nothing of their “Greekness”.

The complexities arising from the struggle of identification emanate from the boundaries existing between the notions of “home” and “away”. These dynamics of belongingness and displacement accentuate contradictions and paradoxes of a “here” here and a “there” there. This “here” and “there” dichotomy leads to a new process, that of “othering” or “otherness”, which can be termed as the other self. Who
then is this Greek-American, this "other" Greek? We now speak, in a postmodern language, about hybrid identities. Writing from a historian's perspective on the Italian migration experience, Donna Gabaccia helps us to appreciate the complexity of the question just posed:

Today, identities among the descendants of Italy's migrants differ as much among themselves as migrants once differed from natives. Although diaspora nationalism flourishes among the five million Italian citizens still living abroad, the much larger number of persons of Italian descent do not share it. Migrants' descendants have created their own civiltà italiana based on the thought, "tutto il mondo è paese". Their italianità – where it has persisted at all – resides in the humble details of everyday life, not in the glories of any nation or its state (2000, pp. 176–177).

Networks of socio-cultural identification: the Greek family and the Greek community

Beginning in the early 1990s a series of important studies were conducted in the United States regarding identity formation and family socialisation among second-generation immigrants. A number of these studies explored the family dynamics and structure that influence and/or determine identity formation, language development and adaptation within the cultural environment.

In the portfolio of Greek-American studies the theoretical bases of analysing family structure privilege the functional perspective of traditional socialisation theory, which argues that this process serves to reproduce social values and norms, thus preserving societal stability and order. In the context of ethnic family socialisation, the parents assume an active role in shaping children's ethnic identities: they teach, promote and practice the ethnic language, religion, culture and traditions in order to transmit national consciousness to their children. These traditional functionalist perspectives have been criticised for their deterministic view of social agents and society as a whole. They have ignored the multi-faceted capacities of individuals to construct, negotiate and interpret symbols and identities within their environments.

In the case of Greek-Americans we can distinguish two independent components that are also integral parts of the socialisation process of identity formation. One basic component is the function of the family

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5 In other words, all people everywhere are the same - it describes the world as manageable, and as a face-to-face community. The proverb strongly implies that all people can get along, for the world is just a global village.

6 For some of the most important of these see Fortes (1996), Waldinger and Perlmann (1998), Zhou (1997).
as the ethno-cultural transmitter towards children; the other component is the function of the children as interpreters and receptors of what is transmitted from the parents. Members of the immediate as well as extended family are all considered active agents in the socialisation of children and assume such a responsibility in its fullest potential. Not only parents and grandparents but also uncles, aunts and godparents reinforce cultural meanings and ethnic behaviours. Not only do they interpret and define ethnic symbols but also they utilise reward and punishment techniques in order to shape and project appropriate ethnic behaviours. Such techniques and schemes of punishment range from pure emotional (brainwashing, psychological blackmail and pressure, creating feelings of guilt, developing dependency syndromes, creating low self-esteem etc) to pure material ones (withholding goods and services, disowning from the family inheritance etc). As Fortier reminds us, “projects of collective identity commonly involve the location of the family as a building block in the growth of the community” (2000, p. 49).

However, parents, family or a specific social group are not the sole determinants of ethnicity and identity. Not only do ethnic families differ in the ways they project and express ethnicity, they also exercise varying degrees of control, intensity and practice in affirming and expressing ethnic identity. For example, ethnic identity is often diluted as generation succeeds generation and more members of ethnic groups become Americanised (Cheng and Kuo, 2000). Furthermore, the characteristic of one’s ethnicity is selectively preserved or expanded (e.g. extended familism or biculturalism) to serve as a family or group strategy for adopting the ethnic minority’s social pattern (Stoller, 1996).

The second component of family socialisation is the participation and involvement of children themselves in the construction of their own identity within the internal familial ethnic context and the external social environment. Greek families tend to cherish their cultural heritage and require their children to preserve and practice ethnic cultural values and norms. Retention and expression of ethnicity may be exerted through coercion and pressure to varying degrees (learning the Greek language and speaking it at home, making purchases from ethnic Greek stores, eating and cooking primarily Greek dishes, following Greek folklore, festivals and music, adopting Greek symbols and customs etc.). However, the traditional socialisation model according to which children are passive receivers of cultural transmission does not always apply: several studies have documented that family conflict caused by different levels of interest in preserving ethnic cultures between generations often leads second-generation immigrant children to resist ethnic identity formation (Waters, 1994).
In a community, group members identify themselves and make connections with a place in several ways. For instance, they form a strong bond with one another and to a place. Community is formed from the collective activities of people who dwell there, who shape the landscape through their cultural activities, and from the distinctive institutions, forms of organization and social relations within an area that is somehow bounded (Harvey, 1996, p. 310). For the traditional Greek culture with its strong familialistic orientation, the family provided the introductory vehicle for relationships, and through it the individual was socially located into the kinship system, the community, and the church. It was within the context of the family that young Greek children developed their sense of being, their self-identity. The traditional Greek family was viewed as a life-long system of emotional support and, if need be, of economic assistance. A strong cultural value inherent in this familialistic orientation was that of mutual aid within the family (Constantakos, 1993, p. 8).

Experiencing return migration: some empirical evidence on the articulation of identity

An important contribution of the Greek-American historian Theodore Saloutos is his landmark study of repatriated Greek-Americans (1956), based on extensive fieldwork in both the United States and Greece. Convincingly he asserts “The experiences of Greek-Americans, as both immigrants and repatriates, brought humor, drama, tragedy, and success into their lives. To these people, nothing stood out more vividly than the emotional intensity with which the repatriates described what they had experienced” (Saloutos, 1956, p. 88), and through their stories Saloutos presents the multiplicity of problems, be they of a financial, professional, personal or social nature, that made their return to Greece both a “challenge” and an “adventure”. A sharp interplay between fortunes gained and misfortunes obtained is a clear illustration of this theme. The participants interviewed, about half a century ago, all representatives of the first generation of Greek immigrants, expressed intense disappointment and suffered unpleasant and disillusioning experiences upon return. According to Saloutos, they were subjected to family ordeals of having to provide financial aid to others and were rejected if they were not willing to comply with such demands. Saloutos records a series of complaints ranging from lack of facilities and conveniences to deceptive practices by locals; moreover they were outcast or ridiculed for dressing, speaking and behaving in a different manner. Some of the subheadings Saloutos gives for his nar-
ratives are indicative of returnees' feelings of despair and frustration in their native country, for instance, "I Left God's Country to Come to the Devil's" (Saloutos, 1956, p. 95). So, although many feasts and celebrations preceded the much-anticipated event of departure for Greece, with compatriots all gathered for the final farewell, it was indeed succeeded by much misery and turmoil in the native land.

Let me now turn to the evidence of the narratives of the seven Greek-American returnees whom I selected for detailed study in Athens in 2001, almost two generations after Saloutos' pioneering study. Key demographic and migration characteristics of these persons are summarised in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Year parents emigrated USA</th>
<th>Year of return</th>
<th>Age on return</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Living situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ilianna</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Astoria, NY</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>University student</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Homeowner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socrates</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>University student</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>With parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicoletta</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1988-89; 1994</td>
<td>14; 23</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Homeowner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panagiot</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>University student</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>With parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perelope</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>University student</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>With parents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In retrospect what is characteristically common among all participants in my study is the cross-sectional bonding of "home", of "return" and of the "self" through the experiencing of return migration, and subsequently the articulation of "place", "culture" and "identity" via this event. Almost schizophrenic, yet clearly articulated, the interchange between a temporary "home" in the country of birth (United States) and a permanent "home" in the country of their parents' origin (Greece) is for the second-generation return migrants a cognitive process of being. Here is an extract from Ioanna's testimony:

Ever since I can remember, I have always felt that home was a different place. Home was a temporary term. As first-generation Greek-Americans, my Greek-born parents succeeded in raising my brother and me with actually three identities. At home, we were Greek. At
school, we were American. In our social lives, we were Greek-Americans. What is my ethnic background you may ask? My response is: all of the above. We managed to maintain each successfully. I can say that now, after looking back and seeing that I was able to thrive in all of my identities. If there was one that would characterize me best now as an adult, I would say, I am Greek-American... Our American address was temporary, and so was my mind frame.

Ioanna decided to move to Greece right after graduation from university, but her family remained in the United States. She lived in Greece for three years and she was happy but missed her family. When she met her Greek husband they both realized that they had the same financial insecurities so they set off for a “new beginning” in the United States. Finally:

After taking the tremendous opportunity that the United States offered us at the time, we once again realized that we had to make a decision as to what we were to do, and where home would finally be...

Upon return once again to Greece she tells us:

I am here, and I am adjusting. Am I home? I don’t know. I don’t think I will ever know. I am happy with my decision, and I believe I have completed a cycle that my family had begun about 100 years ago. For me, I’m settled on Greek ground now. I am still waiting for my family. I hope to one day become a mother and shelter my children from the confusion that has been such a great part of my psyche. I do however hope to allow them to feel as though they have a choice like I had. I hope to teach them and help them understand that an identity as a home is always in constant change and that feeling like Homer is just fine.

This constant struggle between place and identity is also very much what Nicoletta means when she says:

Generally, I find my Greek self fighting the Greek-American self. What’s proper, what people will say? I returned to Greece in 1985–88 because it was the parents’ dream but my father could not adjust so we all went back. After my studies, I decided I had to give it another chance. So in 1994 I returned and could not leave. I consider myself Greek-American and finally know who and why I am the way I am. It takes time and thought but I have come to terms with it.

We find the same type of certainty in Panagiotis’ short-lasting dilemma, initially a brief sense of loss, but then confidence of being in the “right place”:

Although I was young I felt that I lost a lot of things, I felt that I lost my friends and that I lost America. Now if you ask me to go and live in
America I would answer definitely NO. I think that Greece is one of the most beautiful places in the world. This is one reason that I wouldn't go back because I am of the thought that we have one life and we should live it...

Penelope was clear about intentions right from the start, explaining that:

Moving back to Greece was in a way returning back to our (family) base. I could never fulfil the "identity" of being only American.

The process of identity formation through the realisation of "belongingness" actualised in return migration is the apex of the blending of these three distinct yet interconnected ideologies of home, return and self. Andreas realised that:

The fact that my parents sold everything and decided that it was time to move to Greece all changed my life. Although every beginning is hard, as the Greek saying goes, I learned to appreciate the environment as well as my people. All my life I had nowhere to look for my own people until I went to Greece. I took time to learn the language and viewed this culture as my own. I had a difficulty finding friends, but I knew I belonged. I got to know my roots and met elders, whom are treated differently in Greece than in the United States. They told me stories about my ancestors and history first on. I matured and gained self-respect, and even became responsible and realized who I was. I came to the conclusion that I am American, but I have Greek roots. Greece helped me realize this love for country, and I feel first that I am American and then Greek. Greece helped me acquire the knowledge necessary to progress. America will help me put that knowledge to use.

As the life stories flow so does the distinct imaging and imagining of home, which is a flow of concrete conceptual processes. The disorientation of positionality figures prominently in all the narratives and it is only when the agenda of place is actualised in return migration that this leads to the construction of a hybridised identity. The identity of second-generation return migrants is a provisional one, contested and constructed through the human geography of "placeness" or what they perceive as being actually "homeness" and belongingness. This is not an identity devoid of all meaning. They have questioned the spatial dislocation of their identity, they have sought answers to their own ontological and existential tribulations and with an anti-essentialist alternative plan have finally negotiated and translated their identity. Through their transient lives the symbolic geographies of the homeplace materialise in the context of the cultural geographies of the return-place, and their fluid and fragile identities form a new geography.
one that is constitutive of belonging and place. As the term geography etymologically suggests, they are literally writing their own world. The narrative of return is not simply a locational occasion, not a stasis but an occurrence of praxis that embodies being: the “who I am” in the “where I am”. The hyphenated experience becomes a living and lived space where identity is constructed; defying logic, the “who we are” is at times in two places at once, seemingly marginal, outside and within place, it generates this new geography. There is a dialogic and dialectical relationship inextricably connected but not bound with personal and family histories. The returnees are “homeward unbound” because their “personal plan of action” allows them to literally move beyond the collective to the autonomous, the individual choice of return. This reflexive dimension of return is embedded with a sense of mind centred on a sense of belonging, but neither trapped in the rootedness of a static notion of home nor a fixed identity. It encapsulates praxis, which overrides traditional conceptions of individuals as members of the insulated fixities of particular social and cultural fields. This emphasis on the dynamic and shifting qualities of identity formation is in line with the search for the modern self “as inextricably tied to fluidity of movement across time and space” (Rapport and Dawson, 1998, p. 4). Or, in the words of bell hooks, “home is no longer just one place. It is locations. Home is that place which enables and promotes varied and ever-changing perspectives, a place where one discovers new ways of seeing reality, frontiers of difference. One confronts and accepts dispersal and fragmentation as part of the constructions of a new world order that reveals more fully where we are, who we can become...” (Hooks, 1991, p. 148).

Narrating the self and narrating the national: the lived experience of return migrants

If there is one thing, actually two, to be learned from the development of ethnic and migration research, it is that there is no single definition of such concepts as ethnicity and identity; and furthermore that their complex, multi-faceted nature requires analytic tools from a multiplicity of disciplines that incorporate a diversity of constructs, views and assumptions that cross, intersect and override disciplinary boundaries.

The conceptualisation of “Greekness” as an absolutely fixed organic and homogenous entity that is articulated through the Greek ethnos, the Greek State and Greek Orthodoxy as one unit has been questioned as particularly problematic (Abatzopoulos, 1997; Frangoudaki and Dragonas, 1997). A rejection of essentialist approaches to identity has given way to new perspectives in understanding both the
“self” and the “other”: identity may be influenced by heritage and origin but it is not determined by space or biology. As we try to locate our own personal landscapes we realise that we are also part of other people’s landscapes. These ongoing processes are never complete and fixed, they are fluid and interactive. Current literature shows us that we construct, invent, translate and negotiate our identities within a multiplicity of shared roles.

Undoubtedly recent global migration trends and the transformation of Greece from a sending to a receiving country have served as a turning point in re-evaluating what constitutes “Greekness”. It is encouraging to observe that at least some researchers are indeed investigating the ways in which the presence of immigrants (often perceived by the public as massive and threatening in many ways) as foreigners within the Greek national territory has led to the re-definition of Greek national identity (Triandafyllidou, 2000). On the other hand we are also confronted with studies by scholars of the Greek diaspora who maintain that Greek-Americans and Greeks in other countries represent an ethno-religious cultural group with its own historical national identification, cultural and religious physiognomy. That is, Greek-Americans can be studied as an ethnic group with its own historical and socio-cultural dynamics, sense of peoplehood and ethnic consciousness (Kourvetaris, 1997). The Greek-American “experience”, migration and settlement process, are not a single event but rather a series of processes and interactions within a particular chronological, social, political, economic, historical and spatial context. Both Psomiades (1987) and Moskos (1999) suggest that this experience is better understood not primarily as part of a Hellenic diaspora but in the broad context of ethnic experience in the United States. Kourvetaris (1997) argues in turn that the Greek American experience cannot be understood if severed from its roots in modern Greek culture. Greek-American studies on ethnicity and identity can help identify contemporary applications of these concepts within the new context of globalisation and multiculturalism.

The articulation of home is signified both through its conceptualisation as physical space as well as a symbolic belonging to a space which includes symbols of social and cultural meaning. Home then is understood as a new context, which encompasses those meanings that define, develop, modify and produce our sense of belonging. Decorations and food, symbolic images and practices that nourish the soul of the ethnic group members and alleviate some of the nostalgic cravings of “home” are common. Ideologies of “home” in the Greek-American case are consistent and they tend to differ only slightly from family to family. The perception of the country of origin as “home” is highly in-
tense for all Greek-Americans, with the spatial variation of a closer bond to one’s village or region of birth or parental extraction. Most Greek-Americans express and implement the desire to purchase a house or land in Greece, sometimes in addition to the old family house or cottage. Most times it is one and the same. Dilapidated ruins of houses turn into modern villas even in the remotest of areas. “I don’t want to leave my bones here” (referring to the United States), “I want to visit my parents’ grave and be buried there where the soil is sweet”, is a frequent refrain among first-generation Greek immigrants in the United States. It is important to note, however, that their children (second generation) and subsequently their children (third generation) may possibly feel like strangers in the ancestral homeland; for them it is, in a sense, a new type of migration. As Takeyuki Tsuda writes of “returning” Japanese-Brazilians, there is “the sense in which the ‘return migration’ of second and third generation diasporic descendants to the ancestral country of ethnic origin can be a search for a homeland abroad. However, since the ethnic homeland has only been imagined from afar, return migration can challenge and disrupt their previous feelings of nostalgic affiliation toward it” (Tsuda, 2000, p. 6).

Here, then, we are confronted by two opposing facts. On the one hand absence from one’s ethnic homeland produces a strong feeling of nostalgic longing and identification and therefore leads to the rediscovery and reaffirmation of the conceptualisation of a “homeland”. On the other hand, when return migrants are marginalised and socially alienated as foreigners in their ethnic homeland, this constitutes a painful ethnic rejection in one’s homeland and therefore leads to estrangement from it. What is important to point out is that in both cases there is a common denominator, which is the negotiation process of cultural belonging to a homeland and consequently the negotiation of a hybrid identity that will to a degree dominate. What is crucial in the case of Greek-Americans is to investigate how they concretely establish a dual and hybridised identity. For them, movement has provoked a multiplicity of alterations and transformations in terms of identity and belonging.

It seems to me that a conscious plan of action is devised and implemented by Greek return migrants which enables them to overcome barriers of resettlement and to successfully move from one cultural context to another without becoming disoriented or estranged from their ethnic environment. This constitutes a learning process that enables them to navigate through a two-fold cultural landscape; it gives them the flexibility and freedom to “customise”, to personalise, in a sense, their belonging; and it makes them masters (and mistresses) of their destiny who accept, reject and adjust whatever is necessary in or-
order to complete the ethnic portrait. Returnee narratives and participant observation support the argument about the "personal plan of action" described above and evidence the notion of a conscious process of readjusting, reacculturating and reassimilating into their own "home" culture after living in a different culture. Some of the quoted interviewee statements eloquently capture the spirit of this process, which may involve the case of double return, as with Ioanna and Nicoletta. In both cases the returnees not only left the United States – their country of birth, education, employment and residence – but also decided to do so for a second time, despite leaving behind their immediate family (parents, brothers, sisters), their extended family and friends, their material possessions and their careers. It is also interesting to observe that in both cases their initial return to Greece was the same, a period of three years, and their stay in the United States around five years. Another "double returnee" is Andreas, who also consciously made his final decision of return to Greece after a counter-migratory experience in between without his family. They all asserted that "when arriving in Greece there is always a feeling of going home, the feeling of peace, the kind of peace one feels only after arriving home, that unique sense of comfort and relaxation".

*Constructing, contesting and negotiating the "place" of identity: the ambiguity of spatial context*

Several recent studies have demonstrated that many ethnic groups exhibit a strong degree of solidarity even under deterritorialised circumstances. This has been presented by Zelinsky and Lee (1998) as an alternative model of the socio-spatial behaviour of immigrant ethnic communities – "hetero-localism". These types of aspatial ethnic communities are a reflection of those non-spatial communities that are not limited by geography, as in the case with virtual communities and the Internet. In addition, we are confronted with a new emerging literature on transnationalism and migration. Although this theme is very intriguing, it is not within the scope of this article to discuss transnational practices. What concerns us at this point are how place is perceived by return migrants, and how "their" particular landscape is constructed, reconstructed, and possibly contested, to fit their particular life narratives.

Relph (1976) devotes an entire chapter "On the identity of place" in his book *Place and Placelessness*. In noting how fundamental the notion of identity is in everyday life, he looks at both individual and community images of place, presents a typology of identities of places, and elaborates on the development and maintenance of identities of places.
His basic premise coincides with the focus of this paper. "Identity is founded both in the individual person or object and in the culture to which they belong. It is not static and unchangeable, but varies as circumstances and attitudes change; and it is not uniform and undifferentiated, but has several components and forms". Relph goes on to emphasise a vital point of reference, namely that "it is not just the identity of a place that is important, but also the identity that a person or group has with that place, in particular whether they are experiencing it as an insider or as an outsider" (1976, p. 45). The images of identities of places are reconciled with the identity of the subject itself, in our case the migrant, the returnee. The images of places are constructed and reconstructed during the processes of social interaction and symbolic representation of culture in the context of a bipolar relationship between the host country and the home country and the struggle to define their meaning and representation. Images of places are defined through the use of common languages, symbols, and experiences (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). And identities of places become meaningful through the interaction of what Gurvitch (1971, p. xiv) refers to as the three opposing poles of the I, the Other, and the We, exemplified at the stage of "secondary socialisation", that of group attitudes, interests, and experiences (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, pp. 163–173). This is precisely what Relph posits as the distinctive element in individual perception of place: "Within one person the mixing of experience, emotion, memory, imagination, present situation, and intention can be so variable that he (sic) can see a particular place in several quite distinct ways. In fact for one person a place can have many different identities. How, or whether, such differences are reconciled is not clear, but it is possible that the relatively enduring and socially agreed upon features of a place are used as some form of reference point" (1976, p. 56).

In the same vein, Doreen Massey (1994) explains that "The identities of place are always unfixed, contested and multiple. And the particularity of any place is, in these terms, constructed not by placing boundaries around it and defining its identity through counterposition to the other which lies beyond, but ... through the specificity of the mix of links and interconnections to that 'beyond'. Places viewed this way are open and porous." (p. 5, italics in the original). Massey then brings us to a realisation central in this paper:

There is, then, an issue of whose identity we are referring to when we talk of a place called home and of the supports it may provide of stability, oneness and security. There are very different ways in which reference to place can be used in the constitution of the identity of an individual, but there is also another side to this question of the relation between place and identity. For while the notion of personal identity
has been problematised and rendered increasingly complex by recent
debates, the notion of place has remained relatively unexamined
(Massey, 1994, p. 167).

Ilianna's powerful realisation illuminates this point:

Once you assimilate to a new society, it is very difficult to com-
pletely strip yourself away from the place that you were living before.
You are never at home. I would always be in a state of confusion as to
where home was.

The same kind of confusion arising from a "hyphenated existence"
is what Ilianna admits to experiencing when she tells us:

Today I am trapped in a dual situation, as far as the Americans
concern I am a Greek, while as far as the Greeks concern I am a person
with strong American characteristics. I guess this is what makes me a
Greek-American. Being a Greek for me means my heritage, the land
where my grandfathers walked. It is always connected to my father's
dream to come back. Being an American at the same time, means mem-
ories from my childhood, the land that gave my family an opportunity to
achieve something, the key that enabled us to have a better life.

In the case of Socrates, the return experience is used as a critical
tool of personal empowerment:

I loved living in the States but I also love living in Greece. Per-
sonally I am still in a confusing state; I also went to the army (in
Greece) for six months because I was half American. I see from my own
eyes many Greek Americans complaining, for example my family here
sometimes says why we moved back and so on. For me it is a privilege
to have two identities because it opens my mind almost about every-
thing, I have experienced things in two different views.

In her written journal Penelope poses an important question to
herself and highlights the core of her answer in a parallel relationship
between "inheriting" and "knowing":

But how is your ethnic identity really constructed? Is it based only
on your perception, or is it affected by the way of living? My ethnic
background is basically Greek, mixed with American folkways. Look-
ing back to the history of my family, I would have to say that knowl-
dge has been an indispensible factor, of inheriting other ways of living.
I inherited the history of my forefathers, but I came to know the his-
tory of America too. For America I feel gratefulness, for the quality of
life, that offered to my grandparents, when they needed it. Being
Greek does not oblige me, in no way, to forsake the pledge of Allegiance
to the flag of the United States of America.
The experience of belonging, of being members of a collectivity, emerges as a guiding theme in all the narratives, made up of socio-cultural constructs that fit each particular geographical context. There is no static notion of home, no fixed identity. The ideologies of home, return and self are reconstructed by the returnees themselves into geographies of place, culture and identity.

The ambivalent decision: revamping the voyage of return

“This issue of what constitutes Greek identity remains unresolved even today”, Kourvetaris asserts (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987, p. 4). But do we really need to “resolve” or declare what “Greekness” is? Perhaps we have to move “beyond the Greek Paradox”, to borrow the words of Tsoukalis (1997); only then can we extrapolate from a context of transition, and at times rupture, the meanings that empower but also fragment identities. In his essay, “The Ends of Migration”, Nikos Papastergiadis (1998) examines the relationship between the experience of migration and the forms of representation that are utilised to make sense of the self in a foreign place. In addressing these fundamental questions he puts forward a revealing framework:

The radical transformations of modernity have fundamentally altered the form and representation of identity. The social and the personal are always intertwined. Migration often accentuates the complexity of this relationship. Physical bonds might be severed but symbolic links and cultural values persist within the memories and adaptive practices of migrants (Papastergiadis, 1998, p. 171).

Diasporic imaginations extend beyond geographic boundaries into a cultural journey which rises above spatial belongings and precise formulations of place. As we have seen, the return journey of Greek-Americans involves the construction of identifications involving and revolving around concepts of home and a bond with notions of solidarity, warmth and security that family and family relations generously offer. Although dominant themes in the returnees’ narratives, home and family are simultaneously the distinct stimuli that empower the articulation of this strategic plan to return and negotiate this hybridised identity. For the second-generation migrants, this illuminating transformation that takes place brings a compelling juxtaposition of country of origin and country of return to the decision-making process. Interestingly, the country of birth becomes the country of sojourn and the country of (ancestral) origin becomes the country of return. It may seem ironic that the country of birth and initial permanent residence is
transformed into the lived experience of migration for the second generation, and the country of parental extraction is decisively the chosen country of return in search of a homeland settlement. But, by constructing and articulating ideologies of home, culture and place, these migrants and subsequently returnees are able to transcend cultural and geographic boundaries; they demonstrate that identity may perhaps be fluid but that it also solidifies when agents choose to do so. As their identity is constructed, reconstructed, translated, invented and reinvented, the journey approaches its destination for these restless travellers, a destination that is perhaps an amalgamation of both “hope” and “despair” (Ghosh, 2000).

In trying, however, to speculate about the possible future tendencies of return migration, we are confronted by many dilemmas, many blurred concepts and many puzzling questions. Thomas Faist tells us that:

Regarding return migration, it is likely that each type of migration has a differential impact on the propensity to go back to the country of origin, depending on whether it be permanent migration, recurrent migration or temporary migration. These types of movement involve widely differing levels of commitment on the part of the mover to origin and destination... In the case of permanent migration, we would expect that ties and linkages, of both material and symbolic nature, gradually decline as time passes. In the second generation we would expect these ties to the communities and countries of origin to be less prevalent than among first generation. Yet, it is an open question for empirical investigation whether facilitated means of transportation and exchange of information and goods could prolong the period in which strong and symbolic social ties are maintained to the country of origin (1997, pp. 267–268).

Contrary to what Faist seems to expect, the empirical evidence discussed in this paper shows that second-generation ties to the Greek homeland are maintained, and moreover that they are strong. The symbolic transformed into real cannot be overlooked when individuals of this generation make conscious decisions to return to their parents’ country of origin. Some counter-migrate and then go back again but they still consciously construct their sense of identity and sense of place above and beyond the imagined or the parental imaginary. Peter Murphy begins his analysis of nationalism by using the maxim “no one can have two countries”, in attempting to present the norms that dual or multiple geopolitical identities are impermissible, and that geopolitical allegiance must be to a “land” (1998, p. 369). We have demonstrated that there is danger in seeing place and identity as something static, monolithic, essential and solid. Multidimensionality and multiplicity, fluidity and change, are vital aspects of critical geographic think-
ing. Return migrants tell us that they can have two countries and that they do feel allegiance to more than one land. Their return, a planned process of identity search, is still an unfolding process and possibly will be for some time to come. Whether in a context of hope or despair, what they have realised is important for them and what is demonstrated through their narratives is the fact that they have decided this process; whether contingent, necessary or selective ties to people and place have stimulated their plan, it is their plan. Their life histories are the seemingly complex interwoven cycles and waves of their personal landscape, the one they carry with them in any patria they journey to. May they always have safe trips and pleasant memories.

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Summary

This paper is concerned with issues of identity, place and belongingness in narratives of return migration. It is based on the oral testimonies and written narratives of second-generation Greek American return migrants who have moved to Greece, their parents’ country of origin. An important consideration in the analysis is the multiple interactions between place of origin and place of destination, network ties and global forces. The paper aims at understanding how these elements influence and shape return migrant behaviour and in particular to enlighten our understanding of return migration as a process that encompasses the combined notion of “place” and “identity” as the outcome of a continuous search for “home” and what this means. The objective is to examine not only the experience of return per se but primarily the meanings attached to this experience. Through this the article aims to develop a clearer understanding of the concepts of identity and place and how these internalisations are articulated in praxis. One of the challenges of this research is to reveal the extent to which returnees’ actions are reflective of conscious manifestations of individuals’ identity, their self-sense and their positionality of place, real and imagined.
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“Repatriates” or “refugees” and other vexed questions: the resettlement of Pontian Greeks from the former Soviet Union in Greece and the politics of policy discourse

Introduction

Over the past decade Greece has received a large number of Soviet Greek migrants¹ who left the successor states of the Soviet Union to settle in Greece, the country most of them had always considered to be their “historical homeland”. The vast majority of these migrants are Pontian Greeks, that is they originate from the region on the southern shores of the Black Sea (northeast Turkey) which is known in Greece as the historical “Pontos”.² From this initial region of origin comes the label “Pontii” (Pontians), which the host population of Greece uses to identify these co-ethnic migrants. Apart from this label, which is asso-

¹ According to a census conducted by the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace in March 1999, 134,701 ethnic Greeks settled in Greece between the late 1980s and the late 1990s. However, other sources (for example policy-makers I talked with in 1999 and 2000) suggest that the number of the newcomers is larger and amounts to around 200,000 people.

² This means that their ancestors or they themselves left Pontos (in several flows and under various political circumstances) to settle in areas of the Russian Empire or later the Soviet Union. In different historical periods, the region that Greeks have called Pontos did not constitute one and the same political or administrative unit. Although the term “Pontos” (or “historical Pontos”) is historically and politically arbitrary, it is usually used by scholars to describe a coastal region with a chain of Hellenic colonies (founded from the 8th century BC onwards) spreading from the area around Sinope (in present-day Turkey) in the east, to the ancient Colchis (in present-day Georgia) in the west. The region that Greeks call “historical Pontos” had also been inhabited by Armenians, Jews, Turks, Kurds, Laz, Georgians and people of other ethnicities. After the compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey decided in 1923, Pontos was evacuated of most of its Greek inhabitants.
associated with the newcomers’ region of origin before migrating to the Soviet Union, another ascription which is employed by the Greek state and many of its functionaries to describe the newcomers is that of the “repatriate”. Thus, the migration of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union to Greece in the 1990s is officially called “repatriation”, a term which is, however, controversial and has been widely challenged by representatives of the newcomers as well as by some politicians and policy-makers.

In an effort to facilitate and organise the “repatriation” of the newcomers from the former Soviet Union as well as to serve particular national policy goals concerning the area of Thrace in north-east Greece, the Greek government founded a special organisation to aid the resettlement of those “repatriates” who would be willing to settle permanently in the region of Thrace. Thus, in 1991 the National Foundation for the Reception and Resettlement of Repatriated Ethnic Greeks (in Greek policy circles known as the Eiyapoe or simply “The Foundation”) started functioning. The Foundation’s policy-makers put into practice a resettlement programme which would eventually provide the incorporated migrants with permanent housing in a village or city in Thrace.

The Eiyapoe provided temporary and permanent housing to a considerable number of migrants and also helped the first years of the newcomers’ stay by providing them with grants and benefits. However, as the Foundation faced financial and managerial problems in the course of time, the construction of permanent houses was seriously delayed. Thus, according to data I was given by the Foundation in December 1998, seven years after its creation (when according to its initial proclamations all incorporated migrants should have been permanently resettled), the Foundation had allocated permanent houses to only 21% of the migrants who were following its programme. Due to the Foundation’s inability to complete the housing scheme it had planned, and because the resettlement and rehabilitation of the “repatriates” was still seen by many as a pressing and multifarious issue to be dealt with by the government, in February 2000 the Greek parliament passed a law (law 2790/2000) which provided for measures for the self-settlement of “repatriates” in different areas of Greece and not only in Thrace.

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3 Thrace, bordering Turkey to the east and Bulgaria to the north, is one of the less developed areas of Greece and a region which most politicians and policy-makers consider to be “ethnically sensitive”, because of its geographical position and its mixed population (around one third of the population of Thrace are Muslims). The Greek state decided to implement this particular resettlement programme in Thrace to boost the development of the region and to increase the area’s Orthodox Christian population.
In January 2000 (nearly a decade after the first arrivals of ethnic Greeks that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union), in the discussion over the above-mentioned law in the Greek parliament, the issue of the "appropriate" label for the newcomers was once again brought to the fore by certain politicians who argued that the newcomers should be called "refugees" and not "repatriates". Why were ascriptions (in this case from the point of view of politicians, in other cases from that of representatives of Pontian associations and policy-makers) judged to be important? Is policy discourse important in the lives of the categorised? Before proceeding to answer these questions, let us briefly analyse the significance of policy discourse and its relation with power.

The importance of policy discourse

The production of policy discourse is one of the fundamental practices of policy. On the one hand, this is because policy discourses shape, delineate, justify, oppose or subvert the performance of other policy practices (practices belonging to the broader sphere of policy implementation). Thus, for example, policy discourses relate closely to such practices as legislation concerning policy issues, establishment of policy institutions, and implementation of policy regulations. But policy discourses also impact on people’s lives in other ways. They shape the identities of the people the policy is addressed to, by attaching labels to them and by making classifications.

Considering the case of policy towards migrants, policy discourse prescribes how the migrants should be treated by the state or by non-governmental agencies and often determines the migrants’ entitlement to benefits, their rights and obligations in the host country. But it does more than that. Through naming and classifying, policy discourse often influences the ways the classified perceive themselves and the ways they are perceived by others. It impacts on their identities in multiple ways. In an interesting paper about applying the label “refugee” to Greek-Cypriots who fled their homes in North Cyprus after the

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4 By "policy discourse" I mean the stating of policy and the exchange and interpretation of policy ideas and proposals within a policy-planning and making framework. In other words, "policy discourse" will be used to denote the ways in which policy-makers and other people involved in the policy-planning process (for example, presidents of Pontian associations) think and speak about policy issues. "Policy discourse" will also include "policy rhetoric", the latter indicating a discourse whose purpose is to influence and persuade the audience about its soundness. For anthropological and other analyses of policy discourse, see Athorpe and Des Gasper (1996), Grillo and Stirrat (1997), Shore and Wright (1997). For theoretical approaches to rhetoric see Burke (1969), Foss et al. (1991).
Turkish invasion of 1974, Zetter (1991) shows how labels often assume conflicting meanings for both labelled and labellers, and how they influence the formation of policy and the labelled group’s identity. According to Zetter’s analysis, the name “refugee”, which was initially a bureaucratic label relevant to the issue of donations and entitlements, became an often disturbing identity for the displaced, who, however, manipulated it when trying to exert their influence on policy. Thus the Greek-Cypriot refugees in Cyprus chose to maintain the label of the refugee (although they often felt stigmatised by it) and refused to accept property titles in the South, in order to be able to claim rights to repatriation in the North.

Policy discourses are multiple and fluid, often competitive and contradictory. Some discourses are “hegemonic”, in the sense that they prevail and express the dominant view.5 Juxtaposed to these are the less authoritative discourses, or what Foucault (1980, p. 82) would call “subjugated knowledges”. These less authoritative policy discourses and the ways the “objects” of policy talk about policy discourses are certainly worth equal attention on the researcher’s part. They express the perceptions, wishes and often the intentions of the people the policy is addressed to and of policy-planners who try to influence or change the policy line that is already followed. Furthermore, what may now be “weak”, subjugated discourses are very important for one more reason: they are potentially subversive of currently “hegemonic” discourses and policy practices.

In this paper6 I deal with “hegemonic” policy discourses about the Pontian migrants, but also with opposing, or less authoritative discourses (e.g. by representatives of Pontian repatriates’ associations, by politicians and policy-makers who disagree with the policy line followed, or by the migrants themselves).7 The discussion of the two contested labels (“repatriates”, “refugees”) and the views of different ac-

5 The term “hegemonic” is used here in Gramsci’s (1971) sense to denote the political and ideological supremacy of certain discourses over others. For an analysis of the term “hegemony” and its use and usefulness in the anthropology of practice in a particular Greek context see Cowan (1990). For a discussion on the relation between language and power see, for example, Fairclough (1989), Parkin (1984).

6 This paper has grown out of my DPhil thesis submitted to the University of Sussex (Keramida, 2001). The thesis was based on eleven months’ fieldwork (between June 1998 and May 1999), mainly in the Thracian town of Sapes, where I investigated the interplay between migration policy-making and migration experiences by focusing on the resettlement experiences of Pontian migrants from the former Soviet Union.

7 Of course, the generally less “authoritative” discourses which I do not call “hegemonic” because they are not widely used and accepted in an official policy framework, may be authoritative and “hegemonic” in another context, e.g. in the context of certain newcomers’ associations.
tors, as well as the presentation of other policy discourses concerning the Pontian newcomers, will show that policy discourse is a political activity, and as such it is associated with power. Policy discourse has thus the potential to form social relations and realities.

"Repatriates" or "refugees"

"This building has become a cultural centre for local Pontians and refugee Pontians".

"We are the only (local Pontian) association that has a direct contact with the repatriates" (Extracts from a document of the cultural association of Pontians of Komotini, 9 June 1998).

"We have to deal with a refugee issue and we must be effective".

"At the same time we provide full medical care for the Greeks here, that is for the repatriates" (Extracts from a press conference by Grigoris Niotis, Alternate Foreign Minister, 17 December 1999).

"This is an effort to deal with the problems of repatriated ethnic Greek (omogenis) refugees who came to Greece for economic or political reasons after the collapse of the Soviet Union" (George Papandreou, Foreign Minister, Press Conference, 17 December 1999).

"The problem (of Greeks from the former Soviet Union) is a refugee problem" (Vlassis Agtzidis, speech made at the first organisational meeting of the Council of Hellenes Abroad, Thessaloniki, 29 November–8 December 1995).

"The government has presented a housing scheme for the new refugees (neoprosfyges), whom it insists on calling 'repatriates'" (Newspaper Antifonitis, Komotini, 31 August 2000).

"...for the rehabilitation of ethnic Greek (omogenis) repatriated refugees" (Newspaper Imerisia, 29 June 1998).

"The EIIAPOE co-ordinates all kinds of state help towards the ethnic Greek (omogenis) repatriates from countries of the former Eastern Europe" (EIIAPOE 1996, p. 18).

The above sentences (in all cases the emphasis is mine) include labels and characterisations concerning the Greek migrants from the former Soviet Union that one can find in the press, in anthropological and historical literature, in EIIAPOE official documents, or in Pontian associations' letters, declarations and other documents. In various texts, from various sources, Greek migrants from the former Soviet Union are labelled "Pontians", "Pontian Greeks", "Soviet Greeks", "ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union", "ethnic Greeks (omogenis)", "repatriates", "refugees", "new refugees" (in contrast to the "old refugees", 235
the Asia Minor refugees of the 1920s) and sometimes “Russo-Pontians” (especially in newspaper articles where one or more Pontians are alleged or proven to have engaged in a delinquent or illegal action). Often, several of the above names can be found in the same text, or even in the same sentence (for example, “the repatriated ethnic Greek refugees”). In the press especially, the use of one label or the other is not usually explained and different labels and characterisations may be employed alternatively in the same article.

Among the plethora of labels imposed on the newcomers or chosen by themselves as self-ascription, I shall focus on the distinction between “repatriates” and “refugees”, since, as I have already explained, the use of one of these terms instead of the other has often been a point of controversy and has raised interesting arguments by its respective advocates. Furthermore, as we shall see later, this distinction is closely related to policy decisions and may have important consequences for the lives of the newcomers, since generally different legislation applies to people classed in each of these two categories.

Notes on the “repatriates” label

The EYIAPOE, which contains the word “repatriates” (παλιννοστοιντες) in its title, usually employs this word in its documents to refer to ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union (the characterisation “ethnic Greeks” is also frequently used, often in conjunction with the term “repatriates”, as in the phrase “the repatriated ethnic Greeks”). The word “repatriates” is also found in other (not EYIAPOE) policy documents, especially those of government-related bodies (for example documents and leaflets of the General Secretariat of the Greeks Abroad, which is a department of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs). One of the main reasons why the term “repatriates” was officially chosen by the government to describe the migration of Soviet Greeks to Greece in the 1990s was that this term, apart from its symbolic meaning and ideological connotations which will be discussed later on, carried with it a series of rights and obligations and was linked with particular legislative measures.

8 Although the term “refugee” is not encountered in EYIAPOE documents, it has, however, often been used in talks by EYIAPOE officials or even in speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (see fifth quote above).

9 Agtzidis (1997, p. 625) mentions that the use of the term “repatriates” became dominant in policy documents after the foundation of the EYIAPOE. Until then, he notes, the word “refugee” was often found in public documents.
"Repatriation" status, meaning in practice the possession of a "repatriation" visa, was the basic precondition for entering the Foundation's programme and for being accorded the special rights of a "repatriate". In order to acquire this visa before coming to Greece (as was usually the case before the opening of two "repatriation" offices in Greece and before a new law was passed in February 2000), one had to apply to the Greek Consulate in Moscow (or to one of the other Greek consulates in the former Soviet Union that were founded after 1995) and give proof of Greek ethnic origin. The "repatriation" visa was thus an official confirmation of someone's Greekness and was a prerequisite not only for being incorporated into the EITAPOE's programme and being able to enjoy the beneficial legislative measures passed especially for the "repatriates", but also for obtaining Greek citizenship. This seemed to play an important role in the Greek state's choice of the term "repatriates" instead of the term "refugees", since "refugees" do not usually have either the rights of a citizen or an ethnic affinity with the land where they settle.

Let us now turn from the legal connotations of the term "repatriate" to the etymological and sociological—anthropological meanings of the word and see two justifications for the Greek state's preference for the term "repatriates" that are found in the literature.

In Greek the verb "pallinosto" (to repatriate) is a compound one, formed from the adverb "pall" (again) and the verb "nosto" (to return to the homeland). The derivative nouns of the verb nosto, "nostos" and "pallinostis", both mean the return to one's country. In sociological and anthropological studies, the term "repatriation" has usually been employed to describe the home-coming of economic migrants (such as Greek labour migrants from Germany) or the return of temporarily displaced refugees to their homeland. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term acquired one more meaning in the agendas of international policy and subsequently in the literature of the social sciences. As Voutira (1998a, pp. 78-79) has noted, it was adopted to describe the "voluntary repatriation of co-nationals living as national minorities in territories of eastern Europe to their 'historical homelands'". So, as in the case of "repatriating" ethnic Greeks, the migration of ethnic Germans and Jews from the former Soviet Union to Germany and Israel respectively was perceived by the host states as a "repatriation" and

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10 If the applicant or one of the parents or grandparents were registered as Greeks in the Greek Consulate's records, Greekness was indisputable. Thus Greekness was a matter of descent, of jus sanguinis (principle of blood). For the Greek law of nationality and citizenship and the special provisions for Pontian Greeks see Papasiopi-Pasia (1994).
was based on the right to return. As Voutira argues (1998a, p. 81), the choice of the word “repatriation” to describe such movements was politically important since the term “was seen as a sufficiently innocuous one after a long period of considering anyone leaving the communist countries as a legitimate refugee in need of asylum” – as someone fleeing from “totalitarianism” to “freedom”. This view is shared by Kokkinos (1991, p. 312), but he justifies the Greek state’s use of the term by also providing another reason, that of the ethnic affinity between locals and newcomers: “the ideological and ethnic links they (the repatriates) share with Greece as their national homeland”.

Notes on the “refugees” label

The characterisation of migrants from the former Soviet Union as “refugees” or “new refugees” (neoprosfyges) is mainly by representatives of local Pontian associations (i.e., representatives of the Pontian refugees of the 1920s and their descendants), and by some representatives of newcomers’ associations (though many of the latter are called “repatriate” associations and some of them also use the term “repatriates” in their documents). In the interviews I had with EYAPPOE officials, they never considered the term “refugee” to be appropriate and this term is usually only found in EYAPPOE documents in order to be refuted.

As we shall see later, the two terms “refugee” and “new refugee” are used by representatives of Pontian associations to denote a similarity between the newcomers and the Asia Minor refugees of the 1920s in terms of origins and entitlement to rights in the host country. However, the use of the word “refugee” in the case of both influxes of people (that of the 1920s and that of the 1990s) sounds paradoxical if one considers the status of “refugee” as defined by the contemporary International Refugee Law.

One of the most popular international definitions of the term “refugee” derives from the UN Geneva Convention of 1951. According to this Convention (which Greece accepted and signed in 1959), a refugee is someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality”.  

11 In her book about the migration of Russian Jews to Israel, Siegel (1998, p. xviii) states that “repatriation” was the concept around which “the whole industry of returning Jews to their home was developed” and that organisations in Israel developed special strategies for persuading Russian Jews to repatriate. Siegel also mentions that in Israel the word “repatriation” is employed both by Israeli officials and new immigrants.

12 The term “nationality” is used here in the sense of “citizenship”.

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and is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. This Geneva Convention of 1951 and its supplementary New York Protocol of 1967 provide the core definition on which member states of the European Union base their policies concerning refugees.\footnote{But see Nobel (1988) for a critique of the limitations of the concept of refugee as prescribed in the Geneva Convention.}

According to the above definition, refugees are outside of their country of nationality. And, as the exclusion clause of the Geneva definition prescribes, the status of “refugee” does not apply to persons who are recognised by the competent authorities in their country of residence as having the rights and obligations of nationals (Nobel, 1988, p. 24).\footnote{UNHCR’s recognition of someone as a refugee is based on the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the supplementary Protocol of 1967. Thus, ethnic Greeks could not, by definition, be considered by UNHCR as refugees.} The Greek Asia Minor refugees of the 1920s and the recently arrived Greek migrants from the former Soviet Union were always considered to be co-ethnics and thus, by definition, not outside their national homeland when in Greece. As a result of their ethnic origin, Pontian Greeks from the former Soviet Union enjoy Greek citizenship and full citizenship rights soon after their arrival in the country. As far as the refugees of the 1920s are concerned, the label “refugees” did not mean they did not have the rights and obligations of nationals. They too acquired Greek citizenship upon arrival. Voutira (1997, p. 119) explains that “in the case of the exchanged Greek populations of the 1920s, the term ‘refugee’ has primarily economic currency, largely referring to the international assistance programme rather than to the newcomers’ stateless or alien status”.

**Discourses of supporters of the “repatriates” label**

The use of the term “repatriates” in the Foundation’s title and in its documents and public discourse, was often both contested (outside the EYAPOE) and supported (inside the EYAPOE). The EYAPOE’s officials’ justifications of why this term should be and was actually preferred to the term “refugee” were many and often based on different grounds. The following extracts present the views of EYAPOE officials. The first one comes from a talk given by the then Director of the EYAPOE’s Repatriates’ Programme in 1996, in Komotini, in the context of a series of public lectures.\footnote{The lectures, under the general title “Greek refugees from the Soviet Union: problems of integration”, were organised by the Democritus University of Thrace and the Municipality of Komotini.} He began his talk thus:
Extract 1

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would firstly like to make it clear that the Greeks that arrived, or if you wish returned, from the countries of the former Soviet Union are not, and are not (officially) characterised as refugees, but as repatriates. Because it is known that a refugee is a person forced, against his will, to leave his homeland for national, religious or political reasons in order to find rescue and protection in a neighbouring country. Repatriation, on the other hand, is an action of personal choice and results from a person’s consideration of the perspectives he has in the country he resides. Wars, internal conflicts, civil unrest, or economic crisis in the country one lives in, are factors determining repatriation, which takes place when there is a country considered by repatriates to be their first homeland.

The second, third and fourth extracts are the views of the EIYAPOE’s legal advisor (he has held this post since the creation of the Foundation). The first of these (extract 2) comes from his legally very informative book entitled The Legal Status of the Repatriates (Argyros, 1996). The other two (extracts 3 and 4) are from an interview that I had with him in 1999.

Extract 2

The Greek state characterises the ethnic Greeks from the countries of Eastern Europe who resorted to Greece as “repatriates” and not as refugees. This is obviously because the state considered that the term refugee applies to persons who are protected by the clauses of the international Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967 about the status of refugees. [...] The repatriation of a co-national relates to his judgement about the prospects he has in the country he resides, while his return to Greece is decided on his own initiative and not always under threatening or life-threatening conditions (Argyros, 1996, pp. 18–19).

Extract 3

Why did the EIYAPOE use the word “repatriates” in its title?
First of all, the Foundation did not use its own term. The (Greek) state gave this characterisation. It was not the Foundation’s business to get involved in characterising these people.

But why was this particular term employed?
This is the way the law defines the ethnic Greeks who repatriate. It means that it (the law) considers that their base is here. This is, let’s say, a transcendental term which is clearly defined by the law-maker. He defined it, he is the boss. I believe that the reason why he did it was that no other term could be more appropriate and because this characterisation corresponded to reality. This was the reality then. Of course politics can change reality, but that was what he ought to write at that particular time.
Extract 4

The term “refugee” is not appropriate in this case. There is no connection with 1922 here. There is neither a historical connection, nor an analogy in terms of conditions. And there is no analogy prescribed by the legal order. Because it is the legal order which decides upon the use of terms. You are not allowed to say “I am a refugee” and demand what the Convention on refugees provides. Besides, a refugee, according to the International Convention, is someone who leaves temporarily in order to return.

All of the above justifications of the use of the term “repatriates” are based on legal, or interpretations of legal, definitions. The Geneva Convention is mentioned indirectly in extract 1 and directly in extract 2. In extract 1 “repatriation” is initially considered to be an action of personal choice, while later on the speaker admits that this choice can be determined by external factors, such as war, civil unrest and economic crisis. It is interesting that the speaker in extract 1 began his speech by emphasising why the use of the term “repatriate” was the correct one. He did so probably because the whole series of lectures was entitled “Greek refugees from the former Soviet Union”, and he felt obliged to project and justify the EIYAPOE’s view on the subject of terms.

In extract 2, the EIYAPOE’s legal advisor sees the “refugee” definition of the Geneva Convention as the obvious reason why the government chose a different term. As far as the term “repatriation” is concerned, he gives a rather contradictory definition. On the one hand he holds that people “repatriate” on their own initiative, while on the other he notes that repatriation is sometimes decided under life-threatening conditions, so therefore it is not necessarily voluntary.

In extract 3, the Foundation’s legal advisor characterises “repatriation” as a “transcendental” term. One could take this characterisation to mean that the term “repatriate” is in this case a bureaucratic sophism, a term applied in a case where no other term is judged to be appropriate. And since as he admits “politics can change reality”, he seems to imply that the choice of term was a matter of politics. He also mentions that by using this term the state considers that “their (the migrants’) base is here”. So, it is their right to return and the state’s right to consider them as repatriates, as members of the Greek nation who previously lived outside the borders of the state.

In extract 4, the legal advisor follows a different reasoning and justifies the EIYAPOE’s use of the term “repatriate” by talking about the inappropriateness of the term “refugee”. But this time he does not refer to the unsuitability of the term for migrants from the former Soviet Union with regard to the Geneva Convention definition. He bases his argument on a comparison with the “refugee situation” in 1922. As we
shall see, this argument is connected with the demands and claims of some of those who support the use of the term “refugee” for newcomers from the former Soviet Union. By pointing to the incomparability of the two situations (that of the 1920s and that of the 1990s) he legitimates the potential use of the alternative term (that of the “refugee”).

Although throughout his interview the official defends the use of the term “repatriates” in one way or another, he admitted at one point that this term is “somehow wrong”, since “repatriation means that I have lived here, I go away and then return”. At this point in the interview he gave the following example to reinforce that particular argument: “the original side of repatriation is that of the Greek labour workers in Germany, who go there to work and then return”.

In an interview I had in Athens with the former director of the EYAPPOE Reception Centre in Piraeus, a different stance on the issue emerged. I asked him whether he considered the use of the term “repatriate” appropriate. His view was that the Foundation was right in using this term. But his justification was based on different criteria, not common in the views expressed by other EYAPPOE officials. Although, as he put it, most of these migrants were economic refugees, it would be emotionally very difficult for him to call them “refugees”. He said that he had met many people, young and old, who made him feel that they were repatriates, in the sense that they were “people who felt they had returned to their homeland”. Unlike the views examined in the four extracts above, this former EYAPPOE official viewed the issue of labeling and naming from the side of the feelings and “ethnic consciousness” (as he himself perceived it) of those labelled.

Outside the EYAPPOE, other people involved in policy-making concerning the Pontians held similar opinions to the ones described above. However, it is worth mentioning here a partly different view of an employee in the Region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, who was actively involved in the Region’s policy-planning for the Pontians. His opinion was that the term “repatriation” conveys “the particular characteristic of the deficiency of this group, because at this particular moment these people are at a disadvantage”. In this way he implied that the term “repatriates” denoted the dependency of the newcomers on the assistance of agencies and organisations. But, as he later added, the term “repatriates” also recognises the Greek origin of the Pontian newcomers, whereas the term “refugee” is a broader one, which does not acknowledge ethnic affinity.

Let us briefly go over the main points made so far. One could say that in the “hegemonic” context of contemporary Greek policy-planning and making, supporters of the term “repatriates” in the case of Greek migrants from the former Soviet Union usually base their argument for its employment on two main reasons. The first one is that it assumes an
ethnic affinity of these migrants with the host country (while the term "refugee" usually denotes alienation). In this line of reasoning, the fact that they "repatriate" means that Greece has always been their "homeland". The supporters of this view consider the newcomers to be part of the Greek nation (this does not mean that supporters of the term "refugee" do not) and bolster the idea of a national identity based on notions of historical continuity and common origins (in the sense of ethnic and "racial" affiliation). These components of the Greek identity (common origins, historical continuity) are mirrored at the constitutional level, since the "repatriates" have the same rights and obligations as every Greek citizen. Therefore, according to the reasoning of most people supporting the "repatriates" label, these migrants from the former Soviet Union should be and are officially labelled in a way that distinguishes them from other (non-ethnic Greek) migrants. Thus, behind the choice of term also lies a system of evaluation: "Our Pontian brothers", as politicians and others often call the newcomers, deserve and should be eligible for special state assistance and preferential treatment in relation to other, non-Greek, immigrants.

The second reason why supporters of the term "repatriates" find it suitable for the newcomers is that they do not think the alternative term ("refugee") is adequate. They usually base this argument on the definition of "refugee" by the Geneva Convention or on the inconsistency between the "refugee situation" in the 1920s and the contemporary arrivals of migrants from the former Soviet Union. Thus, they answer the arguments of the opposite side (discussed next) and disclaim the demands and ideological reasoning of those who support the use of the "refugee" label.

Usually, policy-planners who supported the use of the term "repatriates" favoured the state policy in relation to the issue of "repatriation". Even if they did not approve of all policies followed by the EYAPOE or by a particular government, their views were usually mirroring a dominant discourse which saw the state and its institutions as exclusively responsible for attaching labels and determining all aspects of any policy line.

However, the fact that migrants from the former Soviet Union were officially considered co-nationals and "repatriates" did not affect the local society’s stance toward them. In Sapes, where I conducted my fieldwork, the locals usually viewed language and cultural practices (and not official labelling) as the main determinants of belonging to an "ethnic community". This was relevant because most Pontian Greeks conserved cultural practices and languages (Russian, Turkish, Armenian etc.) derived from their diasporic experience – see Keramida (2001) for more on this.

This was not always the case for journalists who wrote articles about the "repatriates" or about the problems of the "repatriates". In the press and the media in
Discourses of supporters of the “refugee” label

The “repatriates” label was largely challenged by some presidents of associations of the newcomers from the former Soviet Union as well as by representatives of local Pontian associations and other people involved in policy-planning and implementation concerning the Pontians (usually people who disapproved of the EYAPOE policy). The terms that were judged instead to be appropriate were “refugee” or “new refugee” (neoprosygyas). Favouring these terms and opposing the “repatriates” label often carried with it a specific ideological stance on the identity of the newcomers and the state’s obligations towards them. A newspaper article (Margaritidou, 1998) reveals one of the main arguments of people favouring the use of the characterisation “refugees” for the Greek migrants from the former Soviet Union, according to which their designation as “refugees” will “open up the way for their rural and urban rehabilitation”.

What could this statement mean? The view of Christophoros Sofianidis, president of Argo (an association of Pontians from the former Soviet Union in Athens), will shed light on this particular type of reasoning. In an interview I had with him, he talked about the effects that the use of the term would have on the resettlement of the Pontians. He also based his preference for the term “refugees” on the “historical inaccuracy” of the term “repatriates”, which he characterised as “misleading”, “bad”, “inaccurate” and “untrue”. His view is worth quoting in extenso as it sums up the main arguments put forward by many representatives of Pontian associations against the term “repatriates” and for the term “refugee”:

The neoprosygyes were baptised “repatriates” so that particular purposes could be served. Firstly, with the use of this term (repatriates) there was a distortion of the historical truth, since these people had never lived in Greece. If repatriation was to occur, we should go to Pontos and not come to Greece. Some people didn’t want to reveal that a part of the population that came here had no direct relation to Greece. Secondly, the term “neoprosygyes” or “prosygyes” was not used because there was no political will on the part of the Greek state to solve the problem. It did not want to make over the whole of the available grants to this population, instead it wanted to channel these elsewhere. If the term “refugees” had been used, the state would have to follow the inter-

general, a dominant label was often adopted (and alternatively used with other labels, that of the refugee included) without necessarily expressing the ideological background of those who had created it or of those who argumentatively supported it. And certainly, the use of the term “repatriates” by newcomers’ associations did not, as we shall see, mean that they were content with the Greek state or that they did not oppose EYAPOE policy.
national conventions for the rights of refugees. Thirdly, according to the Lausanne Treaty the exchanged property the Muslims left behind should be allotted to the refugees from Pontos and Asia Minor. If the name “refugees” was used for the newcomers from the former Soviet Union, they would be entitled to obtain part of this property.

A short background note about Christophoros Sofianidis’ life and his activity as Argo’s president is a necessary introduction before proceeding to comment on his views expressed above. Christophoros came to Greece from Kazakhstan when he was 14 years old. He finished his secondary education and then studied and graduated from the National Technical University of Athens. When we met in 1999, he had been living in Athens for 23 years, was working as a civil engineer and was a councillor at the Municipality of Kallithea. In 1986 he was one of the founders of the Pontian Association Argo. The association has been very active, having organised a large number of meetings, cultural events and public discussions concerning the history of Pontos. Christophoros Sofianidis is very well aware of the history of Pontian Hellenism and, as he points out, “The association lays stress on how the Pontian identity will be preserved and on how the Pontians will keep their cultural traits.” In various parts of the interview I had with him he expressed his disappointment at the Greek state which “had always tried to eradicate the Pontian identity and assimilate the Pontian population”.

I now turn back to the cited extract. Argo’s president sees the term “repatriation” to be violating the “historical truth”. He believes that to repatriate would mean to go back to Pontos, and in this way he distances himself from the view supported by many EYPAOE officials that the Pontians’ “base” is the Greek state. He sees the Pontians’ relation to Greece as an “indirect” one and considers that the homeland of their ancestors is the region of Pontos. This particular point was a rather “elite” and “Pontian-centred” argument for the inaccurate use of the term “repatriation”, in the sense that it was expressed by someone who had for many years been deeply involved in issues concerning the Pontians, and who was very well informed about Pontian history and had adopted a separatist – vis-à-vis Greece – Pontian ideology.

I now pass on to a second issue raised in Christophoros Sofianidis’ discourse. In his view, the Pontian newcomers should have been named “refugees”, not because of the conditions under which they fled their homes in the former Soviet Union, but because their ancestors were

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18 Presidents of newcomers’ associations in Thrace to whom I talked (associations founded in the 1990s), did not usually express concern about the continuity of the Pontian identity. The problem of lack of permanent housing and jobs prevailed in their discourse: see Keramida (2001).
obliged to leave Pontos as refugees in the 1920s to settle in areas of the Soviet Union. Labelling them “refugees” in this sense (refugees from Turkey via the former Soviet Union), would make them eligible (according to the Lausanne Treaty) to receive what remained of the exchanged property (abandoned Muslim lots that were left to the Greek state for the rehabilitation of refugees). The president of Argo held that one of the main reasons why the Greek state did not use the label “refugees” was that it “wanted to sustain the policy of keeping the remaining exchanged property for its own purposes and not distributing it to the ones entitled to it”.

The same view about the rights of Pontians from the former Soviet Union to the exchanged property was expressed in a 1986 essay (before the existence of the EIVAPOE, by the then parliamentary deputy (of Pontian origin) Isaac Lavrentidis. Lavrentidis (1986) argued that under the Lausanne Treaty “refugees from Russia (the term he uses to denote the Soviet Union) are entitled to rehabilitation”, since they are legal beneficiaries of the exchanged property. Lavrentidis bases his view on Article 3 of the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations which reads: “Those Greeks and Moslems who have already, and since the 18th October, 1912, left the territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which are to be respectively exchanged, shall be considered as included in the exchange provided for in Article 1.” The same Convention (which was part of the Lausanne Treaty) provided for the compensation of refugees in Article 14: “The emigrant shall in principle be entitled to receive in the country to which he emigrates, as representing the sums due to him, property of a value equal to and of the same nature as that which he has left behind.” In his essay, Lavrentidis claims that the Pontians who left Pontos after 1912 “to find refuge in Russia and now come to Greece from Russia” are included in the populations described by the Treaty of Lausanne. But the answer he received to a petition he sent to the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1983, requesting the allotment of land in the area of

19 In August 1998, Christophoros Sofianidis sent a petition to the Ministry of Finance enquiring about the value and size of the exchanged property that the Greek state still owned. The answer he got from the Ministry was that this information could not be given to him, because of a relevant decision of the Minister of Finance. The petition and the Ministry’s answer are published in the newspaper Omonia, 24 December 1998. In a discussion in the Greek Parliament concerning the passage of a Bill about the “repatriates” from the former Soviet Union, a deputy of the opposition claimed that the exchanged property consisted of about 20,000 plots of land in 28 prefectures of the country. This land, he claimed, had been encroached on by people with no claims and the government should take the necessary measures to give back the land to its beneficiaries, that is the newcomers from the former Soviet Union.
Menidi (in Athens) for the “housing rehabilitation of refugees from Russia”, was negative. It said that according to a Greek legislative decree, “the refugees would only be entitled to help concerning their housing rehabilitation if they had arrived in Greece before 1934” (Lavrentidis, 1986, p. 55). The author (p. 56) holds that this restrictive decree should not be applied to Pontians from the former Soviet Union, since “the Pontian Greeks in Russia were there under a certain regime which did not allow them to come to Greece”. Therefore they were not able to exert their right to rehabilitation in Greece and the law should take that into consideration.

Several people involved in policy-making and implementation in relation to the Pontian newcomers held similar opinions to the ones presented above, while others argued that the Pontian migrants should be called “refugees” because of the conditions under which most of them left their homes in the former Soviet Union. For example, the General Secretary of the General Secretariat for Repatriates of the Ministry of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, in a discussion I had with him in June 1999 in Thessaloniki, claimed that most of these people could be characterised as refugees since they were obliged to leave their homes because of civil wars or collapsing economies. Thus, leaving their homes was a matter of survival; they did not, as he put it, leave because of nostalgia for their homeland.

In January 2000, in a discussion in the Greek Parliament concerning the passage of a Bill about the “rehabilitation of ethnic Greek repatriates from the former Soviet Union”, deputies of different political parties used (exclusively or alternatively) the terms “refugees”, “new refugees”, “repatriates”, “ethnic Greeks” without discussing or arguing for their particular choice. The only exceptions were a deputy of the opposition, an independent deputy and a deputy of the governing party. The deputy of the opposition, who was the first to raise the issue in the specific discussion, argued strongly in favour of the “refugee” label and demanded that the title of the Bill be changed, because “these people are indigenous Greeks in the areas where they were born and left these areas because of the conditions that came up in the course of time, one of which was the socialist experiment”. And then he gave a definition of the term “repatriate”, which as he put it, applies to “someone who inside the span of the previous 100 years had lived in Greece, left it and then returned to Greece again”. The independent deputy, who spoke much later, declared he was not going to vote for a Bill which regarded the refugees as repatriates (he did not, however, clarify the meaning of each term). Later on, a deputy of the governing party spoke in favour of the Bill, but admitted that the opposition’s criticism of the term “repatriates” was correct, and suggested that the term be changed to “refugees”
throughout the proposed Bill. Finally, the Bill was passed and no alteration was made with regard to the use of the term “repatriates”.

So far, three main types of argument in support of the “refugee” label have been expressed by various actors in the policy framework concerning the Pontian newcomers. According to the first type, they are not “repatriates” because they are descendants of refugees of the 1920s and have in a way inherited the refugee status. The second line of argumentation holds that they are not “repatriates” because to “repatriate” would mean to go back to Pontos, and the third argument is that they are refugees because of the conditions under which they left their homes in the former Soviet Union. Let us now turn to the newcomers themselves and see how some representatives of the “repatriate” associations in Thrace felt about the issue, and what the stance was of migrants in the particular town where I did detailed fieldwork, Sapes.

Newcomers’ views on the “repatriate”, “refugee” labels

In a very interesting paper on the long-term consequences of the Lausanne Treaty, Voutira (1998b) argues that in contemporary Greece the term “refugee” has come to be considered a term of honour. This is because the Asia Minor refugees are remembered as a national benefit, since their contribution to the Greek economy and culture is now widely acknowledged by Greek society. In the same paper, Voutira holds that the newcomers from the former Soviet Union prefer the term “refugee” as a self-ascription to their official labelling as “repatriates”. Voutira mentions that the majority of the newcomers’ associations favoured the use of the term “refugee” and that many of these associations requested the renaming of the National Foundation for the Reception and Resettlement of Repatriated Greeks to “The National Foundation for Refugee Resettlement”. Voutira correctly notes that for many Pontian newcomers’ associations, the term “repatriate” is seen as a term promoting the interests of the Greek state. This was evident in most of the discourses of supporters of the “refugee” label that were presented in the previous part of the paper.

I would like to argue that the Pontian migrants’ choice of the word “refugee” as a self-ascriptive term is not always based on specific ideological background and not always related to particular claims or to a certain stance towards the state and its policies. And it is important to note that this is not the only self-ascription used. Using a term is often a matter of following the dominant terminology or the local discourse without always being aware of the possibly “hidden meanings” behind it. In Thrace, for example, nearly all the associations of the Pontians
from the former Soviet Union bore the word “repatriates” and not the word “refugees” in their title. One of the very active newcomers’ associations in Komotini (which strongly opposed ELYAPOE policy) was named “The Repatriates’ Voice”. When I asked the president of this association if she thought that the term “repatriates” represented the newcomers, she responded: “This is what we are now. Legally, we are not refugees.” I then asked her if she felt she was a “repatriate” or a “refugee” and her answer was: “I don’t feel like a refugee because I came on my own initiative, nobody forced me to leave. But if we consider the right meaning of the word ‘repatriate’, we are repatriates, since we are returning to our historical homeland.” Later on, she commented that their characterisation as refugees would have made their rehabilitation easier, since she believed that the European Union would have given the state a bigger grant for their resettlement. The president of the Sapes association of the Pontians from the former Soviet Union also argued that he certainly did not consider himself to be a refugee, because it was his choice to come to Greece. In our conversations, however, he often used the term “refugees” to refer to the Greek migrants from the former Soviet Union. The president of the Union of Pontian Associations of Thrace, in our discussion in Alexandroupoli, argued that the majority of the migrants from the former Soviet Union were refugees because of the conditions under which they left their homes. Thus, he concluded, this would be the correct term to use. However, he always used the term “repatriates” in the association’s documents. When I asked him why this was, he responded: “Initially, some state officials employed the term, and as things went, we also used it”.

As far as the Pontian migrants of Sapes were concerned, asking them which of the two terms (repatriates or refugees) they thought was the right one was often a puzzling question. The word “repatriates” (palinnostountes) often sounded strange and though most of them knew its meaning it was not very easy for them to pronounce. It was largely connected with the ELYAPOE, so they would often answer “this is what the Foundation calls us”. On the other hand, the word “refugees” was used by the local population of Sapes to describe the newcomers (prosyges, Rossoprosyges) and was largely adopted by the migrants themselves. But there were also many migrants who used neither of these labels (repatriate, refugee) as ways of self-definition.

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20 According to the list of associations of Greeks from the former Soviet Union, compiled and given to me by the Secretariat for Repatriated Greeks (Ministry of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace) in June 1999, the majority of the newcomers’ associations all over Greece bore the term “repatriates” in their title. Specifically, of the 73 associations on the list, 50 were named “repatriates” associations, 10 were labelled “refugee” associations, while 13 bore neither of these two terms in their titles.
This is what many of them claimed: "We don't say we are repatriates, we don't say we are refugees. We are just Pontians".

Several migrants found "refugeeness" offensive, a way for locals to pity the newcomers. These people, if asked "are you a refugee?", would strongly declare that they were not, that their life back home was much better than life in Greece and that it was their choice to come. Many migrants, however, even the ones who would deny their refugee status if asked, would often use the term "refugee" as a self-ascription. In some cases this was just because they had adopted the locals' term, in other cases it seemed to be done in order to provoke the listener's compassion or to complain about EYAPOE policy or about not having a permanent house. An example of this is the phrase: "We don't have a house, we are refugees, but they (from the EYAPOE) don't care a bit about us".

Most of the Pontian newcomers in Sapes (and I suspect in other areas of Greece as well), did not share the "collective" memory of the earlier wave of Asia Minor refugees as a national asset. Thus, they did not feel honoured to be called "refugees"; they did not feel the pride that could possibly result from the sharing of such a remembrance. However, local Pontian associations and associations of Pontians from the former Soviet Union that had been functioning for quite a long time (like the Argo association in Athens), often worked in the direction of instilling a Pontian identity in the newcomers by informing them about Pontian history and about their ancestors' past. This enculturation could, eventually, result in the newcomers' adopting a different perspective in relation to the attributes of the "Pontian identity" and to "refugeehood".

Pontians from the former Soviet Union in EYAPOE discourses: a national asset or a national problem?

In many of the discourses of politicians and EYAPOE officials concerning the benefits of the arrival and settlement of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union in Thrace, the newcomers were called "our Pontian brothers" and were presented as a national asset, as a benefit for the development and consolidation of the region of Thrace and Greece in general. In a Parliamentary Committee's report to the Greek Parliament, in February 1992, it was stated that "the development of the crucial border regions of the country, and especially of those in our eastern borders, is a matter of national survival". According to the report, this was mainly because these regions were seriously lagging behind in development in comparison with other regions and because they were "the target of external threat", coming from the
country's eastern neighbour (Turkey). In addition to the other measures that the committee proposed for the development of Thrace and the islands of the East Aegean, it also suggested that the attempts to resettle populations in these areas should be further supported if the demographic problems of these areas were to be resolved and the Greek state's development goals accomplished. The view that the ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union could be the human resources for such a policy was also shared by representatives of local Pontian associations and was often adopted and reinforced by the newcomers themselves.

However, soon after the resettlement of ethnic Greeks from the former Soviet Union in Thrace took place, there were also policy discourses which stressed the "problems" of this resettlement, problems that were often attributed to the characteristics of the newcomers. Thus, in the course of nearly a decade of the EYAPOE's functioning, the inadequacies of its programme and its inability (often admitted by the officials themselves) to cope with major problems that the "repatriates" faced, were often credited by EYAPOE policy-makers to special attributes of the migrants. This was a way in which certain EYAPOE officials justified the programme's failures and projected the migrants' dependency on the Foundation as necessary and inevitable.

To give an example, in an introductory paper included in a collection of data published by the EYAPOE's Data Processing Department in 1992, the Managing Director of the EYAPOE in 1991 wrote:

The linguistic inadequacy, which is the major factor of someone's marginality, is one of the main problems that should be dealt with first. The same goes too for the ignorance of the structures of the new society in which they are called to assimilate, and of the society's values and centres of decision-making and assistance. It is not strange, for example, that most of them cannot conceive of, or have created myths about their personal rights in a Western society. All of these can be summarised in the phrase "enculturation clash", which best describes what a repatriate feels as someone who comes from an Eastern, Oriental society of the 19th century, to a Mediterranean micro-capitalist society of the 20th century in the West. This person is inherently problematic. If he is not trained at an early stage, if he is not helped in his integration, he will bear – without this being his fault – his past as a burden which he will lay down on his new country (EYAPOE, 1992).

In the same paper, the author also referred to the necessity of a vocational retraining that the Pontian migrants should attend in order to be able to meet "Western standards". In this way he constructed an im-

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age of the newcomers which presupposed a particular treatment. Let us look more closely at the above extract.

The EITYAPOE’s Managing Director declares that this group is marginal because of its members’ inability to speak good Greek, but mainly because of the fact that they come from a non-Western society. As a result, he holds that they do not know much about the “centres of decision-making and assistance”. Thus, as he implies, they cannot fully understand and easily follow the EITYAPOE programme, either because they ask too much (“they have created myths about their personal rights”) or because they cannot grasp the meaning of the concept “personal rights” (“most of them cannot conceive of personal rights … in a Western society”). His view about their “ignorance” and “obsolete” ways of thinking is emphasised when the EITYAPOE official notes that they come from “an Eastern, Oriental society of the 19th century”! So he concludes that because of their enculturation they are “inherently problematic” and thus special programmes should be put on for these people. In this way, the policy-maker legitimates the existence of the EITYAPOE programme and strengthens his view that the newcomers need “help in order to be integrated”. If help is not provided, the official is sure that they will cause problems to their new country, and then the state will be responsible for such a result.

After presenting the different stages of the EITYAPOE programme, the EITYAPOE’s Managing Director concludes the article in a very different, optimistic spirit. He writes:

...these Greeks, with their vigour and dynamism, will help strengthen the periphery, as well as contribute to the progress of the whole country. Greece has always gained from repatriation. So rich of experiences that her children return, after so much wandering, they know very well what the existence of Greece means to them (EITYAPOE, 1992).

Having talked about the EITYAPOE programme and the need for invigorating the “demographically weak”, to use his words, areas of the country, the EITYAPOE official wants to sound convinced that the state’s effort will bear fruit. However, the language he uses here to praise the newcomers seems rather contrived, and bearing in mind his earlier description of the Pontians, he is hardly convincing in his declared certainty that Greece will benefit from “repatriation”. Unless, that is, he considers the “vigour” and “dynamism” of the newcomers as the capacities which outbalance the “incompatible” lifestyle of the past. These could, according to his view, be changed by the proper integration programme.

In a public talk given by the director of the EITYAPOE’s Repatriates’ Programme in 1996, in Komotini, more generalisations and ste-
reotypes concerning the Pontians are put forward to justify the EIYAPOE’s difficulty in dealing with these people:

They are not aware of the concept of social services or they equate social services with material supplies and they need time before they trust the social workers and open up to them. This reticence and mistrust of theirs, leads the specialised staff to choose a very cautious psychological approach (EIYAPOE, 1996).

Indeed, the migrants I talked with in Sapes did not usually trust the social workers or any EIYAPOE officials. The migrants who lived in the reception settlement camp, especially, but also those who lived in rented houses, were very disappointed by the EIYAPOE’s failure to live up to the promise it had made to them upon or before arrival (to provide them with a permanent house after their completing six months of stay in a temporary settlement camp). So, their mistrust was due rather to the EIYAPOE’s unsatisfactory policy than to an inherent characteristic of the migrants, as the director of the Repatriates’ Programme implies.

A similarly patronising rhetoric emerges from the words of a high-ranking EIYAPOE official whom I interviewed at the Foundation’s headquarters in Athens in the summer of 1999. Having heard many rumours and read newspaper articles about the imminent closure of the EIYAPOE, I asked him how long the Foundation was going to be functioning. Here is his answer:

For the Foundation to exist, you need to have these 25,000 incorporated people to support. If you leave them on their own and you say that the next morning you are closing it down, if you give them property titles for their houses and say it’s all over, you are bound to create an internal problem in these areas. Because there are also other problems, religious, economic, social problems that have been created there. If the state says “I am not going to deal with you any more”, it would be the state’s right to say so, you will leave 25,000 people on the street. These people are in need of protection, in need of support. There has to be some kind of protection for them.

22 The reception settlements and the rented houses were two of the stages of the EIYAPOE programme in which the migrants were temporarily settled before being allocated a permanent house.

23 Many migrants and representatives of their associations saw the functioning of the Foundation as problematic under the current circumstances and proposed other solutions for the rehabilitation of the newcomers. For example, many migrants claimed that the Foundation should cut down the excessive number of its employees (around 400 people) in order to use the money paid in salaries for the construction of houses and that they would accept a cessation of rent subsidies if they knew this money would be used for the construction of permanent housing for them.
As is evident from these words of the ELYAPOE official, the Foundation, for its own purposes, fostered the migrants’ continuous dependency on it. The Pontians still needed the “protection” of the Foundation, as the official put it. In a later part of the interview he held that even if the mandate for the resettlement of the Pontians passed to other agencies and bodies, the ELYAPOE should not stop functioning. ELYAPOE regulations perpetuated the migrants’ dependency on the Foundation. So, for example, even for those who had been allotted permanent houses, the policy of chrisidanio (leasehold) meant that the houses would remain ELYAPOE property for at least 15–20 years. Presidents of newcomers’ associations complained that ELYAPOE plots of land that were allotted to Pontians in the year 2000 for them to build their own houses, also remained the Foundation’s property.24

Why did the official think that 25,000 people (the total of those incorporated) would be left on the street if the ELYAPOE closed down? Obviously, those who lived in the reception settlements or in rented houses would be left without permanent housing, while, as he later explained, if the ELYAPOE closed down and the people in the permanent houses were given property titles, they would probably sell them and leave the region of Thrace (so they too would be “on the street”).25

Most ELYAPOE officials held that the Greek state was obliged to help the newcomers. One of the reasons they put forward was the Pontians’ special link with Greece; another was the need to reinforce and promote the development of certain regions of Greece. Some officials’ rhetoric of concern was associated with negative stereotypes about the newcomers and was sometimes put forward in order to justify the officials’ patronage. Particular assumed needs of the “repatriates” (for example, the need for “constant protection”) were thus projected in order to bolster a particular relationship between officials and migrants, a relationship in which the migrants were passive recipients of a policy “for” them. There were also some officials who on the one hand presented the migrants as needy and childish, while on the other emphatically claimed that “the Pontians should not expect it all from the Foundation”.

24 In a resolution of protest sent to the prime minister by the newcomers’ association of Zygos, the Pontians wrote: “The ELYAPOE deliberately keeps us under political hostage. It allot[s] plots of land just for use and calls us to build on them without explaining that the ownership of the land remains with the Greek state”. See the newspaper Antifonitis, 2 March 2000. This issue is, however, still unclear in ELYAPOE documents, where it is stated that at some point migrants will get property titles.

25 He based this view on the fact that many Pontians who were given houses in Komotini and Xanthi before the creation of the ELYAPOE let them out to others, tried to sell them, or finally left them and settled outside Thrace (mainly in Athens or Thessaloniki) where the prospects of finding a job were judged to be much higher.
However, there were also a few officials who were against the dependency of the migrants on the Foundation and who claimed that the EIYAPOE should stop practising a policy that deprived the migrants of autonomy. Such views were more frequently heard in the last few years, when the mistakes and failures of the Foundation's policy had come to be acknowledged by many of its officials. To give an example, in a journal that the EIYAPOE published one month after the voting of law 2790/2000 (an informative volume presenting the new legislative arrangements for the "repatriates"), the Foundation expressed its self-criticism, while at the same time extolling the new governmental policy in relation to "repatriation":

From the beginning, the most serious problem in the EIYAPOE's functioning was purely political. The philosophy of the rehabilitation programme created the impression that the repatriates could not express their opinion or play a role in the planning and materialisation of the rehabilitation programme. Thus, everything had to be done for them but without them. In other words, they had to wait passively until the day when the Foundation would allocate them a finished house. This logic had serious consequences, many of which damaged severely the credibility of the Foundation, but also of the state. In parallel, a very negative ambience was created among ethnic Greeks (i.e. the migrants), as they felt secluded and marginalised by an agency which was exclusively created for the promotion of their affairs.

The self-settlement logic and the incentive zones guaranteed a special acceptance to the programme [...]. In this way, the whole philosophy and policy of rehabilitation changed. The basic sources of the problems and misfortune that have for years troubled our fellow Greeks were wiped out and a road was opened for a dignified way out of stagnation. Self-settlement and self-employment were at last accepted by everyone.\textsuperscript{26}

The fact that this self-critical discourse – contrasting enormously with the discourses of EIYAPOE officials previously discussed – was expressed in the year 2000 in that particular journal, is telling: the above extract was written in an informational journal that was addressed to the newcomers from the former Soviet Union. Thus, the readership was special and limited. Moreover, this self-criticism was written at a time when a new law had already limited the Foundation's role in policy-making concerning the "repatriates". Nevertheless, in the extract, the policy-makers acknowledged the ineffectiveness of the EIYAPOE's "philosophy of rehabilitation", while at the same time they

\textsuperscript{26} See EIYAPOE: Nea Kolchida, vol. 1, pp. 18-19.
clearly supported the new governmental policy line. Here the policy-makers, addressing a readership consisting mainly of their "policy targets", put the blame for the programme's failures on their policies and not on the newcomers, something which is not found in EYAPOE public discourses of an earlier time when the programme was running normally and the officials felt they had to support it and justify its delays and inadequacies.

Conclusions

This paper has focused on some of the dominant policy discourses concerning the Pontian migrants, as well as on some of the less "authoritative" discourses of people involved or wishing to be involved in the policy-planning and making concerning the newcomers from the former Soviet Union. The rhetoric on the uses of the terms "repatriates" and "refugees" and the interpretations of these terms by those who supported or opposed them provided the main ground for the investigation of the politics of discourse. These two terms were also examined from the point of view of the migrants in Sapes.

Most of the supporters of the "repatriates" label were EYAPOE officials or other policy-makers, who usually favoured an interventionist state policy promoting particular "national interests". Supporters of the "repatriates" label either justified their preference for the term by arguing that it denoted the ethnic bond and affinity between hosts and newcomers, or by referring to the inadequacy of the term "refugee".

Supporters of the "refugees" and "new refugees" labels were usually representatives of local or newcomers' Pontian associations trying to find ways for the better resettlement of the migrants. These people usually condemned EYAPOE policy and by pointing to the connection of the newcomers with the refugees of the 1920s claimed the right to a property owned by the Greek state. The term "repatriation" was often judged to be unsuitable on the grounds that it would actually mean a return to the region of Pontos. In this case, the ethnic bond with Greece was perceived as indirect and less important than the bond with a closer (in terms of traceable descent) homeland (Pontos). So, inside the wider national rhetoric which saw the Pontians as "repatriates", an "ethnic" rhetoric which emphasised their difference sometimes emerged. However, this was not always the case. As was discussed, migrants in Sapes either adopted and used the term "refugee" or perceived it as negative and disclaimed it, without either of the two meaning that they necessarily related the choice of terms to the ideological background of a particular policy. Furthermore, migrants in Sapes
never claimed they were due property compensation as refugees under
the Lausanne Treaty.

The last part of the paper focused on discourses of the EİYAPOE
which created particular images of the newcomers (images presenting
them as an undifferentiated whole in need of special support and guid-
ance). These discourses were often used to justify the Foundation’s fail-
ures and to project the migrants’ dependency on it as necessary and in-
evitable. Such discourses worked in parallel with regulations (such as
the one which allocated the permanent houses on leasehold) guarantee-
ing a relationship of dependency. Although the EİYAPOE did also ex-
press its self-criticism, this was done in a publication addressed to a spe-
cial readership, and only after the Foundation was left with a small role
to play in the policy-making concerning the newcomers from the former
Soviet Union. The examples presented in this paper have shown that
policy or policy-related discourse and rhetoric concerning the ethnic
Greek migrants from the former Soviet Union was flexible, and that de-
pending on the context, it projected images and notions of the newcom-
ers that suited the pursuit of particular interests at particular times.

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Summary

This paper aims to explore how different labels and discourses concerning the resettlement of Pontian Greeks from the former Soviet Union in Greece after 1990 are used by different actors in different situations and for different purposes. Firstly, it discusses two labels that are employed by Greek policy-makers and by representatives of Pontian associations to identify the newcomers from the former Soviet Union. The two contested labels in question are that of the "repatriate", the official term used by the Greek state and most policy-makers, and that of the "refugee", a term favoured by some representatives of Pontian associations. Then, drawing on ethnographic data collected through fieldwork in the region of Thrace (north-east Greece) where about 21,000 Pontian Greeks were resettled through the programme of a state-supported organisation, the paper explores the newcomers' views and perceptions on these two controversial labels. Finally, the discussion revolves around discourses of policy-makers involved in the Pontian resettlement in Thrace, in order to shed more light on the ways in which some of these policy discourses are used in the pursuit of particular interests and policies, usually through fostering and justifying a relationship of dependency between the Pontian migrants and the organisation that was set up to aid their resettlement.

Il volume di Ambrosini parte dalla considerazione che il flusso di migranti verso l'Italia è riconducibile non solo agli squilibri economici planetari, ma anche alle caratteristiche post-moderne della stessa società italiana. I posti di lavoro coperti dagli immigrati non interessano gli autoctoni non tanto per il livello di retribuzione o per la loro precarietà, quanto piuttosto per il basso prestigio sociale che conferiscono o per le sparse possibilità di crescita professionale. L'A. focalizza la sua attenzione sull’inserimento degli immigrati nel mondo del lavoro e ribadisce che “se anche fossimo in grado di arrestare gli attuali flussi migratori e di rimandare indietro gli immigrati che si sono stabiliti nel nostro paese, il sistema economico ne atrarrebbe degli altri. Con questo effetto inevitabile dello sviluppo dobbiamo ormai fare i conti” (p. 190).

L’indagine segue i percorsi di integrazione degli immigrati nella realtà economico italiana e mette in evidenza come il lavoro venga trovato soprattutto in virtù delle filiere migratorie e delle reti informali di solidarietà fra connazionali. Il che, se da una parte costituisce un modo pratico per gestire una realtà sostanzialmente difficile, dall’altra prefigura il pericolo di una scarsa mobilità sociale, dato che le reti nazionali di immigrati sono specializzate in precisi settori di occupazione (filippini nei servizi domestici, indiani nell’allevamento, etc.), quasi sempre a bassa retribuzione e posizione sociale.

Dall’analisi emerge inoltre che le istituzioni con cui gli immigrati vengono a contatto sono soprattutto quelle locali o del terzo settore (volontariato o cooperativismo sociale); questo fatto, se da un lato consente di rispondere alle urgenze pratiche, dall’altra rischia di costituire un alibi per le responsabilità delle istituzioni centrali, non direttamente coinvolte in un aspetto così scottante e urgente, anche agli occhi dell’opinione pubblica. L’A. mette poi in luce uno dei nodi del problema integrazione, ossia l’eccessiva difficoltà posta ai processi di naturalizzazione, ingiustificata, oltre che a livello economico, sul piano etico, dato che la cittadinanza fondata sullo *jus sanguinis* o la preclusione dei diritti politici a emigrati residenti da anni sul territorio nazionale contrastano di fatto con i principi liberali alla base della costituzione repubblicana. Negare il diritto di voto, anche solo
amministrativo, contrasta pure col semplice buon senso e si traduce in una spirale perversa: è difficile pensare che politici o amministratori si arrischino a varare misure in favore degli immigrati, anche se poi tornano a vantaggio degli stessi autoctoni, senza sentirsi sostenuti dal consenso degli elettori e con il pericolo di esporsi a smentalizzazioni avversarie.

Ambrosini enuncia, sulla sfera del suo studio sociologico, quello che gli italiani sanno, ma fanno fatica ad ammettere: ossia che i concetti di un lavoro e di una vita dignitosi oggi si declinano in modo molto diverso rispetto al passato, anche prossimo. Ma si sa che le rappresentazioni sociali sono abitudini resistenti al cambiamento, più degli stili materiali di vita. Ed infatti, mentre il saggio parla di un'integrazione economica degli immigrati sostanzialmente possibile e in molti casi riuscita, ripetutamente si fa cenno alla fatica di accettare gli stranieri nella società locale, anche a motivo di una retorica pubblica legata ad un'immagine obsoleta del paese Italia. Un'immagine che raffigura gli immigrati come un lusso che non ci si può permettere, mentre di fatto costituiscono una componente stabile del sistema socio-economico, da gestire non con le logiche dell'emanergenza, ma con gli strumenti della normale amministrazione. Questi strambismi sociali, come spesso è già capitato, portano a dover pagare prezzi esorbitanti per gestire quella che in fondo è la normalità.

Circa gli attributi fra culture che inevitabilmente sorgono in situazioni di forte immigrazione, Ambrosini ritiene che sia anzitutto opportuno considerare i migranti sotto il profilo umano, come persone con idee, progetti e aspirazioni, fortemente orientati, come le ricerche confermano, a integrarsi nel sistema locale e nazionale, condividendo una cultura che, pur rifuggendo dall'assimilazione, sanno apprezzare nei suoi aspetti positivi. Trattando del pluralismo delle culture e del relativismo culturale, posizione ormai largamente diffusa nella società occidentale, l'A. ritiene che non ci si debba abbandonare alla continua oscillazione tra la cupidissima dissoluzioni, di chi patisce di sensi di colpa, e l'arroganza di chi soffre di totalitarismo culturale. L'inevitabile meticoloso si svolgerà come un processo a doppio senso, certamente con i suoi costi e con le sue sofferenze, ma sarà un processo in cui la civiltà occidentale avrà ancora molto di valido da offrire. Fra i migranti queste sensibilità e attese non sembrano mancare, dato che, in molti casi, l'abbandono del proprio paese non è dipeso solo da aspettative economiche, ma anche dal riflusso di condizioni di vita, civili, sociali e culturali della terra di origine e dall'attrazione verso quella cultura dei diritti umani, complessivamente intesi, che caratterizza e deve sempre più contraddistinguere la convivenza nel paese di inserimento e di integrazione.

Ciro Mazzotta

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Rispondere alla domanda “che cos’è un conflitto?” si rivela un’impresa alquanto difficile, dal momento che il concetto di conflitto schiude una complessità di aspetti che, mentre connotano il fenomeno come uno tra gli eventi più naturali che l’esperienza umana si trova ad affrontare, al tempo stesso ne manifestano i caratteri “disumanizzanti” legati alla violenza, alla sofferenza e alla guerra. Intento degli autori è far luce all’interno di tale complessità ma, soprattutto, delineare un percorso che aiuti a guardare al conflitto e ai comportamenti che esso produce da nuove prospettive, in grado di trasformare i conflitti in occasioni costruttive di cambiamento. In altre parole, scopo del libro è quello di dimostrare che è possibile rispondere affermativamente alla domanda: “Può un conflitto essere risolto con la cooperazione?”, individuando tra conflitto e cooperazione un rapporto dialettico altamente produttivo, ma tenuto in scarsa considerazione in Italia.

In tale direzione, il testo offre un’analisi dei conflitti, rispondendo alla duplice esigenza di comprendere, a livello teorico, le dinamiche che ne sono alla base e che ne determinano l’esplosione, e di individuare, a livello pratico, le strategie attraverso cui è possibile trasformarli in opportunità costruttive.

La prima sezione del testo si articola in due parti. La prima si preoccupa di definire quali sono le strutture generali che si presentano in ogni conflitto, delineando gli elementi che rappresentano delle costanti nelle situazioni di divergenza. Tale analisi è condotta attraverso l’osservazione di comportamenti, di atteggiamenti soggettivi e attraverso la definizione dei bisogni umani fondamentali, che quasi sempre sono alla base di un conflitto. Ciò consente di costruire un modello generale delle dinamiche di azione, utile per delineare delle strategie di intervento. La seconda parte entra, invece, nel merito di ciò che differenzia un conflitto da un altro, definendo vari ambiti: l’ambito dei rapporti interpersonali e, dunque, i conflitti nella comunicazione; l’ambito dei rapporti tra gruppi e organizzazioni e, dunque, i conflitti all’interno di una comunità sociale; l’ambito dei rapporti tra sistema economico e società industriale e, dunque, i conflitti di classe e di interesse; l’ambito dei rapporti tra stato, nazione ed etnie e, dunque, i conflitti internazionali ed etnopolitici; l’ambito, infine, dei rapporti tra culture e subculture, che interessano i conflitti all’interno della società contemporanea multiculturale e globalizzata.

La seconda sezione del testo, di stampo più pragmatico, offre una panoramica delle strategie di intervento per affrontare e risolvere i conflitti con modalità alternative alla violenza e alla rottura e chiusura della comunicazione tra posizioni inconciliabili. In riferimento alle varie tipologie di conflitto, questa
parte analizza le azioni e le tecniche più appropriate a definire una cooperazione all’interno dei conflitti interpersonali e di gruppo, come la *mediazione* o il *negoziato*, e all’interno dei conflitti internazionali ed etnopolitici, come il *peacekeeping*, il *peacemaking* e il *peacebuilding*, nell’ottica della nonviolenza, sentita come la risposta più civile di un’umanità che, mai come oggi, sta prendendo coscienza di sé e che si ritrova a concordare con l’affermazione di J. Caltun, il maggiore teorico della pace, secondo il quale alla violenza “ci sono alternative”.

Il valore del testo risiede, oltre che nella sua linearità e chiarezza nell’esporre i complessi intrecci entro cui il tema del conflitto si sviluppa, soprattutto nel fatto che introduce nel contesto socio-culturale italiano una problematica che offre prospettive di ricerca del tutto inedite, finora affrontate prevalentemente a livello internazionale.

**ANNA MARIA PASSASEO**


L’opera comprende un insieme di saggi di diversi autori, i quali si interrogano sul rapporto tra la narrazione ed il concetto di nazione. Lo strumento comune adottato è quello della critica letteraria e dell’analisi del testo. La cornice antropologica che racchiude gli scritti, rappresentata sia dall’introduzione all’edizione italiana di M. Pandolfi che dall’introduzione e dal saggio conclusivo di H.K. Bhabha, testimoniano attuale forte interesse dell’antropologia culturale nei confronti della critica letteraria come strumento per mantenere quella che G.F. Marcus e M.J. Fischer definiscono una fondamentale promessa dell’antropologia: ossia la funzione critica, non tanto nei confronti dell’Altro, quanto nei confronti del “noi”. Proprio in risposta a questa esigenza critica, prende forma quello che M. Pandolfi ritiene essere il progetto politico del curatore: uno studio di linguaggio che rivelano le intenzioni di dominio dell’Occidente. Intenzioni che non possono non rimandare alla questione coloniale. Attraverso l’analisi dei testi di autori che vanno da E. Renan a V. Woolf, la nazione si rivela essere una costruzione, il frutto di un’elaborazione culturale, un “prodotto di scrittura”: essa nasce con la scelta (sempre e comunque politica perché di potere) di legittimarsi e consolidarsi attraverso una, e non altre, narrazioni di mitiche origini. La storia di una nazione è dunque frutto di omissioni e si rivela essere solo una delle tante storie possibili. Non più nazione e narrazione quindi, ma la nazione come narrazione. E se l’impossibilità di un linguaggio innocente, che prescinda da asimmetrie di rapporto e logiche di dominio è un dato ormai acquisito, emerge qualcosa di inaspettato: il discorso coloniale non potrà mai costringere al silenzio assoluto
l'oggetto del proprio dominio, presente in quanto ineludibile referente. Nuazione e narrazione, infatti, mostra come l'analisi del linguaggio sia uno strumento potente perché in grado di cogliere l'autorità culturale sul fatto, di sorprendere, come scrive H.K. Bhabha, "nel momento ancora incerto in cui compone la propria potente immagine" (p. 37). Il linguaggio rivela così la sua ambivalenza: strumento di forza del discorso ne smaschera però anche il carattere arbitrario. Attraverso questa ambiguità la minoranza sottesa può rivendicare la propria rappresentanza, divenendo così agente del cambiamento. M. Pandolfi sottolinea come "l'autorità del libro" si rovesci contro il potere coloniale: "Alla narcissistica e ingenua domanda del potere coloniale di imitazione, il colonizzato risponde con gli atti richiesti che diventeranno nella long durée contenitori di strategie implicite di sovversione" (p. 19). L'Alterità si insinua come un clandestino nel discorso coloniale, aprendosi la possibilità di conquistare nuovi spazi. Il saggio di James Snead, ad esempio, evidenzia molto chiaramente come la letteratura possa divenire per le minoranze un cavallero di Troia, una forma di resistenza ed un mezzo di rivendicazione della propria identità, mentre lo scritto di Sneja Gunew denuncia la negazione di queste identità attraverso l'imposizione di un canone letterario nazionale. Il paradosso è questo: l'ambiguità e l'ambivalenza proprie del linguaggio comportano un'impossibilità di controllo totale sui significati, i quali non sono immuni da "contami-nazioni". Questa ibridità, nasce tra le pieghe del discorso, è ciò che H.K. Bhabha definisce "terzo spazio", "luogo della sovversione" ma anche luogo del dialogo, della disseminazione e della rinegoziazione di nuovi centri di significato, poiché, in quanto "bifronte", il linguaggio consente il superamento della mera contrapposizione, rivolgendo la parola "ad Est e ad Ovest". Di qui l'ambiguità della nazione come narrazione che celebra e allo stesso tempo sovrasta. Essa è per l'Autore "una delle più importanti strutture di ambivalenza ideologica nell'ambito delle rappresentazioni culturali della modernità" (p. 37). I saggi raccolti in Nuazione e narrazione esplorano proprio "il margine di ambivalenza dello spazio nazione", le sue "frontiere culturali", i suoi limiti, le soglie di significato che devono essere "varcate, cancellate e tradotte nel processo di produzione culturale" (p. 38). Le frontiere, infatti, non esistono solo per dividere: esse sono zone di scambio, zone ibride, translocale, per usare un termine di M. Pandolfi, quindi trasgressive e sovravvie. Grazie all'articolarsi della differenza nel linguaggio, nella nazione e nella frontiera si apre uno spazio inter-nazionale. L'Alto può così rivelare la propria presenza in noi, nel nostro linguaggio, nelle nostre narrazioni, costringendoci ad una "prospettiva internazionale".

Proponendo un popolo omogeneo e in fusione con un territorio (ad esempio mediante la retorica descrittiva del paesaggio), la strategia narrativa della nazionalità punta l'accento

*Nazione e narrazione* contribuisce a sfatare il mito di una nazione monolitica abitata da un popolo omogeneo con una cultura omogenea. L’opera svela la “costruzione culturale della nazionalità come forma di affiliazione sociale e testuale” (p. 470), la natura di strategia narrativa e l’ambivalenza del linguaggio dell’appartenenza nazionale. Grazie all’allineanza simperica tra antropologia e critica letteraria, a conclusione ideale di un *excursus* tra le metafore letterarie della nazione e della nazionalità, la nazione stessa, in quanto narrazione di un narrato “già detto”, ovvero di un mito delle origini, si rivela essere una metafora che dà voce (per questo il migrante spesso tale, così come i popoli senza nazione non vengono ascoltati). Questo libro ricorda che la storia può svolgersi “fuori dal centro” ed invita ad una narrazione della nazione nella quale si articolino, in una traduzione culturale rispettosa dell’alterità, i diversi percorsi identitari, in una sempre ulteriore prospettiva translocale e transnazionale.

**Angela Roselli**

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Not o medioevalista, l’autore guarda alla storia dell’Europa e del suo rapporto con il mondo islamico come a un confron-to-scontro tra due mondi identificabili in strutture religiose e culturali proprie, giungendo alla conclusione che la “terza on-data islamica”, quella della nostra epoca, appare come un déjà vu, un altro tassello di questa controversa vicenda storica.

Per questa analisi, l’A. trova necessario precisare i termi-ni del discorso e del vocabolario, per poter smitizzare alcuni fat-ti storici diventati luoghi comuni mass mediali, artefici di stereo-tipi e malintesi. Infatti alcune derivazioni etimologiche per de-finire i seguaci di Maometto (Saraceni, Agareni) sono nate dalle relazioni belliche con l’Europa dell’Alto Medioevo, alla ricerca di nuovi cambiamenti e assetti politici. L’VIII e il IX secolo vedono schierati a diverse riprese, ma in modo continuo, due civiltà, arabo-musulmana e cristiana-europea, che, lungi dal’apparire monolitiche, occupano lo spazio geo-politico del bacino del Mediterraneo. Questi due secoli, tra i più duri della storia dell’Europa, vedono gli “Agareni” responsabili di questo scontro, alimentando la memoria e la tradizione epica europea con un’immagine che identifica nel musulmano la “sfida” alla quale le crociate si sarebbero incaricate di fornire una risposta. Nello sviluppo storico dei secoli successivi dei rapporti di forza tra le varie potenze europee e arabe, l’Autore nota che “la storia non solo si può, ma soprattutto si deve pensare al condizionale, con tutti i “se” e i “ma” possibili: solo così il peso degli avvenimenti effettivi si mostra in tutta la sua realtà” (p. 46), non solo sul piano dello scontro militare e di dominio territoriale ed economico, ma anche su quello letterario e culturale. Qui, infatti, le grandi culture mostrano la loro forza di rinnovamento interno, elaborando tematiche capaci di elevare lo smacco militare ad alto momento di martirio e l’insuccesso in uno spunto politico-propagandistico. Esempio e prototipo di questo modello letterario è la figura di Rolando e la rota di Roncisvalle, quale “momento canonico di una contesa lunga, secolare, nella prospet-tiva simbolica eterna, fra Cristianità e Islam: Rolando ne divenne il santo patrono laico, [...] il modello cristomimetico nella misura in cui la sua morte era stata una vera passio” (p. 70). Questo modello servirà dunque come canone interpretativo per l’inquadramento propagandistico contro i Saraceni nei secoli successivi. Figure emblematiche del cambiamento di atteggiamento dell’Occidente nei confronti dell’Islam e del permanere di questa dinamica nei tempi lunghi sono Maometto e Salade-no. Il primo, considerato nelle leggende dai tratti calunniosi, come un eretico e un mago; il secondo presentato, al pari di Maome-to, come una prefigurazione dell’Anticristo ma, a differenza
del suo nobile predecessore, passato gradualmente a simbolo di ogni virtù di cortesia ed eroe di tolleranza.

Tutto questo servirà, in ogni caso, a far crescere l'interesse scientifico verso la cultura araba veicolata dall'islam, che sfocerà nel primo tentativo di traduzione del Corano da parte dell'equipe coordinata da Pietro il Venerabile, e di molti testi islamologici e filosofici che costituiscono per tutto il Medioevo la base di un rinnovato approccio e la migliore fonte della conoscenza dell'islam. La voga d'Oriente nell'Europa medievale comporta, però, molti paradossi: espressione di bisogni intellettuali e richieste commerciali, essa convive con le continue riprese dell'idea di crociata, e non sa liberarsene, tanto che gli europei si trovano nella scomoda situazione di chi ama e sogna continuamente il suo nemico. Questa situazione ambigua e paradossale, lungi dall'essere innocua, produrrà lungo i secoli successivi l'emergere di un progetto politico europeo che identifica in una unità di fatto una terra, un popolo e la sua religione, trasformando l'idea di crociata in guerra di difesa europea contro l'espansismo turco e ottomano. La letteratura, ancora una volta, veicolerà le immagini che durante tutto il periodo del Rinascimento e oltre, serviranno a ridefinire e identificare il pericoloso numero uno della cultura europea: il "turco", l'"infedele", il "saraceno", facendone dei simboli e bersagli pure nel folklore e nelle tradizioni popolari. "Il nemico della croce, indicato ormai anche come nemico dell'Europa, occupava così con naturalezza anche i ruoli di nemico metafisico e di nemico ludico; e la sua presenza diventava anche nell'immaginario collettivo incombinato e familiare al tempo stesso" (p. 212). Sarà la Riforma, secondo l'A., impegnata in una dura polemica tra i cristiani, a produrre inaspettatamente un risultato nuovo attraverso un deciso impulso alla valutazione positiva dell'islam che, a lungo andare, porterà al superamento degli schemi mentali e militari della crociata e al nascere della cultura orientalistica. Le opposte passioni cattoliche e protestanti, che si traducevano ora in emulazione sul piano dello slancio crociato, ora in accuse reciproche di filoislamilsmo, si intrecciano nello sviluppo di una islamistica e di una arabistica che troveranno nel XVII secolo una sistemazione scientifica vera e propria protraendosi fino all'epoca moderna.

Questa storia di relazioni sofferte e di tensioni belliche, secondo l'Autore, va interpretata e capita anche attraverso la storia dei movimenti commerciali. "Se i mercanti occidentali potevano liberamente circolare per il dar al-Islam, lo stesso non potevano fare almeno fino al XVI secolo – ma poco anche in seguito – i mercanti musulmani nel dar al-Harb" (p. 276). Un'affermazione, questa, che meriterebbe più che un approfondimento e un'attenta analisi mancanente nel libro. Così come la ricerca di una risposta al perché, nelle varie ondate di conqui-
sta dell'impero arabo-musulmano prima e dei turchi ottomani, dopo, i nuovi dominatori non ebbero mai cura di imparare l'idioma delle nuove popolazioni conquistate: un dato di fatto che potrebbe aiutare a capire la storica mancanza di interesse verso la cultura occidentale in generale, e il cristianesimo in particolare. Nell'analisi storica dell'Autorre, che si protrae fino agli ultimi decenni, non vi è alcun accenno ai nuovi sviluppi teologici e pastorali della Chiesa del dopo-Concilio riguardo al dialogo con l'Islam, ciò che, invece, viene fatto per le epoche precedenti, forse perché più ammiccanti... Queste "malinteso" storico si porrebbe, dunque, solo da parte del "mondo occidentale cristiano" continuamente minacciato dal mondo islamico? Una risposta affermativa potrebbe dare la sensazione di una lettura storica quantomeno unilaterale e ambigua, anche perché le pagine della storia recente, sia ecclesiastica quanto politica, dell'Occidente come del vicino e medio Oriente, ci offrono ulteriori spunti di lettura e di analisi di questo dato storico ormai millenario.

GIAMBATTISTA MAFFI


Nel testo Dal tribale al globale è evidente fin dalle prime pagine il progetto degli autori, secondo i quali "l'antropologia è uno strumento indispensabile per comprendere il mondo attuale" (p. ix). Questo lavoro, infatti, valorizza la portata critica della disciplina rispetto al tema dell'incontro con l'altro, campo specifico della prospettiva antropologica, oggi non più circoscritto al solo impegno scientifico. Simbolo del nostro tempo, il concetto di alterità riassume le connotazioni di un mondo caratterizzato dalla mobilità umana, dove l'incontro tra le diversità culturali, che si realizza quotidianamente in ogni contesto sociale, costituisce la base dei processi socioculturali contemporanei.

Gli argomenti affrontati sono stati suddivisi in tre sezioni che facilitano la fruizione del volume. La prima parte, "Il sapere della differenza", propone una articolazione di temi, concetti e metodologie, necessaria premessa per introdurre il lettore in un ambito disciplinare specifico qual è il settore antropologico. In questa sezione, quindi, è possibile trovare i riferimenti epistemologici indispensabili per la comprensione di concetti quali l'etnocentrismo e il relativismo culturale, nonché le necessarie definizioni del concetto antropologico di cultura, del folklore, della stessa antropologia. Un'ampia pagina teorica, inoltre, che attraversa tutto il Novecento, si snoda su uno degli interrogativi classici dell'antropologia: il "perché" della differenza.
Questa sezione si conclude con un capitolo dedicato al tema della "rappresentazione", aspetto problematico della relazione tra oggetto di ricerca e descrizione etnografica dell'alterità, analizzato dal dibattito antropologico recente. Momento culminante della ricerca, infatti, la scrittura antropologica "rappresenta" la realtà culturale osservata, risultato dell'incontro etnografico tra universi di significati.

La seconda parte del testo è dedicata al discorso sulle metodologie di ricerca, affrontato partendo da una panoramica storica sui diversi approcci metodologici propri di ciascuna corrente antropologica. Questo aspetto della disciplina ha visto l'affermazione progressiva della "ricerca sul campo" come momento fondamentale dell'indagine antropologica. Nel testo, quindi, sono messi in luce gli aspetti problematici dell'osservazione diretta, teorizzata da Malinowski negli anni '20, specie in relazione al tema della rappresentazione dell'alterità precedentemente delineato. Un intero capitolo della seconda sezione, infatti, è dedicato alla "magia etnografica" (p. 116) di B. Malinowski che ha influito profondamente sull'opera di molte generazioni di antropologi. Con il metodo dell'osservazione partecipante, attraverso cui l'antropologo doveva interagire con il proprio oggetto di studio, era possibile, secondo Malinowski, immergersi empaticamente nel contesto sociale osservato, per raggiungere una conoscenza scientifica, oggettiva e totale della popolazione studiata. L'inizio del declino dell'impostazione metodologica malinowskiana, negli anni '60, derivato indirettamente proprio dallo stesso Malinowski, determina l'avvio alla nuova impostazione della disciplina ed alle svolte teoriche contemporanee. A questo proposito vengono delineate nel testo le linee teoriche attraverso cui l'antropologia ha indagato in modo critico su se stessa, aprendo il campo, come efficacemente evidenziano gli autori, ad uno dei più fondamentali momenti di riflessione antropologica.

Con la terza parte, "Il traffico delle culture", il presente lavoro si addentra nel progetto precedentemente accennato, ovvero quello di sottolineare l'efficacia conoscitiva e l'utilità teorico-pratica della prospettiva antropologica rispetto alle dinamiche socioculturali contemporanee. In questa sezione, quindi, vengono presentate le "sintesi culturali" proprie del nostro tempo, le "culture ibride" e il "pensiero metrico, risultato di incontri culturali tra "individui e gruppi con storie, memorie, conoscenze, e identità diverse [...]" (p. 165). I flussi di "persone, beni e informazioni" (p. 184) evidenziano e creano intrecci culturali sempre più complessi e sollevano problematiche nuove legate alla necessità di ripensare il rapporto stesso tra culture. Inoltre, secondo gli autori, l'antropologia culturale si configura come un "pensiero metrico", poiché "nasce nell'incontro fra la tradizione culturale di chi la pratica e la tradizione, il pensiero
di coloro che costituiscono l’oggetto di quella pratica” (p. 166). Questo permette di pensare l’antropologia come un sapere di “frontiera”, come uno strumento efficace per la comprensione del “traffico delle culture” (idem). In un sistema globale in cui si delineano “nuove nozioni per nuove realtà” (p. 170), i rapporti tra culture, che spesso sottintendono rapporti di forza, obbligano ad una riflessione sulla nozione stessa di cultura, non essendo più sostenibili idee di “purezza” e di autenticità culturale. Tensioni contrarie, inoltre, quali omogeneizzazione culturale planetaria e difesa di particolarismi culturali locali, hanno sollevato problematiche nuove nell’ambito dell’analisi dei rapporti tra identità ed alterità. In una realtà sempre più contrassegnata dal paradigma migratorio, infatti, concetti quali migrante, straniero, identità, appartenenza, sono soggetti ad una riletitura critica che evidenzia il carattere processuale e contingente della loro definizione. Due concetti legati tra loro, delocalizzazione e deteriorizzazione, sottolineano, nel percorso teorico presentato, la novità nella definizione degli scenari culturali contemporanei. La nozione di “mimosi” culturale, infine, è usata per esprimere processi di “adeguamento” culturale o di “imitazione” che scaturiscono dal contatto tra universi simbolici. Il testo si conclude con una riflessione sui temi della modernizzazione e della globalizzazione e del loro rapporto con i sistemi culturali tradizionali e con l’elaborazione del sentimento di identità. A questo proposito, esempi classici della letteratura antropologica contribuiscono a definire i contorni dei fenomeni di resistenza culturale al processo di occidentalizzazione, alcuni dei quali esemplificano lo stesso concetto di mimesi precedentemente trattato.

Attraverso un percorso che, implicitamente, sottolinea il rapporto con le altre scienze sociali, il presente lavoro riesce, con la chiarezza di un manuale, a delineare una panoramica sulle acquisizioni teoriche dell’antropologia. Inoltre, per la sua impostazione e per le scelte tematiche operate dagli autori, questo testo si rivela di indubbia utilità per tutti coloro che necessitano di avvalersi del contributo antropologico per approfondire la lettura dei fenomeni culturali attuali.

Valeria Bruccola


Questo volume collettaneo, frutto di una ricerca coordinata a livello nazionale da G. Giorio del Dipartimento di Scienze dell’uomo dell’Università di Trieste, a cui hanno collaborato ri-
cercatori di università italiane e brasiliane, contiene alcuni saggi di premesse metodologiche, i resoconti di ricerche sul campo svolte in nove piccole comunità e, nella parte conclusiva, saggi che trattano di come i principi esposti possono essere messi in pratica per realizzare una nuova organizzazione statutaria.

Il libro va letto come un contributo sociologico al dibattito sui principi dell’organizzazione sociale ai tempi della post-modernità. Per il lettore è importante sapere che gli autori sono in sintonia con l’approccio comunitarista, di cui il più autorevole esponente è il filosofo canadese Ch. Taylor. Volendo prendere in prestito la terminologia della filosofia del linguaggio, possiamo dire che per il comunitarismo un forte rapporto affettivo con i ‘giochi linguistici’ pubblici, che formano la morale sociale, esiste solo nel caso in cui essi siano confermati da una comunicazione intersoggettiva, diretta e costante, che tocchi tutti i livelli di una civiltà: materiale, valoriale e simbolico. Ciò significa rimanere legati ad un ambito locale ed esaltare i processi diretti di inculturazione, a partire da quelli che avvengono all’interno della famiglia. Questo approccio comporta inoltre un preciso modo di intendere il rapporto fra classi dirigenti e gruppi diretti, fra centri e periferie, in cui i primi non solo non devono soffocare le identità periferiche, ma hanno il compito di promuovere in tutti i modi possibili la loro fortificazione.

Per gli autori la parola-chiave per realizzare questi obiettivi è “partecipazione”, ossia l’impegno di singoli in progetti finalizzati a beneficiare la comunità nel suo insieme. Tutto quel/l’universo costituito dal volontariato, dal cooperativismo e dall’associazionismo (il terzo settore) è visto come chiave di volta per rinvigorire il senso di appartenenza ad una comunità vitale: la sua funzione è fondamentale non tanto per i miglioramenti materiali che inevitabilmente apporta (si pensi anche solo ai servizi di assistenza alle persone), quanto piuttosto per la sua attitudine a rinsaldare i vincoli solidaristici.

L’attenzione al locale non significa cedere alla tentazione dei localismi. La presa di distanza è netta ed esplicita: “Non si tratta, pertanto, di ovvie o banali annotazioni circa la pur risaputa ripresa di formule localistiche, più o meno interpreti di presunte superate tradizioni, quanto piuttosto di prese d’atto di aspetti sociologici ineludibili, per molti versi espressione di analisi innovative rispetto a letture statiche di dati statisticosociali non adeguatamente interpretati” (p. 32).

Un’adeguata interpretazione di questi ultimi, invece, porterebbe a spingersi molto in avanti circa le autonomie locali, fino ad immaginare un mondo in cui “[...] le isole [non solo in senso fisico, ‘bensì come spazio fisico o socio-culturale chiaramente identificabile rispetto agli spazi circostanti’] coprono la terra come un manto e che a ogni chiazza corrisponde un’isola che si interseca, si affianca, si sovrappongono ad altre isole. [...] La mag-
gior autoreferenzialità al proprio interno (che richiede autonoma e capacità attiva di autogoverno, ma che non si esaurisce in assolutizzante auto-orientamento), non significa separatezza ed estraneazione: anche se spesso si usano i due termini come sostanziali sinonimi, ‘insularità’ non va mai confuso con ‘isolamento’” (p. 158).

Da quanto detto, non è difficile capire perché la ricerca sul campo abbia privilegiato piccole comunità periferiche e non luoghi di amministrazione del potere centrale, e perché l’oggetto dell’osservazione siano state le interazioni sinergiche fra i processi di inculturazione e il grado di partecipazione dei singoli ai progetti a vantaggio della comunità. Il tentativo è di dimostrare che, tendenzialmente, l’ove si ha cura dell’organizzazione sociale tradizionale, vi è una maggiore vigoria del sentimento di appartenenza e prendono corpo più iniziative frutto di partecipazione gratuita.

“E la Francia?”, ossia cosa ne è del paradigma della cultura nazionale che assimila i nuovi figli? A questa domanda fornisce una risposta il saggio di F. Lazzari il quale, dai nuovi studi sull’immigrazione italiana in Francia, rileva che anche nel paese transalpino non si è verificata quasi mai l’assimilazione dei singoli nella nuova società, ma si è avuta una lenta adesione delle comunità immigrate, che hanno ricreato e riproposto gli stilemi della civiltà dei luoghi di provenienza. Anche in una realtà a forte identità nazionale, come quella francese, non si può non tenere conto delle resistenze dei nuovi arrivati e delle potenzialità che proprio tali resistenze rappresentano per un inserimento di successo.

Ci si chiederà ‘come’ una rivoluzione di tale portata possa essere acquisita da organizzazioni statuali che, fatte salve le molte differenze, adottano i principi dell’accorpamento centrale, e dell’omogeneizzazione. La chiave di volta è vista nel principio di sussidiarietà. Nel suo saggio, Ivo Colozzi fa giustizia della vulgata diffusa dai mezzi di comunicazione di massa, che propongono la sussidiarietà come una variante delle teorie liberistiche più estreme, al fine strumentale di risolvere i problemi di bilancio. Una sussidiarietà correttamente intesa tiene conto in particolare di due regole: quella per cui le istituzioni centrali non devono intervenire dove le comunità periferiche possono fare da sole; e quella che vede come compito inerogabile delle istituzioni centrali stimolare l’autonomia delle comunità locali, rifiutandosi di intervenire qualora si ritenga che la richiesta di aiuto non sia dovuta a reali carenze, ma a calcoli di opportunismo e a deroghe di responsabilità. Non quindi uno stato ridotto al minimo, ma uno stato capace di farsi promotore di autonomia.

Ciro Mazzotta
La globalizzazione delle società e il multiculturalismo crescono nel mondo contemporaneo, mentre moltiplicano le occasioni di incontro tra diverse culture e tradizioni religiose, al tempo stesso sono occasioni di scontro e di prese di posizione inconciliabili, in difesa dei propri confini identitari. All'interno di tale scenario, l'autore si sofferma ad analizzare, dal punto di vista sociologico, un aspetto fondamentale della crisi contemporanea: quello del rapporto tra le principali tradizioni religiose, che rappresentano, per la maggioranza dei popoli, l'orizzonte etico e del pensiero entro cui sviluppare azioni e comportamenti.

Pur nella consapevolezza che qualunque analisi della società è inizialmente dai paradigmi conoscitivi della cultura di appartenenza che, pertanto, soprattutto in sociologia, non si può rivendicare un'oggettività scientifica, l'A. tenta di offrire una prospettiva che apre verso la comprensione dei fenomeni che caratterizzano il XXI secolo, e di animare il dibattito sul futuro dell'umanità: l'interrogativo di fondo è come sia possibile che le diverse tradizioni religiose e laiche possano coesistere pacificamente sul pianeta?

Per rispondere a tale domanda Kurtz parte dall'analisi che, nel corso della storia, i sociologi hanno fatto della religione e della sua funzione nella vita dei popoli. Non è compito dei sociologi rispondere agli interrogativi sul significato ultimo della vita, né esprimere giudizi in merito alla verità o falsità delle diverse tradizioni religiose: a loro spetta piuttosto prendere in esame come queste problematiche sono state affrontate e incarnate nelle società umane. In tale direzione, l'autore delinea, nei primi capitoli, le credenze, i rituali e le principali istituzioni di ciascuna delle maggiori religioni nel mondo, le cosiddette religioni universalì: il Hinduismo, il Buddhismo, l'Ebraismo, il Cristianesimo e l'Islam. L'assunto di partenza è che le tradizioni religiose non sono sistemi di credenze statici, ma dinamici, che si sviluppano attraverso processi di nascita e caduta delle civiltà e, soprattutto, di contatti di una civiltà con un'altra.

Successivamente, l'A. mette a confronto le religioni esistenti, sulla base anche della letteratura sociologica, giungendo a definire tre punti: la religione è un fenomeno sociale, che nasce e agisce sulla vita associata del popolo che ne è partecipe; ogni tradizione religiosa contiene un sistema di credenze, che è influenzato e sostenuto dai rituali e dalle istituzioni; ogni tradizione stabilisce un'etica religiosa, che definisce i confini tra comportamenti accettabili e inaccettabili, legittima l'ordine sociale e fornisce linee di condotta per la vita quotidiana.

Nel corso della storia, le rivoluzioni politiche e culturali hanno creato situazioni critiche tali da costituire una minaccia
per la sopravvivenza delle tradizioni religiose consolidate. Uno di questi eventi è rappresentato dal modernismo: l’avvento della scienza moderna e il moltiplicarsi dei contatti tra culture diverse hanno reso possibile la conoscenza di altre visioni del mondo, sfidando le credenze tradizionali. In seguito, lo sviluppo esponenziale dei rapporti tra Paesi e società e la costituzione del cosiddetto villaggio globale ha portato a situazioni tra loro apparentemente contraddittorie: da un lato, ha favorito il riven
talizzarsi di tradizioni antiche e dei fondamentalismi e, conseguentemente, la chiusura difensiva sulla propria identità religiosa; dall’altro, ha consentito il diffondersi di “nuove religioni”, anche di matrice ideologica, e a sincretismi religiosi.

Il volume è un significativo strumento di analisi e di riflessione non solo sul ruolo delle religioni, nell’era della globalizzazione, ma anche sul rapporto che intercorre tra religione e conflitto sociale, una sfida che caratterizza in modo crescente il mondo contemporaneo. Le religioni costituiscono una risorsa fondamentale, e consentono, se non strumentalizzate, di affrontare e gestire i molteplici conflitti secondo logiche di non violenza, promuovendo forme di coesistenza pacifica. Nella capacità di individuare e precisare i termini di tale rapporto risiede il valore e l’utilità del presente volume.

Anna Maria Passaseo


Se tutti i musulmani riconoscono nel Corano il proprio libro sacro, la pluralità degli Islam si manifesta in molti modi, non solo nella divisione tra sunniti e sciiti, ma anche nelle differenze storiche e linguistiche. L’appartenenza all’Islam infatti non ha storicamente impedito divisioni all’interno del mondo musulmano, per motivi dottrinali, politici, etnici, nazionali (fattori tra loro da sempre strettamente connessi), né ha precluso situazioni di sopraffazione ed oppressione, o viceversa di ribellione e di riscatto, sempre per gli stessi motivi. Esiste una reale e complessa differenziazione nazionale ed etnica all’interno del mondo musulmano e proprio all’analisi degli elementi che hanno portato a tante diverse realtà è rivolto il lavoro di M. Ly.

L’A., che si pone nell’ottica marxista rivoluzionaria con un atteggiamento critico nei confronti della religione, esamina la genesi dei movimenti radicali contemporanei partendo dal rapporto tra religione e potere e dal grado di rispondenza tra quanto prescritto e quanto datosi storicamente. Il Corano e la *sunnah* costituiscono le fonti del buon governo della comunità dei credenti e stabiliscono il primato dei fattori religiosi su quelli politici. Le prerogative della guida della comunità sono anch’es-
se chiaramente definite: Dio è la guida suprema della comunità e l'unico a poter legiferare, e chi governa ha come compito fondamentale quello di far rispettare la legge islamica (shari'ah).

La mancanza di criteri precisi di carattere dottrinale al tempo della successione di Muhammad ha portato al prevalere della ragion di stato e la questione della guida della comunità, dalla morte del Profeta fino al consolidarsi della posizione di Mu'awiya (fondatore della dinastia Omayyade), venne assunta e sciolta come una questione di conquista e di mantenimento del potere, risolta fondamentalmente in termini politici e militari. Tra l'altro le vicende legate alla successione furono la causa delle due prime e più rilevanti scissioni nella storia dell'Islam. Proprio in queste vicende e nei nodi a cui rimandavano erano contenute le premesse di una storia complessa e contraddittoria dell'Islam e delle aree in cui si è radicato. La politica, alla fine, prevale sulla dottrina, in netto contrasto con il dettato coranico e con la tradizione di Muhammad.

Secondo il nostro autore tale ribaltamento della gerarchia segnò la realtà, l'evoluzione ed il volto del mondo musulmano. Le contraddizioni che erano maturate nei secoli all'interno della comunità dei credenti musulmani assunsero risvolti decisivi nel XIX secolo, in seguito allo scontro con l'imperialismo.

Il periodo di crisi che a partire dal XVIII secolo determinò il processo di declino e di decadenza del mondo islamico vide nasce una corrente riformista che però non fu in grado di sciogliere la contraddizione; al massimo i riformisti si fecero promotori della modernizzazione delle istituzioni e non vi fu, fino all'abolizione dell'Impero ottomano, una significativa contestazione del potere che, pur utilizzando la religione e trovando in essa la sua legittimità, era chiaramente sovrapposto e non sottomesso alla stessa.

In effetti l'inseparabilità tra religione e politica o religione e stato, in un binomio in cui il primo fattore aveva la supremazia assoluta, non venne praticamente mai messa in discussione fino agli inizi del XX secolo. Fu la storia a sciogliere la questione sancendo la separazione tra stato e religione come avvenne nella Turchia di Atatürk.

Altra corrente di pensiero fu quella dell'islamismo radicale, inteso come riproposizione del carattere globale e totalizzante dell'Islam e come impegno militante per farne la base esclusiva dell'ordinamento sociale. Dopo aver analizzato la svolta iraniana ed alcune situazioni complesse, quali quella algerina e palestinese, nelle quali agiscono organizzazioni islamiste, l'autore evidenzia le differenze esistenti tra queste ed altre formazioni, a volte compresenti nelle stesse realtà sociali.

Il primato assoluto e discriminante attribuito al credo non permette di assumere criticamente e ancora meno di risolvere autenticamente la questione etnica o quella nazionale, né quelle
legate all’antagonismo di classe o al rapporto tra stato e società civile, per non parlare della contrarietà di genere. L’impossibilità dottrinale di recepire e risolvere, da parte dell’Islam e dell’islamismo, simili contraddizioni è rafforzata dal fatto che non vengono messe in discussione le basi materiali dell’esistente e i suoi baluardi, le radici dell’oppressione e dello sfruttamento.

Coerentemente con il proprio punto di vista, l’A. ritiene che una prospettiva di liberazione potrebbe essere rappresentata dal socialismo. Il testo, in definitiva, offre diversi spunti di analisi interessanti, con una inedita, ancorché “schiaccata”, chiave di lettura.

Anna Maria Martelli


Il volume, curato da Bruno Nascimbene, raccoglie i contributi di giusti, ricercatori ed avvocati sulla disciplina dell’allontanamento e della detenzione degli stranieri nei 15 Stati membri dell’Unione. Ad ogni Paese è dedicato un capitolo suddiviso in diverse sezioni relative ai vari aspetti dell’allontanamento e delle singole misure nelle quali esso si articolà, e cioè i presupposti dei provvedimenti, il trattamento dei soggetti destinatari, l’esecuzione e le garanze assicurate. I rapporti offrono anche una sintesi della politica migratoria adottata dai diversi Paesi che permette di contestualizzare l’istituto nella più ampia disciplina legislativa che lo comprende, cogliendone la filosofia di fondo. L’ultimo capitolo, scritto dallo stesso Nascimbene e da Alessia Di Pasquale, contiene la sintesi di tutta la ricerca ripercorrendo le sezioni, tracciando le linee di tendenza ed evidenziandone analogie e differenze. Come i due autori rilevano, le differenze sono ancora prevalenti rispetto alle analogie, nonostante in tutti i Paesi siano in vigore le medesime convenzioni internazionali.

Il volume è pensato soprattutto per coloro che si occupano a vari titolo di politiche europee in materia di immigrazione e asilo. Lo stesso legislatore comunitario vi troverà una chiara sintesi delle singole legislazioni nazionali delle quali dovrà necessariamente tener conto in fase di elaborazione di una normativa europea in materia di allontanamento come previsto dal Titolo IV del Trattato sulla Comunità europea (si veda anche la Comunicazione su una politica comune in materia di immigrazione illegale, COM (2001) 672 del 15/11/2001, par. 4.8). Ad oggi, a meno di due anni dalla scadenza del termine voluto dal Trattato di Amsterdam per la realizzazione dello spazio di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia, il legislatore comunitario si è limitato ad

Ma questo volume non deve essere considerato come diretto esclusivamente a chi si occupa di politiche europee. Al contrario, ogni aspetto preso in esame nei singoli rapporti nazionali ci offre nuovi strumenti per misurare e valutare il contenuto della legislazione italiana e può costituire un punto di partenza per ulteriori analisi e riflessioni. Guardando la disciplina italiana in chiave comparativa, riusciamo meglio a comprendere le fattispecie che la legislazione si propone di regolare e ad ipotizzare soluzioni alternative valutandone i pregi e le debolezze. Per questo è interessante leggere anche il rapporto sulla legislazione italiana che, collocato nel contesto europeo, ci consente di capire meglio il funzionamento degli istituti nazionali, di tornare alla sostanza ed alla ratio delle misure e a valutare con strumenti più adeguati la correttezza delle scelte compiute.

Constatare, come si ricava dai 15 rapporti, che, di fronte a comuni esigenze, i Paesi europei hanno elaborato risposte diverse fra le quali è impossibile individuare la soluzione “migliore”, dovrebbe costituire già un dato su cui riflettere in particolar modo oggi che il legislatore nazionale si appresta all’ennesima modifica della legislazione sull’immigrazione, ancora una volta intervenendo sull’espulsione. Ci si accorgerebbe che introducendo misure quali la generalizzazione dell’esecuzione immediata dell’espulsione e il prolungamento del periodo consentito di detenzione potrebbe non portare i risultati attesi in termini d’efficacia dell’allontanamento, mentre costituirebbe certamente una restrizione ulteriore del diritto alla libertà personale, giustificata in nome di preminenti esigenze di tutela dell’ordine e della sicurezza pubblici. E, infatti, un dato estremamente significativo che tutti gli autori non abbiano potuto dare una risposta precisa alla questione loro rivolta sull’efficacia delle misure adottate. L’efficacia è il nodo cruciale della disciplina dell’allontanamento e, per conseguirla, gli Stati hanno predisposto misure di esecuzione molto rigide che comportano la priva-
zione della libertà personale attraverso il trattenimento in centri speciali (Italia, Francia, Spagna, Belgio) o la detenzione nelle carceri (in quasi tutti gli altri Paesi) o, addirittura, in entrambe tali strutture (come nel Regno Unito).

Forse i rapporti potevano soffermarsi maggiormente sul tema connesso degli ostacoli incontrati nell'esecuzione dell'espulsione e degli strumenti adottati per superarli, sottolineando il positivo ruolo che in questo senso possono svolgere gli accordi di riammissione. A questo riguardo il volume denota come il numero degli accordi conclusi vari significativamente da Paese a Paese. Diverse sono anche le aree geografiche verso le quali si sono rivolti i singoli Stati in relazione all'origine dei flussi migratori. L'azione dell'Unione, finalizzata alla conclusione di tali accordi a livello europeo, se pur sino ad oggi scarsamente efficace, contribuirà a rendere omogeneo questo settore delle relazioni esterne degli Stati così rilevante per la politica migratoria in generale e in special modo per l'esecuzione dei provvedimenti di allontanamento.

Infine se, da una parte, questo volume costituisce un contributo per la conoscenza reciproca degli ordinamenti, passaggio necessario per la costruzione di un autentico spazio europeo di libertà, sicurezza e giustizia, dall'altra, proprio perché esplicita le differenze, dà anche la misura delle difficoltà che devono essere superate per vincere questa cruciale ed ennesima sfida che oggi l'Europa si trova ad affrontare.

Chiara Favilli


Come lo stesso A. precisa, l'opera, divisa in tre volumi, non intende essere né un'analisi scientifica, né una ricostruzione storica dell'emigrazione italiana in Germania. Conceputa come un "viaggio", un "itinerario" attraverso le dimensioni socio-economiche, culturali e religiose del fenomeno, questa raccolta consiste in una rielaborazione e riproposizione di contributi già apparsi in precedenti pubblicazioni (dagli anni '70 ad oggi), frutto della lunga esperienza dell'A., missionario scalabriniano in Germania ed in Svizzera. L'eterogeneità delle problematiche affrontate e la loro organizzazione per tematiche conferisce all'opera un carattere antologico e di summa, consentendo un rie-
same delle questioni inerenti non solo all’emigrazione degli italiani in Germania, ma al vissuto dell’emigrazione in generale e alle istanze che la realtà multiculturale pone in tutti gli ambiti, in particolare in quello ecclesiale. L’accostamento di diversi “frammenti” di esperienza di emigrazione, nonché la molteplicità contestualizzata storica, sociale, culturale e religiosa, determina una pedagogica ridondanza dei principali nodi problematici: essi ricorrono inesorabilmente nel testo proprio perché in parte tuttora irrisolti, oltre che riferibili ad altri contesti attuali, non ultimo quello che vede l’Italia paese d’immigrazione.

Nel primo volume, prima di volgersi alla specifica situazione degli italiani in Germania, l’A. affronta la realtà dell’emigrazione come variabile fondamentale e strutturale degli equilibri, o meglio degli squilibri, economico-sociali a livello mondiale. L’emigrazione è presentata non come un problema da affrontare in modo settoriale, esclusivamente in termini di politiche migratorie o di ordine pubblico, ma come un fatto necessariamente globale: “Ad un processo di sempre più ampia diffusione dei valori occidentali, che riducono la distanza culturale tra le regioni del mondo, si contrappone dunque un crescente divario di sviluppo che esprime la distanza strutturale tra ricchi e poveri”. Infatti, dall’analisi dei maggiori flussi internazionali e delle cause della scelta migratoria (economiche, politiche, ecologiche) emerge, non ultimo, il motivo della “globalizzazione” del mercato del lavoro. Per quanto riguarda l’Europa, il rovescio della medaglia dell’accordo di Schengen, che sancisce l’effettiva libera circolazione delle persone, è rappresentato dalla tendenza a costituire una “fortezza” protetta, aperta solo a quanti sono momentaneamente richiesti dal mercato del lavoro interno.

Ad un excursus storico, che vede la Germania evolversi da paese di emigrazione a paese d’immigrazione, segue un’analisi della situazione degli italiani in uno Stato che, nonostante i suoi sette milioni di stranieri, solo alle soglie del 2000 ha riconosciuto pubblicamente di essere un “paese d’immigrazione”. A lungo considerato un ospite di passaggio (si pensi al termine Gastarbeiter, letteralmente “lavoratore ospite”), per il quale spesso ancora oggi l’integrazione è ritenuta “utile, ma non indispensabile”, l’immigrato viene di fatto privato di molti diritti: “l’eliminazione delle frontiere economiche, ma non di quelle politiche”, sostiene l’Autore, “consente ai lavoratori di spostarsi in Europa, solo però in quanto forza lavoro e non come titolari di diritti politici e sindacali”. Privato della propria dimensione sociale ed escluso da tutto quanto non riguardi il suo ruolo produttivo, all’immigrato si concede facile accesso solo all’omologante sfera dei consumi, sperando che così “restituisca” parte di quanto guadagnato. Per gli italiani in Germania, il conseguimento del potere d’acquisto si prospetta come unica fonte di risacca della scelta di emigrazione e come difesa dal sentimento di precarie-
tà, determinando quello che l’Autore definisce “riduzionismo delle aspirazioni”. Le conseguenze di questo atteggiamento sono molteplici: dopo aver effettuato un panorama del sistema scolastico tedesco, denunciando l’eccessiva selettività che marginalizza le fasce sociali deboli, Angelo Negrini riconosce come una delle cause principali dell’enorme insuccesso scolastico e del mancato conseguimento della formazione professionale degli italiani in Germania, proprio il “riduzionismo delle aspirazioni”. Unitamente ai retaggi di una cultura subalternata di provenienza, ulteriormente svalutata perché poco funzionale nella società industriale, questo atteggiamento porta a non riconoscere la scuola come strumento di promozione sociale. La rassegnazione a ricoprire un ruolo subalterno anche nel nuovo paese ostacola l’emanzipazione dall’assistenzialismo e l’acquisizione di competenze politico-sociali, impedendo non solo la quotidiana lotta per la difesa dei propri diritti, ma anche un progetto di integrazione, inteso come “partecipazione libera e attiva”, premessa indispensabile all’affermazione di qualsiasi identità.

Nel secondo volume Negrini affronta il tema dell’incontro tra diverse culture ed sostiene la necessità di un progetto politico finalizzato alla creazione di un’Europa interculturale. Sebbene pronta all’internazionalizzazione in campo economico, l’Europa è infatti arroccata in un egocentrismo culturale dove il multiculturalismo, “è tuttora una semplice situazione di fatto, non costituisce ancora un progetto e non si è ancora trasformato in una precisa proposta politica; è, molto semplicemente, il risultato di precedenti storici”. Per questo motivo l’A. propone un’educazione interculturale che abbia come obiettivo la “preparazione all’esistenza in una società multietnica”, ovvero fornire una “competenza interculturale”, che renda capaci di muoversi “tra le culture accettando la diversità negli altri e in se stessi”. A questo scopo serve nella scuola una nuova pedagogia interculturale che tenga conto dei rapporti di forza dai quali è scaturita la società multietnica. Per ottenere la non servono speciali decreti, ma la “presenza di alunni stranieri sostenuti da famiglie coscienti che la loro lingua e cultura d’origine è un patrimonio da non sprecare”. Questo “curriculum interculturale nascosto” permette la valorizzazione dell’immigrato come “veicolo di cultura”.

Altre tematiche centrali sono la storia e l’evoluzione del concetto di razzismo e le motivazioni socio-economiche del rieffiorire della xenofobia nella Germania riunificata. Nel testo si esplorano a fondò anche le motivazioni della scarsa partecipazione in ambito associazionistico, essenzialmente dovuta alla mancanza di una tradizione e competenza politica della comunità italiana, nonché ad un atteggiamento di passiva fruizione dei servizi. Inoltre l’Autore non tralascia di esaminare i rapporti della comunità italiana con l’informazione.
Il terzo volume è dedicato alla Chiesa e l'emigrazione, in particolare alla sfida che le migrazioni pongono alle chiese locali. L'A. ripercorre la storia dell'immigrazione italiana in Germania e dei rapporti con la Chiesa tedesca, servendosi dei documenti d'archivio della *Charitasverband*, opportunamente integrati da quelli dei missionari dell'Opera Bonomelli. Particolare attenzione è data al ruolo della Chiesa locale nella società tedesca. Fortemente proiettata nel sociale ed impegnata nell'erogazione di servizi, questa Chiesa “secolarizzata” può lasciare sguardo all'immigrato italiano abituato ad una diversa esteriorizzazione del sentimento religioso. Di fronte ad una Chiesa percepita come “fredda” il rischio è rifugiarsi in una religiosità “popolare” che, estrapolata dal proprio contesto culturale e quindi sottratta alla possibilità di essere quotidianamente reinterpretata, può sfociare in mera manifestazione folcloristica.

La pastorale di emigrazione si trova di fronte a dei rischi: da un lato di diventare una pastorale parallela a quella della Chiesa locale; dall'altro di vedere le missioni ridotte ad una “stazione di servizio” per l'amministrazione dei sacramenti, senza evolversi in una vera comunità di fede, in grado di perdurare anche in assenza del missionario. Negrini non si limita ad auspicare l'integrazione delle comunità italiane nella Chiesa tedesca; egli propone di rifondare una comunità che consenta a tutti i fedeli di essere insieme nell'unica Chiesa: “Quando si danno comunità (scuole, paesi, parrocchie) formate per il 50-60% di immigrati non si può parlare di integrazione degli immigrati nella Chiesa locale, ma di unione, di comunione che assicuri a ciascuno il suo posto di reale partecipazione”. In questo senso, il progetto delle “unità pastorali”, partendo da una “spiritualità della situazione” che leggi la Chiesa alla realtà multiculturale del territorio, rende possibile vedere nei migranti “una presenza profetica nella Chiesa in Germania”. Profetica perché segnale di quelli che in realtà sono bisogni dell'intera società e soprattutto perché occasione per la Chiesa locale di diventare “segno della fondamentale unità del genere umano”, unità che si esprime nella pluralità dei linguaggi e delle culture.

ANGELO ROSSELLI


Il volume di Aurelio Pane e Salvatore Strozza presenta una documentata analisi della situazione dell'immigrazione in Campania affrontando non solo gli aspetti demografici ma anche quelli relativi al mercato del lavoro e ai processi di integra-
zione degli immigrati nella realtà campana. Esso si basa su un'attenta disamina dei dati statistici correnti e su un'indagine di campo svolta su un campione di immigrati residenti nella regione. Ne emerge un quadro molto variegato sia dal punto di vista dell'articolazione territoriale della presenza straniera, sia dal punto di vista dei diversi modi in cui l'esperienza migratoria è vissuta dalle comunità immigrate presenti nella regione. E tuttavia, pur all'interno di questa notevole variabilità, possono individuarsi connotazioni abbastanza specifiche di una sorta di modello campano dell'integrazione. Esse riguardano il ruolo svolto dagli immigrati nell'economia locale (in particolare la loro collocazione prevalente, ma non esclusiva, all'interno del settore informale dell'economia), i rami specifici di impiego, nonché il nesso tra queste variabili e le forme di insediamento.

Il volume si apre con una valutazione critica dell'entità numerica dell'immigrazione, individuandone e distinguendone la componente nota, cioè quella legale costituita dalle persone fornite di permesso di soggiorno, da quella definita illegale. Vengono utilizzati i metodi di stima usuali e il risultato porta a cifre – a mio avviso – convincenti. È presumibile che la bontà dei risultati a questo riguardo abbia origine anche nella conoscenza diretta del contesto sociale che gli studiosi hanno acquisito grazie alla ricerca di campo. Insomma il quadro relativo, riferito al 1998, alla vigilia dell'ultima ondata di regolarizzazione, è tutt'altro che drammatico. Ed è noto che con le nuove regolarizzazioni è in parte stata assorbita l'irregolarità, mentre ne è emersa una presenza ulteriore, valutabile intorno al 20%. La consistenza del fenomeno dunque è significativa, ma non smisurata. La questione della dimensione dell'immigrazione è di particolare rilievo in una regione come la Campania, dove la disoccupazione tocca punte molto elevate. E questo fa sorgere dei quesiti in merito alla collocazione degli immigrati nel mercato del lavoro. Gli autori scrivono: "La Campania sembra, a metà degli anni novanta, una regione che attrae soprattutto, ma non esclusivamente, stranieri immigrati in modo clandestino che trovano sul territorio regionale principalmente occasioni di lavoro «in nero» nell'economia irregolare" (p. 119). I settori specifici di impiego sono vari e non c'è una categoria lavorativa precisa che caratterizza l'occupazione informale. "Ma spesso è proprio al suo interno che si riscontra un alto grado di dinamicità e che si assiste alla creazione della maggior parte di nuovi posti di lavoro" (lb.).

La presenza immigrata nella regione è tutt'altro che omogenea e le stesse nazionalità presenti si distribuiscono in maniera diversa nelle due province di principale immigrazione (Caserta e Napoli), anche e soprattutto in rapporto alle specifiche caratteristiche della domanda di lavoro. Così "l'analisi mostra... l'esistenza di realtà piuttosto differenti nelle due provin-
cie considerate: rispetto all'area di Caserta, caratterizzata prevalentemente da una presenza africana in netta maggioranza maschile, occupata in agricoltura e industria, nel Napoletano si registra una presenza straniera decisamente più eterogenea" (p. 141). È nota, nel caso di Napoli così come nelle altre grandi città del Centro-Sud, la presenza significativa di donne occupate nell'area dei servizi alle persone, il cui lavoro supplese alle carenze del locale sistema di welfare.

Riassumendo i risultati della parte riguardante il mercato del lavoro, gli A. scrivono: "I risultati di questa prima analisi delle informazioni disponibili ribadiscono la chiara distinzione non solo tra una immigrazione recente, che vede coinvolti giovani stranieri, senza famiglia, senza permesso di soggiorno e dunque in condizioni ancora precarie, e una presenza straniera stabile, insediatisi in Italia da anni e che per questo ha potuto regularizzare la propria situazione, caratterizzata da condizioni di vita e di lavoro più favorevoli; i dati confermano l'esistenza di modelli femminili distinti da quelli maschili, che interessano donne quasi sempre occupate nei servizi domestici, giunte in Italia in periodi differenti ma seguendo percorsi sostanzialmente simili" (p. 142). Queste considerazioni appaiono condivisibili, come in generale il quadro che è presentato.

Come si è detto, tale quadro è costruito, oltre che sulla base dei dati statistici disponibili, anche sull'indagine di campo attraverso un questionario rivolto a 1139 stranieri provenienti da paesi poveri. E l'obiettivo dell'indagine diretta è molto ambizioso. Personalmente non mi sento di giudicare né l'effettiva rappresentatività del campione né la scelta degli indicatori. L'operazionalizzazione dei concetti e la scelta degli indicatori più opportuni per le varie dimensioni dei fenomeni che si stanno studiando è pratica sociologica molto complessa e non sempre i risultati sono convincenti. In parole povere si possono in generale avanzare seri dubbi sulla capacità di uno strumento del genere di mettere alla prova ipotesi relative a processi complessi come l'integrazione degli immigrati. E tuttavia, tralasciando ogni valutazione sulla correttezza metodologica, la individuazione della tipologia relativa alla condizione degli immigrati, condotta anche grazie al metodo delle corrispondenze multiple, risulta a mio parere accettabile. L'intreccio tra le variabili relative al radicamento sociale (esclusione/inclusione) e quelle relative alla dimensione economico-lavorativa e ai consumi portano all'emergere di sei gruppi (lavoratori marginali in area rurale, lavoratori marginali urbani, esclusi in area rurale, esclusi in area urbana, integrati e un gruppo particolare rappresentato dalle lavoratrici domestiche).

In conclusione, gli autori affrontano il rapporto tra successo nel processo di integrazione e durata dell'esperienza migratoria. Essi affermano che "dall'analisi realizzata sembra
che sia l’immigrazione riuscita a spingere al rientro in patria piuttosto che l’immigrazione fallita”. Questa considerazione è certamente basata su dati empirici. Tuttavia sarebbe rischiosa una generalizzazione ad altri contesti, ritenendo che si tratti di una regola costante. Come accennano gli autori stessi, sulla durata dell’esperienza incidono diverse variabili tra cui in primo luogo il progetto migratorio tipico degli immigrati di una determinata nazionalità (il modello migratorio) e le condizioni economiche e istituzionali del contesto di arrivo. Per alcune nazionalità – ove possibile – la stabilità rappresenta un obiettivo. Per altre, all’opposto, il modello postula comunque il ritorno a casa (per essere sostituiti eventualmente – come è nel caso dei senegalesi – da membri più giovani della famiglia).

I modelli migratori e le specificità dell’esperienza migratoria delle diverse nazionalità sono aspetti di grande rilievo per la comprensione della immigrazione italiana. Di questo gli autori sono certamente convinti, come mostrano i riferimenti alla tematica sparsi nel testo. Ma la metodologia da loro prescelta non permette di andare in profondità su questo tema. In compenso però il volume arricchisce la conoscenza della situazione dell’immigrazione in una delle aree più problematiche del paese dal punto di vista dell’occupazione e dello sviluppo economico. Gli autori individuano le difficoltà e le possibilità di integrazione in una regione dove gli immigrati hanno dovuto sempre misurarsi con clandestinità e precarietà diffusa.

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